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Keywords

Peasant, contract farming, fair-trade, agro-ecology, agrarian reform, peasant struggles, micro entrepreneurs, small commodity production

Abstract

By revisiting earlier debates around the definition of peasantries and new issues around farming in present-day agricultural regimes this review underlines the uneven forms of capitalist surplus extraction. After revisiting the classic debate I explore present-day issues such as market-led agrarian reforms, land grabs and transnational peasant movements that re-center the peasant debate. The following sections address two expressions of small-scale agricultural production: contract farming and agro-ecological short circuit food-provisioning. These two varieties of contemporary peasantries express different forms of dependent autonomy and are integrated in value accumulation circuits in different ways. A final section of the article attempts to compare aspects present in agriculture with similar ones present in other sectors of production in order to show the theoretical value of these discussions.
Introduction

This article revisits earlier debates around the peasant concept and reviews some recent work on production relations in agriculture. My objective is to show the theoretical value of these discussions for non-agricultural sectors of present day capitalism. Between the 1960s and the 1980s scholars in what became known as Peasant Studies tried to understand the awkward position of peasants. This discussion rested on an earlier controversy around the Agrarian Question (Akram-Lodhi & Kay 2010a, b; Kautsky 1974; Lenin 1977) and attempted to settle the political disposition of peasants and their revolutionary potential in the upheavals of the 20th century (Wolf 1969; Scott 1976; Adas 1980). The debate withered away but was far from being resolved. Many of the issues that were addressed then have found their way into a revived scholarly interest in peasants. Because they owned at least some of the means of production, peasants were credited with autonomy although they were generally subjected to “external” dominant forces that extorted rent (in kind, in labor, in money) (Wolf 2001). This tension came to define the peasant concept and became particularly acute with increased dominance of commodity circulation (Wolf 1966; Shanin 1971; Harriss 1982; Mintz 1973; Bernstein 1977, 1986; Roseberry 1976, 1983a; Friedmann 1978, 1980; Gudeman and Rivera 1990). In older definitions of the peasantry a pre-capitalist aspect appeared both as a contradiction with and a necessity for capital accumulation (Roseberry 1989, Ch.8).

As a concept, the term “peasant” is critiqued for its lack of clarity and inappropriateness in the present (Kearney 1996). Indeed, it covers many different social relations of production: from land owning producers –small, middle—to sharecroppers, to landless agricultural day labor, to artisan-peasants, and worker-peasants. This review focuses on what has become the core of the definition of peasant, namely access to land
and family labor. Land might be obtained in many forms often simultaneously: peasants can be owners, tenants, sharecroppers, they might have use rights, or access to the commons. Getting hold of land can occur under different regimes of surplus extraction including slavery, servitude, and bonded labor where subsistence plots create particular reciprocity and dependency links with landowners even as they improve autonomy. Landless “peasants”, will only be considered inasmuch as this circumstance arises from processes of dispossession or, on the contrary, of occupation and redistribution of land.

The tension between peasant and non-peasant ways of making a living has been addressed as a “peasantization of cities” (Roberts 1978), as “semi-proletarianization” of the countryside (De Janvry 1981), as the “contradictory necessities” of “under-proletarianization” (Bourdieu 1977), as “debasement” of the domestic economy livelihood “base” (Gudeman & Rivera 1990), or as “disappearing peasantries” due to deagrarianization (Bryceson 2000). I suggest that this ambiguity of the concept, its complex relations with capital and state, and its ideological versatility gives it renewed interest. For the purpose of this article the central aspect in the definition of peasants that I wish to underscore is the ambiguous relation of “dependent autonomy”, a position that pervades the life of increasingly large populations. Food production, consumption and food sovereignty issues will not be directly addressed. I suggest that much can be learned from the debates --old and new-- that explore how making a living for those involved in agricultural production is entangled with various forms of capital accumulation and political subjection.

After revisiting the old debate in an initial section followed by present-day issues re-centering the peasant, I will focus on two contemporary expressions of small-scale agricultural production: contract farming (Little & Watts 1994; Grossman 1998; Striffler 2002; Moberg 1991) and agro-ecological short circuit production for the market
contemporary peasantries negotiate the tensions between dependence and autonomy in different ways as they are integrated in value accumulation circuits. They are similar in that contractual frameworks are dominant although non-contractual socially embedded relations are crucial to their operation. The geographical scope of the review is worldwide, including cases from Latin America, Africa, South East Asia, Europe and North America. Most of the works reviewed address contemporary peasantries although some are supported by historical analysis of the early 20th century period.

A final section of the article attempts to compare the aspects present in contemporary peasantries with similar ones present in other sectors of production (manufacture, high tech and knowledge sectors) that rely on small-scale family firms, self-employed micro-entrepreneurs, and subcontracting networks of informal sweatshops (Bologna & Fumagalli 1997; Yanagisako 2002; Blim 1990; Rothstein 2007; Smart & Smart 2005; Narotzky & Smith 2006; Becattini 1992; Brusco & Sabel 1981; Harrison 1992; Collins & Gimenez 1990; Collins 2003).

What is a peasant? Who are the peasants?

Certain aspects have been common to all attempts at defining peasantries: Agricultural production, ownership of some means of production, a form of control over land and family labor, an orientation to household and community reproduction, and subjection to dominant groups that appropriate surplus. Here I will not review the vast literature addressing the concepts of the peasant as a category and peasantries as a coherent social group (for a recent review Bernstein & Byers 2001). I will briefly sketch what appear as recurrent and unresolved issues that point out the particular value of the concept.
The concept of “peasant” was often imbued with an idea of a “natural economy”. It described peasants as members of self-sufficient households that could endlessly reproduce their means of livelihood and retain the sense of worth and purpose resulting from a non-alienated relationship with nature and production. Although admittedly part of the larger society, peasants were understood as forming part of “communities” which in turn were pictured as united by strong solidarity ties, jointly struggling against the outside aggressions of an “external” power exacting surplus. This view reified sociological models that pervaded 19th century descriptions (Roseberry 1989, Ch.8). The turn of the 20th century, however, initiated what became the actual Agrarian Question debate, which opposed Lenin (1977) to Chayanov (1986) on the causes of differentiation among agricultural producers and has never actually been resolved (Shanin 2009; Bernstein 2009). The main issue at stake was whether peasants are a coherent category that can be defined by an internal economic logic common to all (Chayanov), or whether they are part of historically diverse processes of economic and political differentiation (Lenin). The first perspective stressed the cyclical differentiation of peasant households in a peasant “society” whether caused by demographic changes in the household composition or by other factors (Chayanov 1986; Shanin 1972, Ch.4). The second perspective understood differentiation as tied to the separation from the means of earning a livelihood through a process of forceful dispossession within the uneven development of capitalist relations. Empirically, however, peasants appeared to be integrated in the wider social formations through the various relations of surplus extraction they were involved in (Deere & De Janvry 1979).

Some authors, understood peasants in terms of a traditional/modern dichotomy to be superseded by modernization (see Escobar 1995, Ch.5). Others addressed peasantries in terms of an articulation of “modes of production” evolving towards the
real subsumption of labor (i.e. full proletarianization) (Roseberry 1989, Ch.6). These very different theoretical and political perspectives converged in a teleological orientation that took for granted the superior functionality of wage relations for capital accumulation. Other authors, finally, pointed to the importance of thinking in terms of uneven relations of capitalist development resulting from the agency both of particular capitalists and of different groups of exploited agents struggling to better their conditions of livelihood (Roseberry 1983a). This perspective avoided functionalist arguments and highlighted the centrality of both institutional political forces and subaltern struggles in the configuration of social relations of production. Mintz, for example, described how a particular historical circumstance (end of slavery) in the Caribbean formed “re-constituted peasantries” (Mintz 1979; for other examples see Stoler 1985; Stolcke 1984; Trouillot 1988; Roseberry 1983b; Nugent 2002; Martinez-Alier 1977). Generally, concrete historical cases pointed to processes of peasantization, proletarianization, repeasantization; or to semi-proletarian, disguised proletarian, worker-peasant situations that were part of complex transformations of political economic environments.

Most interesting to the object of this article are theories of peasant-type petty/simple/small commodity production (SCP). Dependence on market relations for reproduction theoretically distinguished the peasant from SCP, although the use of a mix of market and non-market resources (for subsistence and farming inputs) was ubiquitous. These SCP households were often subjected to “reproduction squeezes” that push their members to find other income sources (Bernstein 1986). They could also generate “endo-accumulation” through exploitation of kinship networks and hired labor resulting in differentiation paths for peasants in a community (Cook 1984). The ability to intensify labor while reducing reproduction costs was the basis of SCP productivity.
It enabled surplus extraction through unequal exchange, but the apparent autonomy of producers expressed in their control of means of production tended to obscure their laboring class position and acted as an ideological blinder (Friedmann 1980; Bernstein 1986; C. Smith 1986; Cook & Binford 1991; Gibbon & Neocosmos 1985; Chevalier 1983). Following from this debate, the present-day peasant vs. small farmer distinction rests mainly on the farm’s dependence on market inputs and its willingness to expand in an entrepreneurial way rather than limiting growth to household reproduction. Do peasants expand their commercial venture when possible? Undoubtedly some do, others don’t although it is difficult to assess motivations. Hence it is problematic to pinpoint a unitary logic to peasants’ practices, one that would express their inherent drive to set “limits to growth”. Differentiation processes are at work, and limits are set by political economic forces created by social actors’ struggles.

Most actual cases observed show blurred boundaries and uncertain trajectories as peasant households often engage in waged occupations, acquire consumption goods in the market or stress self-subsistence (D. Holmes 1989). They produce cash crops, depend on credit from formal and informal sources, access land and labor in diverse ways and distribute earned profits (or income) as capital investment or as consumption or prestige fund (Gledhill 2004; Mayer 2002; Collins 1984). Access to land and labor (water and seeds) together with the possibility for household members to find livelihood opportunities elsewhere (in other places, other sectors) seem to be determinant for configuring relations of production in agriculture. Gender and age divisions of labor pervade household members’ contributions to the farm while kinship, community and wage labor may be used in some periods (Lem 1999; Deere & León de Leal 1981). Private property, sharecropping arrangements (Wells 1984; Byres 1983), tenancy
contracts, communal rights all provide access to land subject to particular obligations while peasant households often combine various systems.

**Becoming peasants through struggle**

Transnational social movements such as Vía Campesina have focused on peasants’ agency in securing land rights and food sovereignty (Desmarais 2007; Edelman 2005; Petras & Veltmayer 2011; Borras, Edelman & Kay 2008; Borras & Franco 2009; McMichael 2006). Peasants are identified as “people of the land” who produce food, rely mostly on family labor and are “embedded in their local communities” (Edelman 2013:10). Some authors have critiqued this as a form of political populism that creates a unitary subject “peasants” out of people situated in very different economic and political positions (Bernstein 2009:77; Baglioni & Gibbon 2013:1563). It might be argued, contra this, that for many dispossessed groups it becomes a “language of contention” (Roseberry 1994) which, as Edelman and James show (2011), makes them interlocutors and rights-bearing claimants in international institutions. Nevertheless, the close study of Vía Campesina shows significant cleavages that follow class and ideological heterogeneity. The various associations that constitute Vía Campesina represent often contradictory interests of their constituencies (e.g. landless rural workers and poor peasants vs. landed commercial farmers). As Borras puts it “they are all ‘people of the land’, yet they have competing class-based interests” (2008:276).

Recent studies have described how “peasant” social movements such as the land occupations in Brazil (Martins 2003; Sigaud, Rosa & Macedo 2008; Loera 2010; Sigaud 2004) can be traced to historical confrontations and negotiations. The language of contention that subalterns use, such as “encampment time” or “sem terra” (without land), has a history. Sigaud’s analysis shows, contra prevailing accounts, that (1) state
and movements do not confront each other but co-operate in defining what land will be
affected and which people will benefit from land distribution and (2) that the “sem
terra” subjectivity is not initially present but develops through the process of
encampment and the knowledge of previous successful occupations (Sigaud 2004).
Often, those mobilizing to get some land are urban slum dwellers with non-agriculture
skills and occupations, whose original aim is not to access land but to attain a better way
of making a living. In the struggle, a particular category of rights claiming people
emerges as “people of the land”.

These mobilizations are generally linked to older land reform processes that
form the background of subjects’ memories. In early 20th century Latin America, access
to land monopolized by landowning classes was a claim of the rural laborers often
framed by enlightened or revolutionary political elites (Wolf 1969; Martins 2003;
Concheiro & López 2014). Expropriation of unproductive hacienda land did not always
imply transferring property titles to peasants, however. Often communal or co-operative
forms of access and production were set in place while eminent property rights rested in
the state (Bretón Solo de Zaldivar 2015a; Gledhill 2004; for a socialist case see
Humphrey 1998). On the contrary, what has been defined as the “neoliberal land reform
policy” starting in the 1980s and developing with force thereafter rests on the need to
enforce private property rights, induce efficient farming and redistribute through market
allocation. Anthropologists have documented how these processes of neoliberal agrarian
reform result in conflicts, internal differentiation, and new patronage links that have
historical roots (Mummert 1998; Bofill 2005; Bretón Solo de Zaldivar 2015b), but they
also point to interclass alliances among struggling peasants, as was the case of El
Barzón association in Jalisco (Mexico) fighting banks for a restructuring of their debts
Titling, registering and privatization of peasant landholdings, collective and communal land, was forcefully undertaken in post-socialist countries and other regions under structural adjustment regimes, frequently through producers’ cooperatives that maintained a semblance of commonality (Verdery 2003; Hann et al. 2003; Humphrey 1998). Agrarian “sociotechnical systems” (Sneath 2004) became increasingly dependent on market inputs while social differentiation developed. Privatization and formal registration produced a new legal framework that supported both individual assumption of risk and liabilities and the capacity to alienate assets, including land. As a result, over-indebtedness might lead to dispossession of small peasants and to new forms of land concentration for example through “reverse tenancy” where smallholders are forced to rent to farmers with more capital (Singh 2002: 1626; Verdery 2003, Ch.5; Borras & Franco 2009; Almeyra et al. 2014).

Land grabs (land rush) have also transformed peasants’ access to and control over land (Zoomers 2010) and water (Franco, Mehta & Veldwisch 2013), albeit not in a uniform manner. A recent definition stresses the control aspect of land grabbing specifying that it does not always result in direct dispossession. Driving the process are capital accumulation strategies that respond to recent food, energy, climate change and financial crises, the aim being to maximize investment returns. Tania Li has evidenced the de-coupling of these new land investments from poverty reduction projects in particular when smallholders under contract to mono-crop plantations lose the autonomy to manage their farms and become “partners” to plantation-corporation (2011). The growth of flexible mono-crops such as sugarcane, soya or oil palm that have multiple uses (food, energy) and serve to mitigate investment risk requires, in turn, the expansion of contract farms and plantations (Borras et al. 2012). Warning us against prejudging on uniform outcomes some authors highlight the complexity and uneven
historical developments and economic models that configure the various relations
glossed over by the term land grab (Edelman, Oya & Borras 2013; Baglioni & Gibbon
2013).

Non-agricultural sectors are also prominent in the new enclosures, in particular
those related to extractive industries, real estate development and conservation (the so
called green grabs), the latter associated with environmental markets and eco-friendly
tourism (G. Holmes 2014; Zoomers 2010). The state is a prominent actor in all of these
processes through reclassification of land use, liberalization of its sale, and tax breaks to
large investors, all of which are generally depicted as inducement to capital investment
and hence as a positive factor of growth and employment opportunities. Here conflicts
around rights (state, international indigenous) over land underline the various meanings
of what is valuable in it for different social actors (Bellier & Préaud 2012; Cotula 2013;
Shipton 1994).

Hence, the ability of peasants to make a living is subjected to the pressures of
market-led agrarian reform and land rush processes. This seems reason enough for
inducing mobilizations in defense of their livelihood base, as in the past. Now, as then,
tensions and struggles around control of valuable resources for making a living and
extracting surplus unevenly configure political and economic fields of force. These two
functions of value, making a living and extracting surplus, would seem to support the
essentialist confrontation between two distinct “logics”: that of the peasant—simple
reproduction—and that of the capitalist—expanded accumulation. I do not wish to
follow this path. Rather I propose to explore the complexities and entanglements of
these two forms of value in the experience of contemporary peasants. For this, contract
farming offers a useful inroad.
Contract farming

Contract farming has developed in parallel or connected to large plantation estates. It is related to export (increasingly of high value added horticultural crops) and expresses social relations that tie farmers and their livelihoods to agro-industrial capitalism through contractual integration. Although not a new development (Striffler 2005), contract has expanded with the restructuring of the agro-food system along commodity chains as a result of globalized markets and the growth of food processing industries (McMichael 2009; Goodman & Watts 1997; Little & Watts 1994). For Sub Saharan Africa, Baglioni & Gibbon (2013) show the influence of changing policy narratives that compare large scale and plantation farming to small-scale farming in terms of efficiency and political stabilization. Contract farming shows the relevance of non-market relations in agriculture as producers are cut from the market through a contract agreement setting conditions of cultivation that typify inputs and quality of product and establish price conditions. Production units span from large agricultural enterprises that employ wage labor to small family farms unable to reproduce without complementary sources of income. Generally they concern labor intensive crops that are difficult to mechanize and would involve high labor supervision costs. Through the setting of stringent grade and quality standards contractors are able to shift risk to producers while retaining pricing privileges outside the market.

Contract operates best under conditions of monopsony when farmers cannot take advantage of eventual high market prices by defaulting on the contract and selling in spot markets. Likewise, monopoly of specialized inputs by the contracting firms (chemicals, genetic seeds) results in the extraction of rents from the outgrowers (Watts 1994; Key & Runsten 1999). When it concerns “independent” smallholders, contract agreements give contractors de facto management power over producers making them
disguised proletarians although the argument of their autonomy has been explained as an ideological instrument (Clapp 1994:88). The ambiguous aspect of the family farm oriented both to pursuing viability as an enterprise and to providing household income appears as an important asset of these production relations. This double bind results in complex articulations of internal household hierarchies with labor and commodity markets that create differential opportunities and bargaining power for members (Watts 1994; Key & Runsten 1999). A historical perspective underscores the concrete struggles between various social actors that produce the conditions of possibility for particular developments of contract relations. Striffler (2002) traces the history of banana contract farming for foreign agribusiness in Ecuador. Here the contractors are large domestic farmers who hire labor, own several haciendas and often double as exporters. Moreover, they benefit from connections with national political elites which can result in subsidies, privileges and labor legislation that favors the business environment (also Clapp 1994).

In smallholder contract agriculture “autonomy” is expressed in the “freedom” of the farmer to enter contractual obligations and in his bargaining power (often as a result of collective organization, Moberg 1991). “Dependency” is expressed in the content of those obligations (regarding use of seed, fertilizers, quality standards, price vulnerability, etc.), the farmer’s inability to negotiate, and the debt-credit ties that are attached to investments in productivity (Key & Runsten 1999; Gerber 2014; Lelart 1978; Edelman 1990). Farmers’ households often subsidize farm viability through their so-called self-exploitation or with income provided by pluriactive members, yet the contractual aspect now frames dependency and exploitation in a liberal moral economy of apparent autonomy and choice. Contract farmers are nominally independent producers but they often lack control over the production process and become mere hands in a system that, moreover, burdens them with the high risk of volatile product
markets. Contract farming might improve some farmers’ income (Miyata, Minot & Hu 2009; Little 1994:221) but positive gains may be limited to an initial start-up stage where firms use promotional policies as incentive. Subsequently a phase of “agribusiness normalization” will attempt to reduce costs and maximize profits by squeezing out farmers (Singh 2002). The role of the state, in particular through land ownership regulation and legal protection for growers, is decisive to processing firms’ alternative favoring of vertical integration, contract integration, or spot market provisioning (Key & Runsten 1999, Singh 2002).

Horticultural export has become one of the fastest growing economies in many countries. The case of Kenya provides an example of how control over commodity chains is unevenly distributed. Leading distribution firms (European supermarkets) directly (through contract) and indirectly (by requiring flexibility) impose production relations upstream. Distancing separates actual producers (contract farmers) from buyers (lead supermarkets) through the mediating operations of processing (grading, packaging), export, import, and logistic firms. Export firms, often integrating processing, are powerful nodes that transfer grade and quality requirements to contract farms and induce flexible labor processes. But they are also subject to market volatility, climatic uncertainty and political instability, risks that they attempt to transfer to producers (Dolan 2004). However, small contract farmers will be in a better position to negotiate if there are many export firms competing to buy product in spot markets (Jaffe 1994). Monopsony is a crucial marker of the dependency of small contract farmers and generally of the hegemonic control of overseas buyers over the commodity chain as a whole.
**Fair-Trade Contracts**

Fair Trade production-consumption chains appear as a form of North-South redistribution of profits benefitting the small farmer and local communities (Bacon 2005, 2010), but some ethnographies have pointed to processes of differentiation at play (Luetchford 2008; Moberg 2014; Lyon 2010). These Fair Trade producers are often subjected to pressures similar to those that we have described for contract farmers in particular high indebtedness (Lyon 2010; Wilson 2010). Indeed, they are contract farmers in a buyer-driven commodity chain even when mediated by a producer’s cooperative. Although Fair Trade buyers seek to foster social justice and an environmentally sustainable development, the contract process constrains peasant autonomy.

Certification standards are often the instrument of smallholders’ dependency. They strictly define the conditions producers need to meet to access Fair Trade or organic certified markets and its premium prices. If the harvest is of poor quality or the need for cash urgent, the producer will have to find an alternative market, often through local middlemen merchants or other conventional outlets (Whatmore & Thorne 1997; Bacon 2005, 2010; Lyon 2010). Qualifying for strict standards requires following farming practices that are generally more labor intensive and will impact differently on household labor following gender and age lines. Farmers are forced to comply with regulations that may be extremely difficult to enact locally. Moberg (2014) speaks of how share ownership inheritance law in the Windward Islands creates conflict among kin when one tries to follow cultivation practices imposed by Fair Trade that conflict with other family members’ use of the land. Certification becomes a neoliberal governance procedure for small producers in the Global South (Renard 2003; Sylvander 1997) and the social premium in Fair Trade projects can be understood as part of the
neoliberal rolling out of the state where NGO projects substitute for government services (Peck 2002; Gledhill 2006).

The debate around the status of these small contract farmers re-emerges. Is this a process of re-peasantization, enabling autonomy within a high value added commodity chain? Does it transform distribution through different exchange relations? How does the incentive to export oriented production shift contract farmers away from food staples for direct consumption or the domestic market, therefore making them more vulnerable? How are these independent farmers linked to the restructuring of the international division of labor in a context of volatile commodity prices, surplus labor and a shift toward rent seeking mechanisms?

**Agro-ecological short-circuit production**

Agro-ecological projects have been defined as a new “rural development paradigm” (Ploeg et al. 2000; Ploeg & Renting 2000; Van Dam et al. 2012; Goodman 2004) and are often related to food sovereignty movements (Patel 2009). They differ from Fair Trade and organic certified agriculture in that they are embedded in local knowledge paradigms and eschew monocrop and export agriculture in favor of short-circuit biodiverse agricultural systems (Altieri and Toledo 2011). These projects are oriented toward re-embedding food production in local territories by strengthening knowledge links and responsibilities between producers and consumers (Collet & Marmon 2003; Grasseni 2014; Counihan & Sinescalchi 2014; Renting, Marsden & Banks 2003). While they are generally presented as grassroots movements claiming power to reorganize food provisioning, they are often supported by regional, national or supra-national institutions.
Theoretically, scholars reclaim a concept of “the peasant” focused on food production, stewardship of nature, pluriactive households, and reduced market inputs (Ploeg 2010; McMichael 2008). On the one hand, this re-peasantization process is perceived as opposing “green revolution” and other high productivity biotechnologies in agriculture, especially those that make farmers dependent on multinational firms (Müller 2006, 2014; Fitting 2011). On the other hand, it is understood as a movement away from an agribusiness logic seeking higher profits and towards a pluriactive peasant logic oriented towards household reproduction (Broad & Cavanagh 2012; Ploeg 2008). The aim of the new peasant farmers would be to obtain an income allowing for family subsistence and the survival of a way of food production focused on craftsmanship, care of the environment, and household employment. At the same time, this way of farming would enable higher value added gains through labor driven intensification and niche product markets (Ploeg 2010). While this process is credited with giving renewed autonomy and cultural purpose to these peasants, their dependence on other sectors of the economy through wages or subsidies in order to make their project “viable” in economic terms remains present (Ploeg 2008; Isakson 2009).

In Europe, agro-ecological short-circuit production farms are often dependent on subsidies from the EU, agro-tourism and regional development projects, and wages from employment in other sectors (Holt & Amilien 2007; Holt 2007). They are also dependent on creating consumer-producer alliances through cooperatives seeking to avoid intermediaries in the food chain, a process of negotiating product provision, quality and prices that is often conflictive. In some cases consumers tend to dominate over producers (Grasseni 2014) while in others it is producers who take the lead (Minvielle, Consales & Daligaux 2011). State imposed standards for organic produce homogenize quality criteria while opening niche market access to agribusiness and
hence increasing competition. Participatory guarantee systems emerge instead as a way to bypass third party certification pressures and control. They require the active involvement of producer and consumer networks that negotiate the definition of quality criteria whose normative status will often be contested (Isaguirre & Stassart 2012; Minvielle, Consales & Daligaux 2011). The twin processes of re-peasantization and agro-ecology point to forms of increased autonomy and empowerment both in the global North and global South. However, they are embedded in a food regime dominated by agribusiness where the pressure of competitive market prices and food regulation frameworks is paramount.

These short-circuit processes are viewed as forms of “food activism” or small producer resistance practices (Pratt & Luetchford 2014; Counihan & Siniscalchi 2014; Pitzallis & Zerilli 2013) that empower local food consumers and producers to be agents of change. Watts, Ilbery & Maye (2005) have stressed that the “alternative” aspect of these food provisioning systems lies in how they confront globalized agribusiness by relocalizing and shortening provisioning networks. Some alternatives rest on institutional support stressing protected “designation of origin” and other localized specialty labeling as a form of promoting local and niche markets (Siniscalchi 2000, Garcia-Parpet 2014). Other alternatives rest on developing short food supply chains through directly linking producers and consumers (box schemes) and promoting trust and care relations between them (Grasseni 2013; Brunori 2007; Van Dam et al. 2012). Indeed, lack of trust in conventional food chains resulting from food scares, and environmental, health and social responsibility issues may foster these processes (Renting, Mardsen & Banks 2003; Stassart & Whatmore 2003).

Consumer-producer alliances, however, do not occur in a social vacuum and the various political and market constraints that configure social actors’ agency could
receive more ethnographic attention (Goodman & DuPuis 2002). In her ethnography of alternative food networks in Italy, Grasseni focuses on the consumer side to the expense of the producers’ side. However, in her brief account of “the producers’ point of view” (2013: 79-89) tensions in the relations emerge, so that the “co-production” nature of consumers’ solidarity (with farmers) is acknowledged as potentially conflictive. We can glimpse the pressure that responsible consumer buyers put on producers (in terms of quality, timing, etc.) but also how producers may compete for these alternative markets (see also Minvielle, Consales & Daligaux 2011). Further exploring the producers’ point of view would help us understand to what extent local producers are contract farmers dependent on “alternative” solidarity consumer groups or, on the contrary, are autonomous peasants co-producing an emergent solidarity economy.

**Expanding the dilemma of dependent autonomy**

The concept of peasant has been dominated by a focus on household social reproduction and by the three aspects of autonomy, dependency and embeddedness. Since Piore and Sabel’s 1980s success in describing an alternative road to industrial development based on small scale cooperating firms (Piore & Sabel 1984) many authors have stressed the pervasiveness and persistence of production relations other than the classical labor / capital one. These include small family enterprises, self-employed workers, the network structure of the “industrial districts” or clusters, and cooperatives in the social economy sector (Bologna & Fumagalli 1997; Smart & Smart 2005; Yanagisako 2002; Blim 1990; Narotzky & Smith 2006; Moulaert & Ailenei 2005).

Creed (2000) links the rise of family businesses and informal economies with flexible accumulation in late capitalism. Other anthropologists have described the scalar complexities of the relationships that people undertake in order to make a living, to
support and care for others through kinship networks and households spanning different locations (Narotzky & Besnier 2014; Pine 2014; Rothstein 2007; G. Smith 1989, 1999). Many of these relations are predicated on engaging in “entrepreneurial” activities of various kinds, formal and informal, legal and illegal, tapping on family or neighbors’ labor, or on self-employment (Rothstein and Blim 1992; Smart & Smart 2005). Entering entrepreneurial careers and developing these gainful businesses generally requires credit which is obtained through multiple sources, resulting in different kinds of dependency (Guérin 2015; Blim 2005).

As the neoliberal emphasis on entrepreneurship expands to most aspects of life, responsibility for subsistence and wellbeing is shifted from social institutions to the individual, the household and the proximate network. Embeddedness becomes a form of capital as in the utilitarian understanding of “social capital” that pervades neoliberal development projects (Narotzky 2015, 2004). In the wake of structural adjustment, as states shed away protection of labor markets and firms lay off employees, entrepreneurship is hailed as the only possible response to the bleak perspectives of the many (Knight 2013). At the same time, resistance movements organize de-commodified provisioning networks (e.g. social money, LETS, time banks) (Hart, Laville & Cattani 2010) while forms of food self-provisioning are emerging (urban gardens, ecovillages, new peasants). These processes, however, are not alien to how capitalism is unevenly developing in different sectors, locations, and nodes of the commodity chain, that often entail the dismantling of waged forms of capital / labor relations (Blim 2000; Harriss-White 2012, Breman 1996). Subcontracting chains (formal and informal) resting on small (family) firms and self-employment expand while working careers become volatile.
The widening inequality gap that economists have described (Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2014) is premised on various forms of surplus extraction that increasingly combine exploitation through wage relations with rent (from monopoly of key productive resources such as land, water, genetic material, etc. and rent-yielding assets such as bonds, securities, debt service) (Lapavitsas 2009). The play between monopoly and competitive gains which is central to capitalism produces a differentiated market place where small entrepreneurs compete in a “despotic market” among them and with monopolistic and monopsonistic firms, as Carol Smith (1986) suggested for petty commodity producers in Guatemala. We have seen above how monopoly of inputs (technologies, seeds, chemicals) and monopsony in product markets are key factors for extracting rent premiums from contract farmers, while competing with others makes conditions of their contract worse in a context where proletarianization is a vanishing option (Li 2009; G.Smith 2011).

While discourses on innovation and creativity are particular to the recent developments of late capitalism, there is much that recalls forms of autonomy and dependency present in the peasant debate. Various authors have pointed to similarities of peasants and small farmers with informal sector vendors, artisans and service providers and more recently with the regulated petty entrepreneurialism that has resulted from flexible accumulation practices and neoliberal discourses (Roberts 1990; Ortiz 2002; Bernstein 2001, 2009; Watts 1994). Their awkward position as simultaneously owners of capital and labor is similar. But what unites them most, I suggest, is how surplus is extracted from them, through rent (debt financing, taxes) and unequal exchange (below cost prices), and the way in which an ideology of autonomy obscures dependency from powerful political and economic actors. In the predicament of reproducing themselves both as capital and as labor, the situation traps them in a
continuous simple reproduction squeeze and pushes them to multi-occupational precarious livelihoods. As became clear for peasant livelihoods in the earlier debate, the critical factor forcing their dependence is not ownership of the means of production but the inability to reproduce a life worth living.

Bernstein reminds us that “the relation of wage labour and capital—the essential, hence definitive, basis of the capitalist mode of production—is neither self-evident nor experienced in ‘pure’ ways” (2001:40 emphasis added). Hence capital’s control over the fruits of labor will be executed through the market, but not only in the labor market. It will be extracted through surplus value but also through rent and unequal exchange. Finally, struggles opposing concrete forms of surplus extraction and domination will result in changes in the capital / labor geometries of power and bring about complex transformations (e.g. agrarian reform, Fordism, welfare provision, industrial relocation, short supply chains). The capacity to recombine different forms of surplus extraction seems to be the hallmark of a resilient capitalism. Likewise, the ability to produce changing normative frameworks through its institutional clout is the sign of its hegemonic power.

Conclusion

Struggles among and between corporate firms, states, small entrepreneurs and laborers take many forms and produce new spaces for reconfiguring relations of autonomy and dependence. For the many pushed to “re-invent” themselves permanently in order to make a living (social) innovation may hinge on using some resources they possess (space, tools, vehicles, skills, capital-money, labor of kin, personal connections, public or communal assets, etc.) as a “means of production”. The quest for subsistence might become a combination of precarious opportunities to access gainful resources at
different times. In these circumstances claims and struggles to keep some control over these resources become crucial for peasant and non-peasant laboring classes alike.

By revisiting older debates around the definition of peasantries and new issues around farming in present-day agricultural regimes this review underlines the uneven forms of capitalist surplus extraction. The comparison with petty entrepreneurial forms that have become pervasive in non-agricultural sectors questions the analytical utility of maintaining a conceptual division between relations of production in agriculture and those happening elsewhere. Rather, an integrated perspective focusing on forms of surplus extraction across sectors and spaces would produce a picture unhindered by teleological constructions of history.

The beauty of the peasant debate of the 1960s-1980s is that it addressed an allegedly awkward situation: one where the classical Marxist labor theory of value could not be applied in a straightforward manner and where concrete historical development challenged the proletarianization thesis. By refusing to understand this situation as a form of universal (“natural”) peasant logic seeking simple reproduction the debate explored the complex forms of surplus extraction historically present in societies dominated by powerful actors of capital accumulation. The search was difficult and was never resolved. The fact it addressed the ambiguity of peasantries and their struggles is, however, what makes its present value. Maybe the answer to the question “Where have all the peasants gone?” is that we are all peasants now, negotiating our awkward position.
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