The historiographic renovation on the nation in the late 20th century and the case of Catalonia

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ABSTRACT

This article considers the need, when studying nationalism, to combine the analysis of the particular case with the status of the issue in the analysis of the generic nation/nationalism which brings us to the historical time when the study is being conducted. What stands out currently is the importance of the historiographic renovation spearheaded by a group of historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists in the first half of the 1980s. And because of his popularity, E. Hobsbawm's contribution particularly stands out. In a complementary fashion, it also advances a hypothesis on the reasons behind this historiographic renovation. The last part of the article focuses on determining the effects this renovation had on analyses of Catalanism.

KEYWORDS: nation, nationalism, historiography, Hobsbawm, Catalanism

It seems logical that with regard to the study of the generic “nation – nationalism”, we begin by considering the relationships, similarities and interferences which may have existed on the international scene as well as those of a specific case, such as Catalonia, from the historiographic perspective of the Mediterranean periphery and the civic and political experience of an area like Catalonia, where the national factor has played and continues to play a crucial role in its historical dynamic and the definition of collective identities.¹

Given the nature of this issue and this comparative perspective in which the general and the particular mingle, it seems appropriate that we mention the attempt to define what can be considered the historical activity performed in the 1920s and 1930s by the great Dutch historian and thinker Johan Huizinga (1879-1945), another individual pursued by the Nazis. He starts with the striking statement that history is the form of the spirit with which a culture (civic body) realises its past with a style of its own; later he ventures to say that any history that has lost living contact with the national and international civic body, which does not take a passionate interest in the laypeople, cannot be a healthy history (he was obviously writing before the major crisis in historical reasoning that was sparked in post-modernity).²

The study of the “nation – nationalism” binary fully enters this exercise-challenge which Huizinga posed to historians, since it has always had to manoeuvre between particular and universal knowledge, between the specific and the abstract, between gathering specific data and theorisation. On the other hand, studying it depends more than other topics on the interpretative and evaluative demands that each civic body imposes and on the general ones determined by the historical dynamic.³

The perspective with which we can undertake the study of this issue is indebted to the era of the “ demonisation” of national issues, which started with the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazi-Fascist national socialisation. This inheritance, which is so difficult to forget, was more recently revamped thanks to the historical turning point of studies on the nation that appeared in the 1980s. And the figure and oeuvre of E. H. Hobsbawm stand out as its most internationally prominent face within this new era. Much of this capacity for impact comes from the publication of his three volumes on the “long 19th century”: The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 and The Age of Empire: 1875-1914. This was a publishing project from 1958 in which the books sought to address a broad audience. Subsequently, Hobsbawm completed the series with The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, which appeared in 1994 and generated at least one major academic controversy on the chronological limits of this century of upheaval.⁴

In those books devoted to the 19th century, this author spoke at length about the advent and development of the
modern national phenomenon as a positive historical force, viewing it, like the good Marxist he was, in relation to the consolidation of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. I do not believe that Hobsbawm could be regarded as an expert in the study of the national question until the 1980s.

We only know that in 1971 he participated in the macro-conference on national independence movements and the working classes in the 19th and 20th centuries, and that his speech highlighted the contrived language of national expressions, distinguishing between historical and non-historical nations (in a formulation that he seemed to be advancing in line with what would later be called the invention of the national tradition). Yet in the same talk he did not hesitate to stress how the essential aspects of historical analysis are the social and economic dynamics, and he cited the example of the contrast between agrarianism and industrialisation in the formulation of some national movements, specifically mentioning the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country within Spain.5

The scant importance that Hobsbawm attached to the contemporary national question can be explained by his human, intellectual and professional background. Born in Alexandria in 1917 to a British father (who died in 1929) and an Austrian mother (who died in 1931) – therefore, orphaned at the age of 14 after spending his childhood in Vienna within a Jewish family with German culture – he moved to Berlin where, as he claimed, he became a lifelong communist (1932). After the rise of Hitler and the law on boycotting Jewish businesses was enacted in 1933, the Hobsbawm family moved to London, and he started studying at Cambridge University in 1936. Therefore, we should note Hobsbawm’s status as a cosmopolitan Jew, as well as an orthodox Marxist who never broke with the British Communist Party even after the crises of 1956 and 1968. Despite this, in his fascinating “autobiography” (which he published at the age of 85), Hobsbawm presents himself with a much more expansive, heterodox image: he saw himself as an anti-specialist in a world (English-speaking) of specialists, as a polyglot cosmopolitan, as an intellectual who targeted much of his political and academic activity at non-intellectuals, and, for much of his life, as “an anomaly among the Communists themselves who, in turn, were a political minority in the countries I have known.”6 What is more, from his biography one can deduce the characteristics that any good historian should have: “To devote oneself to history it is essential to have mobility, the ability to observe and exploit a vast territory, that is, the ability to abandon the place where one has roots”. And he drove the point home by saying that anarchonism and provincialism are the two mortal sins of history, both of them due to an utter lack of knowledge about the way things are elsewhere, an ignorance – he said – that readings or the power of the imagination can rarely overcome: “The past lies in another country and its borders can only be crossed by the traveller”.7

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the cosmopolitan’s mistrust would be joined by that of the Marxist in his foresight with regard to a national phenomenon for which he has no interpretative schema beyond viewing it as the reflection of the bourgeois hegemony, mentioned above, which is expressed through the convergence between liberalism and capitalism and takes shape in the materialisation of the territorial nation-state.8 In his entire rich argumentation, Hobsbawm includes information whose scope and significance are uneven, referring to geographically quite remote cases to justify a single and rather linear argument. Yet he never ended up choosing between the supporters of the idea that a global explanation of the national phenomenon is possible and those who deny this possibility and only accept case-by-case studies. Likewise, he showed a great deal of confusion between aspirations for independence and ethnic particularisms and the (national and patriotic) will for power displayed by the states in this period. Nor does he thoroughly distinguish between the nation meant as a community of citizens with individual rights who are open and tolerant of differences (religious, political, ethnic, etc.) and organic and autonomous communities, and a closed society which superimposes itself over the individual and is expressed through a national rationale of state which transcends the individual interests and shows hierarchical social structures and authoritarian forms of power.

In any case, in all of these texts prior to the renovation in the 1980s, Hobsbawm does not show any interest in relating his analysis with the reflections on the nation and nationalism which were produced in Europe between World War I and the end of World War II, like the analyses offered by Meinecke, Croce, Kaegi, Huizinga, Namier and Chabod, to cite the most prominent. To be fair, however, we should also mention and consider the Marxist authors (Kautsky, Bauer, Lenin and Stalin) as well as the famous book by Georges Haupt, Michael Löwy and Claude Weill, Marxists and the National Question (1848-1914), published in Paris in 1974.

We have already said that Hobsbawm was one of the great historians of the 20th century; we should add that after he joined Cambridge he was a scholar who was perfectly cognizant of the dynamic of the profession. His position with regard to the major historiographic controversies was always highly considered, such as on the occasion of the bicentennial of the French Revolution and in relation to the national theme that concerns us in this paper, and with the new approaches taken in the 1980s. Hobsbawm explains how he mobilised against the revisionist campaign which was unleashed particularly in France on the occasion of the bicentennial of 1789, bowing to a postmodern vogue which, he claimed, ultimately reflected a counter-revolutionary ideology obsessed with diminishing the importance of the Revolution in contemporary history. He claimed that it was a major campaign which harnessed the mass media to attack and discredit Jacobin-
ism and ultimately to use it to “settle scores” with the French Marxism that was hegemonic in many fields (such as the university) until 1968. His theses were published in 1990 in *Echoes of the Marseillaise* (again a reconstruction of one of his lectures), in which he lined up with Marx when he had warned the Polish in 1868 that “the Jacobin of 1793 has become the Marxist of today.”

Hobsbawm’s analysis focused on demonstrating how the Restoration represented the triumph of the moderate bourgeoisie of 1789-1791, which always contrasted with the lower classes and was involved in a class struggle that was targeted against the proletariat in the 19th century. In correspondence, this proletariat saw Jacobinism, its leaders and the sans-coulottes as the forerunner and referent of their struggle; they carried on in the Paris Commune and the 1917 Revolution. It could be argued that the issue fell outside Hobsbawm’s purposes, but the fact is that the only reference to the nation and its by-products is the one that specifies that in the interest of that moderate bourgeoisie there was a desire not to exterminate the class adversary but simply to generate a new overall climate that would take shape in modern national unity.

The scholarly attention that Hobsbawm poured into studying the national question should be situated in relation to the major renovation that this branch of historical studies was experiencing in the early 1980s. This does not mean that the topic was foreign to him, as we have seen: he himself mentioned the studies by Carleton B. Hayes *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931) and Hans Kohn *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944) as his major scholarly forebears. Another predecessor which he regarded with keen interest was the book by Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France (1870-1914)*, which came out in 1976. Regarding the renovation of the 1980s, Hobsbawm outlined the most useful authors and studies who had most overly stimulated his reflections: Miroslav Hroch, *The Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (1985 for the English translation, which is when things started to exist); John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (1982); E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (1983); B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983); A. Smith, whom he regarded as a necessary reference in the start of the modern scholarly debate on the nation, especially in his books *Theories of Nationalism* (1983) and *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986); and John Breuilly, *Nationalism and State* (1985, even though there is an earlier version from 1982).

Hobsbawm himself gave his own opinion on the circumstances behind this major renovation in historiography. To him, it reflected the crisis in the national territorial state, which at that time was no longer expanding after a continuous 250-year period of splendour, along with a context of general crisis in legitimacy that was affecting individual loyalties. In 1990, he further fleshed this out by speaking about the nationalist surge in the late 19th century, made up, he claimed, of negative, divisive movements thus centred on ethnicity and language (often combined with religion). To his mind, these ethnic reactions were expressed particularly with regard to the rise of fundamentalism and its appeal to people for whom living in a “fortuitous” and “disorderly” fashion was unimaginable, and who grasped onto whatever would offer them a complete, inclusive explanation of life and their community while pinpointing eternal enemies against whom they could identify their own group.

In my opinion, we should stress that this shift in the study of the nation and its relationships with nationalism was felt particularly strongly in English historiography and even more so in English culture itself, within which the strength with which ethnicity was revived in a Western world which was thinking one step from definitively modern rationality, and which was shocked by the ease with which it could turn everything into politics and action, was surprising. Thus, what was worrisome was the ease with which irrationality and “invention” built mobilising, triumphant realities in an era in which national aggressiveness had appeared to be permanently defeated by democracy since 1945. The omnipotent USA had learned this in firsthand when it felt defeated by the Marxist nationalism of the Vietcong in 1973, and when the first major crisis in the system (the oil crisis) was unleashed at the same time, over the course of which nationalisms that had apparently been dormant in Europe were revived with at times rather aggressive tones (the case of Scotland would be a good example). And things reached a paroxysm in January 1979, when the Shah of Iran (who was supposed to bring about what was called the “white revolution”) was toppled despite the protection and generous material support of the United States and Great Britain. An effective network dominated by the Shiite clergy, which ended up capitalising on the self-declared Ayatollah Khomeini from his exile in the suburbs of Paris, devoted itself to appealing to the need to get back the morality and national feeling lost with the secular, Westernised government of the Shah, and this sufficed to allow the Ayatollah to triumph in a revolution that ushered in a new era in the Islamic world. Hobsbawm himself detracted from its importance when he equated this Islamic revolution with the first one of the 20th century, which did not have roots in the values and tenets of Enlightened reason and its liberal, democratic or socialist derivatives; this was the underpinning of his theory that the nationalisms in the late 20th century had nothing to do with their historical counterparts.

In the English tradition, as canonised by the Oxford Dictionary, nationalism is viewed from an eminently political and ideological vantage point as “devotion to one’s nation; national aspiration; a policy of national independence”. The English tradition had revealed itself to be increasingly pessimistic regarding the evolution of a liberal system which had managed to generate pernicious forms of nationalism, and therefore rejected the possibility of
viewing nationalism as a natural phenomenon (national socialism could be viewed as a fleeting mental disturbance in old Europe). All of this has borne a heavy influence in studies on the nation. Thus, the new studies in the 1980s were closer to the understanding of the national phenomenon found in the continental definitions, especially those from the Mediterranean world, in which nationalism was equally considered an idea and a politics (so nation could be equated with fatherland) which was affiliated with the principle of nationality, although the nation was also regarded as a superior ethical, political and cultural principle which makes the grandeur of the nation the supreme principle behind political action.

This historiographic revamping from the 1980s largely dovetailed with considering nationalism as a strictly contemporary phenomenon. A few scholars (and sometimes even Hobbsawm himself) recognised the existence of a long prior period during which the elements were assembled which would later take shape in the modern nation, and some even spoke about proto-nationalism.16 According to this notion of contemporariness, Hobbsawm stressed the concept of the invention of tradition (national tradition, as he did not apply invention to any other social reality, at least not with the same disparaging tone) to cite a variety of examples to prove how those national traditions which were presented as the oldest often had quite recent roots and were an intentional invention. According to this national invention, he was astonished at the speed with which these “poorly-intended” artificialities managed to take root in the collective imagination.17

Hobsawm mostly agreed with the anthropological historian E. Gellner and his reflections on why nationalism is a contemporary phenomenon: this social anthropologist with French-Czech roots, another Jew who also joined English academic culture, did not so much develop a theory of the nation as a (non-evolutionary) theory of the processes of modernisation of Western societies in their shift from a farm-based economy in the old system to a more complex economy founded upon industrialisation, social mobility and individualism. Gellner stated that in order to resolve the new interpersonal conflicts, this model of society had to generate a moral framework of reference, a system that should be based on the evidence that social relations could no longer have individuals with an identity defined by the place they occupied within the group but that each individual carried their own identity. In this individualised situation, which marks a rupture with the old system, cultural identity took on much greater value and therefore could not be left to free judgement or individual responsibility: culture and state had to merge into a single culturally homogenising action plan that would generate the modern legitimacy of power. He believed that the core of this new cultural homogenisation was nationalism, which was therefore a completely contemporary phenomenon.

The main critiques of Gellner’s theory come from the field of history, which deemed that the validity of a model was always subordinated to its proof through specific facts. Gellner had explained a mechanism applicable to societies in the midst of a swift process of modernisation, and the impact of his analysis was instantaneous and universal. However, it was clear that this theory could hardly hold up to proof by facts (especially with regard to national movements on the peripheries) or specific chronologies: how, for example, could it explain that the time of the maximum nationalistic feeling in Italy, the Risorgimento, dovetailed with a period prior to industrialisation? Hobbsawm incorporated much of Gellner’s theories into his work, and they both became the standard-bearers against the vision of a national phenomenon with remote roots in time. Thus, for example, “we cannot attribute to the revolutionary ‘nation’ anything that resembles the subsequent nationalist programme that consists of creating nation-states for defined groups according to criteria such as ethnicity, a common language, religion, region or shared historical memories, which have been so hotly disputed by 19th-century theoreticians”.18 They considered the long-term dimension as the reflection of an organicist or even teleological vision of the nation (sometimes its supporters called them “accumulativists”) and were radically against viewing nations as natural entities or social entities, since they are cultural inventions or constructions. Furthermore, they both shared the idea that the nation is not what generates nationalism, but vice-versa. They posited that nationalism is a contemporary political and social phenomenon which never dated from prior to the French Revolution and which accompanied the European process of economic and political modernisation. On the other hand, this vision of the “need for nationalism” in certain historical processes allowed them to associate nationalism with modern forms of consensus and with processes of democratisation (the close tie between nationalism and democracy is one of the prime contemporary historical themes) as well as with the different ways power is legitimised which came to be expressed through the consolidation of the territorially-based national state.

These approaches opened up another sphere of reflection on nationalisms which partly revived the issue of the old distinction between civic (or Western) nationalisms and ethnic (or Eastern) nationalisms. This distinction had been written in stone academically with the appearance of the Hans Kohn book The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background, a work cited above which Hobbsawm, as already mentioned, particularly spotlighted. This author, another Jew who was born in Prague but Germanic in culture, emigrated to the USA in 1934 and alluded to a Western political nationalism based on pre-existing governing structures and grounded upon homogenous populations and bourgeois hegemony and a culture with Enlightened underpinnings built upon principles like reason, equality before the law, constitutionalism and tolerance. He contrasted this with ethnic or Eastern nationalism, in which nation and state were not the
same, and in which the cultural underpinning was inspired by non-urban intellectuals, focused on spiritual traditions, advocating borders based on ethnic demands, with strong irrational and mythic elements and historictist argumentations, as well as a strong component of xenophobia. We can add that Kohn was also in favour of seeing nationalism as a contemporary phenomenon linked to the appearance of modern societies; he believed that nationalism draws all its justification from the past (language, religion, common roots) and elaborates and transforms them, generating a new reality that replaces that of the past.19

The division between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism has traditionally been attributed to the French scholar Ernest Renan, and partly to Friedrich Meinecke as well, when they spoke about political nations and cultural nations in 1907.20 Despite this, when Renan referred to the famous national “daily referendum” he added “if you pardon my metaphor” (which most editions omit); at the same time, he had no qualms claiming that a nation is not a simply aggregation of individuals but instead a soul, a consciousness, a “living result”. The referendum or desire to live together is not enough, Renan also says; the chain that connects the dead to the living is also needed, and a “national charisma” is essential, one fundamental ingredient of which is history. Therefore, Renan’s precedent is not as much of a precedent as later claimed, when there were attempts to radicalise the distinctions according to the war between democracy and Nazism in the first half of the 20th century.21

Counter to this kind of simplification, one of the most important contributions was by A. Smith, later fleshed out in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986). This author associated the ethnic or cultural perspective with the political and considered them inseparable in any nation that is entering modernity. Smith spoke about the national cultural community as a set of myths, symbols and memories which intellectuals elaborate to legitimise the nation and guide its politics. This culture or ethnic baggage, he tells us, is chosen, rediscovered or even invented by intellectuals, but it has to live in and from the political circumstances which the nation is facing: real situations which help to explain why some inventions take root while others do not. Ultimately, Smith believes that one cannot categorically claim that the French Revolution marked a turning point for the nation.

Hobsbawm stressed the concept of “invented traditions” or the “invention of tradition” (a term which is not his own but which he helped to spread definitively), a sphere of analysis which was shared by the majority of authors in the 1980s renovation to some extent. Hobsbawm, who distinguished between tradition, custom and convention or routine, undertook a sweeping methodological and conceptual reflection on the issue. To him, inventing tradition was a process of formalisation and ritualisation, the most interesting part of which was seeing how materials from the past were used to achieve new objectives. He distinguished between three types of invented traditions: those that establish or symbolise social cohesion or group belonging; those that legitimise institutions, status or relations of authority; and those that guide socialisation, inculcate beliefs and impose value systems or conventional behavioural guidelines. Apart from these categories, he said that these inventions are fictitious by definition, are symbolic or ritual in nature, and are made up of rules that are either openly or tacitly accepted, which are enforced by repetition.22

According to Hobsbawm, inventions were characteristics of societies weakened by major transformations which rendered the now-dysfunctional traditions invented for the old social structures obsolete.23 He also stressed the paradox that modern nations are precisely presented as the opposite of novelty, seeking their origins in the most remote antiquity and defining themselves as natural (not artificial), to such an extent that they need no other justification other than their very affirmation. In contrast, he claims that everything that refers to the nation must have a component that was invented relatively recently.24 These processes, he goes on, have sparked lively controversies among historians, especially the attacks on those historians who are blamed for being the conscious or unconscious agents of the invention and distortion of the past in a task that transcends specialised research to become an affair in the public sphere related to individuals as political agents. Counter to them are the historians who, beyond researching the inventions of traditions as a fundamental subject of study in order to understand the nation and nationalism, focus their work on condemning what they regard as their (traitorous) professional colleagues’ poor practices: they could be called “mythophbic” or “mythicid” historians.

More specifically, Hobsbawm focuses on the inventions from the period 1870-1914, “standardising traditions” for which he blamed the governments in their political effort to integrate the masses by unscrupulously using irrational elements to decisively maintain the social order. He assigned much of the direct responsibility for this manipulation on the increasingly large mass of civil servants, and especially the administrators and teachers in compulsory public education.25

Hobsbawm focused his efforts on the emergence of mass politics and the increasing use of irrational elements; he made it dovetail with the intellectual crisis of classic liberalism, with the rising bourgeois reaction to social fears (last effects of the Commune of Paris), and with the need to undertake a formal democratisation of the exercise of power. Therefore, it was necessary to create a new “civil religion” of the state (here he cites the major themes analysed by Émile Durkheim) and this state would rely on “invention” and would reinforce it by promoting imagery and public monuments, national festivals, national symbols, major patriotic ceremonies, the intentional distribution of the main public buildings, anthems and patriotic songs, etc. In fact, it could not be de-
nied that the sacralisation of politics was rooted in the Enlightenment and represented one of the expressions of modernity; what the emergence of mass society did was only to speed up the process and cast it in relation to the process of the nationalisation of the masses.26

Because of the nature of his work, Benedict Anderson could be another of the renovators cited by Hobsbawm as a referent, as we have seen, who may have exerted a certain influence on scholars studying Catalonia. He also subscribed to historical materialism,27 although much more cautiously in his analysis of the national question, as well as in his assessment of the role that this nationalism may play today. He claimed that the end of the era of nationalism, so often heralded, is not even remotely in view. He also recognised that there is no acceptable theory on nationalism, which to him became an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxism. His interest in nationalism was crucial to his historical-anthropological work (we already know that this is not true of Hobsbawm), and even though he believed that nationalism was a new phenomenon linked to the liberal revolutionary process, his studies on major cultural complexes from the ancient world confirmed that in all of them he found a written (sacred) language, a codified world of signs (related to the major cultivated languages: Chinese, Latin, Arabic) and, despite the evidence of inequalities, the desire to present the community as horizontal, including all its members.

Anderson’s analysis was based on the affirmation that nationalism is not an ideology; thus, it must be studied in an anthropological spirit within the same category as kinship and religion, as an “imagined community” both individually and collectively and ultimately one that is imagined as sovereign, since its modern birth dovetailed with the process of destroying the monarchies with divine origins and the decline of religious thinking (which would be replaced precisely by national sentiment).

Anderson claimed that the major cultural complexes of the ancient world and their universal meaning began to be diluted in around the late Middle Ages; in the dynastic monarchies, sovereignty is defined by its centres, while the borders were rather imprecise and inconsequential, so the empires could retain power over highly heterogeneous and at times not even contiguous peoples. This situation was associated with a conception of territoriality in which cosmology and history were confounded. However, it did not withstand the impact of a period determined by economic and social change, scientific discoveries and the development of communications. The spirit of Luther’s Reformation, which brought vernacular languages to the people, along with the printing press, went far to facilitate the change in communities’ internal relations, and all of these changes reached broader audiences (novels, newspapers, pamphlets, etc.) in the 18th century. To Anderson, it is clear that we should bear in mind the pathway embarked upon by the Reformation, the printing press, the new communications and the administrative reform, as they all paved the way for the modern nation.28

Even though he was not cited by Hobsbawm as part of the group of renovators in the 1980s, we should mention Hagen Schulze here because he was an expert in the history of the modern state (a disciple of Otto Hintze) and comparative European nationalisms. Hobsbawm’s “omission” of him is likely a politically correct reflection of the dismissal of a colleague who aligned with Ernst Nolte’s relativist position in the German revisionist controversy regarding the Holocaust in the 1980s.29 Schulze claimed that the concept of nation is very ancient, predating the concept of the state, but that at that time it did not encompass all the members of the nationality since it was used to identify birth: nationes or tribes lacking distinct institutions. Similar to Anderson’s thesis, he believed that the modern phenomenon of nationality was very heterogeneous – and therefore difficult to study in a unitary fashion – and that it began to coalesce in contact with the establishment of vernacular languages and the increase in communications and population movements (which revealed the existence of the “foreigner”). From the French Revolution to the Great War, the concept of nation, he claims, experienced a fundamental shift, since it ceased to be an affair of the elites to begin to interest the masses in a process that was historically as swift and far-reaching as it was difficult for political systems forced to find new forms of legitimacy to digest. His comparative, longitudinal study allowed Schulze to see how the idea of nation gradually became functional, since given the magnitude of the changes, it incorporated the ideas of orientation, community and transcendence into the life of the nationality along with a major simplification in internal and external or inter-state social relations. He defined nationalism as the secular religion of the industrial age. Like Anderson, and largely counter to Hobsbawm, Schulze also conferred a strong emotional component on nationalism, and he thus also considered the invention of traditions. However, they both thought that invention should be given positive connotations, involving creation and imagination instead of only the creation of a falsehood, given that the entire community must be thought of by its members, so it cannot be judged by falsehood but by the way it is imagined.

In his list, Hobsbawm did stress the case of the English scholar John Breuilly, an expert in nationalism and ethnicity (in 2013 he published Nationalism and National Unification in Europe in the 19th Century). Just like Hobsbawm, Breuilly also came from a progressive, critical vantage point, but he focused his analysis on the historical perspective of the new relationships forged between nationalism, the state and modernity. Thus, partly along Gellner’s lines, he also recognised nationalism and the nation as modern phenomena and deemed the fact that they may have had a pre-modern history as irrelevant. He was essentially concerned with nationalism as a political form and its effort to conquer the state, and he viewed the comparative historical perspective and political history as a way of objectivising the subjective definitions given by
the nationalists in their action to exert power via the state. He established three conditions upon which the definition of nation and national actions are grounded: the nation must exist as an explicit, unique entity, the values and interests of this nation cannot have priority over any other value or interest, and the nation must be as independent as possible, which assumes the attainment of political sovereignty.

To Breuilly, the essential factor was analysing the nationalist desire to achieve a state of its own because of the existence of a unique culture (race, religion, language, background, etc.) harnessed for political strategy. Thus, nationalism should be capable of transforming culturally distinct human groups into homogeneous body politics characterised by the action of conscious minorities (most notably the action of intellectuals and professionals) who use nationalism as a tool of cohesion, propaganda and pressure. In the historical perspective, he considered different kinds of nationalist politics: nationalisms revolving around European separation or unification during the 19th century; fascist nationalism; nationalism as a modernising reaction (Japan, Turkey, China); anticolonial and antiimperialist nationalism, and the separatist nationalism of the 20th century in developed countries, which display an incoherent mix between democratic and anti-democratic values and are often responses to shortcomings or centralising and standardising drives from the state with which they are associated.

Breuilly also grappled with the origin of modern nationalism and the contrast between liberals’ view of the nation as a universal subject of sovereignty and the “reactionary” vision which starts with the cultural nation, considered a unique cultural entity. And he resembles the discourse of other authors by deeming that the indisputable success of this nationalism lies in individuals’ need to react to the increasing momentum of modernisation and the fierce individual competition it sparks. Therefore, nationalism would meet individuals’ psychological need to seek refuge in the superior identity of the group, represented via an accessible simplification of purposes and promoted via the constant repetition of arguments, stereotypes and symbols which thus become unquestionable realities.

We should spotlight Miroslav Hroch, whom Hobsbawm cites first because what was translated in 1985 was an old study from 1968 that was expanded in 1973. Hroch’s perspective is interesting because it is not English but Central European, peripheral and tailored to a region with a strong romantic substrate: he himself criticises the English for viewing nationalism as an overly neutral term instead of seeing all the dimensions in specific historical processes. His peripheral study led him to establish a three-phase rhythm in the contemporary national revival which is reminiscent of the case of Catalonia: first, the romantic rediscovery of the people, with no political agenda; secondly, the appearance of a group of intellectuals who take advantage of it, backed by prior history, and start political-cultural agitation, giving rise to cultural institutions to defend the ethnic exceptionality itself; and thirdly, a cultural movement connected to the masses with national political parties that have clear political goals. Whether or not it achieves its own state depends on specific historical circumstances, given that the nation is not an eternal category but instead the product of a complex historical process in which social groups are established via the combination of objective relations (notice the adjective: as opposed to imagined relations): economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographic and historical ones that are expressed in the creation of a collective consciousness. In all of them, the author finds the existence of a shared memory of the past which is viewed as the group’s destiny, the presence of cultural and linguistic ties inside the group, and the egalitarian awareness of its members.

It should be noted that in the 1990s, Hobsbawm reflected on the issue of identities in what seems like a summary and update of his analysis of the nation and nationalism.30 Similar to the evolution in the research, we can notice a kind of paradigm shift, since he abandoned the issue of invention and replaced it with identity. Despite this, if we carefully read the content, we realise that this shift is only due to his desire to discredit nationalism in its harmful interference in the course of the 20th century. He focused his disparagement on the conviction that belonging to a human group is an issue of context and social definition (which normally takes place via exclusion); Hobsbawm viewed the definition of group belonging which prioritises it over all other forms of identification as a way of forcing things, since we are all multidimensional by definition. In parallel, he went on to state that the majority affiliation of the individual identity in a territorial national state was a new phenomenon of the 20th century, unknown in Europe in the mid-18th century, and that during the 20th century this affiliation had taken on sinister tones when the state had tried to get all its citizens to be part of the same community united by a single ethnicity (thus interchanging the concepts of state and nation). The problems appeared when politics was democratised and had to mobilise these masses: the people had to become a homogeneous whole. Hobsbawm generalises within his scheme by claiming that all states (except Portugal) were heterogeneous without major problems, citing the oversimplified example (as proven by Pierre Vilar in relation to the advent of the modern concept of nation) of the Spanish national cooperation of the Basques, Galicians and Catalans in the fight against Napoleon’s troops.

Hobsbawm explains that human groups have always been recognised as such by conferring a name and unique features on their members; he also claims that ethnicity is not a positive trait of groups because what it seeks is radical differentiation from others via fictitious, arbitrary and historically changing definitions. Some nationalisms (let us use the example of Catalan nationalism) encourage the as-
similation of immigrant members and thus contradict the very underpinnings (pure and unique) of their ethnic justification. However, what the majority seek is to define an essential ("natural") and exclusive identity to form a group and radically separate from the outside world (as is well known, one of his prime bones of contention was Islamic fundamentalism). Hobsbawm also considered the pretension that each nation has the right to form its own sovereign state "a totally unreal principle", since this would only become an operative political principle thanks to the international collapse signalled by the downfall of the three major multi-ethnic, multilingual empires (Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman). However, this did not prevent him from thinking that a multi-ethnic state identified with one of the nations, which it prioritises over the others, would end up generating problems and tensions, even if it were a democratic state that was tolerant of minorities. Ultimately, however, he views the state evolution towards mono-culturalism as a historical trend which ends up in assimilation or mass conversion from state imposition or, in the worst of cases, in mass expulsions of minorities, ethnic cleansing, genocide and forms of apartheid.

It seems proven that Hobsbawm added elements from practically all the members of the renegade group from the 1980s to support his theory of the nation and its derivatives. He also shared with the majority of this group, which held progressive stances, a highly critical position towards the subject of study, a stance which they try to justify with historical contextualisation. We must surely situate Hobsbawm somewhere between the most critical and those who were more interested in carrying the analysis towards a critical vision of the late 20th century (to him, the period that was ushered in upon the collapse of the USSR). He argued that there was no new wave of national awareness, and that instead the new states had simply emerged from the collapse of the previous ones and were a consequence instead of a rupture. Hobsbawm was thus able to exonerate real socialism from the "historical sin" of not having been able to counter the old bourgeois nationalism (he cited the example of Estonia and Latvia, which had no national consciousness until 1917, but did in 1940 when faced with the Nazi presence in the region).

Everything led Hobsbawm to claim that the changes in political relations among the states and the national consciousness in the late 20th century must be analysed in detail and with a great deal of caution. He claimed that it was natural to find these changes in Western Europe after the 1960s, and elsewhere fifteen or twenty years later, since they were the outcome of the quicker, more profound and more universal transformation of human history in its entirety, and with it the disappearance of communities’ traditional bonds, with the exception of the more residual and metaphorical capacity to define themselves. We are all uprooted people, he claimed, and this had led to the "nationalistic salvaging" quest for new identities. However, Hobsbawm always claims, these (highly varied) movements may be extremely vital but are also essentially negative. In the best of cases, they are a "cry of pain and a call for succour", while in the worst of cases they are a blind protest by a hopeless people, yet always as manifestations which are presented with a revolutionary appearance without offering any political solutions. This cannot be confused with historical nationalism, Hobsbawm concludes.

Between 2000 and 2004, Hobsbawm delivered a few lectures and talks in seminars on this topic. In Italy, they were compiled into a small volume with the telling title The End of the State. Thus, we can see that around that time he kept reaffirming the negative nature of the national movements in the first part of the 20th century and, as we have just seen, the idea that they have nothing to do with historical nationalism. Here I shall cite the German Jewish sociologist Norbert Elias, who emigrated to Great Britain in 1938 and used his work The Civilising Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (1939) pro domo sua to note how the major crisis of the 20th century had interrupted the civilising process started at the end of the Middle Ages, stating once again, à la Gellner, that the aggregate effects of the individualisation of Western societies and capitalist aggressiveness in the phase of globalisation had generated a new need for national identity.

Perhaps Hobsbawm’s insistence on the idea of the major rupture in the 1960s can end up being understood through the interpretation of his aforementioned history of the 20th century, originally entitled The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1991) (1994). The common thread of his analysis was the clash between socialism and capitalism, while he relegated the internal contradictions of each of them to the background and "forgot" relevant aspects that did not fit within the narrative scheme. Yet when writing after the collapse of 1991, his personal Marxist frustration led him to be somewhat critical of the drift of the 1917 Revolution and profoundly critical of the world that emerged from the "disaster" of 1989-1991. These traits confirm Hobsbawm’s place among the scholars who are more progressive, cosmopolitan and critical of national movements, even though he views them as a prime problem in the contemporary age. And this wave of historiographic renovation in the 1980s is precisely what drew him into this field of historical study, in which he stands out around the world for his indisputable quality, magnificent prose and resonance.

A brief final reflection on the impact in the Catalan historiography of the nation and the derivations of the English "renovation" in the 1980s. As we have seen, Hobsbawm more profited from than spearheaded this wave of new studies, yet he is one of the foreign authors cited the most frequently in Catalonia (along with Pierre Vilar). However, perhaps the issue is to evaluate whether beyond the citations, Hobsbawm and his renovating peers truly influenced the methods, concepts and approaches. In one of his usual hypercritical reflections on historiography itself, Enric Ucelay Da Cal (likely the historian living in Catalonia who follows new international developments
the most diligently) stated his opinion in 1995: “The thematic and methodological continuity, the scarce innovation and the insistent recourse to empiricism – as a moral arbiter of a discipline lacking greater conceptual inspirations – are key in the professional setting in Spain.” In this same introduction, he also speaks about methodological uniformity and an excess of empiricism, which he deems a “dead-end” if it does not come with a corresponding conceptualisation. In line with Hobsbawm, this author thinks that the new studies on the nation have become the “post-communist” issue par excellence in the social sciences, an aspect of which Catalan historiography was somewhat unaware given its traditional introspection. The same reflection gave a few clues as to the reason behind this Catalan resistance to methodological excesses and new developments: in Catalonia, there is a longstanding tradition of studies on the nation which made it more resistant to change, and it trusted that the changes would pave the way for a Spanish historiography that was “discovering” the à la mode importance of studies in this field right around that time.

At the start of the 1980s, the political culture of Catalan nationalism and the local historiography on the nation had arrived, conditioned by the coexistence of long-standing lines and the impact of changes whose repercussions were difficult to determine. The long survival of Franco-era coercion had distanced the national history from academia and, in a complementary fashion, fostered the history written abroad, an extremely rich stream since the Renaissance which in no way reflected the logics and flows common to academia. In the short term, the country had just achieved autonomy with the sublimation of the harsh anti-Franco struggle and the recovery of a missing historical trajectory which had allowed it to attain autonomy during the Second Republic. Therefore, the disparagement of a supposed “invented tradition”, over imaginations with the capacity to generate the state in a place where the state itself was a distant aspiration, or the condemnations over the incomparability between nationalism and the sound development of democratic individualism, could not be very warmly welcomed or do much to change approaches and topics.

It came in the 1980s when Catalonia had just five years of history in the university, little time to consolidate academic momentum, few journals and platforms to publish on and a local history written by scholars just cutting their teeth. It also arrived when the historiographic controversy between Jordi Solé Tura and Josep Termes, which had been going on since 1974, was still underway. And it came with scant references to the international reflection on the topic. Precisely one of the events that did the most to facilitate the arrival of the theses of the innovative, internationalist “renovators” was the political tensions that arose after the electoral victory of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and Jordi Pujol in March 1980, a situation in which the 1974 controversy was renewed and even rendered utterly of the minute. However, we should say that the most important historiographic controversies revolved around settling the issue of romantic essentialism, the nationalistic euphoria sparked by the attainment of autonomy, the impoverishment motivated by the constant clash with Hispanic essentialism, but here without having a state of its own (“epic history” and “political fragility”) and disparagingly condemning how the history made in Catalonia reflected “the current confusion of the political juncture” caused by “Pujoism” and the disinflation of the “popular-front” self-satisfaction of the 1960s and 1970s. The start of the questioning of Marxist state control in university departments did the rest. Historians like M. Barceló, E. Ucelay Da Cal and B. de Riquer expressed these disparaging concerns, especially in the decade from 1982 to 1992.

Just a few examples of this critical reaction in the study of nationalism promoted by the international revision of the 1980s lead us to cite, perhaps first, J. M. Colomer and his selection entitled Espanyolisme i catalanism. La idea de nació en el pensament politic català (1939-1979) (1984). Even though its politological approach was quite traditional, the long introduction cites theoreticians like H. Kohn, Samir Amin, B. Azkin, E. H. Karr, F. Chabod, H. B. Davis, K. W. Deutsch, G. Haupt, Löwy and Weill, T. Nairn, A. D. Smith, J. Surratt and F. Tönnies. However, no reference is made to the existence of new approaches in the study of the nation (which also extends to nationality, fatherland, people and country in the book).

The works by J. M. Fradera and J. L. Marfany were aware that the renovation of the 1980s entailed the possibility of responding to the “traditionalism” (“essentialism” it was called) implicit in previous studies on Catalanism. Fradera explained the desire to join the Catalan debate on the origin of Catalanism and to give it a few new ways to examine the issue. On the very first page, he cites Hobsbawm’s Nations and Nationalism, just released in 1990. Since his real goal was to refute the essentialism of Termes’ thesis, from this book he extracted the reference to the “popular proto-nationalism” within the framework of the bourgeois cultures of Europe in the 19th century, a theory that had been set forth by A. Colin. Thus, Fradera was able to argue that he was making a romantic transposition, given that Hobsbawm had proven that the underclasses were only the passive carriers of an ethnic stock that could only be manifested after the bourgeois had “manufactured” the nation and nationalist movements. Fradera also referred to B. Anderson when discussing the very invention of theories by the leading class which were displaced from the urban nuclei (identified with the liberal bourgeoisie) to more backwards places.

Marfany’s book had a greater impact in the history of literature (such as in Jordi Castellanos) than in history tout court. Borja de Riquer described him as “fairly disputable” and in 1996 offered a series of reflections in which he stated that in Catalonia, historians tended to avoid interpretative theories and distance themselves from the interdisciplinary theoretical reflections which
had been affecting European historiography since the early 1980s. 

But before all this, a French historian like Pierre Vilar, a Marxist like Hobsbawm and the author of an emblematic book like Catalunya dins l’Espanya moderna. Recerques sobre els fonaments econòmics de les estructures nacionals – French edition from 1962 and Catalan version from 1964-1968 – declared that between 1250 and 1350, the Principality of Catalonia may have been the European country about which it would be the least inaccurate, the least hazardous (sic) to pronounce apparently anarchistic terms like political-economic imperialism or nation-state. Vilar claimed that the political creation of Catalonia in the Middle Ages was remarkable in that it came so early. Language, territory, economic life, psychic makeup, community of culture: the essential conditions of the nations had all been in place since the 13th century, and it was not even lacking a concern with the market, “the school where the bourgeoisie learns nationalism”, a phrase with which Pierre Vilar sought to paraphrase Stalin’s 1913 essay on Marxism and the national question. Regarding the contemporary era, the distinction between state and nation is a step in Catalan political thinking which Pierre Vilar claims has a universal value. At a lecture delivered in Paris in 1988, when distinguishing between state and nation, Vilar denied the historical need to convert the nation into state and deemed the denial of national realities that have not become states in the contemporary era, one of the prejudices of Hobsbawm and his followers, unjustified. 

Along the same lines as Pierre Vilar, Josep Fontana has continued the reflection in his latest book La formació d’una identitat. Una història de Catalunya, which was published in 2014. Fontana concludes that in the mid-14th century, Catalonia had achieved the political and fiscal structure of a modern nation state just as Holland would three centuries later. However, being ahead of the times in this way has its own disadvantages when faced first with the major crisis in the late Middle Ages and later with the authoritarianism of the Spanish Hapsburg kind, with Catalonia boxed in between two large states, Spain and France, which were rivals but identical in their zeal to devour it. The visions set forth by Vilar and Fontana, two Marxist historians, are opposed to those of Hobsbawm. A universal theory has to pass the test of the particular case, and the case of Catalonia, which has been studied by historians with ideological conceptions similar to those of Hobsbawm, contradicts the British historian’s general interpretation. Firstly, without an earlier, longstanding, historical popular base, it is impossible to “invent” the nation. Secondly, the underpinnings of the national emancipation movement can be found in periods long before the contemporary era. Thirdly, the distinction of a national identity is not necessarily xenophobic: it can be associated with a democratic process and may seek the integration of new arrivals without leading to their class alienation.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[4] Among these debates, and because of its density, we shall spotlight the one between Roberto Vivarelli — “Il secolo che muore”— and Angelo Ventura — “Il breve secolo xx di Hobsbawm”— in Rivista Storica Italiana, year cx, fasc. iii (1998).
[8] In fact, in his earliest major historiographic contributions, Hobsbawm appeared to be a historian of social phenomena, and here we should recall that ultimately he regarded them in their gradual union, industrial and urban materialisation, while he denigrated other forms of action common to traditional, farm-based societies as “banditry” and primitive (as he saw firsthand in his journey to the Spanish border, where the anarchist patrol prevented him from crossing).
[11] Hans Kohn, in La idea del nacionalisme. Un estudi dels seus orígens i antecedents (1944), considers nationalism a contemporary phenomenon linked to the advent of modern society, but one that takes all of its elements (language, religion, shared ancestry, etc.) from the past and transforms them to create a new reality that replaces the past.
[12] This true forebear, which at that time exerted very little influence on Catalan historiography, entitled the French edition of his work La fin des terroirs.
[13] We could also add the book by Stein Rokkan Economia, territori, identitat i política de perifèries a l’Europa occidental (1983). It establishes a division between economic, social, cultural and political – as well as historical – centre and periphery to claim that what matters is the process of becoming a nation within an ever-changing national and international order.

[15] See Benedict Anderson, Comunidades imaginadas. Publicaciones de la Universitat de València, Valencia 2005. This explains how, in the revolutions in China and Vietnam, first there was more talk of national terms than of triumphant revolution, and later it adapted to societies that were still very attached to the pre-revolutionary past.

[16] In his studies in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries (including his 1963 La revolta dels catalans, which some regard as controversial), John H. Elliott is concerned with the issue of the old patriotism expressed in modern peasant uprisings and religious wars, as well as the nations and national identities activated by the onset of the Renaissance.


[18] Eric Hobsbawm. Naciones y nacionalismos... op. cit., p. 29 (author’s translation).

[19] A claim which is in line with what Pierre Vilar asserted; see note 17.

[20] In Estat nacional prussià i estat nacional alemany (1907), Friedrich Meinecke considers Bismarck the true creator of the German state. His work is particularly devoted to Germany and the tensions caused there between the politics of power and cosmopolitan universalism and the reason of state and moral values. He himself, regarded as the leading representative of historicism, has an organicist vision of societies formed by the independent bonds at the will of their members which is thus counter to the “atomist” vision, which views them as formed by individuals who are in theory free, autonomous and equal.


[22] It is curious to see how Hobsbawm did not apply this disparagement to the invention of other phenomena, such as the entire progressive line that emerged from the French Revolution, which starts with the grand political invention of the Jacobins under the watchful eye of none other than Robespierre himself (cult of reason, new calendar, etc.).

[23] For the place occupied by “political mythologies” within contemporary Western political thinking as a whole, see Raoul Girardet. Mythes et mythologies politiques. Seuil, Paris 1986.

[24] Ferran Valls i Taberner (“La falsa ruta”. La Vanguardia, 15 February 1939) distinguished between the real Catalonia and the invented Catalonia (“a tendentious prejudice”) of the intellectuals of Catalanism.


[27] Anderson is another example of the cosmopolitan progressive: born in China in 1936 to an Irish father and English mother, he was raised in California and studied at Cambridge University.

[28] It is curious that the first to be known and cited in Catalonia was his brother Perry, a fellow historian and Marxist and a frequent contributor to the New Left Review. See Jordi Solé Tura. Catalanisme i revolució burstesa. La sintesi de Prat de la Riba. Barcelona 1967 (although he cites a contribution to Les Temps Modernes).


[33] Eric Hobsbawm. La fine dello stato. Milan 2007; it includes “Naciones i nacionalisme en el nou segle”, “La perspectiva de la democràcia”, “Terrorisme” and “L’ordre públic en una època de violència”.

[34] It is curious to observe how there have been significant ups and downs in this phenomenon of nationalism and its interpretation. Berlin spoke about its “disappearance” in the late 19th century. See Isaiah Berlin. “Nacionalismo...”, op. cit., pp. 415-438.

[35] He personally explains the negative impact of the “crisis” of the 1960s in his autobiography, with unmitigated contempt of the Paris uprisings in May 1968 (which he witnessed in person, he says), following the commemorative instructions of the PCF to the letter.


[38] When commenting on the Termes and Casassas book El nacionalisme com a ideologia, the historian Martínez Fiol was able to state that “under the umbrella of Pujol’s absolute majority, nationalist, neo-convergent and phyloconvergent historians tried to coin what they called a ‘national history’ which, although it does not reject the...
criticism of certain aspects and events from the history of Catalonia, should not lose sight of the constant need to defend the Catalan nation, as well as to stress that Catalanism has been, in a secular fashion, the driving force behind the historical development of Catalonia”. See Ayer, 22 (1996), p. 251.

[40] These historical controversies can be read in detail in Albert Balcells. La història de Catalunya a debat. Els textos d’una polèmica. Curial, Barcelona 1994.

[41] Josep M. Fradera. Cultura nacional en una societat dividida. Curial, Barcelona 1992 (as he confesses, the texts were written between 1988 and 1990).

[42] Joan Lluís Marfany. La cultura del catalanisme. El nacionalisme català en els seus orígens. Empúries, Barcelona 1995. This is the most promoted Catalan-language book in the field of the social sciences; before it appeared, reproductions of chapters, comments, etc., had already circulated.


Biographical note

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