Abstract

In a paper published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides a methodological argument for the “disquotational,” Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation. Gómez-Torrente’s previous work has greatly contributed to making this theory perhaps the most widely supported view of pure quotation in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative view for which I myself have argued. Gómez-Torrente argues that rival views make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon.” I aim to turn the methodological tables. I reply to his objections to my own version of a demonstrative account, and I show that disquotational proposals provide no better account of the data. I also show that, unlike the demonstrative account, disquotational views make an ungrounded distinction between quotations that semantically refer to their intuitive referents and others that merely speaker-refer to them. I conclude that the demonstrative account is to be preferred on abductive grounds.
Davidsonian, demonstrative *Deferred Ostension* DO view that I myself favor. He argues that they all make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” (*op. cit.*, 353). In this paper I aim to turn the methodological tables on him. I will reply to Gómez-Torrente’s objections to DO, and I will show that DT fares no better on the data he brings to bear. To tip the scale, I will show that, unlike DO, DT creates a division in the interpretation of quotations for which its proponents have not given any good support, by distinguishing those which semantically refer to their intuitive referents, and those which merely *speaker-refer* to them. I’ll conclude that DO still affords the “loveliest” explanations.

1. *Deferred Ostension* vs. Disquotational Theories of Pure Quotation

In the pure uses that will occupy us, quotations occupy the argument positions that referential expressions such as proper names, descriptions and indexicals and demonstratives fill up; to that extent they seem to be referential expressions themselves. Thus, consider (1):

(1) ‘Boston’ is disyllabic.

Washington helpfully identified three questions that a theory of pure quotation should address, and on the basis of which they can be classified: (i) what part of a quotation has a referring role, (ii) what is the reference of that referring part, and (iii) how that reference is fixed. According to DO, quotation marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a dedicated demonstrative; the token quoted material plays the role of a demonstrated index; any expression appropriately related to the index might be the referent; reference is fixed by some contextually suggested relation in which the referent stands to the quoted material. In central cases, the relation is: … *instantiates the linguistic expression __*, but there are other possibilities settled by whatever determines the semantic referents of demonstratives, speaker’s intentions or
contextual factors. Quotation marks are thus on DO dedicated demonstratives whose character can be articulated as *the expression in the salient relation to the quoted material*.\(^6\)

DO does not deny that the quoted material (and the quotation as a whole as a result) also count as referring expressions on ordinary, intuitive conceptions of *reference* and *expression*. For we intuitively describe indexes in regular cases of deferred ostension as *referring* to whatever they help refer to; and ordinary language is unabashedly polysemous in any case. DO only contends that, in a strict theoretical sense of *referring device* in which only *tokens of linguistic lexical types that have a referring function in the system of a language* are such, it is tokens of quotation marks that are the referring devices in quotation; only they convey semantic reference.

There is a significant difference that we should however note between such dedicated demonstratives and ordinary ones, including complex demonstratives like ‘this expression’ that explicitly articulate the sortal applying to their referents in successful uses. Unlike the latter, quotations already come with *indexes* to serve as *demonstrata*. As a result, given metasemantic rules for demonstratives to be discussed below, a *default demonstrative rule for quotations*, DDR, can always safely operate in any context in which they are uttered:\(^7\)

(DDR) A quotation refers to the most salient expression that the quoted material instantiates.

DDR is just a default. DO accounts on the basis of exactly the same metasemantic explanations applying to other demonstratives for the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to linguistic expression, but (in the appropriate contexts) also to other expressions related in some way to the token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, as in (2); features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used, as in (3); other related tokens, as in (4).\(^8\)

(2) Use ‘Velázquez’, not ‘Velásquez’.

(3) ‘Hiss’ is a hissing sound.
(4) ‘Batman’ is painted in black.

In order to motivate DT’s contrasting answers to Washington’s questions, let me first present an objection that Gómez-Torrente raises against Davidsonian theories, part of the reason why according to him these theories make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 133; “Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 141; “How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 359; cf. also Cappelen and Lepore, Language Turned on Itself, op. cit., pp. 69-70). The objection assumes the intuitive truth of disquotational schemas for quotations such as the one this instantiates:

(5) ‘‘Socrates’’ stands for (refers to, denotes) ‘Socrates’.

One of the problems that (5) is said to pose specifically for DO goes as follows – I’ll discuss others in the next section. According to it, it is quotation marks that are linguistic expressions, susceptible of being in the standing for or referring to relation; whole quotations are not, because they include what in fact is a mere extra-linguistic index that helps to determine the referent. Now, the expression quoted by the grammatical subject of (5) is a whole quotation: the opening quote followed by ‘Socrates’ followed by the closing quote. But that, according to DO, is not a term that is in the standing for relation to anything – only part of it, the quotation marks, are; moreover, all by themselves, out-of-context, they do not refer to ‘Socrates’ or to anything else. A related problem is that instances of (5) need not be true according to DO, because the subject-term might in some contexts refer to an item that doesn’t refer to what the object-term refers to.

García-Carpintero provides a reply that Gómez-Torrente (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 134) anticipates. Gómez-Torrente retorted that this places DO in a comparatively less attractive position vis-à-vis DT. I will go back to this in the next section, in which I’ll show also that, however damaging the objection is for DO, the alleged problem also afflicts DT. My reply, further developed below, was in a nutshell that the intuitions on which the argument relies are not sensitive enough to the distinction between properly linguistic expressions, part of the
expressive system of a particular natural language, and expressive resources in general, mere
signs. A quotation referred to by the grammatical subject of (5) in the contexts where these
intuitions are prompted is indeed such a sign, “referring” in an extended sense to ‘Socrates’. This
suffices for a theoretical account to adequately honor such pretheoretical, undiscriminating
intuitions; the only real issue is whether, overall, it provides a better explanation of all relevant
facts.

I will come back in the next two sections to this and related objections to DO, comparing the
pros and cons of the two theories. But we have now enough to motivate and state the main tenet
of DT, aimed at capturing the intuitions that prompt such objections. This is what Gómez-
Torrente (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 146; “Double-duty Quotation, Conventional
Interiority Principle, IP; I also provide Cappelen and Lepore’s (Language Turned on Itself, op.
cit., p. 124) equivalent Quotation Schema, QS.11 It tightly compacts DT’s answers to
Washington’s three questions:

(IP) The quotation of an expression refers to the quoted expression.

(QS) ‘e’ quotes/refers to e

Full quotations – quotation-marks plus quoted material – are on DT the referring expressions;
they refer to the quoted material they enclose, by a sort of identity function (Bazzoni, “Pure
quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, op. cit., p. 124). Gómez-Torrente stresses that by
‘expression’ in IP he doesn’t mean lexical item, or word, but rather an abstract type (“How
Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 374) instantiated by the quoted token, a “linguistically relevant
graphical expression type to which the quoted token belongs” (“Double-duty Quotation,
Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 149), which might not be a lexical item
in the language of the quotation, or any other. On this basis, he (ibid., pp. 139-40) takes (2) – in
which the quotations refer to two different graphic articulations of what any sensible account
would count as the same lexical item – to be a standard example of pure quotation, in which the quotations have their semantic referents in accordance with IP, in contrast to (3)-(4), which he accounts for instead as cases in which the intuitive referent is a speaker referent distinct from the semantic referent (ibid., p. 152); I’ll come back to this distinction and its methodological consequences in the final section.

It may not be obvious that the core assumptions of DT allow the quoted material not to be a word. A main goal of Gómez-Torrente’s (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit.) account of reference fixing in quotation is to address this worry, which, as he shows, was left unaddressed in Cappelen and and Lepore’s (Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.) book-length treatment of the issue. Like Richard (“Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity,” op. cit.) previously, Gómez-Torrente (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit.) takes DT to develop the classical Quine-Tarski “name” view of quotation. Both take quotations to be structured, but argue that this structure is not syntactical: it is irrelevant to a compositional account of how the meaning of complex expressions depends on the meaning of their constituents and mode of composition. The structure is rather “lexical” (Richard) or “morphological” (Gómez-Torrente). According to DT the quoted material is a constituent of the quotation, but not a syntactico-semantic one, and hence it doesn’t need to be a word.¹²

The fact that quotations are nonetheless structured according to DT deals – as Gómez-Torrente (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., pp. 383-390) carefully explains – with Davidsonian objections to the Quine-Tarski classical name account based on the productivity and “pictoricity” of the device.¹³ In support of DT, Gómez-Torrente provides other examples of referring expressions that, while they are morphologically structured, and this structure is productively invoked for reference fixing, are nonetheless syntactically and semantically unstructured. Richard (ibid.) already mentioned the most obvious example, Arabic numerals; Gómez-Torrente
(ibid., pp. 376-383) provides other interesting examples, such as some conventions for streets or personal names.

By not taking the quoted material to be a lexical item, proponents of DT can accept part of the evidence adduced for demonstrative accounts, viz., that quotations refer to items which are not expressions of the language to which they belong – or any other language. We quote in English first-order sentences, Chinese expressions, or objects that are not expressions of any language. On Gómez-Torrente’s view, all these cases would be covered by instances of IP in which the quotations refer to the “linguistically relevant abstract graphic type” which is the quoted material. Other versions of DT are more liberal. Unlike Gómez-Torrente, Cappelen and Lepore (ibid., p. 23) take pictures to also be semantically quoted. Unlike both of them, in more recent work Richard accepts that quotations can also semantically refer to tokens, and suggests dealing with this by invoking a version of IP on which the quoted material is a token, to which the quotation as a whole refers.14 Bazzoni (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, op. cit., p. 124) advances a single principle, assuming that the quotable “semantic entities” that may occur as non-syntactic constituents of quotations might include particulars such as physical objects (ibid., 120, 127), in addition to graphical or acoustic types.

But no version of DT, however liberal, can account for examples like (3) and (4) in its proprietary terms, for the item intuitively referred to is not contained in the quotation. Besides, as next section shows, liberality comes at a price: the views are thereby exposed to variants of the very objections that their proponents raise against DO, based on the alleged intuitive truth of (5). In fact, as I’ll argue, even Gómez-Torrente’s less liberal version has also to pay this price.

Both the DO and DT theories of pure quotation – presented above in terms of their answers to Washington’s three questions – account for the traditional uncontested pieces of data. Quotations do not pose a special problem for a compositional account of the semantics of natural language;15 they are a productive and systematic device, and a somehow “pictoric” one, in that general rules
determine their referents on the basis of features of the meaning-vehicle; entities other than linguistic expressions can be quoted. In section 2 I will address objections against DO based on the intuitive truth of claims such as (5), arguing that DT doesn’t have an advantage there. In section 3 I will consider the merits and demerits of the two views. I will reply to Gómez-Torrente’s methodological argument for DT by contending that, on methodological grounds, we should prefer DO instead, given DT’s unprincipled contrast between semantic and speaker reference in pure quotation, and their comparatively equal standing on other issues.

2. DO and DT on the Intuitive Truth of Disquotational Principles

Quotations are ambiguous in a pre-theoretical sense. The views we are discussing provide however different theoretical accounts of this pre-theoretical ambiguity, only on some of which they count as properly ambiguous. Thus, compare (2), repeated below as (6), with (7):

(6) Use ‘Velázquez’, not ‘Velásquez’.

(7) ‘Velázquez’ is the name of a famous Spanish painter.

It is natural to take the quotation occurring as subject in (7) as referring to a word, a proper name; while in (6) what intuitively looks like the same quotation refers instead to a particular way of graphically articulating it. This is one to be distinguished from the one referred to by the second quotation in (6) – a different way of graphically articulating the same word, reproducing the way the name is acoustically articulated in the Spanish spoken in Latin America and parts of Spain. On DO, this ambiguity is just a form of context-dependence. Not so for those proponents of DT who (unlike Gómez-Torrente, as I’ll explain momentarily) appeal to IP/QS to explain the expressed intuition about ‘ ‘Velázquez’ ’ in (6) and (7). For them, the subject-term of (7) and the first quotation in (6) are different expressions, no matter what it intuitively seems; for they refer
to different items, and, in accordance with IP/QS, they do so by containing as non-syntactic parts those distinct items: the word, in (7); a specific graphic articulation thereof, in (6). As Gómez-Torrent (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 370) puts it, “Interiority does not provide a method for assigning a reference to an utterance of a quotation as a function of an aspect of its context; Interiority assigns a reference to each quotation type, independently of any sensitivity to contextual factors”.

Gómez-Torrente himself, however, rejects the impression of ambiguity about the subject terms of (6) and (7) (p. c.): he takes both to refer to the same “linguistically relevant” graphical type. He (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 151 fn.) nonetheless grants that quotations might also refer to words, and hence end up being “mildly ambiguous, or polysemous”, which is what (6) and (7) are meant to illustrate.16 In any case, he cannot sensibly deny some measure of “ambiguity”, given potential disparities in what counts as “linguistically relevant graphical types” instantiated in different contexts by what intuitively is the same expression. Are ‘Velázquez’ and ‘Ve{laz}quez’ one, or two linguistically relevant graphical types? It depends. In some contexts, the difference between boldface and normal types is linguistically significant (it might signal stress), while in others is irrelevant. What about ‘Velá{zquez}’ and ‘velá{zquez}’? Ditto; it might be linguistically significant that words in some categories get their first letters in uppercase, or it might be irrelevant. What about ‘Velá{zquez}’ and ‘Belá{zquez}’? Ditto; in some contexts, spelling differences that do not correspond anymore to phonetic differences might be linguistically irrelevant.

I have placed ‘ambiguity’ inside scare quotes throughout this discussion because, as indicated above, if governed by IP quotations cannot really be ambiguous. When a quotation refers to a word, and when what looks like the same quotation refers instead to a graphic articulation thereof, according to IP the terms doing the quoting are in fact different, for they contain the distinct entities they refer to; so there is no real ambiguity in such cases. There never is on DT,
for the reason Gómez-Torrente provides above: two quotations signifying two different semantic referents in accordance with IP/QS must themselves be distinct. On DT, the apparent ambiguity is thus “pre-semantic”, as with the intuitive ambiguity of ‘David’ when correctly used to refer to Hume and to Lewis on the “multiple homonyms” view of proper names propounded by Kaplan, Kripke and others, on which they share similarly articulated but different words.\textsuperscript{17} As Kaplan puts it, context is here “regarded as determining what word was used” rather than as “fixing the content of a single context-sensitive word”.\textsuperscript{18} An alternative \textit{indexical} view of names treats them instead the way DO does for the intuitive ambiguity in (6)-(7): ‘David’ as applied to Hume and Lewis is one and the same indexical word, with a character that determines the referent given a contextually “dubbing in force”\textsuperscript{19}

Theoretically the difference between these two views is significant, but proponents of DT are sometimes misleading or plainly confused when it comes to appraising its relevance for deciding between it and demonstrative accounts on intuitive grounds. Consider Cappelen and Lepore (\textit{Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.}). In sync with their tirades against contextualist views in their (previous!) work on the semantics-pragmatics divide, they reject the notion that quotations are context-dependent. More specifically, they reject the following principle (\textit{ibid.}, 68), which DO of course endorses:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(QCS)] Let $S$ be a sentence with a quotation $Q$, containing no context-sensitive expressions other than possibly $Q$. Two utterances, $u$ and $u'$, of $S$ can express different propositions because $Q$ in $u$ and in $u'$ quotes different items.
\end{itemize}

This denial notwithstanding, and at first sight paradoxically, they accept some of the data emphasized by DO, suggestive of the truth of QCS. Unlike Gómez-Torrente, they accept that the subject-term of (7) and the first quotation in (6) refer to different entities. They also accept that, while in some contexts (8) below might be true, in more ordinary contexts it is rather its negation which is true, because the expression on the right-hand side of the identity sign does not refer to
the linguistic expression ‘Madrid’, but rather to its written articulation in a specific font, Verdana (ibid., 77-9). For them, this is a semantic phenomenon, not merely a pragmatic one – unlike on Gómez-Torrente’s view, who, as we will see in more detail in the next section, takes the impression of contextual variation in reference here to have a pragmatic explanation:

(8) ‘Madrid’ = ‘Madrid’.

Cappelen and Lepore’s (ibid., ch. 12) way of making their rejection of QCS consistent with their acceptance of these data appeals to the point previously made. Quotations might include “quotable items” which, although “signs”, are not “expressions” (lexemes, or words). Quotations literally have those quotable items – some of them non-expressions – as parts. Thus, to get the result that (8) is false, and its negation true, given IP/QS the quotable items included in the quotations on one and the other side of the identity sign should differ; but this means that the quotations themselves differ, which is how the rejection of QCS can be upheld: when the quoted items differ, the quotations doing the quoting differ too.

As a way of theoretically accommodating part of the data suggestive of context-dependence that demonstrative accounts highlight, while preserving the context-independence of accounts relying on IP/QS, Cappelen and Lepore’s proposal is of course acceptable. However, as a means to gain advantage over demonstrative views, it is rather Pickwickian. This becomes manifest when we confront some of the arguments that they deploy against such views.

A first argument is related to the one by Gómez-Torrente presented in the previous section in order to motivate IP. Cappelen and Lepore argue that demonstrative views accepting the wide-ranging context-dependence that DO assumes “cannot guarantee the truth of (dis)quotation sentences”, such as (9), because, on such views, it “should be on a par with” (10) (ibid., 69):

(9) ‘Quine’ ‘ quotes ‘Quine’.
(10) ‘that’ demonstrates that.
The reply to this on behalf of DO goes along the lines of the one I mentioned in section 1 as a rejoinder to Gómez-Torrente’s (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 133; “How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 359) version of this argument. There is a significant difference between (10) and (9), as emphasized in the previous section: instances of (9) always include by themselves adequate indexes to act as demonstrata, unlike instances of (10). As a result, the default demonstrative rule for quotations (DDR) can always safely operate in any context in which (9) is uttered. Utterances of (9) are hence true in such default contexts.\(^{20}\) This explains perfectly well the intuitions of an asymmetry between (9) and (10). It also explains the intuition that (9) is true “as a matter of meaning alone” (op. cit., 70), when we leave this claim – as we should when discussing intuitions – at a merely intuitive level.

Cappelen and Lepore relatedly object (ibid., 69) that according to demonstrative views there are false instances of QS; (11) might be a case in point, in the suggested context:

(11) ‘‘Quine’’ quotes/refers to ‘Quine’.

In reply, I note first that I do not see any non-question-begging reason why this prediction is wrong. It would be good to have experimental data on this; for what is worth, my bet is that ordinary speakers would simply feel confused if we ask them whether an utterance of (11) is true, and also that many would find it false if we set up a context that makes it salient that the Verdana version of the name is a candidate referent for the second quotation, like those Cappelen and Lepore themselves (ibid., p. 152) provide. Be this as it may, what is more relevant for present purposes is that Cappelen and Lepore in fact agree that some utterances of (11) are false! They (ibid., pp. 153-4) argue that this does not contradict the truth of (9) “as a matter of meaning alone”, because in false utterances of (11) different quotations are at stake: the quotation that is part of the subject is not the same as the one used as the object, hence they are not true instances of QS.
But how can this be taken as an advantage of DT over DO in explaining pre-theoretical intuitions? Given DO, there are false instances of QS, such as an utterance of (11) in the envisaged context; what determines whether we have a true or a false instance of QS is whatever fixes the interpretation of demonstratives (speakers’ intentions, coordinating intentions, context). Given DT, all proper instances of QS are true. An utterance of (11) could either be an instance of QS, and then true, or false, and then not a true instance of QS; and what determines whether it is one or the other is whatever grounds the pre-semantic facts, i.e., whatever fixes what the quoted material is. As far as we can tell (they do not say), it will be exactly the same sort of thing: intentions, coordinating intentions or what have you. In any case, as illustrated by the disagreements among advocates of DT with respect to what counts as a proper instance of QS (whether the variables stand for linguistically graphic types, words, or anything) these are matters that could only be decided on the basis of complex theoretical considerations.

It is a serious methodological mistake to assume that speakers’ intuitions that are acceptable empirical data for semantics can decide which one of these proposals is right, because the differences between them lie at a theoretical level that is far beyond the scope of such intuitions. At the intuitive level, both DO and DT accept violations of QS, because intuitions do not tell apart in the required way the expressions quoted on the left side and used on the right side; intuitively quotations are ambiguous, whether or not they really are theoretically so.

In this section I have argued that DT doesn’t have any advantage over DO when it comes to accounting for the disquotational intuitions that motivate the theory. To the extent that they can be taken as genuine data for linguistic theories, such intuitions find “ambiguity” in quotation, and as a result intuitively potential exceptions to disquotational principles. There is no compelling reason to prefer DO’s account of the data in terms of genuine ambiguity (context-dependence) to DT’s “pre-semantic” explanation.
Cappelen and Lepore’s more liberal views than Gómez-Torrente’s on the matter of what can be the semantic referents of quotations make it easier to make these points, which is why I have focused more on their views in this section. Perhaps this partly explains Gómez-Torrente’s claim that quotations semantically refer only to “linguistically relevant graphical types”. But note first that this might seem \textit{ad hoc}.\footnote{There is no good reason I can see why, given DT, in accordance with IP/QS, quotations cannot refer to words. There are ways of indicating quotation in speech, some of them as far as I can tell as conventional as quotation-marks – i.e., intonation.} In any case, the fact that quotation is more easily indicated in written language doesn’t entail that words cannot be named by such means. It seems to me that only an \textit{a priori} allegiance to IP explains Gómez-Torrente’s choice of semantic referents for quotations. I find it less \textit{ad hoc} for proponents of DT to adopt Bazzoni’s (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, \textit{op. cit.}) stance, shunning any ontological commitment on what the quotable “semantic objects” might be – graphical types, acoustic types, lexical items, or what have you, including tokens and other physical items. This creates more occasions for the intuitive ambiguity that I have pointed out, but it is consonant with disquotational intuitions. Be this as it may, as argued above, given the vagueness/openness of ‘relevant’, Gómez-Torrente’s choice cannot make him entirely free from some cases of such intuitive ambiguity. As I will argue in the concluding section, his more constrained choice of semantic referents doesn’t free him as a result from the indictment of methodological misjudgment – unwarranted reliance on intuitions.

3. \textbf{DO and DT on Semantic and Speaker Reference in Pure Quotation}

Gómez-Torrente presents the most damaging assumption by DO that he takes issue with thus (my emphasis): “the demonstrative phrases of Davidsonian analyses can in principle refer in
some contexts to things that quotations (or quotation marks) as a matter of conventional principle cannot refer to in any context’ (‘How Quotations Refer,’” op. cit., p. 359). As we have seen, he wants what intuitively is one and the same quotation, such as the first in (6) and the subject-term in (7), to semantically refer (“as a matter of conventional principle”) to just one entity, a “linguistically relevant graphical type”. Other possible referents are accounted for as speaker referents. But this aspiration is doomed to failure, and as a result the indictment of Cappelen and Lepore’s proposal applies also to his, even if the number of examples that establish it is smaller.

Thus, consider an apparent instance of QS such as (12), in a context in which it is made clear (say, by running commentaries while one writes it on a board in a discussion of this topic) that the quotation mentioned in the subject is intended to behave as the subject-term of (7), while the one used in the object-term works instead like the first one in (6); i.e., the quotation mentioned in the subject-term is intended to refer to a word, while the one used as the object-term is intended to refer to a particular graphical articulation thereof, so that the utterance is intuitively false:

(12) ‘‘Velázquez’’ refers to ‘Velázquez’.

From a pre-theoretical perspective, on which quotations are (pre-theoretically) ambiguous and validate QCS, the quotation used as the object-term in such a case is the same expression as the one mentioned in the subject. There of course are contexts in which the expressions they both refer to are also the same (say, one and the same graphical type); but there also appear to be contexts, such as the one just described, in which both differ. Such cases falsify the disquotational schema at the relevant, pre-theoretical level.

Of course, both Cappelen and Lepore and Gómez-Torrente deny that in those cases we are confronting true instances of IP/QS,23 but, as argued in the previous section, this is neither here nor there. Cappelen and Lepore (Language Turned on Itself, op. cit., pp. 69-70) say: “to be told that we’re not guaranteed of the truth of a quotation sentence like [(12)] as a matter of meaning

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alone, will surprise most competent speakers”. However, if we use only notions available to ordinary competent speakers, their own view delivers surprising news of this kind. In a similar vein, Gómez-Torrente (“How Quotations Refer,” *op. cit.*, p. 359) complains: “it is not guaranteed purely by Davidsonian theory that apparently context-independent disquotational truisms such as [(12)] are true”. But, as we have just seen, this is not guaranteed either by the version of DT that he subscribes to. Even if we grant him that quotations must refer to linguistically relevant graphical types, we could make the same point by relying in the vagueness of ‘relevant’, as pointed out in the previous section.

Hence, if there is a cost here, it is a cost both for DO and DT, in any version. The fact that no violation of the schema occurs when “expression” and “ambiguity” are theoretically disambiguated along the lines of (a particular version of) DT is in no way an advantage for theories holding it, first and foremost on account of the point that I have been emphasizing: ordinary speakers’ intuitive judgments empirically relevant for semantic theorizing do not deploy such theoretically elaborate notions. Besides, DO can claim that same spurious virtue: no violation of *proper* instances of the schema occurs either when the disambiguation is made on its basis. Ordinary demonstrative sentences obtained by replacing the outermost quotes in (12) with ‘this expression’ need not be true in contexts in which the quotation mentioned in the subject invokes for reference-fixing a *different* index from the quotation used in the object. In any case, the alleged virtue *is* spurious: if it is true that ordinary speakers make the judgment that sentences with the apparent form of (12) are “analytic”, both DO and DT agree that they are wrong and need to be corrected; and both honor a theoretically nuanced form of the judgment.

To evaluate another criticism of DO that Gómez-Torrente makes, and a related reason he provides to prefer his version of DT vis-à-vis Cappelen and Lepore’s, we need to go into the distinction between semantic and speaker reference, and how it applies to demonstratives. The complaint against DO is that it “seems to attribute excessive referential possibilities to
quotations” (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 144). He illustrates this by contrasting a case in which one points to a token of ‘Velázquez’, and utters (13), with one in which one makes a spoken utterance of (14); unlike the former case, he says, in the latter “it seems one can’t … successfully convey to one’s audience the intended true proposition that Velázquez was a great painter, or at least one can’t do this without adding complicated peculiarities to the contextual setting” (ibid., 145):

(13) This man was a great painter.

(14) ‘Velázquez’ was a great painter.

Another example contrasts “This boldface type is a very dark boldface”, said while demonstrating a normal, non-bold face Times New Roman token of ‘Velázquez’, with an utterance of “‘Velázquez’ is a very dark boldface”. While in the former case “I can easily convey and perhaps semantically express the (let’s suppose, true) proposition that the boldface version of Times New Roman “Velázquez” is a very dark boldface”, in the latter I cannot “easily manage even to convey that proposition, as I probably require a fairly complicated contextual setting to do so” (ibid., 145-6). Note, for later use, that in both cases Gómez-Torrente’s point is nuanced: not that what is possible with ordinary demonstratives is impossible with quotation marks, but only that the latter is more difficult and requires special contexts. This is as it should be, because he himself provides good examples of contexts in which the relevant propositions would be conveyed. This is ok for him, because his claim is merely that, although quotations might refer in the ways indicated, these are cases of speaker reference, requiring contrived contexts.

Gómez-Torrente’s criticism of Cappelen and Lepore’s version of DT is the contrasting one, that it is “insufficient” (ibid., 148). I agree with this criticism, which DO upholds, but not with his proposal to deal with it in terms of speaker reference; as I will argue, the relevant cases involve semantic reference, assuming that this notion applies to demonstratives. Gómez-Torrente’s criticism of Cappelen and Lepore is that, as examples (3)-(4) illustrate, we can use
quotations to refer not just to types distinct from linguistic expressions as in (2)/(6), but also to entities distinct from those contained in the quotation, no matter how liberal a notion of part we are using. Consider for example (15), about which Cappelen and Lepore say that they and their informants find it impossible (or very difficult) to get a true reading (ibid., 72):

(15) ‘I’ tastes like peach.

It is difficult for me to make sense of the problems that Cappelen and Lepore report, for I do not hard at all to find contexts in which an utterance of (15) appears to be true. Just imagine that we are speaking about the items in a bag of sweets, in the shape of letters. Not much imagination is needed to contemplate true utterances of (4) above either; I’ll mention one below.

However, the semantic account that IP/QS affords for (6) is unavailable for these cases, because the quoted item is not part of the quotation. Cappelen and Lepore (ibid., 76) consider explaining them in terms of familiar pragmatic strategies, but reject it, so they are left without any account for these cases – which is, I suspect, the true source of their imaginative limitations. Gómez-Torrente (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., pp. 152-6) provides a detailed elaboration of the first pragmatic proposal (“conversational implicature”) that they consider, in terms of Kripke’s (1977) notion of speaker reference: while the quotation keeps its semantic referent (the relevant “linguistically relevant graphical type”), and hence what is said is false, the speaker manages to convey a truth about the intuitive referent by relying on Gricean mechanisms. I’ll come back to Gómez-Torrente’s account presently. But whatever the outcome of this debate among proponents of DT, the main problem for all of them lies in justifying the asymmetries in their accounts of these cases, (6) on the one hand, (3)-(4) on the other. Once one accepts as a genuine semantic phenomenon the (more or less restricted) pre-theoretical semantic context-dependence they are prepared to concede, it is unprincipled not to grant the one they reject.
How are the semantic referents of demonstratives fixed? This is of course a hugely controversial topic.\(^{24}\) I’ll assume for present purposes that this is a matter of the intentions of the speaker, in the qualified way articulated by Bach and elaborated by others including Perry and Speaks.\(^{25}\) For \(o\) to be the semantic referent of demonstrative \(d\) in context \(c\) two conditions must be met. (i) The speaker intends \(o\) to be the value of \(d\) in \(c\). (ii) The speaker intends that his audience take \(o\) to be the value of \(d\) in \(c\). The latter intention is rationally constrained: rational speakers must justifiably believe that what they do make its fulfillment more probable than it would otherwise be.\(^{26}\)

Applied to quotation marks understood as dedicated demonstratives, this proposal validates DDR at the outset, and it provides adequate responses to Gómez-Torrente’s objections that DO entails excessive referential possibilities. Note first that quotation marks are dedicated demonstratives; we can think of them as coming with the sortal “expression”, understood in the intuitive fully general sense in which it applies to tokens and types that are not words. Note also that the view just outlined about demonstratives allows for the distinction between speaker and semantic reference; for instance, cases that Speaks (“The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives,” op. cit., pp. 305-6) describes as of “insufficient intentions”, in which speakers intend to refer to something but fail to provide sufficient grounds to their audiences to pick it out, are cases of speaker reference without semantic reference.\(^{27}\)

Let me now explain the contrast between “This boldface type is a very dark boldface”, said while demonstrating a normal, non-bold face Times New Roman token of ‘Velázquez’, and “‘Velázquez’ is a very dark boldface”. In the first case, the sortal in the complex demonstrative guides by itself a competent, reasonable and attentive audience to the intended referent, so both conditions are met. Not so in the latter case; in any normal context the second condition cannot be taken to be satisfied, when the intended referent is the boldface type Times New Roman. But of course, there are “complicated contextual settings” in which it is satisfied, and that type is the
semantic referent. Gómez-Torrente ("Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said," op. cit., p. 146) provides one: a number of fonts are being discussed, and every font is represented by the written name of a different painter. Similar points can be made about the contrast between (13) and (14): it makes a difference for the satisfaction of the two conditions on semantic reference for the demonstrative whether it is the sortal presupposed for quotation marks or the one explicit in ‘that man’ that is taken into consideration. But again, it is not that difficult to think of “complicated” settings in which (14) is true. Imagine for instance that we are giving examples of three-syllables words that we like, and the reasons why: ‘platypus’ sounds nice; ‘resentment’ is my favorite emotion; ‘Velázquez’ is a great painter.

I’ll conclude with a further relevant observation. Saul suggests a test for semantic content, based on the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading, which Michaelson has refined. What does it tell us about the semantic character or otherwise of reference by means of quotations to expressions not contained in them, as in (3)-(4)? It seems clear to me that we intuitively lie, and not merely mislead, when we utter (4) or (15) knowing very well that what we are saying about the relevant tokens is false, with the intention to deceive, in contexts in which the “question under discussion” (Andreas Stokke, “Lying and Misleading in Discourse,” Philosophical Review cxxv (2016): pp. 83-134) involves the relevant information. Thus, imagine (4) uttered by someone looking with binoculars at the marquee in a movie theater projecting a Batman movie, whose answer will decide a bet on the colors of the words in the marquee, knowing that ‘Batman’ is in fact painted red.

Let us take stock. There are significant differences in the accounts of quotation that DT and DO provide. DO accounts on equal terms for the contribution of quotations to semantic content in (2), in (3)-(4) and in both true and false utterances of (8). The version of DT that Cappelen and Lepore defend provides an account of (2) and (8), but tells us nothing about (3)-(4). The version that Gómez-Torrente defends does explain (3)-(4), and the intuitively false utterances of (8) –
which he also takes to involve speaker reference, because he takes the semantic referents of both quotations to be the same “linguistically relevant graphical type” (Gómez-Torrente, “Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 158-9). But his account also invidiously taxonomizes the cases into two different categories, equally on account of whether or not the reference is determined by means of IP/QS, i.e., of whether or not the referent can be identified with the quoted material.

If these writers commit themselves to psychological mechanisms implementing the processes they posit, their views have empirical consequences. What do the empirical facts tell us about them? At the phenomenological level, I am not aware of any difference in my experiences when I interpret quotations in each of those categories, and, as I have been insisting, I find it methodologically unwarranted to ascribe such awareness to the intuitive judgments of ordinary speakers. There could certainly be processing differences at a subpersonal level, and it would be very nice to investigate the issue. But the authors I am discussing do not provide any evidence of that kind. What, then, should our temporary conclusion be?

Gómez-Torrente’s (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 353) methodological case against other theories of quotation charges that they make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon”. My main claim against DT in this paper turns the tables on him. I have provided what I take to be a decisive rejoinder to objections to DO by proponents of DT, showing that their proposals fare no better on the relevant eccentricities. And I have shown in addition that all versions of DT establish an asymmetry in the interpretation of quotations, dividing them into two groups, for which their proponents have not so far given any justification. On methodological grounds therefore, and to my taste at least, as far as we can now tell DO still delivers the loveliest account.
Notes

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5 I use ‘quoted material’ to refer to what is inside the outermost quotation marks – *Boston* in (1) – and ‘quotation’ for the structured whole constituted by it and the quotation marks. I borrow the notion of an *index* from Geoffrey Nunberg, “Indexicals and Deixis,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* XVI (1993): 1-43.

6 Stefano Predelli (“The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 31 (2008): 555-572) provides a useful formalization of a demonstrative account. To deal with issues raised by Cappelen and Lepore, *Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.*, which I will discuss later, he argues for a distinction between the *character* and the *meaning* of quotation marks that I do not find necessary. Unlike Predelli’s view, DO cannot be objected that it makes quotations “anomalous demonstrative phrase … of a kind that invalidates the standard way of making the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative phrases” (Gómez-Torrente, “How Quotations Refer,” *op. cit.*, p. 354).

7 The notion of a *default context* is of course not clear-cut, but any view like Gómez-Torrente’s assuming that quotations have semantic referents needs it. I take it to be one such that no more is presupposed than the sharing of a public language, and the mutual beliefs required for disambiguation and context-dependence resolution (so that Bach and Harnish’s *Linguistic and


12 In a recent version of the view, Bazzoni (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, *op. cit.*) articulates this idea by saying that quotables (entities that can be referred to by means of quotations, in accordance with IP by being parts of them) are not “syntactic” but – in Bazzoni’s terminology – “semantic” objects, i.e., mere objects in the domain of semantics, to be talked about. He (*ibid.*, 131-4, and 138-9) raises concerns in this regard for both Cappelen and Lepore and Gómez-Torrente that I cannot discuss here.

13 See also Bazzoni (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-131). I put scare quotes around ‘pictoricity’ because I do not take quotations to be literally iconic. Given the variety of quotable items, it is not correct to represent the relation between quotation and quoted item as “picturing”; a quotation can hardly be said to literally “picture” the


15 Maier argues that on demonstrative theories “we […] effectively lose compositionality” (Emar Maier, “Pure Quotation,” *Philosophy Compass* ix, 9 (2014): 615-630, at p. 625), but I have shown in a related piece that his argument is based on a manifestly inadequate characterization of the character rule for the relevant demonstratives (Manuel García-Carpintero, “Reference and Reference-Fixing in Pure Quotation,” in P. Saka & M. Johnson, eds., *Semantic and pragmatic aspects of quotation* (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming).

16 Gómez-Torrente tells me (p.c.) that, in contemplating ambiguity in this quotation, he was just assuming that quotations might also be lexically governed by a rule distinct from IP, on which they might refer to the instantiated words as opposed to graphical types. Given that I regard as obvious that quotations in fact (and very commonly) refer to words, as (7) illustrates, I take it that, by positing two different (unrelated?) lexical rules governing quotations, this suggestion reinforces the arguments in the next section that it is in fact DT that makes quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon”.


18 David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563, at p. 562. Cappelen and Lepore (*Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.*, pp. 154-5) deny that the Kaplanian label ‘pre-semantic’ is adequate for meaning fixing on DT, because it comes after ordinary homonymy resolution and language-selection. They are right that DT’s (very messy, as the reader must by now realize)
form of disambiguation intuitively differs from these. In a nutshell, this comes to selecting the quoted material articulated together with the quotation-marks, whether a more or less abstract graphical type, acoustical type, a word, and so on. But I do not think this (on which they do not elaborate further) affects my points below. My uses of the term ‘pre-semantic’ are thus intended to include not just the processes envisaged by Kaplan, but also whatever is at stake here.


20 Cf. the response to Cappelen and Lepore provided by Predelli (“The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation,” *op. cit.*, p. 566) on behalf of the version of the demonstrative account that he formalizes there.

21 It also exposes him to the additional methodological objection in fn. 16.


23 Gómez-Torrente, I presume, would account for the case in terms of the lexical rule for quotations additional to IP, for cases in which they refer to words, mentioned in fn. 16.

24 Heck denies that the distinction between semantic and speaker reference can get a grip in the case of demonstratives; reference with context-dependent expressions is just speaker reference (Richard G. Jnr. Heck, “Semantics and Context Dependence: Towards a Strawsonian Account,” in A. Burgess, and B. Sherman, eds., *Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp. 327–64). I am not sure that he would really disagree with the limited sense in which I suggest to make the distinction, as indicated in the next footnote. In any case, it is an assumption that I share with Gómez-Torrente that some distinction between semantic and speaker reference applies to referential expressions in general, indexicals and demonstrative included.

26 I take the specific articulation provided here from Speaks (Jeff Speaks, “The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives,” *Mind* CXXV (2016): pp. 301-339, at pp. 329-30); I find compelling Speaks’ arguments against King’s “coordination” account (Jeffrey King, “Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions,” *Philosophical Perspectives* XXVII (2013), pp. 288-311). I have slightly modified his proposal, because I do not share his rejection of a conceptual connection between rational intention and belief. He (ibid., 331) mentions cases such as that of a basketball player who shoots from behind halfcourt just before time expires; but the way of stating the connection that I have given in the main text, which I take from Sinhababu, adequately captures them (Neil Sinhababu, “The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything,” *Noûs*, XLVII (2013), pp. 680–696, at p. 681). Heck (“Semantics and Context-Dependence: Towards a Strawsonian Account,” op. cit., 339-343) endorses a similarly nuanced form of intentionalism and hence, perhaps, a similar notion of “semantic reference” for demonstratives, even if he dismisses the label.

27 More difficult are cases of “conflicting intentions” (Speaks, “The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives,” op. cit., pp. 306-8), such as the famous “picture of Carnap/Agnew” example from David Kaplan (“Dthat,” in P. Cole, ed., *Syntax and Semantics* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 221-43), in which both candidates appear to satisfy both conditions. I think that the nesting-intentions-based proposals of Bach (“Paving the Road to Reference,” op. cit.), Perry (“Directing Intentions,” op. cit.) and King (“Supplementives, the
Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions,” op. cit.) point in the appropriate direction to select which one, if any, provides the semantic referent: it is the “means” intention, as opposed to the “ultimate goal” one. But I cannot go into this here; cf. Speaks, “A Puzzle about Demonstratives and Semantic Competence,” op. cit., for some of the problems these issues raise.
