TTIP negotiations: interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns and public opinion

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was intended to create jobs and boost the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, constituency support was difficult to garnish, and negotiations were frozen in late 2016, leaving their conclusion in doubt. What led to this stage? Why has an agreement been elusive? Using an array of indicators this paper argues that a major reason was the extensive and professionally structured public mobilisation campaign conducted by European civil society organisations. This shifted public opinion across Europe, which in turn impacted policy. Our research contributes to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations, with relevance beyond TTIP. The paper discusses how generalised and diffused interests and public opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced predominantly by lobbying from narrowly focused interests.

Free trade traditionally enjoys support throughout Europe, especially in the northern half, and EU trade negotiations (perceived as technical and remote) have rarely evoked public interest. 2 At the same time, many trade agreements often face resistance from select groups and specific portions of the general population who believe they may experience immediate and focused costs, notwithstanding potential -but diffused -long-term benefits to the overall economy. 3 In regards to TTIP, deep transatlantic economic interpenetration and interdependence means most sectors on both sides of the Atlantic would be affected, with macro-economic gains projected for both sides, even if certain sectors would benefit more. 4 The negotiations were also presented by the EU and the US leadership as a joint transatlantic effort aimed at addressing stagnant growth and unemployment, while also setting global standards at a time of rising competition from emerging powers. 5 3 However, the focus of the debate quickly changed away from the agreement's economic and rule-setting potential as an organized opposition emerged, concentrated in Europe. 6 The projected benefits to the European and American economies were questioned, and the potential costs associated with an agreement were increasingly deemed extraordinarily high by European consumer, welfare, and environmental organizations, as well as more radical and populist antiglobalization and anti-capitalist groups, and labor unions (all here collectively referred to as civil society organizations, CSOs). 7 The advantages enjoyed by business groups favoring free trade (e.g. TABC, BusinessEurope), such as access to the Commission and national governments, were overshadowed by CSOs and unions. These groups mounted an extraordinary and ubiquitous campaign, moving public opinion against TTIP. 8 Opponents challenged the Commission, US Government, and other proponents' claims of prospective economic gains, job creation, and higher safety and regulatory standards. Opposition mobilization occurred through social media and traditional street protests, while also garnering increased attention from mainstream media; the latter being important in order to capture the attention of policy makers and sustain campaigns. 9 The Commission, national governments, and most business organizations were unprepared for the unprecedented and coordinated onslaught through social media, physical protests in rallies and marches, and targeted lobbying of legislators. 10 TTIP had been predicted difficult to conclude, and the protectionist rhetoric dominating the 2016 US presidential election campaign certainly did not help, but European developments are largely responsible for the freezing of negotiations. 11 Opponents' actions have led EU negotiators to alter their approach in ways seen implausible only a few years ago; in other words, affecting agenda setting, the procedure (how), and policy (what). The promise of 'continued dialogue' with stakeholders and civil society groups was, as one Commission official admitted, 4 an acknowledgement that CSOs' 'push' and 'opposition' and altered public sentiments have affected how they reviewed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and how they decided to go forward with the messaging.' 12 A representative of a transatlantic business organization acknowledged in 2015, [t]hey [industry] realize now that civil society groups now have an advantage in the marketing of TTIP and TTIP issues, and that businesses have difficulties in getting across their concerns and issues and difficulty conveying the truth and countering misperceptions distributed by public interest groups. There are intense discussions now on how to counter misperceptions and promote TTIP. 13 This paper identifies and explains how pan-European and national organizations organized opposition to TTIP; why certain key issues were strategically chosen, and how certain words and phrases were utilized to raise public salience and mobilize opposition. 14 The increased salience of issues in TTIP in the eyes of ordinary Europeans then contributed to changing public opinion, as well as increasingly effective fund raising for participating CSOs. This in turn allowed opposition groups to significantly increase their staff with both sympathetic issue specialists and campaign strategists. European opposition groups' dominance of the public debate correlate with declining European public support for TTIP, rendering an agreement highly doubtful. These insights contribute to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations. More specifically, this paper discusses how a campaign targeting key issues while appealing to generalized and diffused interests and public opinion impact a specific area of public policy (trade). 15 The next section shows how the literature on framing and public perception can explain the anti-TTIP strategy and campaign. We thereafter look at the impact on public opinion, while the last section concludes.

Anti-TTIP group mobilization and issue choices
Notwithstanding attempts to present the anti-TTIP opposition as 'grass-roots', the campaign against TTIP has been a highly professionalized, top-down, trans-European campaign. 16 The initial suspicion toward TTIP came largely from mainstream CSOs (e.g. BEUC, Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth Europe), whose concerns focused on the perceived threat to EU safety and food standards (which they argued were higher than America's) emanating from the much touted regulatory focus in TTIP. The argument was that both mutual recognition and recognition of equivalency of each other's standards create a 'race to the bottom' on standards in order to attract investments. 17 These groups produced campaign material independently, but also worked with other groups under an umbrella organization called StopTTIP, which boasted of over 200 participating organizations. But why were certain strategies and issues chosen? How have they succeeded?
Politics is about perceptions, and for agreements requiring European Parliamentary and domestic legislative ratification constituency perceptions matter. Dür (2015: 7, 25) finds that interest groups can shape public opinion in line with their preferences via frames, meaning a particular emphasis on and interpretation of an event (e.g. 'this arbitration case shows how corporations circumvent democracy'), while cues, information used to infer other information the recipient does not possess (e.g. the Greens oppose ISDS, therefore I should oppose ISDS), matter less in shaping opinion. 18 Thus, while CSOs still use 'inside' tactics (e.g. letters to officials and personal meetings), 'outside' tactics (e.g. demonstrations and petitions), 19 social media, postings and creative propaganda websites, they may be more effective in disseminating interpretations when framing issues in their favor rather than sending cues. CSOs also generally 6 enjoy higher public trust than the EU, national governments, or corporations, placing them in a better position to shape public opinion via frames. 20 Receptivity to frames is facilitated by how they are designed. Humans are more receptive to fear than positive messaging; later-in-time information remains more relevant than earlier information, and negatives (e.g. economic pain) are perceived more strongly than benefits. 21 Hence, opponents' messaging is expected to have a higher impact the more fear it is able to convey to the population and the more continuous the messaging. Another key characteristic of good framing is its link with existing beliefs. Perceptions do not necessarily rest on logical and sound premises; in fact, they may contain only a kernel of truth in order to gain traction. 22 Human preferences for consistency and simplicity means there is a tendency to accept information conforming to one's expectations, and to interpret evidence, whatever its nature and strength, as validating existing beliefs. 23 To prevent cognitive dissonance people also erect filters that stop information perceived to be inconsistent with or contradictory to one's expectations (which are based on preconceived notions and worldviews). 24 The result is acceptance of both information and propaganda, but with difficulty distinguishing between the two, and increased likelihood of accepting and disseminating distortions of reality -such as stories with omitted or misrepresented facts -to other audiences, creating myths. 25 Political actors, including interest groups and unions, can achieve the desired reaction in the public by choosing specific issues to simplify and emphasize. Such campaigns may include appealing to product or process associations to elicit a response. Thus, if chemicals (A) are associated with poison (B), associating a different product or issue (C) with A can elicit a negative response to C. Once salience is raised in the targeted population and supporters rallied, 7 other groups also tend to mobilize for the cause (while simultaneously seeking to gain attention, membership, and funds, all of which increase mobilization resources) creating a snowball or avalanche effect. 26 By 'making a fuss' about the chosen issues and processes groups are also more likely to receive news coverage of their message (which increases the likelihood of the desired effect). 27 In sum, fear-filled information, especially when building on general and negative perceptions, gets public attention, so choosing the 'correct' issue(s) is essential.
Opposition CSOs needed specific words and phrases to educate and rally citizens.
Ordinary citizens cannot be expected to engage on obscure issues and opaque trade negotiations, so, as one CSO representative confided, we 'needed something to raise fears and capture attention.' No organization provided more ammunition to anti-TTIP groups than Campact.
Founded in Aachen, Germany, from which Attac (an experienced organization opposing globalization, capitalism, and TTIP) also stems. Campact first emerged as active on policy when campaigning for green labelling on products, at which time it gathered 800,000 email addresses.
This list rose to nearly two million by 2016. The organization promotes and engages on ideas provided by other groups and individuals, but most importantly serves as a source of pivotal data and support. Campact provides material, raises money through town hall events and online donations, disperses money to groups and campaigns, but does not serve as the primary organizer of anti-TTIP protests. 28 Its tactics work effectively as force multipliers. Campact conducts market tests on policies requested by the client by using phrases and words on the topic or issue.
It takes a name or process, ties it to a policy, and sends a query to targeted e-mails drawn from its list-serve. Building on the responses the message is modified, and the product, action, or process is associated with something negative (e.g. chicken and chemicals, or ISDS and circumventing 8 democracy) before being retested. The client is then provided the results, or campaign 'fuel' (e.g. which words, phrases, or associations evoked certain desired reactions). The phrases and words shown to resonate with citizens are used not only in campaigns, but also when seeking funding from donors for specific activities, another Campact specialty. 29 Their 'infrastructure for political education' includes donations (over €140,000) to groups across several EU Member States; much of the money is raised through small online and town hall donations. 30 Specific issues such as food and investor rights were chosen not primarily because they represent issues on which groups would have the best chances of influencing policy proposals, but rather because they help raise the salience of TTIP generally, which in turn allows lobbying, protests, and campaigns also on technical details and other specifics. 31 The American process of chlorinated microbial wash of poultry was a natural choice of focus as it connected an appealing food (chicken) with chemicals (chlorine). 32 For most Europeans the significance of food extends far beyond its nutritional value; it is an essential part of life, where caution prevails and discussions of recognizing others' standards raise concerns. 33 Sixty percent of European check the origin of their food, and for nearly half the origin influences their purchase. 34 This is higher than for any other category of products, indicating awareness of and concern with food, and likely higher receptivity to public campaigns regarding issues related to food. Furthermore, the precautionary principle guides EU food policy, and groups have successfully appealed to Europeans' relationship with food.
'It is not without reason that chlorinated chicken has emerged as a symbol of the detriments European consumers might face if a TTIP deal is signed… [t]he European approach to meat safety is more efficient in protecting public health,' and that the 9 American approach is '[t]he "easy fix" to make up for poor farming and slaughter hygiene.' 35 The prevailing norm of objection to GMOs is also deeply entrenched as only 21% believe they are safe. 36 While Europeans widely support science and technology as the bases for policy and progress, the exception is food, where less than half believe science can improve food quality. 37 This was manifest when the EU's chief science adviser publicly and repeatedly urged more evidence-based decisions, only to be forced out following political outcry over her views. 38 CSOs present American standards as 'weak' and 'less safe,' as reflected in position papers, social media posts, online videos, protests, and public statements, and key European publics have increasingly agreed. 39 Foodwatch, an anti-corporation group founded in 2001 and involved in raising awareness on issues such as mad cow disease, chemicals, and GMOs, entered the TTIP fray in 2014. Thilo Bode -the charismatic leader whose 2015 book Die Freihandelslüge was a best-seller in Germany -effectively used selective trigger words and provocative framing in public speeches and debates in order to win of over public support against TTIP, the provisions of which he asserts 'serve big business instead of ordinary people, and they undermine our democratic standards.' 40 Raising public salience on food was thus primarily an issue of presenting the specifics of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) as a threat to Europeans' health in a simplified and understandable fashion.
ISDS was quickly deemed a useful target which could be drastically simplified to the general public in order to garner attention and raise awareness of TTIP. The dispute settlement system is intended to ensure that foreign investors have access to de-politicized legal redress for compensation (not legislative changes) when a host country's government violates the terms of the investment treaty. 41 Though Europeans have longstanding experience with ISDS through Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs) -which began in Europe after WWII as investors wanted assurances when investing in former colonies (EU states have signed 1,400 BITs, many with ISDS, compared with fewer than 50 BITs signed by the US) -it was unknown to the general public (as well as many CSOs, labor unions, and policy makers) prior to 2013. 42 Yet 'Allowing corporations to sue governments in secret courts over policies they don't like' and 'threatening public services' tested well, and became mantras continuously repeated in protests and panel discussions, in YouTube videos, tweets, position papers, reports, and press releases.
The anti-TTIP campaign was a great boom for 'campaign companies' such as 38 Degrees, Campact, and Attac, for whose 'business models, TTIP provides an ideal breeding ground to increase brand awareness and funding, respectively.' 43 Campact doubled the number of employees, to a professional staff of three dozen people and a budget of 6 million euros, or about $6.8 million, annually. 44 Similarly, other opposition groups also enjoyed rising donations (in addition to the grants many receive from the EU), and hired trade specialists from government and academia, adding additional in-house expertise while boosting the credibility of their cause. 45 Legal experts toiling in obscurity on ISDS (some of whom had been told when submitting academic papers that 'this is not important') were suddenly coveted as the concept of investors suing governments using secret arbitration panels tested well. The extensive penetration of trade specialists (including academics) in opposition groups provided an aura of professionalism and seriousness to the campaign. These groups were many aspects as wellorganized as the business organizations and lobbyists they criticize.

11
The combination of professional testing, mass mobilization, tech-savvy employees, and proliferation of mobile, easy-to-use social media meant that the years 2014-2016 saw an effective, highly asymmetrical, anti-TTIP propaganda apparatus. 46 TV remained the most popular source of information across the EU in 2016, while newspapers retained a significant share among those 55 and older, thus making traditional media attention crucial for opposition groups seeking to raise salience and attract supporters. However, six out of ten EU citizens, and half of young people (<35), as well as those with a college degree, get news from the web, including social media sources (of which Facebook, Youtube and twitter are the most popular). 47 This helps to (partly) explain both the anti-TTIP campaign's focus on social media ('that's where people are'), and the campaign's success, as cleverly constructed information (read: propaganda) and advertisements frame people's perceptions of TTIP. The European Commission instructed its staff and member states on the need for 'strong political communication' in order to 'define the terms of debate' on TTIP, 48 not unlike the way the US Administration and USTR attempted to set the terms of debate on TPP, but with little success.
In the fall of 2013 CSOs and unions staged protests and published policy papers opposing ISDS. The opposition was so intense that in January 2014 a negotiating pause on the issue was announced, during which the public would be consulted. In July 2014, led by StopTTIP!, the Commission was presented with a European Citizens Initiative with more than one-million European signatures petitioning it to alter negotiations (remove ISDS) and hold hearings in Parliament. 49 While dismissed (petitioners were informed that the petition process is inapplicable to preparatory decisions), it succeeded in generating further outcry from citizen groups, while generating media coverage across Europe. In an online world, participation in petitions serve as a way of expressing opinion, and when covered by the media this in turn helps convey the anti-TTIP message to larger audiences. Throughout the year think tanks, academics, and law centers also issued policy papers, commentaries on past and ongoing arbitrations, and held panel debates. 50 By mid-2015 the Citizens Initiative has gathered two million signatures, while the US Congress in turn debated trade promotion authority legislation requiring ISDS in trade agreements, providing additional fuel for European opponents. 51 Following the January 2015 press release of the results of the public consultation, the Commission promised months of stakeholder dialogue and possible refinements to ISDS. This was met with indignation from CSOs. 52 Opposition CSOs had collectively amassed 150,000 signatures against ISDS, predominantly by getting citizens to contribute pre-formatted submissions against ISDS (96% came from Austria, Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain). Notwithstanding the tactics, the fact that 97% of submissions were in opposition to ISDS in TTIP was widely publicized and used by CSOs, putting pressure on the Unfortunately, anti-TTIP groups keep on spreading speculations and risks that are completely irrelevant and frequently taken out of the blue…Due to Campact's efforts, we have arrived at a stage where German citizens' interest in TTIP is 25 times higher than in the US and roughly 15 times higher than in France. The sad thing is, however, that most citizens are simply misinformed, e.g. by paid-for Google advertisements set up by anti-TTIP groups. 57 Publicity surrounding the fall 2015 release of the EU's ICS to replace ISDS also generated increased online searches on the issue. Internet search frequency is one reflection of an issue's salience, and while there were no discernable volumes prior to June 2013, the following year saw Germany register the most TTIP web searches, followed by Austria and Belgium, the three countries with the largest anti-TTIP movements and most CSO activity. 58   found that 85 per cent of all TTIP-related positions in German online media are originally authored and spread by anti-TTIP groups. Similarly, for the period July-December 2014, anti-TTIP groups' announcements in Germany amounted to 83 per cent of total online media reporting on average, going up to 93 per cent in peak times. …around the TTIP negotiations rounds, and it is obvious that there are coordinated multi-online-media campaigns with high success rates.

REFERNCE TO ONLINE SUPPLEMENTAL GRAPH 1 SOMEWHERE HERE
YouTube searches on TTIP also peaked around the same dates as web searches, and in regards to the content found on YouTube the results were similar to those of a google search. 60 When googling TTIP in Germany one was first exposed to paid advertisements from opposition groups (e.g. Foodwatch), followed by a news headline, and thereafter several more anti-TTIP links. 61  Opposition to ISDS also worked its way into governments, with France and Germany expressing desires for a renegotiation of the ISDS clause in CETA before the Commission's revised ICS, and support for similar text in TTIP. 63 Opposition was also visible later, at the October 2016 near-fatal objections to the CETA text by the regional Belgian parliament in Wallonia. 64 There was significant regional public opposition stemming from the anti-TTIP/CETA campaign's assertions of how allowing ICS could hurt public policy, and the opposition found great receptivity in Wallonia's socialist prime minister. Following immense pressure from other EU leaders he agreed to sign only after the EU issued a 'binding declaration on ICS' and approved a referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union to rule on ICS compatibility with EU treaties. 65 Europe's long, favorable and expansive history of trade agreements could be expected to mitigate at least some of the negative messaging of TTIP; even in the depth of the financial crisis (2010) 65% of Europeans said the EU benefitted from international trade, and general support for free trade stood at 69% in 2016. 66 Yet, support for TTIP across the EU has fallen, and in some larger EU countries fairly dramatically, correlating with a continuous campaign asserting 16 the possibility or potentiality of having to accept GMOs, chlorinated chicken, companies suing governments, and privatization of public services.
The opposition campaign's focus on SPS (food safety issues) intensified in 2014. In a June 2014 open letter, which was either published or referenced by several news prominent European outlets, three leading civil society groups argued, …fair, sustainable and safe food could permanently be damaged by the transatlantic trade deal on the table….[T]he WTO SPS agreement has been disproportionately used by the US (on behalf of agribusiness) to challenge EU standards on a wide range of food safety measure.
[W]e cannot have confidence that the draft measures designed to expedite agricultural and food trade between Europe and America will uphold to the highest standards the food safety safeguards that protect consumers and animals. 67 The anti-TTIP campaign tapped into this skepticism, frequently presenting American food as chemically enhanced and driven by large-scale industrial output, in a society that has no food culture. 68 Appealing to the public about the possibility, however remote, of having to accept GMOs, chlorinated chicken and companies suing governments worked exceptionally well. The recipient notices the action or threat (chlorine chicken, sue governments) rather than the modal verbs signaling a remote possibility. Only 30% of Europeans expressed concerns about residues such as antibiotics or hormones in meat in 2010 -before any talk of a trade agreement -but in 2014 there was great resistance to accepting American standards or altering what is perceived as higher Europeans standards. 69 In the UK opposition groups deliberately played up the potentiality of privatizing the National Health Service (NHS) as a consequence of regulatory convergence and forced competition. 70 Despite continuous government assurances to the contrary, the percentage of British respondents who believed the government could protect the NHS dropped twenty-four percentage points the first year of negotiations; 39% thought TTIP would harm small business, and more than half did not trust the government to negotiate a deal in Britain's best interest. 71 One year later only 19% thought TTIP 'was a good thing,' even though 44% believed it would create British jobs; however, only one in six admitted following TTIP 'closely.' 72 While the aspects of TTIP debated in most business and EU circles differ from those promoted on social networks, the goal for all participants is to influence public opinion to one's advantage and, in this way, to exert pressure on policymakers. Opposition groups have been very Furthermore, the argument that because negotiations occur behind closed doors the participating parties must be hiding something conveniently omits that not only is this standard negotiating practice and necessary for frank discussions (which can lead to acceptable compromises), but every previous treaty was also negotiated in the same fashion, by the Commission based on a mandate from elected national governments .

Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions to the literatures on trade, lobbying, and transatlantic relations. Together they indicate that transatlantic relations (deeper integration between the US and the EU) were being challenged even before Donald Trump became president, and that lobbying in trade may no longer be limited to narrowly focused interests, such that even a finalized TTIP agreement would face serious problems with ratification in many Member States. 75 The first contribution has to do with how key pan-European and national organizations are able to mobilize generalized and diffused interests and public opinion. Despite its novelty and relatively limited resources (compared to business organizations) the anti-TTIP campaign in Europe has been able to raise public salience and mobilize public opinion by choosing the 'correct' issues, words, and phrases. Democracy's freedom of speech entails competition over ideas, values, and policy. It allows the dissemination of ideas irrespective of whether they are true, or even partially accurate, and social media enable disseminators to promulgate truths as well as unsubstantiated and/or unverified claims, while leaving the determination of what is true in the hands (minds) of the recipient. Alarmist, fear-filled messaging tends to be more impactful than facts, and when faced with conflicting opinions, those holding positive views tend to remain silent, allowing the more critical crowd to dominate the discussion.
The second contribution has to do with how generalized and diffused interests and public opinion are impacting an area of public policy (trade) traditionally influenced largely by lobbying from narrowly focused interests. The timing of searches on Google and YouTube indicate that the public debate has been impacted by European opposition groups' actions and that there is a correlation between these results and declining European public support for TTIP.  12 Interview, Brussels, May 2016. Though the Commission's January 13, 2015 press release was strategically worded to balance recognition of opposition with a determination to find a compromise to ensure ISDS or ICS is included in a final agreement. 13 Interview Brussels, May 2015.