EVIL AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IN *THE STRANGE CASE OF DR JEKYLL AND MR HYDE* AND *LORD OF THE FLIES*.

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“No man calleth Good or Evill, but that which is so in his own eyes”
(Hobbes, 1433).
Abstract

The image of evil in Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and Golding's *Lord of the Flies* has traditionally been read as an inherent feature of mankind that is submerged but ever present. The aim of this dissertation is to challenge that view and demonstrate that evil is a subjective judgment that is socially constructed and imposed onto the Other. In order to do so, I will show how Otherness serves as vehicle to invent “the enemy”; a creature that is essentially different from “Us”. The subjectivity and social construction of evil will be further demonstrated by showing how the belief in the myth of evil allows characters to perform evil themselves. This is not to say that we all have an inherent evil side, rather we all have the potentiality for aggression that can be developed and unleashed under certain social, psychological and cultural constructs.

**Key words:** evil, social construction, the Other

Resumen

La imagen del mal en la novelas *El Extraño Caso del Dr Jekyll y Mr Hyde* de Stevenson, y *El Señor de las Moscas* de Golding, ha sido tradicionalmente interpretada como una característica inherente al ser humano que permanece oculta pero siempre latente. El objetivo de este estudio es cuestionar esa postura y demostrar que el mal es un criterio subjetivo, una construcción social impuesta sobre el Otro. Para llevar a cabo mi propósito, demostraré como la Alteridad sirve como vehículo para inventar a “el enemigo”; una criatura esencialmente diferente a “Nosotros”. La subjetividad y construcción del mal será nuevamente fundamentada al mostrar como la convicción en el mito del mal permite a los personajes llevar a cabo actos de maldad. Esto no implica que todos tengamos una parte malvada en nuestro ser, sino que todos estamos dotados de un mecanismo para la agresión que puede ser desarrollado y desencadenado en función de ciertas construcciones sociales, psicológicas y culturales.

**Palabras clave:** el mal, construcción social, el Otro
1. INTRODUCTION

“Evil” has always been an enigma that has puzzled mankind. But, what is “evil”? Who gives it a definition and for what purposes? Are we humans provided with an inherent evil side that only social and moral values can keep it at bay? Or are we inherently good and it is society that corrupts our beings by transforming us into devilish monsters? Both, Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and Golding's *The Lord of the Flies* reflect the authors’ concern about the nature of mankind. It is for this reason that the dichotomy of good and evil in both narratives is central to examine human “wickedness”. Thus, it is within the social and historical context in which these two narratives were written, the Victorian era and Post-World War II, that the “evil side of human nature” is explored and deconstructed in this paper.

On the one hand, the story of *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* takes places in Victorian England. As mentioned in *Victorian Era England & Life of Victorians*, this is a period in Great Britain's history of massive industrialisation, territorial expansion and national influence worldwide. The success of the country was thought to be reflected by a strict moral conduct that manifested their social perfection and superiority. However, the prudish Victorian morality was based upon a group of principles including practising sexual restraint, zero acceptance of criminal activity and a stern demeanour. It is in this period of Britain's history that Stevenson’s novella presents us with the “evil” half-side of a doctor that unleashes his cruelty onto the “innocent” and “respectable” members of Victorian society. However, Stevenson's narrative is not so much about the horrors of a despicable monstrous subhuman creature but a criticism of the strict moral codes of Victorianism and its hypocrisy. The author then, suggests that “evil” in human nature is the product of what society has produced; since it is the environment that determines human's behaviour.

On the other hand, *Lord of the Flies* is set in the aftermath of World War II, a dark period in contemporary history that shook the foundations of our civilisations; all countries participated in the war one way or another and the conflict caused trauma and devastation. This period also brought to light the horrors of the Holocaust that was carried out by the regime of Nazi Germany. However, the British were also indirectly involved in the massive genocide, since, as mentioned by the English Department of Loxford School,

“British ideas had indirectly played their part [since] it was a British scientist, Sir Francis Galton, who advocated eugenics, a powerful influence behind Hitler's plans for 'genetic cleansing'. Furthermore, during the Boer War, it was the British generals who held South African civilians in concentration camps, where conditions and death rates were appalling. In this longer view of history, it would appear that the boundaries between collective good and evil have often been more blurred than one might like to think".
It is in the framework of this historical context that we are introduced in Golding's narrative with a group of stranded “innocent” children that need to survive in an uninhabited island away from civilisation's intervention. However, children settled their own hierarchical order, and soon they found themselves divided between a democratic and reasonable group and a tyrannical and categorical gang, that is “good” and “evil”. However, since even the “good” children also ended up involved in outrageous crime, Golding's seems to suggest that “evil” is an inescapable feature in human nature that springs out naturally from man's heart without society's mediation.

Finally, by comparing how the image of evil is portrayed in these two narratives, and with the help of other secondary sources, I will demonstrate that evil is not an inherent human state but a subjective judgment that is socially constructed.

1.1. Objectives of the paper

Even though answers to locate evil are not and have never been fully satisfactory, the purpose of this paper is to deconstruct the concept of evil as an inherent feature of human nature. Through Stevenson and Golding's literary narratives, and with the help of other literary, philosophical, psychological and sociological texts, my objective is to demonstrate that “evil” is a social and cultural construct; also, I intend to prove how the image of evil can be challenged depending on the perspective it is looked from. Additionally, I will also aim to show that the “wicked” characters in both narratives are indeed ordinary people, and not “evil” as they are portrayed. Accordingly, my final objective will be to demonstrate that it is society that determines human behaviour; and consequently, “the darkness of man's heart” (Golding, 401) will be no other than the result of what society has produced.

1.2. Methodology

To begin with, I will introduce five short sections, Definition of Evil, View of Evil in Traditional Christian Thought, State of Nature and Social Contract, Nature of Aggression, and Otherness and the Enemy, which will help us understand the construction of evil that will be further developed and explored in both narratives.

Immediately after, I will proceed with Stevenson's narrative in order to show how the image of evil in Hyde can be challenged if taken into account different social perspectives across times and cultures. Furthermore, I will illustrate how Hyde's transgressive conduct results as a reaction
against the hypocritical moral codes of Victorianism that oppress the individual. Therefore, we will see how it is society that determines the behaviour of Jekyll's alter ego at the same time that Victorianism defines a constructed view of evil in Hyde in order to prevent their “noble” moral values and power to be subverted.

I will proceed with Golding's narrative in order to show how a chain of escalating tensions among the boys in the island is the result of constructing the Other as the image of evil. Consequently, the psychological construction of the Other will demonstrate how the myth of evil is imposed onto an invented enemy. We will also see how Otherness is a bi-directional construction and how the delusion of believing that one group is morally superior to the other confers the children their justification for committing outrageous crimes. Thus, the construal of the Other will serve to illustrate how ordinary people like Jack, Ralph, and definitely all of us can indeed be the agents of despicable atrocities against the socially constructed “evil”.

Finally, I will come to an end by exposing the conclusions reached throughout the paper.

2. CONCEPTS AND APPROACH

2.1. Definition of “evil”

In order to deconstruct the concept of “intrinsic evil”, first it is necessary to define what do we understand by “evil”, and most of us would agree with Claudia Card's definition of evil as:

“The creation of conditions that materially or psychologically destroy or diminish people's quality of life – their dignity, happiness, and capacity to fulfill basic material needs. Such conditions include the harming of property (for example, theft or vandalism); psychological harm from threat of physical injury, trauma, or fright; social harm from exploitation, debasement, slander, or libel; or harm that comes from the taking away of an individual's freedom (for example, invasion of privacy, kidnapping, or false imprisonment). At its extreme, the definition also includes killing that is not required for biological survival (that is, murder). In short, harm is the most salient characteristic of human evil, and it is the deliberate intentionality of harm, inflicted with reasonably foreseeable consequences that directs our attention.” (Waller, 13)

Nevertheless, this definition of evil, although agreeable from a behavioural perspective, is subjective, because it falls into the trap of the cliché of what the social psychologist Roy F. Baumeister calls the myth of pure evil; this consists on:

- First, evil involves the intentional infliction of harm on people.
- Second, and of crucial importance, evil is driven primarily by the wish to inflict harm merely for the
pleasure of doing so.

- Third, the victim is innocent and good.
- Fourth, evil is the other, the enemy, the outsider, the outgroup.
- Fifth, evil has been that way since time immemorial.
- Sixth, evil represents the antithesis of order, peace, and stability.
- Seventh, evil characters are often marked by egotism.
- Last, evil figures have difficulty maintaining control over their feelings, especially rage and anger.

The last two features, high self-esteem and poor self-control, are less central to the myth. (Baumeister, 146-149).

Therefore, as I will try to demonstrate in this paper, the image of evil in both characters, Mr Hyde in The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll, and Jack in Lord of the Flies, are traditionally represented by the features that constitute the myth of pure evil; a subjective and unrealistic view that I will try to challenge by showing how socially and culturally fabricated it is this image. As mentioned by Alexander, “the very existence of the category 'evil' must be seen not as something that naturally exists but as an arbitrary construction, the product of cultural and sociological work.” (10). And this is so, because indeed, “human actions and behaviours do not come labeled right and wrong, it is the different moral values of every culture and time that define them and judge them”. (Baumeister, 492). Also, and equally important, is the fact that very rarely the point of view of the perpetrator is taken into account, and only when this is done do we realise that the very notion of good and evil is turned upside down. Consequently, the view of evil in The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and The Lord of the Flies is not only subjective but socially and culturally constructed; since, “Evil exists primarily in the eye of the beholder, especially in the eye of the victim” (Baumeister, 18).

However, in order to understand the notion of evil that I propose in this paper in relation to these two literary narratives, it is essential to go back in time in order to locate and define “evil” from its roots, to check where do the features of the myth of pure evil stem from. And, as could not be otherwise, it is in religion where we will find it; since as mentioned by Baumeister, “the best place to learn how people think of evil is in religion, which often provides explicit, vivid explanations of evil.” (131).

2.2. Evil in the view of traditional Christian thought

According to The Bible, God considered mankind as being “inherently good” before Eve ate from the forbidden tree. After such a “horrendous” sin, the offspring of Adam and Eve would become sinful and wicked in nature, “And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.” (Genesis
6:5). God therefore, decided to kill all living creatures with The Great Flood except a chosen couple of each animal species and Noah's offspring. However, God realised that nothing had changed in Noah's descendants and still their imaginations remained evil from birth, “the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis, 8:21). Consequently, the “good” God considered that “something needed to be done”, and this is when the rules of the Almighty are mandated to us through The Bible, defining what is good and what is evil in the Ten Commandments, “Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal ...” (Romans 13:9), as well as through other moral obligations and prohibitions, like the warning against homoerotic relationships, “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination” (Leviticus, 18:22), “If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.” (Leviticus, 20:13). Therefore, the punishment for those not committing to the moral laws of God would have to deal with the Lord's wrath through His ministers, “If thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him who doeth evil.” (Romans, 13:4), as well as with God Himself in the afterlife “But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abomina ble, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death.” (Revelation, 21:8). As can be seen, the most influential grand narrative in the Western world presents us with a dogma that dictates what is good and what is evil, how our conduct should be and what are the mundane and eternal punishment for those not abiding by it; because after all, according to the religious Christian thought, we are all possessed by an innate evil nature that must be vanquished in order to achieve salvation. This is especially relevant in order to understand “evil” because The Holy Bible has a strong weight even today on our secular societies' view of “wrongness”, not to mention in Victorian England where religion had an essential role to control their citizens' behaviours and to label subversive and mismanaged people as well as impropriety as “evil”; sins that needed to be punished in order to legitimise and perpetuate the teleological power of the “Lord's Ministers”, that is, the Church of England, aristocracy and the Establishment.

2.3. State of Nature and Social Contract

State of nature is a theoretical framework that refers to the condition of mankind in a primitive state, previous to the existence of either laws or rulers. For the purpose of this paper, I'm going to focus on two philosophers' perspectives, that of Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes.

On the one hand, Rousseau argues that “humans are naturally good and capable of living free and contentedly in a state of nature, but that civilisation corrupts us and makes us unhappy.”
Thus, the “evil” in mankind is what civilisation has produced by the creation of private property,

“The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying “This is mine”, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not anyone have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: “Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruit of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.”” (Rousseau, 81).

This notion of “innate innocence and goodness” that is perverted by civil society is of vital importance in order to understand Stevenson's moral in his narrative; since the dichotomy of Jekyll and Hyde is not but a criticism of what Victorian society has produced. The British Empire was certainly the maximum possessor of property, a quarter of the globe belonged to Britain and they became the rulers of the world, they were “entitled by the divine grace” to impose their laws and their moral conduct as an example of “excellence and perfection” while they turned their subjects into slaves. However, “The words slave and right contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a people: “I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it as long as I like.”” (Rousseau, 102). Victorianism would be then the analogy of “wrong” that turns its people into slaves of rigid morality. Certainly, Stevenson is not suggesting that Jekyll is inherently good, but it seems no accidental that his narrative points towards a similar line of Rousseau's theory. Moreover, it is from this perspective that the notion of good and evil turns upside down; while Hyde is labelled by society as “evil”, Stevenson seems to suggest that it is his society the source of it; hence, Victorianism is the “evil” entity that with its rigid moral precepts corrupts the ordinary man and turns him into a devilish Hyde.

Moreover, in order to prevent tyranny, Rousseau believes that mankind needs a treaty that would avoid exploitation; that, he called The Social Contract: “The fundamental compact substitutes, for such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral and legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one equal by convention and legal right.” (120). As can be seen, the social contract that Rousseau proposes is a human invention, a covenant, which is based on morality and lawful equality; also subjective concepts. This would prevent the abusive exertion of power so that the “inherent goodness” of mankind prevails, and in turn, a “good” society would emanate from it.

On the other hand, Thomas Hobbes' perspective on the state of nature is completely opposed to Rousseau's. Hobbes is a subjectivist who does not believe in any “intrinsic good” or “evil” in
human nature; rather, he attributes those two terms to human “desires” and “hates” respectively. So then Hobbes argues that,

“But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.” (97).

As can be seen, Hobbes' “good” and “evil” are subjective judgments because in a pure state of nature things do not come labelled right or wrong. In that primitive state of nature, all people are free to take what they please and reject that which is detrimental for their fulfilment. For Hobbes therefore, the only intrinsic nature of mankind is the law of nature, “A law of nature, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.” (263). From this lines it could be concluded that murder belongs to the individual's natural right to dispose of that which s/he hates or is detrimental for him/her. Therefore, since murdering someone brings benefits for the murderer, murder would not be an “evil” act but a natural conclusion that results from the natural law; murder, after all, would contribute to the welfare of the murderer; like Jack in Golding's narrative. For the same token, those individuals who are weaker would also have their natural right to defend that which they love, and dispose of that which they hate, and consequently, they would have their natural right to align among themselves in order to defeat a strong opponent that is considered a threat. Therefore, in order to prevent the law of the jungle, or natural law, Hobbes also considers necessary a social contract, or what he calls The Second Law of Nature, in which citizens would entrust some of their freedom in exchange of self-preservation, “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.” (266). However, unlike Rousseau who defends his idea of social contract to reinforce and nurture the “intrinsic goodness” of man, Hobbes' notion of his Second Law of Nature is that government needs to be absolute in order to keep order and domesticate the primitive nature of mankind.

Thus, Golding's narrative reflects somehow Hobbes's view of state of nature, where children are on their own in a primitive state and with hardly any knowledge of government. Therefore, it
can be argued that the “evil” within the children is not “evil”; since their behaviour respond to Hobbes' natural law. “Evil” is then a social construction perceived from the failure of attaining a fruitful social contract. Moreover, the fact that both philosophers, Rousseau and Hobbes, have such a different perception about natural human nature also illustrates the subjectivity of “intrinsic evil”.

2.4. Nature of aggression

Despite actions categorised as “evil” entail aggression and violence, they are not complete analogues. On the one hand, “evil” is a wholly subjective notion that is attributed to someone in relation to certain established moral or religious codes, therefore, it is an absolute social and cultural construction. On the other hand, aggression and violence are hostile behaviours that are also open to interpretation,

“Aggression results from an instinct shared with all animals, from an instinct or drive manifested through particularly human, subconscious, psychological mechanisms and processes, from an acquired response to pattern, from frustrated goals or drives, or from cultural learning.” (Rummel, 10).

However, despite the subjectivity of the source of aggression and violence, everything seems to indicate that they constitute a sort of essential genetic inheritance that cannot be denied. As an example to illustrate this point, the frustration-aggression theory states that “deprivations, inequalities, and exploitations are believed to frustrate the desires of the poor and disadvantaged. Delinquency, crime, rioting, and the high level of interpersonal aggression among some minority groups are believed to result from such frustrations.” (Rummel, 9), an assertion to which I totally agree, as well as I do with the social and cultural approach; which identifies aggression on external sources of learning in which aggression is said to be acquired through experience within a culture, since it is culture that provides the context for aggression. (Rummel, 8, 10). However, although I could not agree more with these theories, still there remains a genetic inheritance that cannot be overlooked. To put it differently, in the same way that human beings would not be able to speak unless their physiological features allowed them to articulate such an action, no matter how much training or cultural environment they were immersed, mankind cannot possibly have learned to behave aggressively if it is not because we are genetically equipped for such behaviour. Moreover, Rummel argues that although the social and cultural approaches defend that aggression is dependent on external influences, “This is not to deny our inherited neurophysiological and phylogenetic potentiality to aggress. The learning theorist recognizes this.” (9), as it seems to agree as well Baumeister by stating that,
“Aggression is probably a product of the interaction of nature and nurture. The universality of some patterns, such as young male aggressiveness, suggests that nature has programmed aggression to be more pronounced in some groups than in others. Yet aggression and violence seem to be quite sensitive to many factors in the social environment. Changing the environment will probably not be enough to eliminate violence completely, but it can increase or decrease it and can channel it into particular patterns.” (44).

It could be said then, that mankind has the intrinsic neurophysiological potentiality for aggression that can be triggered or developed given certain environmental situations. Even so, if just one of the already mentioned aggression approaches were on its own completely certain, still the nature of violence would not necessarily entail by itself evilness. For instance, if the intrinsic hypothesis was on its own correct, aggression would just be the genetic mechanism that allows us to defend ourselves from a potential threat. As for the frustration-aggression theory is concerned, it would just mean that we would react aggressively as a result of being frustrated by the lack of success that our environment prevents us from achieving. Finally, since cultural approach locates aggression on cultural environment, this entails that we are not individually responsible for our aggression, rather, our environment determines our behaviour. Therefore, despite the concept of evil entails aggression, none of these theories, in the face of their divergence, implies that aggression on its own is evil; since evilness, in order to be perceived, necessitates from a judgment. Consequently, given the multiplicity of fields and approaches about the nature of aggression, it seems more precise to assert that “aggression is partly instinctual, partly drive, partly character, partly learned […] Regardless of the source, aggression is a wholly subjective manifestation within a conflict process.” (Rummel, 31).

2.5. The Other and the Enemy

The concept of the Other refers to the definition of the Self as opposed to what one is not. Harle argues that for Aristotle the Other is the foreigner who cannot speak or understand Greek, therefore, a “Barbarian” who became the object of prey, the slave. (Harle, 10). Thus, since “the life world is experienced as a coherency of objects with definite characteristics.” (Harle, 10), it is by defining the neighbour as “savage” and “evil” that we are, consequently, “civilised” and “good”. Harles proceeds with the notion that the definition of the Other constitutes our identity because “one cannot experience oneself as righteous […] without an unrighteous alter ego against whom to compare oneself.” (11). Also,
Social psychologists often speak about these sharp delineations in terms of “in-group” and “out-group”.
In-groups can range from small, face-to-face groupings of family and friends to large social categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Out-groups are any groups to which we do not belong or with which we do not identify [...] Assigning people to in-groups and out-groups has four important effects: assumed similarity, out-groups homogeneity, accentuation, and in-group bias.” (Waller, 174)

Thus, *Otherness* is an essential concept that will be explored in this paper in order to show how Mr Hyde and Jack are represented as the *Other*, or the “out-group”. Accordingly, the “wicked” characters in the two narratives are perceived and defined with characteristics that fit within this category so as to manipulate our perceptions and make us believe that society is far better without those “subhuman beasts”. It is important to stand out that “the Other serves an important social function: to have a social order, one must tell the difference between those who commit crimes and those who follow the law.” (Harle, 10), and the criminals in our two narratives become therefore the necessary *Enemy* whom the “good” society must fight against, that is to say, the scapegoat that will allow rulers to perpetuate their power. The *Enemy* then, “emerges if ‘we’ and ‘they’ are thought to be fundamentally different, that is, when the distinction is understood to reflect the struggle between good and evil, and when good is associated with ‘us’ but evil with ‘them’.” (Harle, 12). Therefore, by drawing this antagonism we are “licensed” to dispose of the subversive *Enemy*, the *Other*. We live under the delusion that, since they are “evil”, our crimes against them cannot possibly be unrighteous because we are working for the service of “good”; this entails that we, the rulers, are “entitled” to subjugate them and perpetuate our power.

3. “EVIL” IN THE STRANGE CASE OF DR JEKYLL AND MR HYDE

3.1. Contextualising the novella

The story of *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* takes place in the late 19th century Victorian England. As mentioned in *Victorian Era England & Life of Victorians*, this is a landmark period in the history of Great Britain that is characterised by the large expansion of the British Empire, the Industrial Revolution, scientific progress as well as the improvement of communication and transport. Ironically though, Victorian era's progress also brought about a series of social scourges, like child labour exploitation in the mines and factories, poverty due to the increase of population and the exploitation to which the working class were subjugated; so then, Victorian era is a time of contradictions. It is in fact then, that the majority of the population, (who was the working class), were the ones who sustained the few rich and aristocrats in power, whereas the aristocracy itself was seen as the perfect example of high morals to follow by the rest of society; as
mentioned by Snodgrass,

“Victorians measured “success” by class and money [however] Victorians defined true character by
Class – not merely one's social class, but all those characteristics that made one “classy”:
educational/intellectual refinement, good manners, a sense of fine style, the “right” friends, good
breeding, etc. It was assumed that well-bred behavior should be the natural consequence of elite bloodlines,
but “good-breeding” still needed to be exhibited. (10).

In essence, Victorian behaviour was all about appearances, and it is in fact what Stevenson's novella
is about; a criticism about the hypocritical morality of his society that suppressed all those human
attitudes, impulses or desires that were not considered “classy”; instead, “distinguished” and
“illustrious” citizens were forced to carry out a boring, unnatural and superficial life for the sake of
one's reputation. Mr Utterson and Einfield perfectly represent the conformity to these moral
standards,

“It is the mark of a modest man to accept his friendly circle ready-made from the hands of opportunity;
and that was the lawyer's way. […] It was reported by those who encountered them in their Sunday walks,
that they said nothing, looked singularly dull and would hail with obvious relief the appearance of a friend.
For all that, the two men put the greatest store by these excursions, counted them the chief jewel of each
week, and not only set aside occasions of pleasure, but even resisted the calls of business, that they might
enjoy them uninterrupted.” (Stevenson, 3-4).

Although it is clear Mr Utterson and Mr Eifield do not enjoy each other's company because
basically they have nothing to share with one another, they really treasure their walking meetings so
as to boast in public about the respectable figures they represent in society, a lawyer and a
gentleman. Another instance that shows the classiness of its citizens is exemplified by Dr Jekyll,
who perfectly represents how one is supposed to behave and with whom you are supposed to
befriend in order to be accepted as a reputable citizen, “the doctor gave one of his pleasant dinners
to some five or six old cronies, all intelligent, reputable men and all judges of good wine.”
(Stevenson, 29). As shown in these lines, it is the exemplar demeanour, appearing always perfect in
public and surrounded by the most exquisite acquaintances that is most valued by the strict conduct
of behaviour; this Victorian morality was instilled not only by the aristocracy by also by the
authority of religion,

“[although religion] suffered under the emerging nineteenth-century New Science, of which Darwin is the
most visible emblem [still] religion remained a substantial influence in Victorian culture, fed by middle-class
cultural myths and sustained pragmatically by the local rectors, who on a daily basis and weekly basis invoked
religion's social and moral authority.” (Snodgrass, 20-21).
This influence of religious morality is well exemplified by the tormented Dr Jekyll, who must have had a religious education and brought up under the morality of the Christian thought, such as it is exemplified when he resorts to God after the murder of Sir Danvers Carew, “whilst he had always been known for charities, he was now no less distinguished for religion […] his face seemed to open and brighten, as if with an inward consciousness of service.” (Stevenson, 51). But, why is Dr Jekyll so tormented by his alter ego's actions and why does he resort to religious practices in order to achieve salvation? Next section will help us understand how Jekyll believed religion would help him oust the “evil within him”.

3.2. Homoeroticism and the shadows of mankind

In order to understand why Jekyll searched for refuge in religion, it is necessary to draw on some psychological knowledge as well as to bear in mind that in the Victorian era, religion played not only a significant role on how people should behave but also on the social perception of what is good and evil and the way this affected to the human psyche. So then, whereas the already mentioned examples of propriety represents good, the duality of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde represents all those natural features of human nature, like passions, desires, and sexuality, that according to religious and Victorian doctrines are feared and suppose a threat for the stability and perpetuity of the institutions' power; therefore, the challenging natural urges that Dr Jekyll materialises through Mr Hyde are condemned, forbidden and considered evil. And the 'evil' natural urges that the text alludes to Dr Jekyll is his inherent homoerotic desires; since as pointed out by Laubender “though references to Jekyll's (and consequently Hyde's) homosexual inclinations are never explicit, they are certainly alluded to and hinted at, often through Jekyll's own self-reflective declarations.” (24). So then, as Laubender perfectly points out, one of the instances in which Dr Jekyll's homosexual desires are implicitly exposed, is when towards the end of the narrative he recognises in a letter to Mr Utterson that Jekyll's wish to maintain Hyde was necessary in order to give full free rein to his forbidden pleasures and desires, “I was the first that could plod in the public eye with a load of genial respectability, and in a moment, like a schoolboy, strip off these lending and spring headlong into the sea of liberty.” (Stevenson, 105). However, Dr Jekyll does not only not assume his homosexuality but also, given the social context of homogenising and oppressive discourse of the Victorian time, he also believes that his desires are evil, “There comes an end to all things […] and this brief condescension to my evil finally destroyed the balance of my soul.” (Stevenson, 116). Furthermore, it is so strong the oppression exercised by the moral codes of Victorianism that Jekyll resists to admit his natural desires to be part of himself; he is ashamed of it, as shown by the
confession to Utterson when Jekyll says:

“And indeed the worst of my faults was a certain impatient gaiety of disposition, such as has made the happiness of many, but such as I found it hard to reconcile with my imperious desire to carry my head high, and wear a more than commonly grave countenance before the public. Hence it came about that I concealed my pleasures; and that when I reached years of reflection, and began to look round me and take stock of my progress and position in the world, I stood already committed to a profound duplicity of me. Many a man would have even blazoned such irregularities as I was guilty of; but from the high views that I had set before me, I regarded and hid them with an almost morbid sense of shame.” (Stevenson, 95).

In psychological terms, the natural but rejected impulses and desires of human nature, like those of Dr Jekyll, are called *shadows*. *Shadows* is defined as:

“Aquella parte del psiquismo inconsciente contiguo a la conciencia aunque no necesariamente aceptado por ella. La personalidad de la sombra, opuesta a nuestras actitudes y decisiones conscientes, representa una instancia psicológica negada que mantenemos aislada en el inconsciente donde termina configurando una especie de personalidad disidente […] A los dos o tres años de edad todo nuestro psiquismo irradia energía y disponemos de lo que bien podríamos denominar una personalidad de 360º. Un niño corriendo, por ejemplo, es una esfera pletórica de energía. Un buen día, sin embargo, escuchamos a nuestros padres decir cosas como: ‘¿Puedes estarte quieto de una vez?’ o ‘¡Deja de fastidiar a tu hermano!’ y descubrimos atónitos que les molestan ciertos aspectos de nuestra personalidad. Entonces, para seguir siendo merecedores de su amor comenzamos a arrojar todas aquellas facetas de nuestra personalidad que les desagrada en un saco invisible que todos llevamos con nosotros […] Cada cultura llena su saco con contenidos diferentes. El cristianismo, por ejemplo, suele despojarse de la sexualidad [sin embargo] cuando nos negamos a aceptar una parte de nuestra personalidad ésta termina tornándose hostil.” (Jung et. al., 16, 19, 20).

Consequently, given the fact that Jekyll considers his natural drives to be evil due to the rejection of these human qualities by his society, he filled his invisible bag of *shadows* with his natural but repressed homoerotic desires, without realising that by not accepting them, these would inevitably lead him to his own destruction. So then,

“Dr Jekyll conocía la dualidad que albergaba en su propia naturaleza – era consciente de que dentro de él habitaba otro ser cuyos deseos iban en contra de su necesidad de aprobación social – y estaba dotado, por tanto, de una compresión psicológica superior a la de la mayoría de sus semejantes. Si hubiera profundizado en esta compresión hasta el punto de sostener la tensión entre los opuestos su personalidad hubiera podido seguir creciendo hasta la individualización.” (Jung et. al., 33).
Jekyll however, instead of growing and deepening on his knowledge about his two indissoluble selves, in which the tension between Jekyll's two opposites would be reconciled to become a mature and fulfilled individual, the only way he came about to unleash his true self was by dividing his id and his superego, as if his id was not a part of himself. Consequently, as mentioned by Saposnik,

“This is Jekyll's tragedy. He is so enmeshed in his self-woven net of duplicity that he cannot identify the two entities whose separation he hopes to achieve. By seeing Hyde as another being rather than as part of himself, he is forced to deny the most significant result of his experiment and indeed of his entire story, the inescapable conclusion that man must dwell in uncomfortable but necessary harmony with his multiple selves.” (724).

Thus, Jekyll believes his id to be evil, “I am the chief of sinners” (Stevenson, 54), because he has been instilled by Victorian morality and religion that his natural cravings are just the opposite: unnatural, fearful, beastly, unnameable, sadistic, amoral and sinful; therefore, worthy of punishment. We have to bear in mind, that being homosexual when one is born in an environment that tells you from all sides: religion, family, friends and society on the whole, that homosexuality is a depravation and an abominable condition, one feels cursed from the very moment he is conscious about his inherent natural desires; since, you are not supposed to exist as that because this is the constructed “evil” image that we have inherited from religion. Furthermore, by not having either any referent to whom you may possibly identify with in school, family or society in general, your self-alienation becomes thus so fierce that in order to survive, your psyche throws into the invisible bag of shadows your natural and inherent self; you then become a farce, an actor, a masquerade. It is needed a strong will that is able to defy society and the very foundations of religion that condemns your being into the abyss of eternal suffering and punishment; you need to challenge on the one hand, yourself, by confronting your shadows and accepting them in order to reconcile your id with the superego, and then defy the teleological order of society; if you want to break free and experience blessing in “sin”. However, Dr Jekyll was unable to retrieve his real self from his “invisible bag of shadows” due to the strict moral codes of his society. Instead, he resorted to religion; Jekyll expressed in his full statement of the case that he clung to the hope of salvation by attending mass and abiding to its set of moral religious codes, “You know yourself how earnestly, in

1Id: “primitive and instinctive component of personality. The id is the impulsive (and unconscious) part of our psyche and operates on the pleasure principle (Freud, 1920) which is the idea that every impulse should be satisfied immediately, regardless of the consequences. When the id achieves its demands, we experience pleasure, when it is denied we experience 'unpleasure' or tension.” (McLeod).

2Superego: “The superego incorporates the values and morals of society which are learned from one's parents and others. The superego's function is to control the id's impulses, especially those which society forbids, such as sex and aggression. It has the function of persuading the ego to turn to moralistic goals rather than simply realistic ones and to strive for perfection.” (McLeod).
the last months of the last year, I laboured to relieve suffering.” (Stevenson, 115). Thus, Jekyll expected that the “good” Christian values would save him from the “evil” within himself; a hope that would certainly not come. Because, just as mentioned by Jung et. al.,

Accordingly, Dr Jekyll's shadows take over his being, “My devil had been long caged, he came out roaring.” (Stevenson, 112), and he is therefore doomed to failure not because of his “evil” nature, but because he has not managed to assume and reconcile his shadows with the strict moral codes of Victorian society and religion. After all, the “evil” image that Victorian society attributes to Dr Jekyll is nothing more than a social construct in which natural sexual desires are condemned and vilified in a specific culture and time; as mentioned by Saposnik, “[the narrative] plunges immediately into the center of Victorian society to dredge up a creature ever present but submerged; not the evil opponent of a contentious good but the shadow self of a half-man.” (717).

However, homoerotic desire has not always been a natural feature that was needed to be thrown into the shadows of a half-man. In fact, in ancient Greece and Rome, homoerotic relationships were considered not only normal but also relationships befitted of sophisticated societies, such as Plato illustrated when he wrote:

“For Plato, it is despotic governments that he categorises as “barbaric”; as can be seen, everything is subjective and “evil exists primarily in the eye of the beholder.” (Baumeister, 18). Also, the very same Bible that condemns homosexuality says that “God creates man, both male and female, in His own image.” (Genesis, chapter 1). Consequently, even from a Christian perspective, how then is that homoerotic relations are labelled as “abomination” at the same time that we have been created in His own image? This shows that the biblical discourse is also open to interpretation and manipulation; nothing, not even metadiscourses within themselves escape subjectivity; thus, the
“inherent evil nature” does not exist but on our constructed image of “reality”. Moreover, two millennia after Plato's life, how is it that homosexuality is considered nowadays in many different countries around the world, not only a natural sexual orientation but it is also a legalised condition that can benefit from the same marital and even adoption rights as hetero-erotic relationships? At most, rather than “evil” being an innate feature of human nature in which homosexuality would be included, it is a variety of sexual desires that do not necessarily conform with the hetero-normative model of many societies and cultures that are inherent to humankind.

However, Victorian social structures and moral values did not approve individualistic fulfilment and pleasures, “While they valued individual distinction, the Victorians tended to put community and custom first – embodied, not least, by home and family – ahead of individual pursuits [the Victorians placed values] on the greater whole, on honor, nobility, self-effacement – above individual achievements, and certainly above financial success.” (Snodgrass, 9-10). With this in mind, it is easier to see that it is Victorian society that constructs and instils the image of “evil” to those behaviours that look for individual fulfilment; since they fear their social structures, values and power to be challenged and lost. This reading is supported by Laubender's point, “The “horror” [Hyde] incites in all those who see him is more clearly understood as resulting from the socially constructed fear of and abhorrence for homosexuality itself. Society feared (and still fears) the homosexual “taboo” and so automatically assumes it to be an innately violent desire [and an inherently evil feature in human nature]. (25). Accordingly, then, “Civilization behaves towards sexuality like a tribe or a section of the population that has subjected another and started exploiting it. Fear that the victims may rebel necessitates strict precautionary measures.” (Freud, 104). Hence the importance for Victorianism to condemn and ostracise those subversive subjects that may pose a threat to those “straight” moral values that the Victorians were so proud to spread out into the world as a symbol of perfection and supremacy.

3.3. Language as a vehicle to define “madness” and “evil”

On the other hand, it is discourse the vehicle that turns Hyde, and by extension subversive human conduct, into a “monster”, a “mad evil creature” that has to be ostracised and punished in order to safeguard the “nobility” of an advanced civilisation; as mentioned by Foucault, “Language is the first and last structure of madness.” (210). Then, it is through language that Hyde is dehumanised; he is turned into a beast, an “ape-like” figure that justifies social condemnation. As mentioned by Waller, this is a psychological construction of the Other, in which “dehumanization involves categorizing a group [or person] as inhuman either by using categories of subhuman creatures (that is, animals) or by using categories of negatively evaluated unhuman creatures (such
as demons and monsters).” (206). Certainly, when Mr Utterson realises that Mr Hyde is the only benefactor of Jekyll's will and goes in search of Mr Hyde, Utterson states to Jekyll, “If ever I read Satan's signature upon a face, it is on that of your new friend.” (Stevenson, 24). Furthermore, previous to this statement, Hyde is described by Utterson as “dwarfish”, “hardly human” and “troglodytic”; derogative linguistic terms that dehumanises man with the purpose to legitimise the idea that an specimen with such features cannot possibly be anything else but a disorderly individual who is affected by “madness”; and as such, the “madman” does not deserve to be part of a civilised culture. It must be remembered that just after Jekyll seems to have temporarily recovered his peace of mind, he tells Utterson that he is going “to lead a life of extreme seclusion; you must not be surprised, nor must you doubt my friendship, if my door is often shut even for you.” (Stevenson, 54). This sudden transformation in Jekyll’s behaviour is then considered by Utterson as madness, “So great and unprepared a change pointed to madness.” (Stevenson, 54). Additionally, Dr Lanyon’s letter with his full statement, in which the incomprehensible instructions by Dr Jekyll are explained, also reinforces the idea of Jekyll's alleged madness “The more I reflected the more convinced I grew that I was dealing with a case of cerebral disease.” (Stevenson, 87). As can be seen, it is language that defines and categorises Jekyll as the Other, the “madman”, and consequently, “evil”. However, the only reality these linguistic labels show is the subjectivity with which the Other is constructed; since, as mentioned by Knoll,

“The word evil inescapably invokes religious and mythological mind-sets […] labeling someone as evil suggests that he or she is beyond redemption [and that] the person is permanently beyond human understanding, a sentiment that is contrary to scientific principles. Perhaps the most objective conclusion one could reach about evil is that it is a term associated with considerable linguistic ambiguity, with various meanings to different people.” (106).

Moreover, Foucault also states that,

“Madness is not linked to the world and its subterranean forms, but rather to man, to his weaknesses, dreams, and illusions […] the symbol of madness will be that mirror which, without reflecting anything real, will secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his own presumption. Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with man and whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive.” (70, 71).

To put it another way, by applying Foucault's point to the story of The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, madness should be Jekyll's existential inquisitiveness and his quest for “the mystic and the transcendental” (Stevenson, 96), that lead him to the conclusion that, “man is not truly one, but truly two.” (Stevenson, 96). Hence, the madness attributed to Dr Jekyll for his behavioural
change it is an unreal construction of the Other that does not reflect any truth. Indeed, through the use of language that categorises Jekyll as madman and his alter ego as a beast of “ape-like fury” (Stevenson, 34), Victorian society vilifies and demonises any wisdom that may turn citizens into subversive beings. After all, for Victorianism, Jekyll's madness represents Foucault's idea that “since it is a forbidden wisdom, it presages both the reign of Satan and the end of the world.” (62); therefore, “madness” constitutes a scandal for society, a state of mind that needs to be damned and disposed of. The “evil madman” is then a mere social construction that justifies the elimination of the subversive and revolutionary. However, since all humans are provided with the ability to wonder about our own “realities”, this means that we are all candidates to be labelled as “mad”, and then persecuted whenever our conduct is categorised as “subversive evil”. This idea goes in line with Baumeister's statement, “A determined inspection of almost anyone's life and mind can find evidence of abnormality, neurosis, and other pathology. This ambiguity has made psychological diagnosis a useful tool for the repression of political dissent.” (554). Baumeister's point perfectly reflects Stevenson's criticism of his constraining society and how the duality of Jekyll/Hyde can be read as an allegory of Christ; since “Jesus crucified … was the scandal of the world and appeared as nothing but ignorance and madness to the eyes of his time.” (Foucault, 171). Consequently, just as Jesus was portrayed as a madman and an evil oddity who threatened the authority of Rome, so is Hyde portrayed as an abhorrent evil figure that shakes the moral foundations of Victorian power; both had to be demonised and disposed of, because “The body of a dehumanized [individual] possesses no meaning. It is waste, and its removal is a matter of sanitation.” (Waller, 207). Moreover, in the same way that Jesus' martyrdom came to symbolise the salvation of humanity for Christianity centuries later after his death, Hyde's homosexual appetite, and by extension Jekyll's homoerotic desires, could be envisioned by Stevenson, as the future liberation of human desires from the chains of the restraining morals of the Victorian era; so as to suggest that just as Jesus went from being a madman to being a saviour, so would Jekyll/Hyde go from being evil to being a liberator. So then, the dichotomy of good and evil in both Jesus and Jekyll/Hyde are shown to be just a social construction; one which is based on discourse about how an individual is categorised in a certain way at a specific time and by a given culture so as to prevent the legal authority from being subverted.

3.4. Deconstructing evil in paedophilia

Hyde's paedophiliac inclination is a crime from a determined moral perspective, but not an evil feature of mankind. Thus, we are aware of Hyde's transgressive sexual preferences when Mr Utterson is told by Mr Enfield that “I saw two figures: one a little man […] and the other a girl of
maybe eight or ten […] the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her screaming on the ground.” (Stevenson, 6). This molestation suggests Hyde's paedophiliac disposition upon the child, which may be claimed to reflect the “evil” nature of the perpetrator. However, despite how abominable child abuse may sound, categorising the perpetrator as an inherently “evil” individual is to fall on the trap of labelling him within the framework of the myth of pure evil. In order to justify the construction of evil on paedophilic behaviour, it is important to bear in mind that the conception we have nowadays about paedophiles, and certainly too in the Victorian era, has not always been the same; rather it varies from time to time and from culture to culture. So then, while “Modern law codifies the image of portraying children as mentally incapable of consenting to sexual relations and as guiltless in criminal procedures.” (Mullis and Baunach, 390), this has not been the same at all across centuries and cultures. As an illustration of cultural and time differences it is important to realise that in ancient Greece, “adult-child sex was part of a normal cultural life in which sexual relationships between upper-class men and boys were embedded in an educational context designed to further the younger males' social and emotional development.” (Mullis and Baunach, 390-391). Also, in Papua New Guinea, it was believed that “as late as the 1970's the fellated semen of an older male “masculinizes” a prepubescent boy, allowing the boy to mature into a fierce warrior. Thus, around age 7, boys would begin a prolonged rite-of-passage characterized by frequent oral-sexual contacts with older, sexually mature males.” (Mullis and Baunach, 391). As can be seen, adult-child sexual relationships have not always been condemned; in fact, depending on the time and culture, these types of sexual intercourses have been promoted and required as a necessary step that would allow the minor to achieve an expected and desired social status. How then, these types of sexual intercourses came to be considered as despicable crimes and therefore attributable to “evil” characters such as Jekyll/Hyde? According to Mullis and Baunach, three historical developments influenced such a change of perspective, “the spread of Christian thought, the 'invention' and lengthening of childhood, and the advent of compulsory schooling.” (392). Hence, Mullis and Baunach state that on the one hand,
Having this in mind, now it is easier to see how Mr Hyde's abuse on the child can only be labelled as “evil” from the moral perspective of his time (as well as from ours), but not as an inherent evil feature of his nature, otherwise many other people and even whole cultures in past times would for the same token need to be catalogued as such; and doing so would even reinforce the idea of fabrication, since it is impossible that entire past traditions and people are “evil”. So then, as mentioned by Mullis and Baunach, “The wrath reserved for child molesters is a product of our cultural construction of childhood.” (390).

Moreover, the fact that even the way the perpetrator of a child abuse is judged by society in Victorian times differs from ours further supports Mullis and Baunach's point of cultural construction. While in our modern times a paedophile would be sent to court and without the shadow of a doubt he would be sent to prison, that was not the case in Victorian England. This is exemplified in the narrative, when once Mr Hyde is caught on the act of abusing the minor by the child's family and Mr Enfield himself, the penalty for his deed would be “to make such a scandal out of this as should make his name stink from one end of London to the other” (Stevenson, 7), unless Mr Hyde would pay a certain sum of money for compensation that would allow him to go free, “we screwed him up to a hundred pounds for the child's family.” (Stevenson, 8). Certainly, making a scandal of someone's reputation was far more detrimental for a child molester than taking him to court in the Victorian era. However, allowing a paedophile to go free in exchange for some money, while being caught in the act, even by the child's family, would be labelled today in our 21st century, not only as “evil” but also as all those attributes that well fit within such a term, like “depraved”, “degenerate” and “grotesque”; and most surely parents would be not only judged for their “outrageous” reaction but they would also be deprived from keeping their child by the social services. This demonstrates that the judgment and labels that we apply to certain deeds or behaviours, whether that of the perpetrator or the bystanders' response who allow the paedophile to go free, are just the reflection of a social and cultural set of moral codes.

3.5. How transgression is performed by “good” people

This section will show the cliché about transgression performed by “evil” people. In fact, many offenses are carried about by “good” people. This idea is supported by Javaid, who states that,

“It has been argued that 'evil' is not necessarily the absence of good (they are not opposites); they are both contestable concepts (Beirne and Nelken, 1997). This suggests that 'evil' relates to morals but morals can be flawed. Moral values may differ from culture to culture, so it is argued that conceptions of morality
ought to be based on how people actually behave, not on an ideal standard on how people should behave. The fact that an individual has committed an 'evil' act, such as pedophilia, may not automatically make that person 'evil' because 'evil' acts may be committed by 'good' people. Therefore, no one is inherently 'evil', arguably only actions are (Agamben, 2005). Labeling someone as 'evil' may make it easy for societies to justify his or her condemnation, rejection and punishment of that person.” (4).

Javaid's statement perfectly illustrates how the attribution of “evil” to certain people gives us the false comfort that we would not ever commit a certain trespass because we are “well-founded” citizens. Therefore, “evildoers” deserve to be persecuted and punished; “they are so outrageously different from us that our society is better off without them”. However, by assigning the label of “evil” to a person, we are categorising that individual within the framework of the myth of pure evil, and therefore, we are prevented from knowing the potentiality for transgression by ordinary “well-grounded” people, that is, Dr Jekyll, the “reputable” Victorian gentlemen, and definitely, us. Knoll illustrates this point as follows:

“Views of evil as the adversary of good, work well for increasing hostilities between rival nations, ethnic groups, and other social units. Having strong beliefs in an active and tangible evil (i.e. Satan) correlates significantly with intolerance towards others […] Perhaps the most self-satisfying achievement of perpetuating the myth of evil is that it allows us to be reassured of our own goodness. It confers a moral superiority that is itself, a set up for perpetrating all manner of atrocities.” (114).

Certainly, the narrative goes in this direction, suggesting the hypocrisy of all those “reputable” and “good” Victorian gentleman that under no circumstances would they ever admit to commit Hyde's “atrocities”; since, “giving evil a distinct face also gratifies us by putting distance between us and the “others”, lending certainty to the idea that we are worlds apart in our differences. Thus, there is a social virtue to outlining the face of evil; society is exonerated and bears no responsibility.” (Knoll, 109). Accordingly, the idea of “evil” actions committed by “good” people is hinted at in the narrative, first and most obvious, by Dr Jekyll, but also by those gentlemen of good reputation, like Mr Enfield when he gossips to Mr Utterson about his first encounter with Mr Hyde on the night the child is assaulted, “[Mr Enfield to Mr Utterson:] Did you ever remark that door? […] It is connected in my mind with a very odd story […] I was coming home from some place at the end of the world, about three o'clock of a black winter morning.” (Stevenson, 5). Mr Enfield is not explicit about his whereabouts at three o'clock in the morning, but the narrative suggests that “Enfield, who has been out all night, is one of these people. Enfield is like Jekyll – someone who clearly secretly likes the high life – but we never discover what pleasures he enjoys.” (Gilbert, 24). The vague description of Enfield's whereabouts, “some place at the end of the world”, although not explicit at this stage, it
refers to “the dismal quarter of Soho” (Stevenson, 37), a part of the city that is described as “a district of some city in a nightmare.” (Stevenson, 37), where crime, vices and sex would usually take place. Even today, the Soho quarter is a renowned area of central London for its gay life and other types of transgressive sexual entertainment. Consequently, as Laubender exemplifies, “Jekyll logically hides Hyde in a place where he will have 'easy access' to those evil indulgences that comprise his nature, a place where those types of indulgences would never be subject to suspicion.” (25). However, if only people of doubtful honour would stride the streets of that quarter at those times of the night, what was Enfield doing? Where exactly was he coming from? The narrative suggests that Enfield, who may appear to be as a “good” person turns out to be doing exactly the same as Hyde; since, as mentioned by Saposnik, “Victorian man was haunted constantly by an inescapable sense of division. As rational and sensual being, as public and private, as civilized and bestial creature, he found himself necessarily an actor, playing only that part of himself suitable to the occasion.” (716). Thus, Stevenson hints at transgressive actions not only performed by “evil” characters; rather, “good” people also indulge their desires despite they may not acknowledge it. Hence, not admitting Enfield's “evildoing” prevents him, and by extension the whole “reputable” society, to acknowledge his longing for executing the same passions. The rejection of Victorians' self-indulgence in prohibited pleasures “licenses” their condemnation towards Hyde and the construction of his character as the myth of pure evil; because he cannot possibly be like us. Nonetheless, Hyde is not evil, but rather, he is the disturbing and uncomfortable embodiment of “ordinary” people, the personification of Enfield, and certainly, of all of us; since, just as Baumeister points out, “the myth of pure evil confers a kind of moral immunity on people who believe in it […] belief in the myth is itself one recipe for evil, because it allows people to justify violent and oppressive actions. It allows evil to masquerade as good.” (188).

### 3.6. Deconstructing evil in murder

Finally, Hyde is depicted as a murderer, and not only that, the fury with which he inflicts murder on Sir Danvers Carew seems to indicate Hyde is a murderer of the worst ilk; which as cannot be otherwise, would corroborate Jekyll's “psychopathology” as an indicator of his “inherent evil side”. However, even though murder could be classified as one of the worst human evils from a moral perspective, this categorisation is also a social fabrication because of two reasons: firstly, murder could be seen as good depending on the perspective it is looked from, and secondly, it is the social environment that conditions Hyde's behaviour. Thus, in order to clarify the myth of the pure evil attributed to Hyde, let's first consider the description of Sir Danver Carew's murder:
“All of a sudden he [Hyde] broke out in a great flame of anger, stamping with his foot, brandishing the cane, and carrying on (as the maid described it) like a madman […] Mr. Hyde broke out of all bounds and clubbed him to the earth. And next moment, with ape-like fury, he was trampling his victim under foot and hailing down a storm of blows, under which the bones were audibly shattered and the body jumped upon the roadway […] The stick with which the deed had been done, although it was of some rare and very tough and heavy wood, had broken in the middle under the stress of this insensate cruelty.” (Stevenson, 34-35).

As can be seen, Hyde murdered his victim savagely, the maid's version of the facts are then corroborated by the very same Jekyll in his full statement of the case, “I declare, at least, before God, […] that I struck in no more reasonable spirit than that in which a sick child may break a plaything.” (Stevenson, 113). But, to what extent can this morally despicable deed be attributed to an “inherent evil nature”? We have to bear in mind that despite Jekyll's testimony defines his alter ego's actions as “unreasonable”, which would fall within the parameters of the myth of pure evil, there may be a strong reason to have murdered Sir Danvers Carew. He is a Member of the Parliament and therefore a political representative, that is, he creates laws that are based on the Victorian perspective of morality. And as we have mentioned earlier, it is Victorian morality that represses natural desires of man, and therefore, those individuals who transgress social normativity are prevented from enjoying a free life. This situation brings about individual repression, from which the inhibited *shadows* of Jekyll would one way or another be unleashed with fury, “as the first edge of penitence wore off, the lower side of me, so long indulged, so recently chained down, began to growl for licence.” (Stevenson, 116). Therefore, although Jekyll describes the crime as “unreasonable”, that is not quite accurate; rather, it is his myopia that prevents him from seeing that his “evil” nature is in fact a reaction against an oppressive society that pushes him to act like that for survival. From this perspective, the murder of Sir Danvers Carew could be interpreted as “good” because it justifies Hyde's right to defend himself against a moral injustice that prevents him from achieving his human fulfilment. This example would illustrate what Nietzsche called “*the master-morality*” and “*the slave-morality*” (253), in which Sir Danvers Carew would serve as a representative of the nobility who, “regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: “What is injurious to me is injurious in itself” [because] *he is a creator of values.*” (Nietzsche, 254), whereas Hyde would be a representative of the slave who rebels against what is injurious and detrimental for him; since, “The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a scepticism and distrust, a refinement of distrust of everything “good” that is there honoured.” (Nietzsche, 256). As can be seen, Nietzsche perfectly illustrates that everything is subjective, and depending on the angle it is looked from, the concept of
“good” and “evil” is turned upside down. A further example that would determine the subjectivity of evil is if we look at how the victim is described, “When they had come within speech [it refers to Hyde and Sir Danvers Carew] the older man bowed and accosted the other with a very pretty manner of politeness.” (Stevenson, 34); as illustrated by these lines, Sir Danvers is attributed noble proprieties, features that suggests the victim to be “good” and “innocent”. Therefore, our perception of Hyde is that he is “evil” because, who would murder an “innocent” and “noble” citizen in such an unreasonable way and with such a cold blood if not the “Devil” himself? However, we have to take into account that in the Victorian era, Britain was the most powerful nation in the world that gained a great deal of its money, power and influence, by colonising and enslaving other civilisations; therefore, what if Sir Danvers Carew was not that an innocent man? What if he, a representative of Victorianism and a creator of values, was in charge of a sugar plantation in an indigenous territory and his murder meant that thousands of lives would be spared from slavery and death? Would then his murder be perceived as “evil” or as “good”? Most probably his murder would be labelled as a “good” action by the majority of us, because it serves a humanitarian purpose. As can be seen, “evil” is not an inherent feature of some “depraved monsters”; rather it is the biased view of rulers that twist our perception. And Stevenson seems to imply precisely that, that Victorianism may be the source of “evil” because they created laws based on artificial and hypocritical morals; and these, may be detrimental for the wellbeing of individuals. This idea goes in tune with Rousseau's belief that, “Morality began to appear in human actions, and everyone, before the institution of law, was the only judge and avenger of the injuries done him, so that the goodness which was suitable in the pure state of nature was no longer proper in the newborn state of society.” (89). Rousseau perfectly illustrates that “evil” would not be an inherent feature of Jekyll but the cause of what society has produced. Although Rousseau's notion of humanity as “inherently good” is also a social construction, it nevertheless demonstrates how it is the environment that determines human behaviour.

4. “EVIL” IN LORD OF THE FLIES

4.1 Contextualising the novel

Golding's Lord of the Flies is an allegorical post-World War II fiction that “reacts against the Victorian texts and its assumptions; the moral superiority of Westerners.” (Golding, 519). Thus, the author subverts the image of “evil” that traditionally has been attributed to indigenous people in Victorian castaway novels during the massive expansion of the British Empire. Westerners were portrayed as “good” and “civilized” beings whose divine mission was in fact “The White Man's
Burden” (Kipling, 1) that would enlighten the “savages” and bring them a “proper culture”, “the true religion” and “civilisation”; obviously a justification for their “noble” enterprise of colonialism in which the “savage” was “evil” as opposed to the “goodness” of the white man. So then, a century later, the effects of World War II made Golding challenge the preconceived notions of “good” and “evil”. Golding himself, “served in the Royal Navy, took part in the pursuit of the German battleship Bismarck as well as in the invasion of Normandy, and by the end of the war he was a lieutenant in command of a rocket landing craft.” (Golding, 15). His experience in the most atrocious and cruellest war of all times inevitably influenced the way he perceived human nature; and thus, as a reflection of Golding's conviction, “the narrative suggests that evil is inherent within all of us.” (Golding, 513). However, although Golding's view of “inherent evil” is perfectly understandable if we take into account his participation in the mother of all wars and his witnessing of the horrors of the Holocaust, I argue that there is no intrinsic evil in human nature; rather, “evil is socially enacted and constructed. It does not reside in our genes or in our soul, but in the way we relate to other people.” (Baumeister, 692). “Evil”, therefore, is our constructed projection onto the Other that artificially distances “Them” from “Us”. Golding's view on “evil”, however, shows some kernels of “truth”; not that “evil” is in all of us, but that all humans have the potential for aggression that allows us to defend ourselves against that which is pernicious for us. This potential, nevertheless, may lead us all, under certain social, political and cultural variables, into a mutual commitment of atrocities that are the product of an escalation of hostilities within a conflict process. This conflict process is what makes us believe the moral delusion that we are fighting against “evil”. And, since They cannot possibly be like Us, we must therefore be “good”, no matter the barbaric means we may use.

4.2. Escalation of hostilities

Violence is not the signature of evil, rather the environment develops our potentiality for aggression into a mutual escalation of hostilities. So then, in Lord of the Flies we are presented with a group of “innocent” British children that end up in an uninhabited island after the plane they were travelling on crashes. This is the perfect environment in which children could develop an ideal society, starting from scratch, without the vices of created and already established rules, a sort of idyllic Rousseauian's state of nature where mankind has nothing but “benevolence”. However, no sooner had the frightened boys realised they were on their own than they felt the need to organise themselves and replicate the established model of society from where they came from. Consequently, their fear makes them feel the need of a ruler, a social order, that would lead the group towards survival, “[Ralph:] Seems to me we ought to have a chief to decide things.”
(Golding, 61); and this is when the trouble initiates and the escalation of hostilities begins to brew. Hence, despite the election for a ruler is carried out by mirroring the norms of “democracy”, or the type of social contract proposed by Rousseau, there is no reason for Ralph to be recognised as a chief; Piggy is the most intelligent, and Jack, who is bully and bossy, is “the most obvious leader” (Golding, 62), nevertheless, “there was a stillness about Ralph as he sat that marked him out: there was his size, and attractive appearance; and most obscurely, yet most powerfully, there was the conch.” (Golding, 62). This situation brings about Jack's discomfiture, “Jack's face disappeared under a blush of mortification.” (Golding, 63), who feels degraded and humiliated, and does not agree with his partial leadership over the hunters; he believes the election of Ralph as a chief is detrimental for his personal fulfilment, therefore, he has what Hobbes would call, his natural right to reject that which bedevils him. And, although he also believes a kind of social order should be implemented, it is himself who in his view should rule with an iron fist, after all, Jack was already the leader at school, “[Jack:] I ought to be chief […] I'm chapter chorister and head boy.” (Golding, 62). Henceforth, an escalation of aggression and violence is the recipe that will undoubtedly bring about the fatal outcome, since as Baumeister argues, “Large-scale [atrocities] is probably most often the end of a long road that no one foresaw at the start. People become caught up in the process gradually, and things become more and more extreme.” (525); and this is exactly illustrated in the narrative, “[Ralph:] “You let the fire out”. Jack checked, vaguely irritated by this irrelevance but too happy to let it worry him.” (Golding, 151). As can be seen, Jack, the most aggressive boy among the children, does not prioritise to keep the fire alive in the mountain in order to be rescued, his interests seem to be less mature than Ralph's, as Jack only seeks to have fun and move away from Ralph’s authority, “[Jack:] Bollocks to the rules!” (Golding, 193), “I'm going off by myself. He can catch his own pigs. Anyone who wants to hunt when I do can come too.” (Golding, 260). Jack's attitude, perhaps, may be indicative that despite his apparent courage, he is scared to death, more than anybody else; and therefore, his alleged “natural evil” would not be but a natural psychological mechanism to overcome his fear. Nevertheless, Jack's confrontation, in turn, results in Ralph's disregard of Jack, “We can do without Jack Merridew. There's others besides him on this island” (Golding, 262). This situation incites Jack to acclaim himself the ruler of his own band of hunters, “We'll hunt. I'm going to be chief.” (Golding, 271), and challenge Ralph's group by both, stealing their source of fire, “We'll raid them and take fire.” (Golding, 277) and fighting against them, “Jack made a rush and stabbed at Ralph's chest with his spear.” (Golding, 353). These lines show how, “the interpersonal exchange contributes to escalation […] much violence is reciprocal, and revenge tends to be poorly calibrated so that the retaliation often exceeds the provocation.” (Baumeister, 528). Baumeister's point is perfectly illustrated by the tragic death of Simon and Piggy. Moreover, although the situation of escalating violence in the narrative is analogous to the escalating tensions
that lead the totalitarian regime of Hitler to commit horrendous atrocities.

“Even one-sided violence escalates, however. Studies of the Holocaust suggest that large-scale mass murder came only after a long and slow progression of lesser actions against its victims. The German Jews were at first stigmatized, discriminated against, deprived of various legal rights, subjected to special taxes, and in other ways mistreated for years before there was any systematic plan to kill them. Even sending them to concentration camps was not necessarily done with an intention to kill large numbers of them […] There is plenty of evidence to suggest that many Germans who participated in the relocation process thought only of deporting people who did not fit in. The final solution of mass killing was implemented after it became apparent that there was no place to which the unwanted Jews could be permanently deported.” (Baumeister, 528, 529).

still, this does not prove any inherent evil nature in mankind; rather, atrocities develop as a chain reaction of mutual minor actions that would gradually and exceedingly turn into barbarism. Moreover, the resulting barbarism can only be categorised as “evil” from a moral perspective, but again, whose moral perspective? Because, in the context of Nazi Germany, Norbert Elias states that,

“The mere sound of the word 'Deutschland' seemed for Germans to be laden with associations that were out of the ordinary, with a charisma that bordered that of the holy. - Our cause is sacred; theirs is evil. We are righteous; they are wicked. We are innocent; they are guilty. We are victims; they are the victimizers. It is rarely our enemy or an enemy, but the enemy – a usage of the definite article that hints of something fixed and immutable, abstract and evil.” (Waller, 178).

Baumeister equally describes the “superior morality” of Nazi Germans as follows:

“The key point about the SS is that people designated to carry out the most brutal and wicked actions were the ones who had been chosen and taught to be an elite force, superior in character and virtue to everyone else. It was not the dregs and thugs, but the finest flower, who committed the most horrible deeds […] In their own view and in the view of their colleague organizations, they were the best, the noblest. They were therefore the logical ones to use for making sure that mass murder was carried out in the most decent and morally proper fashion, in the official view.” (358).

As illustrated by both, Elias and Baumeister, morality is subject to interpretation. At most, one could argue that mankind is born with the potentiality for aggression given certain circumstances, but not “evil”, because from the SS' perspective their “righteous” actions were a reaction to defend their “lofty” ideals. So then, although Golding seems to suggest that evil is an inherent feature in humans because it manifests itself within people of the same race, age, country and culture, and it springs naturally from their own beings without the intervention of a “civilised” and “mature”
society, still Golding's pessimistic view is subjective; it does not reflect any absolute reality, except that the escalating tension among people and or civilisations is no other but the result of constructing the Other as an image of evil.

4.3. Psychological construction of the Other

“Evil” does not exist, it is just a social construction that is projected and imposed onto an adversary. This subjective perception allows us to categorise an opponent within the parameters of the myth of pure evil; thus, it justifies our pervasive actions and gives us license to exert our power and dominion over our invented Enemy, the antithesis of “us”, the Other; and therefore, the “Devil”. This dichotomy of Self vs Them is an important feature of personal and group identity that will enable us to understand the construal of the Other, and consequently, of “evil”.

Very soon in the narrative, we can see how minor physical and psychological traits are used to differentiate “you” from “me”. The “good” Ralph establishes this difference by deriding his friend when he asks his name and the answer is, “They used to call me 'Piggy'. - Ralph shrieked with laughter - .” (Golding, 41). Without delay, Ralph proceeds to unveil his friend's nickname despite Piggy told him he did not mind Ralph's mockery “So long as you don't tell the others” (Golding, 42). Ralph mocks Peggy because he also fits within the pattern of the Other, “He was shorter than the fair boy and very fat […] He came forward […] and then looked up through thick spectacles.” (Golding, 34). The description of Piggy is a sign of how he is delineated by his physical condition as well as his intellectual features; the latter, marked by his wearing glasses as a sign of being a nerd. However, Peggy is too submissive so as to present a threat to Ralph, and more importantly, Peggy, although unwillingly at first, he ends up supporting Ralph's leadership, “Every hand outside the choir except Piggy's was raised immediately. Then Piggy, too, raised his hand grudgingly into the air.” (Golding, 63); therefore, despite Peggy is fat and a nerd, it seems more advantageous for Ralph to have Peggy as “one of us”; since with Peggy's favourable vote, Ralph could legitimately be chief and rule over Jack and his choir followers; the “dangerous” Other. As can be seen, from this perspective, Ralph does not seem to be the alleged “good moral” boy who fights for a “common-wealth democracy”; rather, he could be interpreted as an opportunistic being whose aspiration is to be in power and impose his rule. The “civilised democracy” that Ralph represents would not be but a replicate of the vicious and flawed “egalitarian democracy” that the adult world has instilled in him, and from which we are too much familiarised with, I am afraid. Hence, what initially could be understood as “good”, now it does not look so much as that, which implies that “good” and “evil” is just a matter of perspective.
However, the distinction that Ralph establishes between his group and Jack's is dramatically higher than with Piggy, and it enables him to perceive his “in-group” as “good” as opposed to the “evil” he attributes to Jack's “out-group”. The following lines will illustrate this point:

> Within the diamond haze of the beach something dark was fumbling along. Ralph saw it first, and watched till the intentness of his gaze drew all eyes that way. Then the creature stepped from mirage on to clear sand, and they saw that the darkness was not all shadow but mostly clothing. The creature was a party of boys […] and dressed in strangely eccentric clothing […] The boy who controlled them was dressed in the same way.” (Golding, 56, 57).

Without having even met, Ralph is already establishing a division between the Self and what is going to be the Other. Ralph is described as “the fair boy” (Golding, 34), not only is “fair” a characteristic of his blond hair but also an allegory to his “noble” moral attributes that distinguishes him from Jack and the choirboys. Thus, the out-group is “bestowed” with a series of features that fit within the parameters of the myth of evil: if Ralph perceives Jack and his followers choirboys as “dark” then they must be “evil”, if they are a perceived as a “creature”, then they must be a “subhuman sadistic beast”, and if they are dressing in “eccentric clothes”, then they are deviating from conventional usage and conduct, and consequently, they must be “mad”. By establishing these differences, Golding is already illustrating how the Enemy is constructed.

4.4. Deconstructing inherent sadism

Sadism, is without a doubt, a feature of Jack and his gang that helps the reader, through Ralph's perspective, “[Ralph:] 'You and your blood, Jack Merridew!'” (Golding, 153), to categorise them as possessors of an innate cruelty befitted only by the Other. This is evidenced early in the narrative when Jack's bloodlust suggests he is like a “satanic savage”: “I cut the pig's throat' – said Jack, proudly [...] 'There was lashings of blood,' said Jack, laughing and shuddering, 'you should have seen it!'.” (Golding, 151). Jack therefore, is shown not only to boast about the killing but also to enjoy the process of slaughtering; he even laughs as a result of the pleasure he achieves by his killing. Moreover, the pleasure that Jack and his hunter group are claimed to have by slaughtering pigs, turns itself into a further feral frenzy at hunting down the “innocent” Ralph, “It was an ululation over by the seashore – and now the next savage answered and the next.” (Golding, 380), whose purpose was to inflict on him the same fate as that of the hunted swine,

“ The chief and Roger -
- yes, Roger -
They hate you, Ralph. They're going to do you.
They're going to hunt you to-morrow.

“But why?”

I dunno. And Ralph, Jack, the Chief, says it'll be dangerous -
- and we've got to be careful and throw our spears like at a pig.”

(Golding, 375)

Definitely, the cruelty, excitement and rejoice displayed by Jack and his team for the slaughtering of pigs and their intention to do the same with Ralph, are stereotypically assigned to “essential vicious evils”. Baumeister argues that, “Sadism is a central image of the myth of pure evil […] Sadists derive pleasure from hurting others, and they celebrate, rejoice, or laugh with pleasure when they hurt or kill someone, especially if the victim is a good person. Pure and simple, the Devil is sadistic.” (139, 141). Thus, Jack and his group may seem to fit within this definition of innate sadists and, accordingly, they are categorised as maniacal creatures who spread terror, fear and death; images that are referable to the very same Lucifer, “[The twins to Ralph:] You got to go now, Ralph. For your own good […] You don't know Roger. He's terror. And the Chief – they're both – terrors.” (Golding, 376).

Nevertheless, the fact that at the beginning of the narrative Jack is unable to kill the first pig, “[Jack and Ralph:] 'I thought I might kill'. 'But you didn't.' 'I thought I might.'” (Golding, 116), also deconstructs the notion that his sadism is innate; since, Jack's statement may be an allusion, not only to his still unskilful abilities to kill the swine but also, at a deeper level, to the shock that might have arisen in him the thought of actually giving a bloody death with his hands to the creature. Baumeister clearly exemplifies how the perpetrators of the Holocaust as well as professional torturers initially felt disgusted by the task in which they were involved:

“The cheerful sadism that is often found in victim accounts and in the movies almost vanishes when one looks at the perpetrators' own stories and experiences […] Systematic killing of civilians began during the eastward thrust of the German troops, when special units were detailed to execute certain categories of people in the captured areas [by shooting innocent civilians in the neck, including children, women and old people]. After the killing was completed, the men returned to their barracks for the night. This had been their first experience with such grisly duty. Many could not eat, but most of them drank alcohol very heavily. There was little conversation. Many men had nightmares, and the barracks atmosphere was further disturbed in the night when one man woke up from a bad dream firing his gun into the ceiling. […] The military psychiatrists found themselves called upon to treat a broad range of psychological disorders […] The perpetrators emphasized the disgusting, gruesome nature of the task, such as the sound of the screams, the feeling of being splattered with a victim's brains, or just the terrible gut feeling of killing a person […] Professional torturers hurt others as a job, but they, too, often find it stressful […] Thus, there is a convergence of evidence from many sources. Hurting someone is generally unpleasant, and it often
evokes severely negative reactions. At least, that is how most people react the first time or first few times. As we will see, it does become easier with repetition.” (Baumeister, 392-398).

Waller also agrees with Baumeister in that the first experiences of slaughtering people is often distressful, and that pleasure comes only after a process of repetition that leads to desensitization; in order words, “desensitization is the psychological process of becoming accustomed to initial extreme shocking atrocities that eventually become routinized and in some cases may even produce pleasure” (Waller, 244). This way does Waller relate how an U.S veteran become a sadist during the Vietnam war:

“Flying over a group of civilians in a helicopter, he was ordered to fire at them, an order that he did not obey. The helicopter circled over the area and again he was ordered to fire, which again he did not. The officer in charge then threatened him with court-martial, which lead him to fire next time around. He vomited, felt profoundly distressed. The veteran reported that in a fairly short time firing at civilians became like an experience at the target-shooting gallery, and he began to enjoy it.” (Waller, 247).

Given these points, sadism is a developmental state, not an inherent feature of an “intrinsic evil being”. Moreover, Jack's laughter after actually slaughtering his first prey, “He noticed blood on his hands and grimaced distastefully, looked for something on which to clean them, then wiped them on his shorts and laughed.” (Golding, 151), may not necessarily need to show he enjoys the barbarism he inflicts; since as exposed by Baumeister, “laughter is not conclusive proof of sadistic pleasure […] People may laugh for a variety of reasons. Indeed, humor is one defense against a shocking or disgusting task.” (400). Therefore, the fact that the narrative does not explicitly show any initial repulsion from the sadists, as that of the German Nazis or the US veteran in Vietnam, seems to be, suspiciously, the result of Golding's disposition to influence readers and “lured them to include themselves with the “us” group – Ralph's group. [Thus,] Golding distances Jack and the hunters from the reader while, at the same time, makes Ralph more approachable.” (Meuronen, 66). Golding's manipulation, after all, serves the purpose to include Jack and his hunters within the image of the “Devil himself”, since, “the myth of pure evil depicts sadistic, malicious forces that arbitrary and randomly attack innocent, virtuous victims” (Baumeister, 179). Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence from social psychology which indicates that “intrinsic sadism” is the product of “the social construction of cruelty.” (Waller, 230).
4.5. The Other's perspective

“Otherness is not bred only from one side but is a two-way street” (Meuronen, 32), and just as Jack and his hunters are socially constructed and perceived as the Enemy, so are Ralph and his group. In this fashion, it is essential to take into consideration the “evildoers’” point of view in order to see how they also construct the Other onto their adversary; this provides the perpetrators with their moral justification that the cruelty they exact is righteous; which, in turn, will lead us to the conclusion that the “evilness” they are attributed is a subjective judgment and therefore, a social construction. So then, although it is true that at the beginning of the novel children have fruits from which to feed, in the mid-long term little nourishment would they obtain from them as their only source of food; and they did not know for how long would they be stranded on the island, maybe, forever. Consequently, killing pigs does not only provides them with a full source of energy and nutrients needed for their optimal health, but also keeps them sportive, in shape, gives them thrill in a demotivated environment and, more importantly, provides them with a sense of power that helps them overcome their inner feeling of abandonment from civilisation and the adult world. Could anyone really blame them for killing pigs in their situation? I would certainly kill pigs too. Perhaps it may be claimed that the problem is not so much the slaughtering of the swine but the abandonment of what is supposed to be the priority: to keep the fire alive at the top of the mountain in order to be seen and rescued. However, although it is true that provided a ship comes close enough to spot them, as it really happened, “[Ralph:] There was a ship. Out there. You said you'd keep the fire going and you let it out! […] They might have seen us. We might have gone home.” (Golding, 153), the fire is a good strategy for being saved, it is arguable if that should be the priority; nobody could have possibly known how long a ship would take to appear for their rescue; a ship may have never come by. Moreover Jack was in favour of Ralph’s orders to keep the fire alive, he abandoned his “duty” only momentarily, “[Jack:] The fire’s only been out an hour or two. We can light up again.” (Golding, 152), because apart from having fun, his priority was to obtain proper substantial food, “[Jack:] We need meat.” (Golding, 154).

Furthermore, Jack and his followers obey to their psychological need of overcoming their fear of being defenceless in a remote uninhabited island; since, as Spinoza's notion of the 'causa sui' puts out,

“Children react to their own helplessness by trying to master their own bodies, deny their neediness and dependence, and fantasize their self-sufficiency through narcissistic inflation. The fantasy of being an autochthonous being that is not weak, defenseless infant is a reaction to the terror and anger of actually being a frail child who runs into his mother's arms and weeps in terror, who cannot fend for
Consequently, the violence exerted by Jack and his hunters is not whimsical, rather it responds to their desire for power in order not to feel how vulnerable they really are, “His mind was crowded with memories; memories of the knowledge that had come to them when they closed in on the struggling pig, knowledge that they had outwitted a living thing, imposed their will upon it, taken away its life like a long satisfying drink. (Golding, 152). Thus, the realisation that Ralph is the hindrance whose rules make them feel frail and small and their power ephemeral is overwhelming. This realisation confers them their reasonable and pragmatic use of violence against those who Jack considers to be the responsible for strangling their psychological need of feeling powerful; as mentioned by Baumeister, “to the perpetrator, the victim's life or death becomes a pragmatic rather than a moral issue.” (238). All things considered, Jack and his tribe would not be the inherent malicious force that want to inflict harm just for the sake of it, but rather, they are ordinary frail and vulnerable children who cannot stand the psychological pressure of feeling weak and defenceless beings. The need to feel empowered and fight against their vulnerability is the reason why Jack turns Ralph into the Other, and therefore, the enemy. Initially however, Jack does not construct the image of “evil” onto who will finally be his foe. Rather, Jack invents an imaginary creature, “the Beastie”, onto which the image of evil will be projected and therefore be categorised as the immediate enemy:

“[The boys asking about the “beast”]:
'Tell us about the snake-thing.'
'Now he says it was a beastie.'
'Beastie?'
'A snake-thing. Ever so big. He saw it.'
'In the woods.'

Either the wandering breezes or perhaps the decline of the sun allowed a little coolness to lie under the trees. The boys felt it and stirred restlessly. (Golding, 88).

As shown in these lines, Jack has cleverly resorted to the invention of a creature that is described as a “snake-thing” that crawls “like ropes in the trees and hung in the branches” (Golding, 89); an allusion to how the Devil himself is portrayed in The Bible. And, since the Devil is labelled by religion as the antithesis of “God”, then the “Beastie” must undoubtedly be the image of pure evil that turns into different shapes in order to murder the unguarded children at dark, “He says he saw the beastie, the snake-thing, and will it come back to-night?” (Golding, 89). By doing so, Jack achieves his goal: to arouse a fear in the children that helps him construct the image of the Malign
onto the Other; an enemy, which so far, is just a resourceful illusion:

“[Ralph:] They're frightened [...] I mean the way things are. They dream. You can hear 'em. Have you been awake at night? [...] They talk and scream. The littluns.” (Golding, 118).

As these lines illustrate, the children are frightened to death and suffer nightmares at the mere thought or unconscious manifestation of the lurking creature's presence. Thus, the fantasy of the monster's existence is a blatant illustration of how the image of the “evil enemy” is constructed. This invention serves Jack's purpose to legitimise his authority as a ruler who is worthy of his group's unquestioning servitude, “The two savages looked at each other, raised their spears and spoke in time. 'The Chief has spoken'” (Golding, 286), in order to defeat the malicious being that dares disturb their sleep, serenity and integrity. This reminds us to the Nazi Germany, and how Hitler projected the image of evil onto the Jews, who in turn, they served as the scapegoat that helped the dictator rationalise and legitimise his longing for power. Similarly, Jack manages to manipulate his group into believing a fantasy in order to be in control of the group and make his decisions sound reasonable, and thus, worthy of being obeyed,

“[Jack:] 'Ralph's right of course. There isn't a snake-thing. But if there was a snake we'd hunt it and kill it. We're going to hunt pigs to get meat for everybody. And we'll look for the snake too - ' [Ralph:] 'But there isn't a snake!' [Jack:] 'We'll make sure when we go hunting.'” (Golding, 90).

The strategy shown by these lines makes Jack's intentions be perceived not only as good but also as necessary if they want to survive; they need to hunt and must be ready to kill, for their own sake. Put it another way, if the “Beastie” is the image of evil that threatens their lives, then, the tribe's purpose must be “good” and “holy”. Similarly, the Nazi Germans really believed their cause was just and holy because they were fighting against evil forces that threatened their country, their identity and basically, their existence. Baumeister argues that,

“The Germans believed they had suffered substantial injustices. They felt their country deserved a leading position in Europe, but instead it had been treated with disrespect; conspired against by the older powers; tricked into losing the war; and then utterly exploited, humiliated, emasculated, and looted by the outrageous Versailles treaty and postwar settlements. [...] The Jews had undermined the war effort and stabbed their country in the back.

From an objective viewpoint, there were some kernels of truth in their complaints. The Versailles
treaty was unfair, and they had been badly used. Very clearly, though, the Jews had not stabbed the Germans in the back. But the Germans' perception was what mattered in terms of the actual flow of events.” (79).

Similarly, Jack and his hunters' perception is what matters to see that, whereas from Jack's view his cause enables him to be the chief and be relieved from feeling insignificant, therefore, a noble enterprise, for the rest of the tribe, hunting would be the means to defend themselves; and Jack would stand as their sovereign, under whose command, evil forces would be defeated. Thus, from their perspective, their mission cannot be but “sac red”. After all, the hunters' mission responds to their psychological need of feeling autonomous and powerful instead of weak and defenceless. Waller illustrates how aggression and cruelty can be interpreted as good by groups who feel vulnerable:

“Feeling insecure, their self vulnerable, and perceiving the world as a dangerous place, they experience threat as more intense than it is. They are more likely to engage, therefore, in aggression which they see as defensive. In this way, evil can be redefined as acceptable – even benevolent, since it may prevent more human suffering than it causes – in the face of comparison with actual or perceived threats by one's enemies. Such comparisons are exonerating for perpetrators, and as a result, even genocide and mass killing can become “normalized” as an appropriate response to fear and crisis.” (Waller, 203).

Waller's point perfectly illustrates how the perception of good and evil is completely subjective. Moreover, it helps us understand that by demonising the Other, in this case the invented “Beastie”, they provide themselves with the moral immunity of becoming precisely what they project onto it; that is, cruel and bestial.

4.6. Deindividualization and ritual conduct

The evolution towards becoming cruel beings takes place through a gradual process of deindividualization, that is, “the state of relative anonymity in which a person cannot be identified as a particular individual but only as a group member.” (Waller, 251). Accordingly, Golding's narrative illustrates this process as follows:

"Jack explained to Roger as he worked […]

'If only I'd some green' […]

'For hunting. Like in the war. You know – dazzle paint. Like things trying to look like something else' […]

He rubbed the charcoal stick between the patches of red and white on his face. […]

Jack planned his new face. He made one cheek and one eye-socket white, then he rubbed red over the other half of his face and slashed a black bar of charcoal across from right ear to left jaw."
As shown by these lines, Jack himself had to masquerade and teach the others to do the same in order to be able to perpetrate savagery; warfare painting, then, allows Jack to free himself from remorse, “He was safe from shame or self-consciousness behind the mask of his paint and could look at each of them in turn.” (Golding, 285). Furthermore, not only had they to customise their physical appearance but also a ritual conduct needed to be implemented in order to camouflage their conscience that otherwise would have not allow them to exert the cruelty they inflicted. This ritual conduct serves, therefore, as “an instrument of professional socialization into cruelty” (Waller, 234), such as it is illustrated in the narrative by the choreography and warfare chants of Jack and his group, “The chant rose ritually, as at the last moment of a dance or a hunt. *Kill the pig! Cut his throat! Kill the pig! Bash him in!*” (Golding, 236). The children’s behaviour, “however theatrical they may seem to outsiders, carry significant meaning and rewards for those who perform them in a culture of cruelty” (Waller, 234), since it intends to inspire in the children a “sense of high purpose and invincibility” (Waller, 234) that enables them to perform their outrageous duty of death, as it is illustrated in the narrative when Roger crushes Piggy to death with a huge rock,

> “Roger, with a sense of delirious abandonment, leaned all his weight on the lever […] The rock struck Piggy a glancing blow from chin to knee […] Piggy fell forty feet and landed on his back across that square, red rock in the sea. His head opened and stuff came out and turned red. Piggy's arms and legs twitched a bit, like a pig's after it has been killed.” (Golding, 360, 361).

Moreover, it is important to realise that ritual conduct is used in the narrative as an allegory of religion, as it is through the symbolic biblical construction of the invented “Beastie” that Golding suggests “evil is inherent in mankind”. Golding's determination is explicitly illustrated in the novel by the supernatural encounter between Simon and the impaled head of a pig, referred to as the Lord of the Flies. Simon then, seems to hear the decapitated swine's head addressing to him like this:

> “There isn't anyone to help you. Only me. And I'm the Beast.' [...] ‘Fancy thinking the Beast was something you could hunt and kill!’ [...] ‘You knew, didn't you? I'm part of you? Close, close, close! I'm the reason why it's no go?’”.

(Golding, 291).

Thus, Golding suggests that Jack's invention of the “Beastie” is not really a fantasy from which you can hide or give it hunt; rather, the creature is within us all:

> “[Simon:] 'Maybe', he said hesitantly, 'maybe there is a beast' [...]”
'What I mean is … maybe it's only us.' […]
Simon became inarticulate in his effort to express mankind's essential illness.” (Golding, 188).

Certainly, the “Beastie” epitomises Satan, a symbolism in which Simon finds himself “face to face with the decaying head of the pig mounted on a spear, like Christ in the wilderness facing the Lord of the Flies himself. Here we have the human being confronting the evil of his nature, witnessing the barbarism of his kind, attempting to understand himself through the face of death.” (Piven, 56). Precisely though, Golding's resort to religion reflects the constructed nature of his perspective. At most, it can be argued that the invention of religion and superstition reflects how, by abiding to its fabricated precepts and revering them with offerings, “[Jack:] 'We'll kill a pig and give a feast'. He paused and went on more slowly. 'And about the beast. When we'll kill, we'll leave some of the kill for it. Then it won't bother us, maybe.’” (Golding, 272), we justify “our superior morality” and sanctify our barbarity upon the Other; as Piven states, “We feign subservience to God when we have glorified our own bloated narcissism. It is a game of make believe, of pretending that all our acts of conquest, ruin and slaughter are His will, not ours.” (56). Thus, ritual conduct, as an allegory of religion and superstition, serves as a mechanism of manipulation in which, in order to fight “evil”, we perform evil ourselves. Ritual conduct, precisely, was an essential implementation in Nazi Germany; in the very same words of a commandant of the SS named Franz Stangle, “ritual conduct serves the purpose to condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it possible for them to do what they did.” (Waller, 234). Definitely, the state of deindividualization within a ritual conduct also deconstructs the idea that they are intrinsically evil; since warfare painting and theatrical performance implies the playing of a role that does not belong to the real character. They become indeed, the product of a dramaturgical interpretation and social intervention that allows them to do what their individual conscience would have repressed them to execute. Hence, it is their social environment that determines their behaviour, which in turn, is subjectively categorised as “evil” by their adversary.

4.7. How ordinary people commit evil deeds

Actually, the manipulating power of deindividualization within a ritual conduct can be so effective and mesmerising that it may lead ordinary individuals, and not “innate evil” people, to commit atrocities. The trial of Adolf Eichmann, a bureaucrat in the Final Solution, perfectly illustrates “the most discomforting of all realities – ordinary, “normal” people committing acts of extraordinary evil.” (Waller, 98). Hannah Arendt explored Eichmann’s trial and argued:
“Eichmann had little in common with the dramatic antisemitism or florid lust for killing of some other Nazi leaders. He was not evil personified. Neither was he a deranged Jew-killer. Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as “normal” - “more normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him”, one of them was reported to have said. Eichmann was, in Arendt's view, a drab drone committed to industriousness and efficiency, a featureless functionary particularly steadfast in obeying and carrying out assigned duties and orders. “Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement”, Arendt wrote, “he had no motives at all.” It was the discovery that there was nothing to discover that turned Eichmann trial into such a shocking experience.” (Waller, 100).

Arendt's realization that ordinary people indeed commit atrocities is illustrated in the narrative when the “good” and “noble” Ralph and Piggy attended Jack's feast in order to keep some control on Jack's ritual gathering, “Piggy and Ralph, under the threat of the sky, found themselves eager to take place in this demented but partly secure society” (Golding, 306). Although Ralph and Piggy were not bureaucrats carrying out duties and orders as Eichmann was, it serves to exemplify the ordinary psychological nature of individuals who end up involved in bloodshed and destructive tasks. This is not to suggest that Jack and his group are “evil” and “unbalanced”, they are also ordinary people who from their view they are fighting for a good cause and against their enemy; the “Beastie”. However, since the image of Ralph and Piggy is portrayed as that of “good” and “civilised” boys, their participation in barbarity, as we will see in short, serves to illustrate how constructed, subjective and biased is the perception of evil that is attributed to the Other. Thus, Ralph and Piggy went so spellbound by the frenzy chants of the tribal ceremony that even themselves partook in the brutal murdering of Simon, “believing”, under the spell of the feral ritual, that Simon was not himself, but the “Beastie” that everybody assumed it was real:

“The sticks fell and the mouth of the new circle crunched and scream. The beast [Simon] was on its knees in the centre, its arms folded over its face. It was crying out against the abominable noise something about a body on the hill. The beast struggled forward, broke the ring and fell over the steep edge of the rock to the sand by the water. At once the crowd surged after it, poured down the rock, leapt on to the beast, screamed, struck, bit, tore. There were no words, and no movements but the tearing of teeth and claws.” (Golding, 308).

The killing of Simon can be read as the final vestiges of civilisation, when the environment turns reason into chaos and ordinary people become the agents of brutality and irrationality. In this scenario, the construal of attributing evil onto the Other becomes more evident than ever when even Ralph realises that they are not that different from Jack and his hunters, “[Ralph:] I'm frightened. Of us.”. (Golding, 316). Ralph's self enlightenment and terror of his “subhuman potential for evil” is certainly Golding's reflection that evil is inherent in mankind. However, Golding was mistaken,
“evil” is not intrinsic in human nature, rather, our potential for aggression is. It is the social and cultural environment of violence that determines our behaviour and triggers our natural physiological equipment for aggression; which, it naturally reacts against that that we perceive as a threat. What it is terrifying is, not that we are all partly evil, but that our social and cultural environment can so easily manipulate us with discourses of hatred against an invented enemy that we refuse to believe the Other is indeed like Us; ordinary people. It is therefore, through the illusion of defining the Other, that Piggy and Ralph could be read as an analogy of Eichmann, the “Jewish Specialist” of the Third Reich, who in words of Arendt. “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.” (129). Arendt's reflection shows how Eichmann, Piggy, Ralph, and definitely, all of us, are not possessors of an evil side, rather, we are ordinary people whose “human nature contains some built-in mechanisms that can be (and all too often are) adapted and recruited into the service of evil.” (Baumeister, 465). Piggy is an illustration of this point after their realisation that he and Ralph were part of the mob who killed Simon, “It was an accident,’ said Piggy suddenly, 'that's what it was. An accident.' His voice shrilled again. 'Coming in the dark – he hadn't no business crawling like that out of the dark. He was batty. He asked for it.’” (Golding, 316). Piggy's statement reflects precisely, not only that he is unable to accept his crime but, what is more, that he defines Simon as mad, a feature that is normally attributed to the Other, and as such he “deserved” his end. Immediately after, Piggy's image of Simon as the Other is further extended towards Jack and his hunters when Piggy tries to persuade Ralph that they are “innocent”,

“[Ralph:] 'But we were! All of us”
Piggy shook his head.
'Not us till last. They never noticed in the dark. Anyway you said I was only on the outside'
'So was I', muttered Ralph, 'I was on the outside too'.
Piggy nodded eagerly.
'That's right. We was no the outside. We never done nothing, we never seen nothing.””.
(Golding, 317).

Definitely, by saying they were “on the outside” of the circle that attacked Simon, Piggy is defining a distinction between Them, (referring to Jack and his group), and Us, (Ralph and Piggy). This intentional detachment serves as a vehicle to exonerate himself and Ralph from blame; by saying they were in the periphery Piggy implies their participation on the murder was a triviality, and therefore they could not be compared with the “savage Other”. Piggy is just justifying Ralph and himself because, after all, they must think “We just cannot possibly be like Them”, we are “normal”,

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“good” boys whereas they are not; a rationalisation that Ralph seems to accept without further remorse. However, by positing the distinction between Us vs Them, “we live with the illusion of moral superiority firmly entrench in the pluralistic ignorance that comes from not recognizing the set of situational and structural circumstances that empowered others – exactly like us – to engage in deeds that they too once thought were alien to their nature. We take false pride in believing that ‘I am not that kind of person.’” (Zimbardo, 5).

Zimbardo's point is further exemplified in the novel, when not the “Beastie” anymore but Ralph, becomes Jack's immediate enemy. Jack's ambition and longing for power is undeniable, however, he pursues Ralph's same goal, to rule over the island. It is no surprising then, that Jack considers Ralph his rival, the Other, that needs to be ousted if he is to be the chief. By this time, Jack has already snatched the instrument to make fire from Ralph and Piggy, “He was a chief now in truth; and he made stabbing motions with his spear. From his left hand dangled Piggy's broken glasses.” (Golding, 337), as well as the further murder of Piggy brought about the shattering of the conch into pieces, “the conch exploded into a thousand white fragments and ceased to exist.” (Golding, 360). Thus, the losing of fire and the shell implies the downfall of Ralph's power and his control over civilisation. Moreover, the twins had been kidnapped, so Ralph's world collapses as he is left on his own with nobody else to support him anymore; he has become the Other, and therefore, the enemy:

“He argued unconvincingly that they would let him alone; perhaps even make an outlaw of him. But then the fatal unreasoning knowledge came to him again. The breaking of the conch and the deaths of Piggy and Simon lay over the island like a vapour. These painted savages would go further and further. Then there was that indefinable connection between himself and Jack; who therefore would never let him alone; never.” (Golding, 366).

Ralph is very aware of his downfall and his condition as Jack's enemy, and his only way out is to hide for survival; since, as argued by Harle, “An Enemy loses its status as a human being and the Enemy must be killed simply because he is the Enemy” (Meuronen, 30). So then, by acquiring the status of a subhuman creature, Ralph is turned into the analogy of the “Beastie”, the new “evil enemy” that is fundamentally different from Jack. The irony though, is Ralph awareness, that in essence, they are not that different. Both yearn for power and both have constructed each other as the enemy in order to achieve their disputed goal. Ralph's realisation of their similitudes is what makes him be certain that there can be only one ruler, and that just as he subjectified Jack as a savage in order to legitimise “his right” to be in power, Jack, in turn, has ingrained his followers with the dehumanising image of Ralph as a dangerous evil creature whose only destiny must be its extermination. Only this will bring the prosperity and harmony to the island and her citizens; that is
to say, he will have a prosperous existence by being the indisputable “lofty” sovereign that has
defeated “evil”. Keen's beautiful poem perfectly illustrates this reflection:

THE ENEMY MAKER

“To create an enemy … start with an empty canvas.
Sketch in broad outline the forms of men, women, and children.

Dip into the unconscious well of your own disowned
darkness with a wide brush and stain the strangers with
the sinister hues of shadows.

Trace onto the face of the enemy the greed, hatred, and
carelessness you dare not claim as your own.

Obscure the sweet individuality of each face.

Erase all hints of the myriad loves, hopes, fears that play
through the kaleidoscope of every finite heart.

Twist the smile until if forms the downward arc of cruelty.

Strip flesh from bone until only the abstract skeleton of
death remains.

Exaggerate each feature until human is metamorphosed
into beast, vermin, insect...

Fill in the background with malignant figures from ancient
nightmares – devils, demons, myrmidons of evil.

When your icon of the enemy is complete
you will be able to kill without guilt, slaughter without shame.

The thing you destroy will have become...
merely an enemy of God, an impediment
to the sacred dialectic of history.”
(Sam Keen, 9).

Indeed, Keen's poem perfectly reflects the construal of “evil” in Golding's characters, and how by
doing so they unjustly legitimise their cruelty and glorify their “right” to obliterate the enemy; a
“noble” enterprise that (ir)rationalises their greed for power. Moreover, the analogy between the poem's author and the narrative's characters are an illustration of some social evils that we are experiencing in our modern world, like “terrorism”. For instance, Western nations tend to define Arab countries as savages, and essentially evil beings with despotic and authoritarian regimes that do not only reject democracy and gender equality but also their mission is to expand and subjugate humanity under the dogmatic principles of Islam. The ex-president of the USA George W. Bush referred to countries such Iran or Afghanistan like, “the axis of evil”. This distorted, partial and biased perception of the Other allows us to take the false pride in believing our ideals to be morally superior, and since they are “evil” and we are “righteous” we are licensed to fly drones over their countries, bomb their villages and murder their population. In turn, Arab countries also deem Western nations as their enemy, our civilisation is corrupted, we are a plague of heathen immoral creatures that exploit the natural resources of Islamic nations, we subjugate their people and invade their territories for their oil. In their view, their ideals are righteous, since they consider they are fighting against evil forces; their principles then, confers them their justification and duty to murder people with suicide bombers and other outrageous means. Who are the terrorists then? All things considered, it seems we are all terrorists, from both sides we commit atrocities that we justify and sanctify under the delusion of believing our ideals to be superior whereas the Other's are perverse. However, none of us are “evil”, it is simply that we do not realise we are what Arendt called The Banality of Evil (134), that is, ordinary people who under the spell of a perverse social construction end up working for the service of evil. It is this awareness that made Ralph cry after being rescued by a naval officer in the island, “Ralph wept for the end of innocence.” (Golding, 401).

5. CONCLUSION

Indeed, in this study I have shown how “evil” is not an inherent feature of neither Jekyll nor Jack, nor by extension of mankind, but a social construction that is instrumented for our own benefit. Evil then, is a delusion, a subjective moral judgment that not only varies across times and cultures, but also, it is subverted if taken into consideration the Other's perspective. We have seen how the concept of evil stems from religious morality and how Christianity influences the way we perceive it. However, moral principles are not absolute realities, but ethical conventions designed, in theory, for the peaceful coexistence of civilisation. However, the very constructed nature of morality that defines what is evil is evidenced by the divergent perception of human nature exposed by Rousseau and Hobbes. Additionally, Nietzsche has further helped me illustrate the subjective image of evil with his master-slave-morality, in which nobility places evil on those who do not abide by their high moral values, whereas the underprivileged locate evil on the nobility that
oppress them. All these reflections have been useful to deconstruct the image of evil on homoerotic desire, paedophilia, madness, sadism and murder in *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and *Lord of the Flies*. Definitely, it is the social and cultural context of a specific time that determines those actions, behaviours or estates, “good” or “evil”. In essence, the projection of evil onto the *Other* in both narratives illustrate how under the moral delusion that “we cannot possibly be that kind of evil person” we exonerate the blame for our own crimes against our invented enemies. The “darkness of man's heart” (Golding, 401) that Golding refers to would not be the intrinsic evil nature of mankind, as he seems to suggest, but our failure to recognise our *banality of evil*. Indeed, the reading of *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and *Lord of the Flies*, together with other philosophical, sociological, psychological and literary works have helped me understand and illustrate not any inherent evil side in mankind but our own disposition, under certain social and cultural variables, to believe and create evil onto the *Other*, and how, by doing so, we perform evil ourselves. Furthermore, the approach of evil as a social construct taken in this paper could not be of more relevance today, since it provides us with an understanding of our past and present day social constructed evils, like Nazi Germany or terrorism. Indeed, we have seen how *Otherness* is a two-way street that illustrates the *banality of evil*, in other words, “the nature of our human nature endows us with psychological mechanisms that leave us all capable of extraordinary evil when activated by proximate cultural, psychological, and social constructions.” (Waller, 287). Understanding this will help us have a better knowledge of ourselves, it will hopefully allow us to accept who we are and be suspicious of any categorical discourse, Only then will we have the opportunity to moderate our behaviour against the *Other* and contribute to create a more inclusive society that will accept diversity and difference; since as mentioned by Waller, “civility, after all, is a chosen state, not a natural condition.” (298).


