# Soldiers, Bombs and Rifles

Soldiers, Bombs and Rifles:
Military History of the 20th Century

Edited by

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To the memory of Professor Gabriel Cardona

CONTENTS

Introduction

Beyond the Uniforms: Military History as a Necessary Tool to Interpret the 20th Century

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Though twentieth century historians have often considered military historians a variable to be reckoned with, the study of weapons and armies has nevertheless been seen as an "asset" to those who research political, social and cultural phenomena. After all, the scholars who work in this field end up studying, collecting, and most importantly, providing data. However, those who study armed conflicts from a broad perspective (which is, in fact, of a political, social or cultural nature) have often viewed military issues as a somewhat closed or concrete sphere; while the field leads to useful interpretations, these have always been seen as either subordinate in some way, since they are limited to or projected in the framework of a specific context, or decisive, yet isolated factors which disregard underlying, widely-accepted trends.

However, there seem to be more and more convincing reasons for rethinking the position of military history among the methodological approaches used to study, understand and interpret twentieth century history.

The first and probably most important reason for doing so is bitterly brought to mind in the words of Massimo Salvadori:

"I have argued that the twentieth century was a period of never-before-seen violence and tragedy. Hegel had already dubbed the past a universal bloodbath, yet this label was never so true as during this era. In fact, the

first thing we should note is that the violent events and tragedies of the 20th century are not strictly the result of cruelty in political, social, religious, ethnic and racial conflicts or of the horror of wars – which are themselves ancient dimensions of life, even though they were conceived of and experienced in a completely different way. Rather, they are the result of the fact that human beings and their States possessed the incredible destructive power provided to them by the instruments of technology and science. Before the twentieth century, this power may have been kept within certain limits, and the aggressiveness of humankind appeared relatively contained. However, later it would develop with a destructive power beyond our wildest dreams. This led to the widespread violence that characterized the century, capped off by the carnage of the two world wars and other major conflicts, the terrorism of totalitarian regimes and their death camps, the Jewish Holocaust and the atomic bombs dropped on Japan."[1]

Therefore, war, or more generally speaking the experience of war, is in one way or another a key component representative of twentieth century history, an element which broke from the past quite dramatically as it spread among society.

Since large armies of conscripted soldiers were key agents in the wars of the twentieth century, these wars led to significant societal change. Large conscripted armies raised awareness of and created problems regarding the relationships between citizens and authority figures, thereby playing an important role in creating and spreading hegemonic discourses centered on the state and nation. Furthermore, they were crucial in the complex process of including the masses in public events. (Indeed, in many cases, especially World War I, this was the general public's first real contact with the State.) Moreover, the length of twentieth-century wars and their "demographic" intensity significantly impacted the balance between men and women in countries involved in the conflicts. In other words, war – which kept millions of men stationed at the front for long periods of time – acted as a portal that helped women access the public sphere, the working world and society in general. Though often viewed as temporary and anomalous – and despite the challenges of traditional value systems – the access and presence women gained during the war were destined to endure and strengthen.

As Salvadori has argued, three other significant aspects of war should be highlighted.

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[1] Massimo L. Salvadori, *Breve historia del siglo XX* (A Brief History of the Twentieth Century), (Madrid: Alianza, 2005): 8-10.

First, science and technology played a key role in these wars. During the 20th century, technology came to fruition and had wide-ranging effects, thereby proving its importance, yet we also lost our innocence about its potential impact. War played a decisive role in bringing about this change. The horrors of the concentration camps and trauma of World War I first underscored the tragic nature of war, while the fear of nuclear attacks during the Cold War definitively proved the importance of technology. Consequently, the experience of war challenged the ideal that technology would bring about unlimited progress – which proved to be the central debate of an entire century. The technologically-aided expansion of warfare (consider, for example, the impact of aerial attacks) ended up reshaping the mental outlook of all of mankind.

Second, since the wars of the twentieth century, to a greater or lesser extent, all needed to create a climate of consent imbued with meaning, propaganda and the mobilization of citizens were crucial. (This was true of warm wars, but even more important for cold wars.) Concretely, these elements were tied up in the building of identity and cosmogonies, alliances and conflicts of importance not only during the war itself but especially in the years that followed. Furthermore, the enormous importance of the media would be impossible to explain without referring to war and its component events. For example, consider Lasswell's first studies on the impact of media on contemporary society,[2] which argue that World War I itself triggered a change destined to transform the relationships between culture, power and society.

In the end, the wars of the twentieth century drew a new de facto world map. Beyond their strictly territorial and political impact, the experiences of war during the two world wars led large segments of the population to gain knowledge of the unity of the world itself. Consider apparently minor conflicts, like the Russo-Japanese war, when the bulk of European public opinion collided with the evidence of numerous, incredibly deep interconnections between places quite far from each other. Not to mention, of course, the Cold War, which provided ideological, strategic, and especially military data which clearly proved the famous metaphor of chaos theory: "A butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing can cause an earthquake in New York."

In light of these reasons (and the list could go on for many pages more), it seems clear that contemporary historiography as a whole could benefit significantly by rethinking its relationship with military

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[2] Harold Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (Peter Smith: New York, 1927).

historiography. This would create a new dialogue that would involve contemporary historians *tout court*, pressing them to acquire the minimal technical skills needed to analyze conflicts. At the same time, these new connections would invite military historians to leave behind technicalities in order to reinterpret the wars of the twentieth century from a much clearer perspective, one which bears in mind the many issues envisaged in the contemporary art of war. This courageous dialogue could successfully overcome hegemonic temptations and methodological vices while constantly considering conceptual innovations and a multi-disciplinary approach. In fact, the ability to generate complex analyses – which is the fundamental core of a historian's scholarship, regardless of his or her area of specialization – depends on this dialogue. We must reconstruct the complexities of the past in order to gain the greatest possible understanding of its deepest depths.

This kind of dialogue has already begun, and as we shall see, in recent years, such conversations have proven productive. In fact, we can already see the first traces of a historiographic transformation which has impacted both methodological approaches and topics of study (as will be mentioned in the next few pages) in the five major topics included in this book – World War I, military intelligence, World War II, the Spanish Civil War, and the conflicts which took place in the late twentieth century. We have now set off on our path, although many twists and turns lie ahead.

A 'State of the Question' of recent military historiography

At this point, it is necessary to outline – albeit briefly, given the relatively limited space available for this introduction – the major trends in recent approaches to twentieth-century military history, when the discipline began to explore new fields of study, ask stimulating historiographic questions and fruitfully overcome its traditional limits. These limits had often framed military history as a narrow type of specialized research; consequently, the works produced by military history – though interesting – were limited to general, large-scale syntheses, analyses of the political components of conflicts or research on major wars. In order to draw attention to the significant progress military history has made, we shall begin by examining several major lines of research which have recently predominated in studies of the field and then shall lay out a brief state of the question for each of the five thematic areas touched on in this volume.

Any consideration of the most interesting and stimulating lines of military history research pursued in the last twenty years must begin by citing the huge proliferation of studies related to war memoirs. For many

years, scholars studied memoirs written by generals and great political leaders. Now, however, the field has shifted, focusing especially on the ordinary citizens who were sucked into the tragic conflicts that spilled blood across the last century and the rank and file soldiers whose memories portray horrors historians sometimes fail to grasp and thereby help to understand these events. At the present time, these lines of research are quite in vogue, as are all studies related to "memory" in general.[3] They are based on a wide variety of sources, from direct oral histories to the war journals published by soldiers on every side of the war. This influx of war memoirs has had an additional benefit: after years of relative disinterest, a number of new academic studies have finally have begun to analyze the conflicts of the twentieth century by considering the views and experiences of civilians, women, and other ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. (Gender history has proven particularly important in this field). Similarly, a desire to delve into previously overlooked aspects of major twentieth century conflicts has generated a significant amount of research focused on the "losers," who were too often neglected in the major historiographic overviews of the past. Finally, archival research has been particularly relevant in recent years. Though archival documents have always been crucial in studying military history, the recent opening of archives which scholars had been unable to access (especially the Russian archives, which remain difficult to study to this day, as well as others in countries which were part of the Soviet Bloc until 1989), in combination with newly available sources, has shone light – often for the first time – on numerous questions which have generated significant interest not only in the field of military history but also – indeed, especially – for history in general.

The state of the question with regard to the First World War is in line with the aforementioned general observations. Though an enormous number of academic studies have been written about the Great War since it ended, for many decades these were plagued by a series of problems which somewhat reduced the validity of these historiographic contributions. First, as was the case in many other spheres of military history, a good number of studies limited themselves to bringing up old analyses focused on politics, diplomacy and major battles, especially those which were fought on the decisive Western Front (the Battles of the Marne, Verdun, Somme, etc.), adopting a traditional perspective which the new historiographic

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[3] An interesting analysis of the complex relationship between History and Memory can be found in Enzo Traverso, *Le Passé, modes d'emploi : Histoire, mémoire, politique* (The Past: A User's Manual. History, Memory, Politics), (Paris: La Fabrique, 2005).

ideas established after World War II were unable to crack. Second, the vast proliferation of studies on the Second World War inevitably reduced interest about the conflict that preceded it to a certain extent, thereby decreasing its "weight" in historiography. In this vein, World War I has all too often been dismissed as a "useless massacre" in which millions of men died for no apparent reason in the trenches and mud as the result of decisions made by politicians indifferent to their suffering. It has often seemed that such positions have sought to draw a not particularly implicit parallel with the "just war" the Axis and Allies would engage in starting in 1939. Indeed, we find this reductive approach in many of the studies focused on the "European Civil War," in which the Great War was seen as a necessary prelude to World War II, a war which – despite having its own unique characteristics – served as a needed introduction which helped explain the major event of the twentieth century, the war of 1939-45. Luckily, significant progress has been made toward supplanting this view, as research since the 1970s has finally focused on the unique complexities of the Great War. Thanks to the contributions of French, British and Italian historians, especially, research on the conflict has taken on a new and exciting series of topics, moving beyond traditional analyses produced in a political and military mold and comparative simplifications. In particular, the French school in Péronne has authored a series of new studies focused on consent (and dissent) among the population, especially soldiers. These studies help us understand how the front "held firm," both internally and militarily, over long years of conflict. Simultaneously, additional studies examining the violence endured and inflicted, both on the front and in the rear guard have been published. Furthermore – and this cannot have come as a surprise – the memory of World War I itself has become the subject of research, as historians investigate how the event has lingered in the European conscience and the grieving process which followed it. We could perhaps criticize the historiography of the Great War for focusing on regional perspectives and fronts thus far, with few more general analyses that bear in mind the global aspect of the conflict. Nevertheless, in the last thirty years, crucial strides have been taken in researching the social and cultural history of this conflict.[4]

The historiography of intelligence – especially work examining the role of intelligence agencies in major conflicts of the twentieth century, referred to as "military intelligence" – struggles and has always struggled with two significant conceptual issues: the difficulty of accessing classified

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[4] An introduction to the World War I bibliography can be found in Mario Isnenghi and Giorgio Rochat, *La Grande Guerra, 1914-1918* (The Great War: 1914-1918), (Milano: La Nuova Italia, 2000): 509-549.

archives and finding a balance between the mythification of intelligence agents and negative views of intelligence work. First, as most people would imagine, accessing unorganized and often classified sources has proved challenging, especially given that quite a bit of information is often missing in these sources. Second, the myth around intelligence agents, often seen as decisive figures who can single-handedly change the course of history[5] thanks to escapist literature and cinema, proves a stark contrast to the limited esteem enjoyed by intelligence to this day, as people question whether it is useful in solving armed conflicts involving millions of soldiers on different fields of battle. Despite these clear challenges, the historiography of intelligence has nevertheless produced works of unquestionable merit, particularly with regard to the role of Western intelligence agents in major international conflicts (consider, for example, studies of British and American intelligence) as well as some specific topics in the history of World War II. Nevertheless, a systematic, fleshed-out historiographic approach to intelligence must touch on many other topics, which confirms the complexity of this field. Consider just two cases: our knowledge of how Soviet intelligence worked and the missions it carried out between 1939 and 1945, which is still insufficient to this day, and the numerous gaps which those who study the undeclared conflict that was the Cold War still must reckon with.

The historiography of the Spanish Civil War is indubitably more complex. Indeed, an immense quantity of research is still produced about the conflict, which in fact garners as much attention from historians as World War II.[6] Early works on the history of this war predominantly touched on the powerful polarization of ideologies, with hagiographies produced by the official Francoist historiography on the one hand and Republican tales that primarily claimed to justify the government's defeat on the other. However, scientifically sound research about the conflict – written predominantly by eminent English-speaking historians and focused on the political and military aspects of the war – was not published until the late seventies. Two of the best known such studies, by Thomas and Jackson, laid the groundwork for an authentic explosion of work on the war. This research continued to study the complex diplomatic relationships

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[5] For example, consider the title given to the film acclaiming the famous deeds of "Garbo" (aka Joan Pujol García) in World War II: *Garbo: The Man Who Saved the World.*

[6] For an excellent synthesis of the historiography of the Spanish Civil War, see Juan Andrés Blanco Rodríguez, "La historiografía de la guerra civil española" (Historiography of the Spanish Civil War), *Hispania Nova* 7 (2007): 741-772, last accessed November 26, 2012, http://hispanianova.rediris.es/7/index.htm.

during the war (see, for example, Viñas' and Coverdale's on the German and Italian interventions), yet also moved beyond traditional syntheses to explore new topics related to the conflict (such as collectivization or the strategies of various political groups). As democracy returned to Madrid in the late seventies and early eighties, Spanish historiography began to make its voice heard, producing studies on the Spanish Civil War. Though English-language scholarship on the conflict still played an important role (mostly thanks to the work of Paul Preston), Spanish historiography came into its own as independent, influential research that produced valuable contributions in previous neglected fields. As a result of this new generation of Spanish historians (including Aróstegui, Casanovas, and Villarroya, among others), research on the Spanish Civil War continues to be an important field of study in contemporary military historiography. In recent years, it has focused primarily on four major issues.[7] The first, relatively traditional topic relates to the origins (or presumed inevitability) of the conflict which broke out in the summer of 1936, while the second, which had been examined beforehand but now benefited from significantly more detailed archival research, touched on the role of foreign powers in the conflict. Though these two fields of study have been around for many years, the other two topics studied by historians are quite novel: research on the role of the Republic during the war, which finally overcame the mythification of the past; and studies about the repressive nature of different forces (especially the Francoist power) in both 1936-1939 and immediately after the war itself. This final, essential topic is seeing an authentic boom as it bears witness to the persistence of the debate about the Spanish Civil War among not only historians but the public in general.

Though it is quite challenging to sum up the state of current research on the Spanish Civil War, it is nearly impossible to keep tabs on the immense quantity of historiography related to World War II and the key players involved therein, both individually and on a collective level. Thus, we shall instead simply note some of the major issues that have sparked academic debate in recent years. The first such area of research (which has been around for quite some time) has to do with the origins of the conflict. Over the years, discussion has continued to focus on Nazi Germany's foreign policy guidelines (whether Germany had crafted well-defined attack plans or Hitler was simply a skilled improviser). Moreover, the study of Hitlerian diplomacy is but one of the questions related to the

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[7] The most recent historiographic trends related to the Spanish Civil War are covered in Hugo García, "La historiografía de la Guerra Civil en el nuevo siglo" (The Historiography of the Spanish Civil War in the New Century), *Ayer* 62 (2006)/2: 285-305.

Third Reich currently plaguing scholars: though the historiography of Nazism continues to produce dozens and dozens of volumes of all types every year, in recent years historians have been able to concentrate on aspects of the regime which had generally been overlooked, such as the daily life of Germans under the Third Reich. The Holocaust and the German slaughter of Jews and other ethnic and sexual groups during the war are inseparable from the study of Nazism; indeed, they are so crucial that they represent a de facto question in and of themselves. Although the issue may not always produce a "Goldhagen Case," as took place in the late nineties,[8] the inner workings of extermination, victims and their executioners remains an essential topic for contemporary historiography. Furthermore, as noted when discussing World War I, in recent decades researchers have been able to take a broader view when analyzing violence, thus going into greater depth in new and interesting research on the behavior of soldiers at the front and behind the lines. In fact, they have managed to do so while also studying victims of every gender, origin and social status, including the losers of the war. Finally, with regard to the more strictly "military" aspects of the conflict, numerous studies about specific incidents should also be mentioned (for example, the Battles of Stalingrad, Okinawa, and Normandy, among others). Similarly, we should not forget the fascinating research about the decisive Eastern front, which has benefited from new access to the archives of the former USSR (despite the aforementioned difficulties), filling a gap which had been present in Western historiography for far too long.[9]

Finally, at least a brief mention should be made of the major lines of research historians (as well as political analysts and journalists) have pursued in recent years when examining the complex wars of the late twentieth century. Again, trying to briefly sum up the extensive historiographical work on the conflicts which bloodied (and in many cases continue to bloody) the planet after the Cold War would fill many pages, both because of the considerable number of such studies and because of their complex, diverse nature. In fact, it is these two features that ensure that the classical approach to military historiography must inevitably be overturned. While on the one hand, the last twenty years have seen

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[8] See Daniel J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and The Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
[9] For a basic bibliography of the large historiographic bibliography on World War II, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 921-944, and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000): 606-612.

ongoing conflicts that fit a more traditional mold, conflicts which almost always arose during the Cold War itself (the most significant example is Palestine), on the other hand, the number of so-called "asymmetrical conflicts" has increased in parallel to a growing political and institutional fragmentation. Consequently, traditional methodological approaches and analyses prove neither sufficient nor functional, and specialists who study the "military events" of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century must broaden their view. For example, consider the flourishing analyses, produced on both a local and international scale, of the humanitarian crises arising from conflicts, why they were certain and why they continue. A second particularly common field of research relates to both resolving or transforming conflicts that are currently underway as well as unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding. A list of those conflicts and geographic regions that have most interested scholars must inevitably begin with those of the Middle East, and, as a direct consequence thereof, those which stemmed directly from the attacks of September 11, 2001. Particularly after the attacks on New York and Washington, interest in this problematic region and analyses focused on a variety of topics related to the Middle East (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, civil wars, etc.) have also increased quite significantly and are by now on the agenda. And we should not forget the ongoing research touching on various conflicts that have emerged in countries of so-called "social realism," from wars in the Caucasus to the tragedy of Yugoslavia to the power struggles in Central Asia. An unfortunate result of this is that there is still relatively little research on the terrible conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, one of the challenges for military historians in the new millennium will be to finally broaden their focus to include the "forgotten continent" and its tragedies.[10]

A historian, a soldier, a book

The ensuing pages, which comprise the core of this book, are the result of a day of study entitled "Soldiers, Bombs and Rifles: Military History of the 20th Century," held on April 12, 2012 at the University of Barcelona's (UB) Faculty of Geography and History. The event was organized by the

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[10] For more information on recent conflicts and research into them, see the websites of the International Conflict Research Institute, http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/index.html, last accessed December 2012; Uppsala Universitet (UCDP), http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php, last accessed December 2012, and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, http://www.iwpr.net, last accessed December 2012.

UB's *Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals* (Center for International Historical Studies; CEHI), within the framework of GRANMA (Group of Research and Analysis of the Present World) (SGR 099, 2009-2013), in memory of Professor Gabriel Cardona, who recently and prematurely passed away. Professor Cardona regularly argued that military history must be included in the major historiographic trends of the twentieth century. A soldier by training, teacher in the UB's Department of Contemporary History by profession, and member of the CEHI, this Spanish Civil War expert knew how to break down the barriers of specialization in military history with an approach consistently based on a strong technical underpinning. His impressive publications bear witness to this.

Consequently, Professor Cardona stands as an important example of the integration and dialogue between contemporary history *tout court* and military history, a topic that is more important than ever. The *Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals* honored his memory by organizing an event that encapsulated his intellectual legacy, an event that not only memorialized Gabriel Cardona but also provided a space for reflection and sharing findings. The conference brought together highly prestigious experts to speak about some of the most significant topics in twentieth-century historiography. Chaired by Professor Antoni Segura i Mas, the director of the CEHI, the event included contributions from Fortunato Minniti on World War I, Giuseppe Conti on military intelligence, Allan R. Millett on World War II and Joan Villarroya Font on the Spanish Civil War. When it was decided to publish the proceedings of this initiative, it also seemed opportune to include a piece by Antoni Segura i Mas on the conflicts of the late twentieth century, thus rounding out an overview of the major topics of war and peace which have pockmarked the twentieth century. We invite you to explore the articles that follow, and are convinced that this ambitious work will inspire reflections that break through the traditional barriers of historiography.

CHAPTER ONE

MODERN REFLECTIONS ON CULTURAL
HISTORY IN THE GREAT WAR

FORTUNATO MINNITI
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA TRE

> The war of 1914-1918 belongs to no one, not even to historians.
> —Jay Winter and Antoine Prost
> *"Urkatastrophe": A "special" war*

1. "Why are we so obsessed by the Great War of 1914-1918?"[1] The
question has been asked before, and bears asking again. Perhaps because
of the war's scope? But the war was neither longer nor bloodier than
World War II, nor was it more harmful or more painful for the civilian
population. Several other pertinent answers should be considered: perhaps
we are obsessed by the Great War because it shattered our expectations
about the future by revealing the dark side of progress; because in killing
or maiming millions of promising young men, it permanently disproved
Darwinian arguments that war supported selection of the fittest; or because
it led part of Europe toward totalitarianism and a new war.[2] However,
though all of these answers are compelling, on their own they are
insufficient.

Therefore, we should reformulate the question and ask: "What made
the First World War so special in its impact on attitudes towards war?"[3]
Was the Great War unique because it was more destructive than major
conflicts of the past, because it put an end to a long period of peace, or
because it demonstrated that instruments of war could annihilate the world
we knew? According to John Mueller, none of these explanations are

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[1] Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, "Review article: The First World War," *Journal
of Contemporary History* 35 (2000): 319-328.
[2] Prior and Wilson, "Review article," 319.
[3] John Mueller, "Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact of the First World
War," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (1991): 1-28.

correct. Rather, our surprise and disappointment about the Great War can be ascribed to the gap between perception and expectations before and after the war.[4] John Horne has made the same point, arguing that the war's ability to set free forces that were both destructive and constructive consolidated and perpetuated this gap, as the war gave rise to new social and political structures that would place the balance of power in Europe – which had been profoundly changed – in an even larger, previously unknown context, a context that was, for the first time, global.[5]

This inconsistency between expectations and results is precisely why the origins, decisions, features and outcomes of the Great War are still studied with such passion today. Nevertheless, this has not managed to make a dent in the Great War's wholly negative image. Indeed, over time the wide cultural arena of publicness[6] has seen a proliferation of twisted perceptions about indisputable events like the British victory – which is still overshadowed by the memory of methodical massacres at the Somme – or the Italian view of the Battle of Caporetto, which is known for the breaching of the front, disbanding and withdrawal of troops, and flight of thousands of civilians. In the long run, however, this would end up centering the action on the Piave, where two defensive battles and one offensive battle were fought, paving the path to subsequent victory.[7]

The aforementioned explanations present several justified interpretations of the ongoing interest and unease that still characterize the Great War. In fact, when describing this war, John Mueller wrote: "It was not the first horrible war in history, but it was the first in which people were widely capable of recognizing and being thoroughly repulsed by those horrors and in which they were substantially aware that viable alternatives existed."[8] It is reasonable to doubt that they were aware of legitimate alternatives, but their feelings of repulsion cannot be questioned, since they were commensurate with the long-lasting moral and social – not to mention

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[4] Mueller, "Changing Attitudes," 9, 24-25.

[5] John Horne, "Introduction" to *A Companion to World War I,* ed. John Horne (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): xvi, xix-xxvi

[6] According to Geoff Eley, publicness is "the public sphere where ideas and images about the past are produced, mediated, reworked, fought over, fashioned into ideology, and put into collective circulation." Geoff Eley, "The Past under Erasure? History, Memory and the Contemporary," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46: 555.

[7] Mario Isnenghi, *La tragedia necessaria. Da Caporetto all'Otto settembre* (The necessary tragedy: from Caporetto to September 8th) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999); Fortunato Minniti, *Il Piave* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002).

[8] Mueller, "Changing Attitudes," 12.

military – beliefs of almost all of the participants. Certainly, in terms of public opinion, feelings and outbursts of intolerance mostly came to a head *after* the war ended, when literature and painting in Europe and the United States found the strength to voice their feelings, ingraining a negative view of the war into the consciences of future generations, who were the first to label it an *Urkatastrophe*.[9] This concept, which is still historiographically compelling, would later be formalized in the political sphere by George F. Kennan, who defined an *Urkatastrophe* as an original event able to stand the test of time and historical research, with the latter held back by the outbreak of another, larger conflict.[10]

Indeed, World War II inevitably sapped energy from its predecessor, achieving scientifically significant results in the field of political history when the archives began to open in the seventies. Research focused especially on the "origins" of the war. Meanwhile, military history, defined narrowly as the history of military operations, was evidently incapable of providing information on the "totality"[11] of the war, which involved not only institutions but also societies and economies, whose cultures and political structures it transformed.[12]

2. In France and Italy, the moment to tackle the complicated dimensions of the war once and for all arrived in the early seventies. As this unfolded, the wounded and disabled, defectors, prisoners and veterans gradually came to replace politicians and generals, strategies and battles, who had been the first leading characters of this monumental event. Meanwhile, a second, internal front was opened. It looked beyond battles to peasants and workers, parents, widows and orphans, poets, writers and artists. Large and small military units were no longer seen as pawns in strategic or tactical maneuvers. Rather, they came to be viewed as instruments which

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[9] Belinda Davis, "Experience, Identity and Memory: The Legacy of World War I," *The Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003): 112

[10] Kennan is famous for writing of a "seminal catastrophe." See George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[11] Hew Strachan, "Les histoires militaires officielles de la première guerre mondiale" (The Official Military Histories of World War I), in *Histoire culturelle de la grande guerre* (Cultural History of the Great War), ed. Jean-Jacques Becker and Centre de Recherche de l'Historial de la Grande Guerre (Péronne-Somme), (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005): 46-47.

[12] Antonio Gibelli, "La storiografia militare italiana negli ultimi venti anni: la Grande Guerra" (Italian Military Historiography in the Last Twenty Years: the Great War), in Società Italiana di Storia Militare, *Quaderno 2000*, (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2003): 188.

could inflict suffering and death on their own members before even taking a shot at the enemy.

Studies – which were often conducted on a small scale – were entrusted with identifying a new mass subject[13] that experienced the war from a point of view quite distant from its politics. This led to consequences some viewed as excessive, such as concentrating on military victims of the war and their disagreement with it and thus decreasing the focus on soldiers, who were seen as complicit, motivated and active.

Upon close consideration, all of the actors in the war – both victims and combatants – were being pushed toward new positions forged for them by historians thanks to an innovative approach which is still valid today, more than a quarter century later. In my opinion, it was the most fitting way to begin to understand our obsession with the Great War, a conflict we deem "great" due to the repercussions it had on the history of the twentieth century. As Christophe Prochasson wrote in 2005 (although the idea dates back to three years earlier), studies focused on World War I in the last 15 years have predominantly revolved around cultural history.[14] Ten years later, the trend remains unchanged.

Prochasson's argument is certainly true. Therefore, we too shall dive into this arena, even if this means omitting from our historiography of the Great War the history of political and military relationships, armaments, military operations and the economy of war, which are part of the "'hard' military history of armies, tactics, strategy and warfare."[15]

Therefore, this chapter will focus exclusively on cultural history, in fact narrowing its scope to only some of the topics and publications in this field, which commenced in the seventies. In addition to critical works and sources about the war, we also must invariably consider a goodly number of pieces tied to the double anniversary of the beginning and end of the Great War. We have celebrated the triumph of memory embodied in these two moments

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[13] Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 203-205.

[14] Christophe Prochasson, "La guerre en ses cultures" (The War in its Cultures), in *Histoire culturelle de la grande guerre* (Cultural History of the Great War), ed. Jean-Jacques Becker and Centre de Recherche de l'Historial de la Grande Guerre (Péronne-Somme), (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005): 46-47; and Davis, "Experience, Identity and Memory," 112-113.

[15] As per the definition published in the *Cambridge Military Histories* series.

every decade since the mid-seventies. In the eighties, this concept[16] began to take hold, and in the nineties, it came to dominate studies.

This "memory boom" has led to an enormous number of studies on places, rituals and languages[17] with one limit: the so-called "collective memory" has become an obsession that threatens to confuse individual and social experiences, memory and history. However, as Bourke wrote, society has no memory[18]; I would add that instead of rituals surrounded by celebratory ceremonies, it needs philologically correct analyses and broad general interpretations which look beyond the pressure – either imposed by publishers or by our own selves – of an unmissable opportunity to reach a wider audience. However, the search for memory has a plus: it gathers testimonials from the generations touched by the war. In fact, by thoughtfully processing individual or local memories, historians play an indispensable part in analyzing contemporaneous portrayals and passing them down to future generations.[19]

"Modern Memory": A changing world

3. In Italy, the focus on these expressions of culture through which we can "consider" – or even reconsider – the Great War dates back to a 1970 work by Mario Isnenghi. Italian writers and intellectuals have focused on expectations around the war, its "beneficial" aspects, and the social and political role of officials and soldiers.[20] Yet this model was limited to Italy, where it was accompanied by studies which aimed to foreground new subjects including the soldiers, farmers, and workers, propaganda in the country and among the troops, and popular culture.[21]

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[16] This is a translation of the "nostalgia for the present" stemming from current needs to forge our identities. Cf. Eley, "The Past under Erasure? History, Memory and the Contemporary," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46.3 (2011): 556

[17] Stefan Goebel, "Beyond Discourse? Bodies and Memories of Two World Wars," Review Article, *Journal of Contemporary History* 42 (2007): 377

[18] Joanna Bourke, "Introduction: 'Remembering' War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39 (2004): 473-474

[19] Bourke, "Introduction," 484-485.

[20] Mario Isnenghi, *Il mito della grande Guerra* (The Myth of the Great War), (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1970), which was preceded by Mario Isnenghi, *I vinti di Caporetto* (The Defeated of Caporetto), (Padova: Marsilio, 1969).

[21] Mario Isnenghi, *Giornali di trincea. 1915-1918* (Trench Diaries: 1915-1918), (Torino: Einaudi, 1977) as well as the pieces dating to 1978 published in Mario Isnenghi, ed., *Operai e contadini nella Grande Guerra* (Workers and Farmers During the Great War), (Bologna: Cappelli, 1982) and in Giovanna Procacci, ed., *Stato e classe operaia in Italia durante la prima guerra mondiale* (The State and

The opposite happened in Great Britain, where Paul Fussell's important volume, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, was published in 1975.[22] Fussell is credited with proposing a universal interpretation of the Great War, although it was actually founded on portrayals offered up by British writers. In his preface to the 1984 Italian translation, Ernesto Galli della Loggia wrote that the war had been seen "as an isolated event of significance in and of itself, as a crucial, paradigmatic event,"[23] without considering it in its real framework, namely the conditions faced by combatants, the risk of death, the deep wounds and changes in humanity caused by an incurable tragedy. Consequently, "beyond its political, strategic or military impact, the Great War was at its core an enormous cultural event: herein lies... its *significance*",[24] which is, therefore, why appropriate methods and sources should be deployed to study it. For example, the "aesthetic" dimension of the war experience was generated from an almost completely allegorical and metaphorical perception of reality, focusing on how the senselessness of events forced combatants to seek to indirectly construe meaning. As this methodology deprived it of any connection to time and space,[25] the experience of war became the uninterrupted experience of humankind in the twentieth century, by which "all wars, in a certain sense, are the Great War."[26] This type of discourse served to explain how a "terribly 'British'" book helped Europe and the United States to understand "the intensity, duration, and sometimes dramatic responses of fleeing from or rewriting" this experience beyond the self-evident specific national contexts.[27] According to Leonard V. Smith, this classic has become a *lieu de mémoire* for everyone, especially those involved in the conflict. [28]

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the Working Class in Italy During the First World War), (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1983).

[22] Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[23] Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Introduzione all'edizione italiana" (Preface to the Italian Edition) of Paul Fussell, *La grande guerra e la memoria moderna* (The Great War and Modern Memory), (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984): viii.

[24] Galli della Loggia, "Introduzione". Original italics.

[25] Galli della Loggia, "Introduzione".

[26] Galli della Loggia, "Introduzione".

[27] Antonio Gibelli, "Introduzione all'edizione italiana" (Preface to the Italian Edition) of Paul Fussell, *La grande guerra e la memoria moderna* (The Great War and Modern Memory), (Bologna: il Mulino, 2000): xvi – xviii.

[28] Leonard V. Smith, "Paul Fussell's *The Great War and Modern Memory*: Twenty-five years later," *History and Theory* 40 (2001): 241, 248.

It should, however, be noted that Fussell's book was not showered with universal acclaim: in addition to the critiques that came out upon its publication and in the years following it, which noted the book's limited scope as well as some inaccuracies, we should also bear in mind Brian Bond's 1997 review, which called the work "unreliable."[29] A year later, Roger Chickering would challenge this observation, hoping to craft a work of similar merit about the German experience.[30] Fussell's scholarship helped lead to a continuous series of studies which brought the field to the excellent levels it currently enjoys, even if it didn't do so alone.[31]

Robert Wohl also aimed to pursue Fussell's goal in his 1979 work *The Generation of 1914*, although he did so less successfully. The work described how groups of young intellectuals contributed to creating an atmosphere of war during this tragic period in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain.[32]

4. In those years, the Great War was still – or even had just become – a fertile terrain for both historiography and groundswells of public opinion in the western world. After Fussell, Eric Leed would prove this with nearly as powerful an impact in his 1979 work, *No Man's Land*.[33] Leed saw the modernity that Fussell called to mind in the changing physical and mental conditions, expectations, and personalities of leading figures, thanks to whom it was possible to "provide a cultural history of the First World War *through* men who participated in it" and were transformed[34] by it after

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[29] Brian Bond, "A Victory Worse than a Defeat? British Interpretations of the First World War," Annual Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Lecture given at King's College London on November 20, 1997.

[30] Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 95.

[31] Adam R. Seipp, "Review Article: Beyond the 'Seminal Catastrophe': Re-imagining the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41: 764.

[32] Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[33] Eric Leed, *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). The beginning might sweep us away when we read that the book "is not a military history." Yet we must simply hold out for half a page more to discover that military history "gains an overwhelming fascination when one looks at it in order to see how it mobilized, articulated, and modified the resources of signification available" to those involved with it (in other words, what contemporaries do to understand what they are doing).

[34] Citations based on the Italian edition of Eric Leed, *Terra di nessuno. Esperienza bellica e identità personale nella prima guerra mondiale* (No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War 1), (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985): 5-7.

becoming bewildered by the sensorial labyrinth symbolized by the trench system.[35] Leed especially laid a path to include within the "historical discourse of this great biological and mental catastrophe...that was the Great War" the traces and murmurs of those who had not written about, recalled or given voice to it because they were incapable of doing so or because they were at a loss for words after locking eyes with the Medusa referred to by Keegan as the "face of battle."[36]

We might also consider whether Leed's work, like Fussell's, has itself become a place of memory, a model, and an obligatory point of reference. I believe it has. First of all, *No Man's Land* preceded George Mosse in noting that the experience of war reoccurred in the imaginations and actions of politicians after a military conflict.[37] Furthermore, he and Fussell helped to launch a new era of studies in Italy, one phase of which included the convention that took place in Rovereto (Trento) in 1985 and focused on social history and mental outlooks.[38] A second phase can be seen in Gibelli's 1991 work, *L'officina della guerra. La grande Guerra e le trasformazioni del mondo mentale*,[39] as well as in the works of Giovanna Procacci[40] and Bruna Bianchi.[41]

Ten years after Fussell, Modris Eksteins' *Rites of Spring* also saw war, death and destruction as elements that helped form the modern conscience and which could not be stopped by the armistice, instead continuing inexorably onwards. The key to understanding this is the "movement"

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[35] Leed, *Terra di nessuno*, 103-155, 217-255.

[36] Gibelli, "Introduzione," xxi, xxix; John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976).

[37] Leed, *No Man's Land*, 7.

[38] Diego Leoni and Camillo Zadra, ed., *La Grande Guerra. Esperienza, memoria, immagini* (The Great War: Experience, Memory and Images), (Bologna: il Mulino, 1986).

[39] Antonio Gibelli, *L'officina della guerra. La grande Guerra e le trasformazioni del mondo* mentale (The Laboratory of War: The Great War and Transformations in the Mental World), (Milano: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991). Another important work is Antonio Gibelli, "Nefaste meraviglie. Grande Guerra e apoteosi della modernità" (Fateful Wonders: The Great War and the Apotheosis of Modernity), in *Storia d'Italia. Annali XVIII. Guerra e pace* (The History of Italy: Annals XVIII: War and Peace), ed. Walter Barberis (Torino: Einaudi, 2002).

[40] Giovanna Procacci, *Dalla rassegnazione alla rivolta. Mentalità e comportamenti popolari nella grande guerra (From Resignation to Revolt: Popular Outlook and Behavior During the Great War),* (Roma: Bulzoni, 1999).

[41] Bruna Bianchi, *La follia e la fuga. Nevrosi di guerra, diserzione e disobbedienza nell'esercito italiano (1915-1918)* (Folly and Flight: War Neurosis, Desertions and Disobedience in the Italian Army, 1915-1918), (Roma: Bulzoni, 2001).

from the acceleration of the Great War to the world's decline,[42] which was manifested metaphorically through art and occasioned by the wounds Alfredo Bonadeo saw and described in a study of literature (and other sources) in the same year as Eksteins. The title of Bonadeo's book – *Mark of the Beast* – is itself indicative of its contents and thesis.[43]

At this point, two different views of the war coexisted. One was expressed by Samuel Hynes in *A War Imagined*, which used literary sources to paint a portrait of not only the mood of elites but also that of the population as a whole. The work condemned political representatives and all of the citizens who let the soldiers go to their fate.[44]

John Fuller's *Troop Morale and Popular Culture*[45] truly toppled consensus about the war when it noted the absence of a plausible reason for it. The work shifted our focus back to the soldiers of the Empire and noted that leaders did not manage the experience of war. Instead, poets and artists became the core of future research and interpretations.[46]

After at least a decade of reflection, in 1989 Mosse followed with *Fallen Soldiers*,[47] a fundamental contribution to the study of the way in which the myth of the war experience emerged to short-circuit the challenges posed by mass killings and help society to survive politically. This myth perfectly met its goals, although it did so at quite a high cost to the European political and social equilibrium of the twenties and thirties. Marked by a sense of meaningfulness and pride about the actions and suffering of the war, the myth denied its unjustifiable absurdity. At its core, it focused on the sacredness of the nation, which was reconfirmed through the sacrifices of so many living and dead, the latter of whom were transformed into cult figures following a liturgy that had been created and celebrated much earlier in France and Germany. Moreover, Mosse

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[42] Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (New York: First Mariner Books, 2000, first ed. 1989), xii-xiv.

[43] Alfredo Bonadeo, *Mark of the Beast: Death and Degradation in the Literature of the Great War* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989).

[44] Samuel Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (London: Bodley Head, 1990).

[45] John Fuller, *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

[46] Jay M. Winter, "La grande guerra negli studi anglo-americani" (The Great War in Anglo-American Studies), *Ricerche storiche* 3 (1991): 569-575.

[47] George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

inspired fruitful areas of study in Italian historiography, particularly with regard to war narratives and the cult of the fallen.[48]

We therefore find ourselves facing positions that are at times antithetical by conscientiously accepting the impossible linearity of this momentous transition in twentieth-century history. This is suggested in another (lesser) work that helps to discover the cultural dimensions of the Great War (understood in the reductive sense of literary works that would anticipate the characteristics of the war and later build on this). The work is Daniel Pick's 1993 book, *War Machine,* which provides a useful formula for the *modus operandi* of wartime culture and society, arguing that they mirror a machine which freely switches between two antithetical and invertible tasks, those of cohesion and fragmentation.[49]

In the works of Fussell, Leed and Mosse, the image of the Great War is one of a tragedy that modernizes culture and society, which have shifted from their pre-war status, opening the door to the irrational at various levels, especially the political.

"Penser la Grande Guerre": On consensus

5. Scholars from the school of French historiography would follow in the footsteps of Fussell, Leed and Mosse. As long ago as 1992, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker had grasped that a triple approach to cultural history existed, a product of different national schools – in French,

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[48] See also Donatello Aramini, *George L. Mosse, l'Italia e gli storici.* (George L. Mosse: Italy and Historians), (Milano: Angeli, 2010). This list is not meant to be exhaustive and also includes Sandra Staderini, *Combattenti senza divisa. Roma nella Grande Guerra* (Soldiers Without Uniforms: Rome in the Great War), (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995); Fabio Caffarena, *Lettere dalla grande guerra: scritture del quotidiano, monumenti della memoria, fonti per la storia: il caso italiano* (Letters from the Great War: Writing of Daily Life, Monuments of Memory, Sources for History: The Italian Case), (Milano: UNICOPLI, 2005); on the second topic, see Bruno Tobia, *L'Altare della Patria* (The Altar of the Homeland), (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998); Bruno Tobia, "Monumenti ai caduti. Dall'Italia liberale all'Italia fascista" (Monuments to the Fallen: From Liberal Italy to Fascist Italy), in *La morte per la patria. Le celebrazione dei caduti dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica* (Dying for your Country: Celebrating the Fallen from the Risorgimento to the Republic), ed. by Oliver Janz and Lutz Klinkhammer (Roma: Donzelli, 2008): 45-62; Oliver Janz, "Lutto, famiglia e nazione nel culto dei caduti della prima Guerra mondiale in Italia" (Mourning, Family and Nation in the Cult of the Fallen: The First World War in Italy), in *La morte per la patria,* 65-79.
[49] Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993).

German and English, respectively – which were attuned to contemporaneous portrayals of war, focused on political issues and interested in the expression of popular culture.

They proposed the concept of a culture de guerre, which they defined as all self-representations of the tragedy constructed by contemporaries. This "culture of war" would be a key that would permit access to cultural history, and Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker argued that it was not a consequence of war but rather its *véritable matrice*[50] (genuine matrix) derived from both the predisposition to violence and the horror suffered in the preceding years. The long years of peace, tormented by political and cultural contrasts woven with intolerance and growing rivalries, were dominated by a vision of the future which mixed fitful expectations of innovation with the fear that civilization would degenerate and come to an end, both of which were inevitable as a result of the miraculous virtues of war.

Many scholars have noted that it is difficult to understand how this climate might have influenced the majority of soldiers, who were uneducated and lived in a peasant society only marginally receptive to these types of political awareness and mobilization; this is a position with which I sympathize. Moreover, in *L'apocalisse della modernità*, Emilio Gentile detected and masterfully defined the somber reality hypothesized by Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker for the learned and middle classes who lived in small and large cities. Indeed, Gentile's repeated definition of a "beautiful era of triumphant modernity" as a temporal, cultural and social space of surfacing tensions represented humanity's gradual descent toward the "solemn festival of evil," in the words of painter Paul Klee.[51] It was a war that saw the collapse of not only the political, intellectual and urban elite but also of the middle and popular classes. In sum, it touched the heterogeneous majority of citizens, including millions of people directly involved by authorities (the majority) or of their own initiative (volunteers were in the minority, with the partial exception of a substantial contingent of volunteers in the British army). This assorted group was brought

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[50] Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, "Vers une histoire culturelle de la première guerre mondiale," (Towards a Cultural History of World War I) *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'Histoire* 41 (1994): 5-6; and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, "Violence et consentement: la 'culture de guerre' du premier conflit mondial," (Violence and Consent: The 'War Culture' in the First World War) in *Pour une histoire culturelle* (Towards a Cultural History), ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997): 252.

[51] Emilio Gentile, *L'Apocalisse della modernità. La Grande Guerra per l'uomo nuovo* (The Apocalypse of Modernity: The Great War for the New Man), (Milano: Mondadori, 2008).

together under the auspices of the project drawn up by Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker between 1992 and 1994, which noted that: "Studying the culture of war therefore meant placing oneself in the very heart of conflict. One must therefore 'penser la Grande Guerre,' considering it in the context of the century and the entire world."[52]

These were "vast programs," as those with overly ambitious goals were sometimes ironically dubbed. Yet they were inevitably courageous; all in all they were in line with the importance of an event which was widely accepted to usher in the contemporary period. Yet they still suffer from the weight of a not-too-distant past marked by a strong pressure to overturn the internal equilibrium of society and politics, a pressure which was, at the time, viewed as positive. [53]

6. This unique culture would ensure consent for the war in France and beyond among not only the ruling class but also the population in general, both before and during the war. This concept – that the European public approached the war with unbridled, unanimous enthusiasm in August 1914 – has recently been reassessed in the case of Germany[54] as well as Great Britain.[55] The perseverance shown through the dark years was undeniable, an incredible endurance displayed by the armed forces and all societies, which underwent greater strain than expected with the exception of Russia. At present, these are nevertheless viewed with narrow criteria in order to insist on a perfect unanimity of approaches.[56]

Thus, the first key topic related to the cultural history of the Great War is consent. The topic was quite common among political historians of conflict until the eighties, especially with regard to recognizing that the middle class and uniformed bourgeoisie participated in the goals and values of the war; fears stoked by governing bodies that the troops might be unreliable; and the ways in which soldiers expressed dissent. Many works written from 1986 onwards aligned themselves with the idea that consent was more widespread than dissent. Indeed, this led in 1989 to the formation of a group of historians focusing on consent, whose research

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[52] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, "Vers une histoire culturelle," 5-6.

[53] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, "Vers une histoire culturelle," 7.

[54] Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[55] Adrian Gregory, "British 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914: A Reassessment," in *Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914-1918*, ed. Gail Braybon (New York: Berghahn, 2003): 67-85.

[56] Belinda Davis, "Experience, Identity and Memory: The Legacy of World War I," *The Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003): 124.

would find a permanent home in the Historial de la Grande Guerre in Péronne in 1992.

Scholars sought causes and displays of consent among soldiers in trench diaries, religious sentiment, and the spontaneous mobilization of society,[57] and the use of such sources is significant. In 1999 Frédéric Rousseau, the author of *Guerre censurée*, noted that not only the stories of elites and intellectuals but also those of common soldiers were important for understanding the war's narrative and providing testimonials of suffering, fear and pain. For him, widespread consent seemed impossible to prove, since those at the front and in the country in general had been unable to come out in favor of or against the war. Though he stated that he did not want to lead a school that opposed consent (*consentement*) in favor of coercion (*contrainte*), Rousseau especially rejected the key concept of culture de guerre. In fact, he proposed that a multi-faceted body of factors (*faisceau de facteurs*) should be considered when studying the war.[58]

It would fall to Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker to apply the concept of culture de guerre, defined as the sum total of depictions of the war which imbue it with profound meaning. They would do so in 2000, with the publication of *14-18, retrouver la Guerre*.[59]

In ruling out rational justifications for why engaged members of society might immediately support the war – an issue that explains in large part why the war continues to fascinate us today – we must recognize that despite differences between those in the city and those fighting in the

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[57] Leonard V. Smith, "The '*Culture de guerre*' and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914-1918," *History Compass* (2007), 5(6). DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00484.x. Smith quotes "preparatory" works including Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *A travers leurs journaux: 14-18 Les combattants des tranchées* (Through their diaries: 1914-1918, the Soldiers in the Trenches), (Paris, Colin: 1986) and Jay Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) in formulating the concept of war culture, which was followed by works such as Leonard V. Smith, *Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Annette Becker, *La Guerre et la foi: De la mort à la mémoire* (War and Faith: From Death to Memory), (Paris: Colin, 1994); and John Horne, ed., *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[58] For a list thereof, see the preface in Frédéric Rousseau, *La guerre censurée, Une histoire des combattants européens de 14-18 (The Suppressed War: A History of European Soldiers from 1914-1918),* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2003), 9-23.

[59] Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14-18, retrouver la Guerre* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). Published in English as *1914-1918: Understanding the Great War* (London: Profile Books, 2002).

campaigns, "the homeland had the upper hand." Instructions for immediately launching a defense came from afar. While soldiers at the front refused to accept that the prevailing images of the war were in fact imaginary, and some two and a half million British volunteers (not to mention those in the Dominions) poured in to help, these issues were clearly secondary. Condemning atrocities was the dominant narrative, maintaining consent and producing ongoing hostility towards the enemy.

Signs of consent were initially present between mid-1916 and mid-1917, although the exact moment when these signs appeared varies in every country. In any case, a desire not to lose the war prevailed over a desire for peace for everyone but Russia. Patriotic feelings around defense were widespread in every army, including among the Germans, while European societies were newly mobilized, with propaganda – the result of dominant narratives that did not necessarily come from above – playing a significant role. Religious faith completed this ideological framework, "sanctifying" the war, which had become universally seen as a vehicle for the victory of law and civilization over savagery. The elite always shaped consent, idealizing sacrifice and abnegation. Intellectuals, who were victims of the sudden brutalization, were also faithful followers of this approach. The end – a new world free from the enemy and therefore from war – justified the means.

At the end of the war, everything would change. Consent could no longer bear the overwhelming burden of tragedy. Tragedy had been tolerated during the war, but became intolerable after it. A key reason for this may have been the fact that violence could no longer be justified. [60]

Thus began the revenge of dissent, which became the nearly unanimous approach for understanding the behavior of part of the European populace. This held everywhere except among the majority of Italians and Germans, where political events delayed the moment when this view would arise.

In 2002, Rémy Cazals would provide a critical response filled with controversial ideas that challenged the historians of Péronne.[61] In it, he argued for a third position, adaptation (*adaptation*), which would break free from the duality between consent and coercion. It was a sign of

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[60] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *La violenza, la crociata, il lutto. La Grande Guerra e la storia del Novecento* (Torino: Einaudi, 2002): 79-92, 99, 130, 157. (This is the Italian translation of *14-18, retrouver la Guerre*.)
[61] Rémy Cazals, "1914-1918: oser penser, oser écrire" (1914-1918: Dare to Think, Dare to Write), *Genèses* (2002), 43, 46.

openness to the "*péronnistes*" (in the words of Jean-Yves Le Naour)[62], and I believe they were equally willing to try to understand these controversial ideas when they proposed a larger framework[63] and again took up Mosse's view on brutalization,[64] the result of violence in combat.[65] This shifted the focus on consent to the soldiers, where the primary aim was to maintain morale. There was some anxiety around this, leading to attempts to create limits by censoring correspondence, which therefore proved useless in predicting troop behavior.

Recently, André Loez has provocatively concluded that soldiers who were elsewhere could only fight for a limited period of time, since "the morale of soldiers does not exist."[66] A positive reading of this concept of being elsewhere can be seen through the lens of their shifting targets, which sometimes led to unequal types of motivation. On a general level, this can be viewed as defensive patriotism or aggressive nationalism; while from a military perspective, it is evident in feelings of solidarity and belonging among members of the unit, the knowledge that a mission had been completed effectively, or the certainty that not following orders would be punished.

The alternative to consent did not come through revolt, which was tried and overcome in France, and, to a lesser extent, in Italy. Rather, it came through expanding the ever-growing tolerance for passiveness, in which less motivated, physically and mentally exhausted,[67] or poorly trained

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[62] Jean-Yves Le Naour, "Le champ de bataille des historiens" (The Battlefield of Historians), last accessed March 4, 2013, http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Le-champ-de-bataille-des.html?lang=fr.

[63] Rousseau, *La guerre censurée,* 17.

[64] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *La violenza,* 25-26.

[65] Antoine Prost, "Les limites de la brutalisation. Tuer sur le front occidental, 1914-1918" (The Limits of Brutalization: Killing on the Western Front, 1914-1918), *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'Histoire* (2004), 81. This was confirmed by historians studying violent behaviors in the wars immediately beforehand, from the Russo-Turkish War to the First Balkan War, such as Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, "La Grande Guerre a-t-elle brutalisées les sociétés européennes?" (Did the Great War Brutalize European Societies?), *Sens Public* (2005), 1, last accessed March 4, 2013, http://sens-public.org/spip.php?article169.

[66] André Loez, "Pour en finir avec le "moral" des combattants" (The "Morale" of Soldiers: Getting It Over With), In *Combats. Hommage a Jules Maurin* (Combat: A Homage to Jules Maurin), ed. Jean-François Muracciole and Frédéric Rousseau (Paris: Michel Houdiard Éditeur, 2010): 106-119.

[67] Giorgio Rochat, "Eserciti di massa e società dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale" (Mass Armies and Society from World War I to World War II), in Giorgio Rochat, *L'Esercito italiano in pace e in guerra. Studi di storia militare*

soldiers took refuge. This was certainly influential in cases of crisis, helping to hold units together after serious issues like desertion threatened their stability and allowing them to continue to maintain pressure on enemies, gradually wearing them down.[68]

A 2002 conference in Péronne aimed to describe the conceptual framework from which cultural history had arisen. The conference assessed a decade of work and proposals about depictions of the war and established directions for future research which would take advantage of the resources made available by archaeology and psychiatry, science and law, the contributions of gender history and, especially, a micro analytic approach which aimed to verify results by viewing the *culture de guerre* from a distance. This would provide strategic value if, as Audoin-Rouzeau argued, "our gradual progress toward a cultural history of the Great War were only possible through a special – or even extreme – focus on *the singular*."[69]

This "singular" referred to utilizing soldiers' diaries and objects and studying "archaeological"[70] findings from graves and mental illnesses. This cheerful methodological contradiction led Audoin-Rouzeau and Carlo Ginzburg to question whether weak scientific underpinnings and decisive results might be better than strong science and weak results.[71]

Surprisingly, in the 2003 synthesis written by Audoin-Rouzeau, Leonard V. Smith and Annette Becker, *France and the Great War*, "culture" is still referred to in the singular. The authors argue that this culture was forged as journalists, writers, actors, singers, photographers, painters, designers, directors, artisans and manufacturers spontaneously constructed a system for depicting war, with intellectuals playing a central

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(The Italian Army during Peacetime and Wartime: Studies of Military History), (Milan: R.A.R.A., 1991): 182-189.

[68] Giorgio Rochat, "Come misurare l'efficienza dell'esercito italiano nella Grande guerra" (Measuring the Effectiveness of the Italian Army during the Great War), *Ricerche Storiche* XXVI (1997): 569-594.

[69] Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, "Micro-histoire et histoire culturelle de la Grande Guerre: apports et limites d'une approche" (The Contributions and Limits of Micro-history and Cultural History as applied to the Great War), in *Histoire culturelle de la grande guerre*, 235.

[70] Nicholas Saunders, "Vers une archéologie anthropologique de la Première Guerre mondiale" (Toward an Anthropological Archeology of World War I), in *Histoire culturelle de la grande guerre*, 159-170. See also the pieces published in Nicholas Saunders, ed., *Matters of Conflict: Material Culture, Memory and the First World War,* (London & New York: Routledge, 2004).

[71] Audoin-Rouzeau, "Micro-histoire", 236, 238.

role in the process. However, the work *does* recognize that soldiers constructed their own culture in parallel to the civilian world.[72]

The historians of Péronne therefore continued to disagree with the methodology and merit of the work produced by the scholars who would later comprise the Craonne research center.[73] And, as Smith has noted, this led to a *counter-culture of war* among this group.[74] In a meticulous exegesis of the *péronnistes'* argument written in 2004, they challenge the ongoing use of "*culture*" in the singular,[75] arguing that its contents are plural. Jay Winter and Antoine Prost had also noticed this in their collaborations with the *péronnistes*.[76]

In 2006, the *Collectif de Recherche International et de Débat sur la Guerre de 1914-1918* (CRID) was founded in Craonne to challenge the *Historial de la Grande Guerre* in Péronne. According to Le Naour, it was a *veritable machine de guerre* (authentic war machine) that aimed to move beyond cultural history to a total history of the Great War[77] that could be read as social history. Led by Rousseau, Cazals and Offenstadt, among other scholars, the *CRID* continued to play down its disagreements with Péronne, while relentlessly proceeding to criticize methodological premises it believed to be erroneous.[78]

In other words, this "trench war between historians," as *Le Monde* dubbed the conflict in 2006, boiled down to finding the correct answer to this simple question: "Dans la boue, sous les obs, comment diable les

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[72] Leonard V. Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *France and the Great War 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 54, 98.

[73] Giovanna Procacci, "Alcune recenti pubblicazioni in Francia sulla "cultura di guerra" e sulla percezione della morte nel primo conflitto mondiale" (Recent Publications in France on the "*Culture de guerre*" and Perceptions of Death in World War I), in *Il soldato, la guerra e il rischio di morire* (Soldiers, War and the Risk of Death), ed. Nicola Labanca and Giorgio Rochat (Milan: UNICOPLI, 2006): 110-112.

[74] Leonard V. Smith, "The '*Culture de guerre*.'"

[75] Nicholas Offenstadt et al., "A propos d'une notion récente: la "culture de guerre" (Regarding a Recent Concept: The "*culture de guerre*"), in *Guerres, paix et sociétés, 1911-1946* (War, Peace and Society, 1911-1946), ed. Frédéric Rousseau (Neuilly: Atlande, 2004): 667-674.

[76] Antoine Prost, "La guerre de 1914 n'est pas perdue" (The War of 1914 is Not Lost), *Le Mouvement social* 199 (2002): 97-98; Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War*, 164-165.

[77] Frédéric Rousseau's summary basically outlines this. See Frédéric Rousseau, *La Grande Guerre en tant qu'expériences sociales* (The Great War as Social Experiences), (Paris: Ellipses, 2006).

[78] Leonard V. Smith, "The '*Culture de guerre*.'"

soldats onts-il tenu?" (In the mud, with shells falling, how the hell did the soldiers hang on?)[79] The answers offered by some historians have differed from those of the Péronne school. Before considering them, however, it is useful to reflect on *Le Monde*'s observation that the historians of Péronne were convinced they had definitively lost the battle of public opinion. Accordingly, public opinion about the Great War did not by any means coincide with the answers offered by historical research, which scholars legitimately believed to be more convincing.

Perhaps due to this, in their latest version, *culture de guerre* has finally become plural. "But the plural, *cultures de guerre*, is self-evident," said Annette Becker in 2007, since the numerous groups involved – including ethnic, national, regional, social, ideological, aesthetic, family, friendship and gender groups[80] – each experienced their own realities. Leonard V. Smith's *The Embattled Self* puts forward an argument along these lines, in which the narratives of war experiences appear to change over time, plotting a shift from illusion to disillusionment[81] that prevents us from recognizing consent as universal among all soldiers, and suggesting that the challenge of maintaining morale lies in an alternative between consent and coercion, both of which factors must be of use.[82]

Luckily, to break free from this clear-cut juxtaposition between consent and coercion, patriots and "rebels," and victims and executioners, the Craonne school also ended up accepting the concept of *culture de guerre*. However, its members avoided using it as a general explanation of collective behaviors, for which they turned to studies of social factors, the actions of institutions, political organizations, unions and churches, and,

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[79] Jean Birnbaum, "1914-1918, guerre de tranchées entre historiens" (1914-1918: Trench War Among Historians), *Le Monde,* March 10, 2003.
[80]"Culture(s) de guerre: Entretien avec Annette Becker" (Culture(s) of War: Interview with Annette Becker), Site d'histoire et de géographie de l'Académie de Lille,   http://www5.ac-lille.fr/~heg/site_academique/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=284&catid=34&Itemid=44, last accessed March 4, 2013.
[81] Leonard V. Smith, *The Embattled Self: French Soldiers' Testimony of the Great War* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2007).
[82] Patrick Facon, "Les recherches sur le comportement des combattants francais pendant la Première Guerre mondiale: des mutins aux fusillés pour l'exemple ou par erreur" (Research on Behavior of French Soldiers during World War I: Rebels to Shootings as an Example or by Mistake), in Società Italiana di Storia Militare, *Quaderno 2000* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2003).

obviously, the actions of bureaucratic and military structures instead of focusing exclusively on how elites thought.[83]

A 2008 conference in Péronne provided an opportunity to test convictions as well as the usefulness of these hybrid solutions while avoiding rigid contrasts. The conference examined behavior through the lens of three interconnected topics: acceptance, endurance and refusal, focusing on soldiers and civilians and a variety of situations related to life, combat and mental responses like fear.

Many now believe that this process of reshaping the theoretical framework around consent and coercion is vital. At present, scholars now accept that *cultures de guerre* should be viewed in the plural and that there is a difference between consent and patriotic enthusiasm (which Prochasson defines as the "negotiated acceptance of war"),[84] confirming the lasting effectiveness of processes which sought to nationalize the masses and affirming the role of the State.[85] This demonstrates the limited impact of not only the methodological juxtaposition between the two schools but also of the controversy in general, except the initial dispute, steeped as it was in French self-referentiality. And it also demonstrates the importance of all of the scholars who have worked to increase our knowledge of the archetypes of war in the twentieth century, regardless of the school to which they ascribe.

7. As mentioned before, several historians have proposed alternative explanations to the long-standing theory of consent. These explanations focus on how morale was maintained among those soldiers who did not endure serious physical and mental trauma, the majority of soldiers, which, in my view, makes them highly relevant.

Niall Ferguson[86] and Joanna Bourke[87] have proposed that the desire to kill and the pleasure derived from doing so managed to "protect" a soldier from fear and nightmares, paradoxically preserving his mental balance and ability to endure the war. As Giovanna Procacci noted, these states cannot

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[83] François Buton et al., "1914-1918: Retrouver la controverse" (1914-1918: Rediscovering the Controversy), http://www.laviedesidees.fr/1914-1918-retrouver-la-controverse.html?lang=fr., last accessed march 4, 2013.

[84] Christophe Prochasson, *14-18. Retours d'expériences (14-18: Back from the Trenches)* (Paris: Tallandier, 2008).

[85] Pierre Purseigle, "A Very French Debate: The 1914-1918 'War Culture,'" *Journal of War and Cultural Studies* I (2008): 9-14.

[86] Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

[87] Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*: *Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare* (London: Granta Books, 1999).

be generalized, but rather must be carefully assessed for every group, individual case, place or moment.[88]

Edgar Jones did just that. He also doubted the reliability and number of testimonials the soldiers committed to writing, calling into question the correlation between good mental health and willful attempts to kill the enemy. [89]

Solid coping strategies seem to have played a key role in successfully maintaining good mental health. Many soldiers adapted in non-traumatic ways, providing a contrast to others who sought to escape through revolt, desertion, mental illness, self-mutilation, suicide and homicidal tendencies. Critical works in this new field of study are few but promising. A piece by Alexander Watson provides one highly persuasive example. Based on a first study of "endurance" among a relatively large cross section of British and German soldiers, Watson argues that endurance stems from an innate ability to deal with unpleasant situations and tolerate a sense of impotence when confronting uncontrollable forces. In the face of danger, soldiers fall back on surprising optimism and religious faith (or in its absence, faith in superstition), often tricking themselves into believing they will come out on top. Ideological tension, effective training,[90] and an internalization of military values certainly translated into a strong degree of resistance. They also were quite effective, since junior officers were able to deploy their leadership ability and moral commitment in taking on a paternal role with their men.[91]

Part of this explanation can also be seen in the work of Michael Roper, who found that junior officers treated their soldiers similarly. However, Roper claimed that this behavior was typically *maternal.* In fact, Roper postulated that this ability to bear the unbearable derived from the close relationships many soldiers had with their family circle; the maternal figure stood at its very center. Helped along by this relationship, their

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[88] Procacci, "Alcune recenti pubblicazioni," 109-110, 115, 117.

[89] Edgar Jones, "The Psychology of Killing: The Combat Experience of British Soldiers during the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History,* 41.2 (2009).

[90] Hew Strachan gives great importance to this in "Training, Morale and Modern War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4 (2006): 211-227.

[91] Alexander Watson, "Self-deception and Survival: Mental Coping Strategies on the Western Front, 1914-1918," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41 (2006): 247-268; Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 2, 6, 10, 85, 92, 232-235; Alexander Watson and Patrick Porter, "Bereaved and Aggrieved: Combat Motivation and the Ideology of Sacrifice in the First World War," *Historical Research* 83 (2010): 146-264.

correspondence with their families and the material support they received from them, lucky soldiers managed to find a valid form of protection and, consequently, an acceptable degree of balance in their lives.[92]

On violence: The "brutalization" of war

8. In an article on the *culture de guerre*, Leonard Smith noted that "societies mobilized, died, mourned, and remembered, all rather bloodlessly. But the further interrogation of consent eventually had to pose the question of violence."[93] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker also tackled this question in 2000, when they wrote about violence, the *second* key topic in the *culture de guerre*, which played a significant role in the behavior and fate of soldiers and civilians both on the field and after the war. Violence is especially relevant when considering the history of warfare (and the role of different armies), as it explains how participants portrayed their experiences, overcoming their reticence about the brutal aspects of warfare they not only endured but also inflicted.

14-18, retrouver la Guerre predominantly refers to the former group, the millions of victims who suffered during the war and were killed, wounded or disabled. Among them, a surprising loser was war itself: in a very short period of time, its excesses caused "an aesthetic and ethical code of heroism, courage and battle violence" to disappear permanently.[94] However, *14-18, retrouver la Guerre* also mentioned the other reality, the up-close and personal experiences of soldiers and the suffering they inflicted. This was omitted in the majority of testimonials, whose authors were able to hide behind widespread anonymity and therefore avoid taking responsibility for their acts. In doing so, it helped keep historians from touching on these experiences, which was interrupted only when Bourke published her hypothesis about the willingness to kill. This would be followed by other works which reshaped our understanding of the topic and the consequences of brutalization among soldiers.[95]

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[92] Michael Roper, *The Secret Battle: Emotional survival in the Great War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

[93] Leonard V. Smith, "The '*Culture de guerre*.'"

[94] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *La violenza*, 19.

[95] Nicolas Mariot, "Faut-il etre motivé pour tuer? Sur quelques explications aux violences de guerre" (Is Motivation Needed to Kill? Several Explanations of War Violence), *Genèses* 53 (2003); Prost, "Limites de la brutalisation," 81. For a comparative perspective, see Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, "Au coeur de la guerre: la violence du champ de bataille pendant les deux conflits mondiaux" (At the Heart of the War: Battlefield Violence During the Two World Wars), in *La violence de*

Trauma victims were also among those who suffered from the violence
of the war. Trauma, the result of explosions and other events, immediately
and often permanently damaged the minds of those it afflicted. Some years
after Leed began exploring the subject, a 2000 issue of the *Journal of
Contemporary History*[96] represents the moment when trauma fully entered
into the cultural history of the Great War. The issue included articles
written by Leed himself, Mosse, Winter, Bourke, Becker and at least five
other researchers[97] including Paul Lerner, who later penned a monograph
about the German case.[98] All of these articles focused on those who were
sentenced to relive the war even after it had ended for everyone else.

Another group of defenseless soldiers were the prisoners, whose
experiences were ignored in the scholarly literature for many years. This
left these soldiers perhaps even more excluded from the study of warfare
and marginalized than the disabled,[99] above all consigning them to remain
marginalized when more attention was paid to the latter. A significant
example is the Italian case, where a political *damnatio memoriae* focused
on deaths among soldiers ignored those who passed away in prison.[100]

The same can be said about soldiers who revolted or deserted, who
were, if possible, even less protected by the severe laws of war.[101]

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guerre 1914-1945 (The Violence of War, 1914-1945), ed. Stéphane Audoin-
Rouzeau et al. (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 2005).

[96] Special Issue: Shell-Shock, *Journal of Contemporary History* 31 (1), 2000.

[97] Ben Shepard, *A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth
Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Peter Barham,
Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War (New Haven & London: Yale University
Press, 2004); Peter Leese, *Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British
Soldiers of the First World War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Fiona
Reid, *Broken Men: Shell Shock, Treatment and Recovery in England 1914-1930*
(London: Continuum, 2009).

[98] Paul Frederick Lerner, *Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry and the Politics of
Trauma in Germany 1890-1930* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

[99] Odon Abal, *Soldats oubliés: le prisonniers de guerre francais* (Forgotten
Soldiers: French War Prisoners), (Bez-et-Esparon: Etudes et communication,
2001); Heather Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War:
Britain, France and Germany 1914-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).

[100] In both its scope and results, a major work (originally published in 1993) is
Giovanna Procacci, *Soldati e prigionieri italiani nella Grande guerra. Con una
raccolta di lettere inedite* (Italian Soldiers and Prisoners in the Great War:
Including a Collection of Unpublished Letters), (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri,
2000).

[101] For a general overview, see Frédéric Rousseau, *La guerre censurée.* For
individual perspectives, see Smith, *Between Mutiny and Obedience*; Christoph

For many years, historians also failed to focus on the civilian victims of violence and individual atrocities as well as acts of war and general issues that concerned the population, whether as collateral victims or as intentional targets of executions, sexual violence, forced labor, internment and deportations of the population who lived near the front, in the war zone, or in occupied territory.[102] This lack of attention was inexcusable,

Jahr, *Gewöhnliche Soldaten. Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen Heer. 1914 – 1918* (Common Soldiers: Desertion and Deserters in the German and British armies, 1914-1918), (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1998); Nicolas Offenstadt, *Les Fusillés de la Grande Guerre (1914-1999) et la mémoire collective* (The Shootings of the Great War (1914-1999) and Collective Memory), (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1999)*;* Marco Pluviano and Irene Guerrini, *Le fucilazioni sommarie nella prima guerra mondiale* (Hasty Shootings in World War I), (Udine: Gaspari, 2004); André Loez, *14-18. Les refus de la guerre. Une histoire des mutins* (1914-1918: The Refusals of War: A History of Rebellion), (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).

[102] Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *L'enfant de l'ennemi, 1914-1918. Viol, infanticide pendant la Grande Guerre* (The Enemy's Child, 1914-1918: Rape and Infanticide during the Great War), (Paris: Aubier, 1995); Annette Becker, *Oubliés de la Grande Guerre. Humanitaire et culture de guerre* (The Forgotten Victims of the Great War: Relief Workers and the *Culture de Guerre*), (Paris: Hachette, 1998); Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14-18*, *retrouver la Guerre*; and especially John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); John Horne, "Populations civiles et violence de guerre: pistes d'une analyse historique" (Civilians and War Violence: Paths of Historical Analysis), *Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (2002): 174; Bruna Bianchi, ed., *La violenza contro la popolazione civile nella Grande Guerra. Deportati, profughi, internati* (Violence against Civilians during the Great War: Deportations, Refugees, and Internments), (Milano: Hoepli, 2006); for an Italian example, see Daniele Ceschin, *Gli esuli di Caporetto. I profughi in Italia durante la Grande Guerra* (The Exiles of Caporetto: Italian Refugees during the Great War), (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2006); see also Alan Kramer's essential work, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Oswald Uberegger, "Le atrocità nella prima guerra mondiale. Saggio storico-bibliografico e bibliografia scelta" (Atrocities in World War I: A historical and bibliographic review and selected bibliography), *DEP Deportate, esuli, profughe. Rivista telematica di studi sulla memoria femminile* (2007): 238-239, available at http://www.unive.it/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=36320, last accessed March 4, 2013; as well as the pieces by Frédéric Rousseau, Eva Krivanek, and Bruna Bianchi in Frédéric Rousseau and Burghart Schmidt, ed. *Les Dérapages de la Guerre du XVIème siècle à nos jours; Kriegsverbrechen vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, (War Crimes from the 16th Century to Modern Times), (Hamburg: DOBU Verlag, 2009); and Sophie de Schaepdrijver, Annie Deperchin and

seeing as there had been a focus on these acts from the very beginning of
the war and throughout it.

By now we are aware of both the different guises under which violence
sprang forth and its consequences. According to the Péronne historians,
another factor that played an important role was the armistice – at least in
one part of Europe, where it was responsible for the process of
"brutalization" *à la* Mosse (in terms of German post-war politics).[103] It is
now criticized for imperfectly conditioning soldiers and "independently"
radicalizing postwar society.[104]

The path of pre- and post-war barbarization following the outbreak of
violence, from its origins to its consequences, is also portrayed in
"Cultures of War," the second part of Enzo Traverso's excellent *À feu et a
sang* (2007), which analyzes one its cultural impacts, namely the deep
wounds inflicted on European civilians.[105]

Thanks to artillery and machine guns, mass killings would continue on
the battlefield. This shifted the focus of historiographical interest from
victims to executioners, from trenches to ways of killing more people
(using artillery and machine guns) or new killing techniques (using gas
and aerial bombings). In fact, these differed from genocide only because
they were a reciprocal form of homicide.

Without this type of violence, the Great War would not have been
different from the wars which preceded it, and would not have been
transformed into a total war[106] marked by massive death counts, leading to a
type of trauma we have only been able to bear through the creation of the
Myth.[107] It was helped – materially – by a successful process of trivialization

Laurence van Ypersele, Gerd Krumeich, Peter Holquist, Donald Bloxham, Hamit
Bozarslan, Annette Becker and Jay Winter in part 2 and 3 of John Horne, ed., *Vers
la guerre totale. Le tournant de 1914-1915*, (Toward Total War: The Turning Point
of 1914-1915), (Paris: Tallandier, 2010).
[103] Citation from the Italian edition: George Mosse, *Le guerre mondiali dalla
tragedia al mito dei caduti* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1990): 175-199. Originally
published as *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
[104] Belinda Davis, "Experience, Identity and Memory: The Legacy of World War
I," *The Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003): 126; Oswald Uberegger, "Le atrocità."
[105] Italian edition: Enzo Traverso, *A ferro e fuoco. La guerra civile europea 1914-
1945* (Blood and Fire: The European Civil War, 1914-1945), (Bologna: il Mulino,
2007).
[106] For its elements, see Pierre Purseigle, ed., *Warfare and Belligerence: Perspectives
in First World War Studies* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); John Horne, ed., *Vers la guerre
totale*.
[107] George Mosse, *Le guerre mondiali*.

that took place during the war, as useless, highly kitsch objects were placed in homes. These included items shaped like – and sometimes forged of – war materiel as well as war postcards, which touched on topics ranging from patriotic fervor to humorous circumstances. These efforts tried to make the war at least a bit more familiar, and therefore, bearable.[108]

"*Retrouver la guerre*": Between death and mourning

9. Along with studies on consent and violence, *Retrouver la guerre* discusses research on loss and bereavement, the *third* topic in the *culture de guerre*.

On death, the authors cite Thierry Hardier and Jean-François Jagielski's *Combattre et mourir pendant la Grande Guerre* (2001),[109] which focuses on the tools and methods used to carry out mass killing in France, the locations where these took place and how they came to be "settled." On bereavement, meanwhile, a key work is Jay Winter's 1995 book, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning*,[110] which proposes the idea of a community of mourning, defining the boundaries of communal mourning and the limited, highly individual forms it took. Winter argues that a great deal of time was necessary to heal the wounds of loss. Most importantly, traditional memorials and ways of mourning were needed.[111] These would take both individual and collective forms and include monuments to the fallen and war cemeteries (a subject dear to Mosse), the sites of mourning.

Though *Retrouver la guerre* discussed making too much of the dead, it was neither the first nor last work to do so.[112] The topic "found its own

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[108] See collections such as Barbara Jones and Bill Howell, *Le arti popolari della prima guerra mondiale* (Folk Art in World War I), (Torino: Cooperativa Editoriale Studio Forma, 1976); Lucio Fabi, ed., *1918. La guerra nella testa. Arte popolare, esperienza, memoria nel primo conflitto mondiale (1918: Mental War: Folk Art, Experiences and Memory in World War I),* (Trieste: Lint, 1998); and Lucio Fabi, ed., *La guerra in salotto. Der Krieg im Salon* (War in the Parlor), (Udine: Gaspari, 1998).

[109] Thierry Hardier and Jean-François Jegielski, *Combattre et mourir pendant la Grande Guerre (1914-1925)* (Fighting and Dying in the Great War: 1914-1925), (Paris: Editions Imago, 2001).

[110] Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[111] Citation based on the Italian edition of Jay Winter, *Il Lutto e la memoria. La grande Guerra nella storia culturale europea* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), 7-13.

[112] Annette Becker, *Les monuments aux morts. Patrimoine et memoire de la Grande Guerre* (Monuments to the Dead: Heritage and Memory in the Great War), (Paris: Errances, 1988); Carine Trévisan, *Les fables du deuil. La Grande Guerre:*

roots in that *culture de guerre* which transformed the dead into voluntary martyrs of a great wartime crusade," making it more difficult for their families to achieve the closure they needed.[113] Furthermore, the scope and serial nature of death in warfare between 1914 and 1918 made it impossible to sweep death under the rug. This had been the approach typically used during the second half of the nineteenth century, and the inability to do so made death even more unbearable. Thus, mourning came to take place both in private – where faraway or missing bodies complicated and delayed the grieving process among family and friends – and in public, where grief was expressed on both a local and national scale.

In the public sphere, more and more ceremonies were held and monuments erected. They gained additional currency during the postwar period, just when spontaneous and widespread consent around the reasons for going to war, which started to regain ground in 1918, had abated almost to the point of disappearing. This paved the way for the completely opposite phenomenon, blame, and for renewed political and national support for past sacrifice. The difficult grieving process would come to focus on the atrocious cost of war and, in the British version, on war itself, memorializing individuals one name at a time and commemorating the nameless, who would come to represent the entire nation.

"…la guerre que je préfère, c'est la guerre de '14-'18."
(The war I prefer is the war of '14-'18.)
—Georges Brassens

Sites of memory (and history)

10. This brings us to the *fourth* topic in cultural history, memory. The survivors of the war of 1914-1918 were the first "generation of memory"

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mort et écriture (The Fables of Mourning: Death and Writing in the Great War), (Paris: PUF, 2011); Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, *Cinq deuils de guerre: 1914-1918* (Mourning War Five Ways: 1914-1918), (Paris: Noesis, 2001); Luc Capdevila and Danièle Voldman, *Nos Morts. Les sociétés occidentales face au tués de la grande guerre*, (Our Dead: How Western Societies Deal with those Killed in the Great War), (Paris: Payot, 2002); Christina Theodosiou, "La mobilisation des morts: culte du souvenir et culture de guerre en France pendant la Grande Guerre" (The Mobilization of the Dead: The Cult of Memory and War Culture in France during the Great War), *Revue LISA/LISA e-journal* X. Available at
http://lisa.revues.org/4844, last accessed March 4, 2013.
[113] Jay Winter, *Il Lutto e la memoria.*

in the twentieth century, the first narrators of their own experiences. After their disappearance, their "stories have become iconic,"[114] making the work of historians even more important.

The first major result of this is Fussell's *modern memory*, which remains valid even in light of Pierre Nora's *mémoire*, which aimed to preserve the French focus on the processes behind identity.[115] (This was due to the fact that *mémoire* favored consequences over causes, the remnants of the event over the event itself, and the paths to tradition over tradition itself, almost a kind of "secondhand history."[116]) Scrutinized by few voices, this proved inadequate for describing the history of war. Nevertheless, it was examined by more than the three authors who contributed to *I luoghi della memoria*, a three volume work edited by Mario Isnenghi.[117]

The study of how memory was created owes much to the contributions of Winter, who moved from a large-scale, contemporaneous and postwar grieving process to a proposal to replace the word *memory* with *remembrance*. In doing so, he aimed to more precisely identify the source, site, time and forms of memory through a process that simplified access to it.[118] The next stage in this process was historical remembrance,[119] e.g. a way of interpreting the past necessarily founded on both memory and history, which together replaced *collective memory* as it is still understood today. Beginning from this starting point, Winter examined aspects of Great War experiences, which therefore became dynamic in nature: portrayals of these experiences were not set in stone, instead changing[120] in light of the distance between wartime and the postwar narrative.

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[114] Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History.*

[115] Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de mémoire* (Realms of Memory): Volume 1, *La République* (The Republic), Volume 2, *La Nation* (The Nation), Volume 3, *Les France* (Sides of France), (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992).

[116] This is underscored in Hue-Tam Ho Tai, "Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory," *American Historical Review* 106 (2001).

[117] Isnenghi, Mario, ed., *I luoghi della memoria* (Realms of Memory), Volume 1, *Personaggi e date dell'Italia Unita* (Characters and Dates in the History of United Italy), Volume 2. *Simboli e miti dell'Italia Unita* (Symbols and Myths in the History of United Italy), Volume 3, *Strutture ed eventi dell'Italia Unita* (Structures and Events in the History of United Italy), (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996-1997).

[118] Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006), 3.

[119] Jay Winter, *Remembering War*, 7, 9, 11.

[120] Peter Liddle, John Bourne, and Ian Whitehead, eds., *The Great World War 1914-1945* (London: Ian Harper and Collins, 2000).

Renewed public (which is to say political) discussion of historical remembrance invariably rises up when the issue fortuitously (or sometimes intentionally) rears its head. An example can be seen in the controversial issue of welcoming back the dead. In France, Prime Minister Jospin did so "in order to set an example" when opening the Chemins des Dames in 1998. This is a constant form of remembrance we historians regularly face in our work. The most appropriate approach is to let such occasions spur reflection and renewed research.[121]

11. The cultural history of the Great War is not approached from a self-referential, single-issue point of view. Nor should it be. Rather, it must flow along with the currents of comprehensive military history, becoming "soft" rather than "hard." It must move beyond "hard" readings and include a broader analysis derived from a study of economic, productive, financial, social, strategic and political factors. And this going with the flow should extend beyond a simple, cumulative approach. It must be dynamic, striving to "rediscover" what made the Great War a total war.

We are on the right track. In fact, cultural history features heavily in Audoin-Rouzeau and Jean-Jacques Becker's *Enciclopédie de la Grande Guerre 1914-1918* (2004),[122] where 22 entries about cultural history face off against 14 pieces on classic topics in military history. It should be noted that Audoin-Rouzeau penned these classic entries, leaving cultural history to others and instead writing about trenches, artillery and machine guns, aircraft and tanks, equipment, and even battle (in collaboration with Gerd Krumeich).

Cultural history is also present in the third volume of *Gli italiani in guerra*. The 2008 work overseen by Mario Isnenghi includes seven typical topics in cultural history as well as issues in political and social history.[123]

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[121] For an example, see Annette Becker, "Riflessioni sull'ottantesimo anniversario dell'armistizio in Francia, 1998" (Reflections on the Eightieth Anniversary of the Armistice in France, 1998), in *Commemorare la Grande Guerra. Francia, Germania, Gran Bretagna, Italia* (Commemorating the Great War: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy), ed. Nicola Labanca (Firenze: "Quaderni Forum," 2000): 11-20.

[122] Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Jean-Jacques Becker, eds., *Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre, 1914-1918: histoire et culture* (Encyclopedia of the Great War, 1914-1918: History and culture), (Paris: Bayard, 2004).

[123] Mario Isnenghi and Daniele Ceschin, *Gli italiani in guerra. Conflitti, identità, memoria dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni* (Italians at War: Conflict, Identity and Memory from the Risorgimento to Modern Times), Volume III, tome 2, *La Grande Guerra dall'intervento alla "vittoria mutilata"* (The Great War: From Intervention to "Mutilated Victory"), (Torino: Utet, 2008).

Furthermore, some authors who contributed to the *Enciclopédie* also added their voices to *A Companion to World War I*, which was edited by John Horne and published in 2009. The Péronne historians were asked to write 14 entries about cultural history, which stand alongside nine entries focusing on traditional dimensions of military history and eleven articles on individual nations that span military, political and social issues. Consequently, the work seems innovative in contrast to the traditional structure of general compilations.[124]

The same can be said of "The Era of Total War, 1914-1945," part 2 of volume 4 of *The Cambridge History of War*, edited by Chickering, Showalter and van de Ven, which dedicates ample space to the topics of prison, occupation and memory.[125]

In short, I believe that we must acknowledge cultural history's contribution to the history of the Great War, irrespective of its heuristic limitations. Yes, "uniformed" military history may be quite entertaining – from "technical" details like producing plans for building bridges through various preparations and military summits. Nevertheless, neither this nor political behavior can serve as a substitute for cultural history in shedding light on total war.

Today, as we study the war, the European spirit is in a very different place than the one Rosario Romeo referred to in 1968, when he wished that – in order to avoid mistakenly taking refuge in counter-factual hypotheses – historians finally "accept that there had been a first world war in the European past, as they [had] accept[ed] that the Punic Wars, Crusades, or Thirty Years' War had existed."[126] (To this list, I would now add World War II.)

Romeo's hopes have been rewarded. Now we no longer struggle to accept that the Great War, in all its complexity, belongs to each and every one of us.

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[124] John Horne, "Introduction" to *A Companion to World War I,* ed. John Horne (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

[125] *The Cambridge History of War*., Volume 4, *War and the Modern World*, ed. Roger Chickering, Dennis Showalter, and Hans van de Ven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[126] Rosario Romeo, *La prima guerra mondiale* (The First World War), in Rosario Romeo, *L'Italia Unita e la prima guerra mondiale* (United Italy and the First World War), (Roma-Bari, Laterza: 1978), 141.

CHAPTER TWO

MAN VS. MACHINE:
HUMANS AND TECHNOLOGY
IN 20TH-CENTURY INTELLIGENCE

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1. Historiographical issues in studying intelligence

Military intelligence is a unique sub-discipline of modern military history. Since it is difficult to gain access to the archives of intelligence agencies, the field suffers from a scarcity of reliable intelligence documents. Historians of intelligence therefore face challenges generally unknown to others who study the military history of the same periods. This is the case of World War II, where archives have gradually been made available over time, providing access to a growing number of historical documents and leading to research advances and the growth of a scientifically-grounded historiography of military intelligence.

An endemic lack of documentation is certainly the primary – or perhaps the only – reason for ongoing efforts to pass off as historical research works which, in the words of John Keegan, are "often too sensationalist or...mere compendia of intelligence gossip or speculation." Not to mention the fact that "biographies and autobiographies of intelligence agents or their controllers...are rarely reliable."[1]

Keegan's observation tends to hold across the globe, although the facts may vary slightly and the historiography of intelligence may be at a different stage in its development in each country.[2] Great Britain provides

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[1] John Keegan, *Intelligence in war. Knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (Hutchinson: London, 2003), 363.
[2] They certainly hold in Italy, where these limits have meant that the field still progresses quite slowly, even in the case of events in the distant past, like the

a powerful example of how analyzing intelligence-related events can help reconstruct the overall military history of the country. Consider *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, which came out thanks to a team of scholars headed up by coordinator Francis Harry Hinsley and including Michael Howard. The first two volumes of the series were published in the late '70s and early '80s, and three more volumes would follow before the series was completed in 1990. This wide-ranging cultural project was the most robust, significant contribution to establishing the scientific validity of the historiography of intelligence. Thanks to a prudent use of archival sources, Great Britain now has an official record that clears up the aforementioned pseudo-history and serves as an essential point of reference for all intelligence scholars.[3]

Keegan himself pointed out the importance of the collection in his outstanding volume on intelligence in war, noting that Hinsley's works "cover almost every topic in his remit, including how Enigma was broken, how Ultra worked, how British intelligence successes and failures are to be judged in comparison with those of her enemies, and how intelligence affected the outcome of the war as a whole."[4]

Keegan focuses especially on this final topic, namely the influence of intelligence on wartime decision-making, which is, in fact, the crux of his

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Second World War. In fact, the first systematic scientific contribution to Italian historiography of military intelligence in World War II was Alberto Santoni's *Il vero traditore* (The true traitor; Milano: Mursia, 1981), which focused on Ultra, the British intelligence produced at Bletchley Park. Note, however, that Santoni's work was not the result of an unexpected and auspicious opening of the Italian military archives; rather, it was based on documents in the London archives. This approach has not often been followed. However, Giuseppe Conti's *Una guerra segreta. Il Sim nel secondo conflitto mondiale* (A secret war: Military Intelligence in the Second World War; Il Mulino: Bologna, 2009) is based on the *Diari storici* (Historical diaries) at the Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, which the military intelligence agency, like every combat unit, wrote each day of the war. These records are available for consultation. Nevertheless, no comparable documentation on the peacetime actions of the Italian intelligence agencies exists. The only records of peacetime intelligence are a few, fragmentary letters, which make it difficult to organically reconstruct military history in depth.

[3] The first two volumes of the work were published in 1979 and 1981. The third volume was divided into two parts which were published in 1984 and 1988, respectively, while the fourth volume, *Security and Counter-intelligence*, and the fifth, Michael Howard's *Strategic Deception* capped off the series in 1990.

[4] Keegan, *Intelligence,* 417.

book. This represents the second important point in researching intelligence, which was referred to at the beginning of this chapter.

In his introduction, Keegan in fact wrote that his book sought to "answer a simple question: how useful is intelligence in war?[5]"

Historians of intelligence frequently broach this question. In his book on the topic, which was published in the mid-eighties, Water Laquer asked "How important is intelligence?" He then definitively responded that this was in fact the "main question" his study sought to address.[6]

Upon further consideration, though, the question seems a bit strange. Similar questions are rarely asked about other institutions, be they political or social, religious or even military in nature. Those scholars who research such topics assume that they are useful fields, which primarily focus on the nature, structure and functioning of the institutions themselves.

As Laquer observed, however, some of the greatest military commanders fed this skepticism about intelligence. This began with Napoleon and Frederick the Great, who proclaimed the benefits of intelligence yet in practice rarely took it into account.[7] As Laquer noted, while "intelligence fulfills a vital function, [it] does not follow that intelligence is always important." In short, knowledge of your adversary will not ensure automatic victory. Consequently, "it is as wrong to exaggerate the importance of intelligence as it is to underrate it."[8]

Keegan's analysis is much more drastic. The historian begins by stating that "war is not an intellectual activity but a brutally physical one"

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[5] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 3.

[6] Walter Laquer, *A world of secrets: The uses and limits of intelligence* (New York: Basics Books, 1985), xxi.

[7] After noting that intelligence, namely "tutte la cognizioni che possiamo avere del nemico e del suo paese" (all the knowledge that we can have of the enemy and his country) in fact represented "la base per tutte le nostre idee ed azioni" (the basis for all of our plans and actions), Clausewitz seemed to wish to limit its importance, or at least suggest that it be used cautiously, stating that "Le affermazioni che si ottengono in guerra son in gran parte contraddittorie, in maggior parte ancora menzognere, e quasi tutte incerte" (information obtained in war is to a good extent contradictory, to a greater extent untruthful, and most of all uncertain). Though this uncertainty was already present while preparing for a conflict, it became even more serious "nel tumulto stesso della guerra, ove un'informazione segue l'altra" (during the tumult of war itself, where pieces of information come one after another). Cf. Carl von Clausewitz, *Della Guerra*, "Rivista militare" (On War: "Military magazine"); Rome, 1989, book I, ch. 6, "Le informazioni in guerra" (Intelligence in war).

[8] Laquer, *A world,* 23-24.

which focuses on actions, not thoughts[9] and arrives at the conclusion that
"intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of
victory."[10] Of course, "to make war without the guidance intelligence can
give is to strike in the dark"; nevertheless, at some point or another, the
two armies will meet and intelligence is rarely the decisive factor. Keegan
therefore concludes by noting that "intelligence, however good, is not
necessarily the means to victory...ultimately, it is force, not fraud or
forethought, that counts."[11]

Keegan's controversial view presumably addresses the tendency to
overrate wartime intelligence. In fact, Keegan sets "operational intelligence"
apart from general intelligence and counter-intelligence, which are
uninterrupted, ongoing and highly bureaucratic in nature.

Nevertheless, there has always been a tendency to glorify the role of
spies to some extent. Fiction after the Cold War – as exemplified in works
by Fleming, Buchan and Le Carré – helped to create unrealistic stereotypes
about spies who conquered the imagination of the general public and
became authentic heroes. This is the case of James Bond, who was seen as
able to save his homeland thanks to his intelligence, which was presented
as a kind of "decisive weapon."[12]

Likewise, this deformed view of reality – that is, of political espionage
– has always stood in contrast to the true work of intelligence agents. As
Laquer has pointed out, their job consists of "long hours...humiliation,
[and a] lack of recognition." With a touch of irony, he concludes that the
secret services have always been a sort of Cinderella "with no Prince
Charming in sight!"[13]

In fact, General Kenneth Strong, a long-serving veteran of British
intelligence, wrote that "a great deal of Intelligence work is not concerned
with the secret and the esoteric." Field Marshal Harold Alexander added
that it was anything but "the spectacular service of the common
imagining." Rather, it was "a much more prosaic affair...The art is to sift

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[9] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 369.
[10] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 349.
[11] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 349.
[12] It is no coincidence that the Barbican Centre in London is hosting an exhibition
dedicated to the myth of James Bond this year, in honor of the 50th anniversary of
the character's birth.
[13] Laquer, *A world*, 13-14.

the wheat from the chaff, and then to lay before the commander a clear statement."[14]

Without a doubt, intelligence is a long and difficult journey that, according to Keegan's model, passes through a number of phases.[15] First, information is acquired and presented to potential users. This must happen in real-time to keep the information "fresh." Then, recipients accept the intelligence. Subsequently, they must assess, judge and interpret it and then put all of the pieces together into a coherent picture. And all of this work would be useless without the final phase, where the intelligence is put to use. This is the bailiwick of decision makers, politicians, commanders and leaders.

2. The twentieth century and the beginning of "electronic warfare"

For centuries, we based our knowledge of the enemy on information gathered from and supplied by human sources. This intelligence is usually referred to as *humint* (human intelligence), since it comes from interpersonal connections.

However, the twentieth century saw a definitive shift toward a new source of information based on electronic intercepts, *sigint* (signals intelligence).

The new information era began with the single-wire telegraph system in the mid-nineteenth century. Invented by Samuel Morse, the device was based on a special code – later named for its inventor – that conveyed the letters of the alphabet using dots and dashes. A product of the industrial revolution, the telegraph was one of many civilian inventions that were quickly adopted for military purposes. Unsurprisingly, the first effective military uses of this new system of communication took place on land during the American Civil War, which was, in fact, the first large-scale industrial war.[16]

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[14] Cf. Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (Doubleday: London, 1969), xii, and H. Alexander, *The Alexander Memoirs*, cited therein.

[15] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 5-6.

[16] Andrea Tani, "Guerra elettronica e intelligence nella loro dimensione storica" (Historical Aspects of Electronic Warfare and Intelligence), in Tomaso Vialardi di Sandigliano, Virgilio Ilari editors, *Storia dello spionaggio. L'intelligence militare italiana. L'intelligence elettronica. L'intelligence cinese* (A History of Intelligence: Italian Military Intelligence, Electronic Intelligence and Chinese Intelligence), (Associazione europea degli amici degli archivi storici: Savigliano, 2006), 116.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the first successful uses
of underwater cables, which had been tested as early as the 1830s. As
noted, however, the true improvement in quality came at the beginning of
the twentieth century. In the late 1890s, Guglielmo Marconi developed and
patented his wireless telegraph system, which he had designed for
commercial uses, having seen the enormous opportunities of sending
communications over the open seas.[17] In December 1901, Marconi sent
signals across the Atlantic from England to the United States. This was the
birth of the radio, which would rapidly become the primary system of
communications used by the British Admiralty. In turn, this would force
all of the major maritime powers to quickly adapt to this system.[18]

The first large-scale use of *sigint* in warfare dates to the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-1905. It represents an interesting case study in
terms of how the innovation was both understood and undervalued. After
effective intelligence took the surprise out of Japan's "surprise attack," the
Russians used their "Marconian devices" less, perhaps because they were
worried about their accuracy. The Japanese made better use of the
telegraph, which was the "key element in their success."[19]

However, radio did not signal the end of the telegraph's usefulness.
Rather, the telegraph was still used on land, while radio was first used
overseas.[20] By 1914, nearly all major warships were equipped with radio
devices that could transmit over 1000 miles.[21]

Due to their minimal movements and limited use, armies did not
immediately turn to radio since it was not yet seen as "necessary." In fact,
although these new systems for transmitting information finally made it
possible to supply intelligence in real time,[22] they were also easy to
intercept, jam and deceive. These limitations could be put to use by their
opponents, significantly reducing their effectiveness.[23]

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[17] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 107.
[18] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 107.
[19] Andrea Tani, "Guerra" 116. In this conflict, they were especially helped by
Admiral Zinovij Petrovic Rožestvenskij, who commanded the Russian fleet. The
admiral committed a series of errors, including not authorizing the use of the radio
to jam transmissions from the Japanese cruiser, which had just spotted the Russian
fleet and was communicating this to Admiral Togo! Given the overall Japanese
advantage, the outcome of the Battle of Tsushima might not have changed.
Nevertheless, undervaluing the new technology led Rožestvenskij directly into the
hands of Togo, who was poised and ready to strike.
[20] Andrea Tani, "Guerra.", 116
[21] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 111.
[22] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 26.
[23] Andrea Tani, "Guerra",115-116.

During the First World War, electronic warfare techniques progressed rapidly. While the enemy's radio transmissions were still intercepted and jammed, "it was quickly noted that the information they provided, in comparison to the disturbance they created, was often quite useful in operations."[24] This gave rise to the widespread use of decryption, which also employed new instruments like the radiogoniometer, a rice-transmitter radio that could determine where a ship was and the direction it was headed. The period between the two wars also saw the birth of radar, which could measure the location and speed of both fixed and moving objects. This new instrument would later enhance the military possibilities offered by electronics.

3. World War II

During World War II, intelligence played a key role in numerous events of significant strategic and military importance. This was the case in both the new field of electronic warfare and the more traditional field of human intelligence ("humint"), which was appreciated despite the growth and development of technology.

Along these lines, the American navy's widespread use of radar in the Pacific theatre proved a significant advantage.[25] Technology also played an equally important role in Enigma, Ultra and Magic.

Enigma, the German-made encryption machine decrypted by the Poles, was used by the British Ultra at the beginning of 1940, just in time to provide valuable help during the Battle of Britain. The machine would continue to be used to decrypt German codes over the next few years, providing considerable advantages for the Allied forces in both Germany and Italy.

Magic, the US Army and Navy's effort to crack the codes utilized by Japanese military and diplomats, began in 1939 and supplied precious information to the political and military leadership throughout the war, contributing to many Allied successes. Especially noteworthy was the 1942 Battle of Midway, where the US obtained its first victory over Japan. A breadth of detailed intelligence unequaled on other occasions proved to be an excellent and decisive counterpart to Nimitz's considerable skill.

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[24] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 116-117. Original quotation: "ci si rese conto ben presto che la loro interpretazione era spesso molto utile, sul piano operativo, rispetto al loro disturbo"
[25] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 116-117

Interestingly, this is one of the cases where Keegan challenges the
importance of intelligence. Despite their extensive knowledge of the
enemy, the Americans nearly lost the battle. Given this, Keegan contends,
perhaps a bit ungenerously, that the Battle of Midway in fact demonstrated
that war "is the arena of chance."[26]

As for humint, Keegan argues that it played a limited role during
World War II. It certainly was not part of some of the most significant
skirmishes, like the U-boat war, the German conquest of Crete, or the
aforementioned Battle of Midway. Paradoxically, however, in the "high-
technology struggle between German secret weapon scientists and their
blinkered Allied opponents, human intelligence was of critical importance."[27]
Typical of this point of view was the so-called "Oslo Report," a brief
report penned by anonymous German scientists who opposed Nazi racial
policy. Written in 1939, the 2000-word document was initially seen as
implausible and was consequently stored in a drawer for a long time. It
would later demonstrate to the British the nature and danger of the so-
called "secret" German weapons.[28]

In truth, the Second World War saw several similar situations. One of
the most blatant such cases revolved around Richard Sorge, a Soviet agent
whose Japanese intelligence connections allowed him to inform Stalin of
Germany's aggressive plans in the spring of 1941. These plans later
materialized as Operation Barbarossa. Although Stalin did not believe
Sorge, this in no way detracts from the importance of his intelligence. In
this case, the information chain stopped at the "acceptance" phase, when
intelligence landed in the hands of its intended recipient. It is difficult to
determine whether this lack of acceptance was due to the Soviet state's
dictatorial nature, Stalin's personality, or both.

Similar cases also took place in Fascist Italy, especially during World
War II. For example, consider the conflict with Greece in October 1940,
which both Mussolini and Ciano favored. At the time, the foreign minister
painted a completely false portrait of Greece for his father-in-law,
claiming that the country was on the brink of military collapse and that

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[26] Keegan, *Intelligence,* 314. In fact, the Americans had lost five of their six
attacking squadrons, when the sixth happened across the main Japanese force
temporarily unguarded by their fighter planes. At that point, the US dive-bombers
hit three of Japan's four aircraft carriers. The fourth was later destroyed. Cf.
Keegan, *Intelligence* 35-38
[27] Keegan, *Intelligence,* 320.
[28] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 320.

Fascist attempts to liberate Greeks from the rule of Metaxas would be politically advantageous.[29]

However, the leader of Italian military intelligence (the "SIM"), Colonel Amè, had in fact provided a large, factually-accurate dossier describing a completely different situation, namely that the Greek public was hostile to Italy and the country's modest army was ready to fight the invaders to the bitter end. This would prove irrelevant. Mussolini preferred to believe the first version, either because it brought reality and his wishes into line or because he distrusted the military, including the intelligence agency, and preferred to put greater stock in his own sources of intelligence. The result was a military disaster, leading to the end of the illusory "parallel war" and Italy's subordination to Germany.

Although we cannot know how different choices might have changed history, we can attempt to draw some general lessons from this moment. It is reasonable to argue that intelligence could have proven valuable, if only in bringing to the campaign more appropriate resources (in terms of both manpower and tools) than those that were deployed. This seems especially pertinent in light of the fact that the engagement was viewed – with criminal levity – as a "walk in the park."

Apart from these cases, where human intelligence took its revenge on technology, the debate about the importance of intelligence during World War II is especially concerned with signals intelligence, particularly with regard to the role of Ultra and Magic in the Allied victory. Yet many scholars consider this an idle debate. Indeed, as Stephen Budiansky has noted, sigint was decisive, "particularly at sea, where simply knowing where the enemy is amid a vast expanse of water is often more than half the battle," and "in carrying out effective deception, where knowing what the enemy is thinking is practically *all* the battle." Nevertheless, it is dangerous to join Budiansky in asking "did code breaking 'win' the war, or even shorten the war, as is so often claimed?"[30] Avoiding the murky territory of "what ifs," where Budiansky seems to seek to challenge the devoted supporters of sigint,[31] it is worth noting the consequences that

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[29] Cf. Conti, 174ff.

[30] Stephen Budiansky, *Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II* (New York: Touchstone , 2000), 332.

[31] Concretely, "even in the cases where one can single out one battle in which Ultra was clearly decisive, it is heading onto dangerous ground to assume that absent Ultra the battle would have been lost...If there had been no Ultra, how can we say that necessity would not have driven the Allies to take other measures that would have been as effective, or even more effective, in countering the challenges they faced?"; Budiansky, *Battle*, 333.

certain firm beliefs rooted in World War II had on the subsequent choices of some powers. As the author says, it was perhaps inevitable that, with the zeal of converts, the military and political authorities that had so long neglected signals intelligence would come in time to overrate it. The remarkable successes scored in the war and the technical wizardry of it all was so persuasive – and the continuing fiascoes in attempting to run actual human agents so discouraging – that "national technical means" (which would later include spy satellites and other remote sensors) came to dominate intelligence gathering.

The issue is especially relevant for the United States, which on various occasions "would pay for that lopsided emphasis. The dearth of humint [...] would become a recurring theme in the fight against insurgent and terrorist groups in the sixties, seventies and eighties."[32]

4. After World War II

The inseparable bond between technology and human factors in intelligence was again decisive after World War II. It was particularly important during the Cold War, when the world was divided into two blocs and the misleading stereotype of spies mentioned earlier came about.

During this period, electronic intelligence saw considerable growth. This stemmed in large part from the development of radar and other devices that analyzed the electromagnetic signals of enemies, using this information to draw up the most appropriate counter-measures. Elint (electronic intelligence), a new branch of sigint, grew gradually and was applied in both naval and airborne contexts.[33] Furthermore, during the forty years of the Cold War, submarines – especially American subs – made wide use of elint. Their more than 2,000 missions provided knowledge about and helped monitor potential adversaries in Europe and Asia.[34]

All of the conflicts of this period, from the Vietnam War to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Falklands Crisis, made wide use of electronic warfare. However, humint also played an important role in each of these (to a greater or lesser extent). Human intelligence has revealed itself to be a double-edged sword: depending on how it is used, it can lead to success or disaster.

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[32] Budiansky, *Battle*, 332.
[33] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 121.
[34] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 122.

Humint was certainly put to good use in Israel's four wars between 1948 and 1973 (and, more generally, in the country's relationships with Arabs). Its relevance stemmed from Israel's demonstrated skill at the trade and the ready availability of perfectly bilingual people who resembled local citizens and could be deployed in the field.[35]

The American experience in Vietnam was quite different. The so-called Phoenix Program, which the CIA ran between 1967 and 1972, was a joint endeavor designed in collaboration with the Vietnamese secret service that was tasked to "penetrate the peasant population to gather information and to arrest or slay Communist cadres." Although we still know very little about this operation, it is certain that innocent people were indiscriminately arrested, tortured and murdered.[36] In any case, the Americans ended up being defeated on the field. Nevertheless, it is easy to hypothesize that similar operations might have had such a negative impact that a military victory might have been overshadowed by rather negative political repercussions.

5. Recent history and the future of military intelligence

Even after the Soviet Union was dissolved, the two-pronged combination of humint and technology has continued to play a significant role in intelligence. Despite the growth of electronic warfare, which in the last few decades has gained increasingly more cutting-edge technological tools that have led to more and more refined attacks and counter-measures, everything points to the continued use of both humint and technology in future wars.

New technology, in turn, has led to a growth in intelligence of every type. The sheer quantity of information now available can seem overwhelming, and humans cannot always appreciate its value. In fact, thousands of analysts and computer technicians constantly sift through this data, although, as we shall see, the results are not always what they hope for.

At the same time, situations like those which led to the aforementioned disasters have reappeared. From time to time, some scholars seemed to be seized by a kind of euphoria about the potential of new technology, leading them to believe that the first countries to achieve electronic

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[35] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 310

[36] Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 616-617. The final count would amount to some sixty thousand "neutralized" individuals, over twenty thousand of whom were killed.

supremacy in the theatre of operations shall prevail in current conflicts, and, to an even greater degree, those of the future. For example, Andrea Tani noted that net superiority in the field of electronic counter-measures "in and of itself entails the epilogue to a tactical contest. Often, if suitably replicated, it also carries over to its strategic counterpart."[37]

These peremptory statements may have picked up steam thanks to military successes in the last twenty years in conflicts such as "Desert Storm" in 1991 and "Peace enforcement" in Kosovo in 1999, which some consider to be a true apotheosis of electronic warfare.[38] Technology was utilized to a lesser extent in "Operation Enduring Freedom" (Afghanistan, October 7, 2001) and to an even lesser degree in "Iraqi Freedom" (March 19 - May 1, 2003). The Afghan and Iraqi conflicts were asymmetrical wars characterized by significant technological differences. This was particularly the case in "Iraqi Freedom," the first true example of a network-centric war, that is, of "digital warfare."[39] In fact, this moment marks the beginning of a new chapter in the history of warfare, and shall serve as an end bracket to this study, since any further analysis would look to future events rather than history.

Indeed, it is more interesting to reflect on the first major operation during this new phase of warfare and military intelligence, "Desert Storm," which was, without a doubt, a model of intelligence gathering. The intelligence agencies of all the countries in the coalition worked together. In fact, the Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC) was specifically created to intercept ships. On a strategic level, satellites, aerial spying and photographic recognition, electronic recognition aircraft and unmanned miniature aircraft all contributed to the decisive result "to gain information about the electronic characteristics of the radars in the Iraqi aerial defense system, radio frequencies, etc."[40]

But just as every rose has its spine, although "Desert Storm" and the Persian Gulf War were a triumph for the coalition, they nevertheless

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[37] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 115. Original quotation: "comporta da sola l'epilogo di un confronto tattico e spesso, se opportunamente replicata, anche del corrispondente strategico."
[38] Andrea Tani, "Guerra", 126.
[39] Pietro Batacchi, *La Network Centric Warfare e l'esperienza italiana. Il processo di digitalizzazione dell'Esercito*, (Rome: Network Centric Warfare and Italy: Digitalizing the Army; Centro Militare di Studi Strategici [CEMISS], 2009).
[40] Mario De Arcangelis, "I Servizi segreti nella Guerra del Golfo" (The Secret Services during the Gulf War), in *Rivista marittima* July, (2006): 100-101. Original quotation: "per conoscere le caratteristiche elettroniche dei radar del sistema di difesa aerea irachena, le frequenze della apparecchiature radio ecc."

brought to light a series of shortcomings and errors. Some of these were human errors, such as a lack of comprehension about the Iraqis' true intentions typical on the part of the intelligence agencies, and more generally, their commands. Others were machine errors that arose when satellites and surveillance aircraft were unable to exactly pinpoint the location of nuclear, chemical and biological facilities or assess the exact damage aerial bombardment inflicted on enemy posts. A wider use of humint could have made up for these misassessments, but human intelligence in fact played quite a minimal role in the campaign. And when it was utilized, it did not always produce the expected results. For example, the coalition rarely managed to gain information about Saddam Hussein's movements or hiding places.

In truth, "Desert Storm" represented a new type of warfare quite different from that of the Cold War, when the enemy was well known. Now, threats came from difficult to locate, largely unknown forces. What's more, problems related to drug trafficking and international terrorism would complement those tied to military issues in the coming years, underscoring the need for information gathering which is as timely and exhaustive as possible in order to prevent crises before they begin, rather than manage them once they have broken out.

To this end, only the joint fruits of more advanced technical tools and ever-more-prepared, morally-grounded intelligence agents can meet new defense needs. In contemporary theatres of war, one of the most delicate issues to take on is in fact related to training agents, which is why Keegan turns to literary precursors when suggesting what seems to be the revenge of the human element: "The masters of the new counter-intelligence will not resemble the academics and chess champions of the Enigma epic in any way at all." Rather, they will be like "Kipling's Kim...a model of the anti-fundamentalist agent," ready to "become trusted members of criminal gangs, with all the dangers and moral compromises that such a life requires."[41]

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[41] Keegan, *Intelligence*, 362-363.

CHAPTER THREE

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR II

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Almost ten years ago the trustees of the Smithsonian Institution asked a group of historians to identify the most important wars in the history of the United States of America. The historians' recommendations would guide the creation of a new wing of the National Museum of American History that would feature the nation's wartime experiences and the impact of those wars. With little disagreement, the group chose three wars: the War for Independence, the Civil War, and World War II. The choices reflected a broad cultural bias to judge wars on their domestic impact rather than on their international influence. Had historians selected wars based on their foreign relations impact alone, they might have chosen the Mexican War (1846-1848), the War with Spain and the U.S.-Filipino War (1898-1902), and the Korean War (1950-1953). As the deliberations continued, the historians agreed that if one joined domestic and international significance, World War II had the distinction of being the nation's most significant war. Since that meeting in 2002, Congress designated the D-Day Museum, New Orleans, Louisiana as a "national" museum to commemorate World War II, the first museum of an American war to be so designated. A World War I museum and a Civil War museum are now also designated "national" museums. There is no museum yet for the War of Independence.

While American cultural commentators can debate whether or not World War II was "a good war" or whether those who fought that war represent "the greatest generation," one great truth remains: the United States of America was the only member of the Allied coalition to play a significant role in defeating all three major belligerents of the Axis alliance: Nazi Germany, Japan, and Italy. No one disputes the fact that the Soviet Union ruined more German divisions and killed more German soldiers than the other allies, but it did little to destroy the German Luftwaffe and the German submarine force or to cripple German industry.

Its brief war with Japan was an adventure in capturing slave laborers and looting Japanese assets in Manchuria and Korea, not in engaging in serious combat with the Japanese armed forces. No one disputes the fact that the British and the Commonwealth forces fought the longest war across the world against Germany, Japan, and Italy and held back nothing in their Churchillian doggedness to gain victory at whatever cost. The Commonwealth forces could not have defeated either Germany or Japan alone, however. Although Poland and the Soviet Union take the dubious prize for Allied civilian suffering, the British people may have escaped Nazi occupation, but not bombing, starvation, and family separation and disintegration, effects of slight consequence in the United States. Yet the only war the British "won" as the dominant participant was against Italy in the Mediterranean and Africa. The Indian-British forces in Burma or the Australian-New Zealand (ANZAC) forces in the South Pacific, regardless of their skill and fighting heart, did not defeat the naval and air forces that defended Japan.

The Chinese Nationalist and Communist armies and the refugee forces of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, and Norway had neither the numbers nor the military effectiveness to be major threats to the Axis except in minor local and regional campaigns. Except in Yugoslavia, no resistance movement could claim a separate victory, although some tried.

American direct participation in the war with Germany began in late 1941 when both the Soviet Union and Great Britain faced defeat and the temptation of a negotiated settlement. To be sure, a limited capitulation would have required the fall of Churchill and Josef Stalin. Neither man appeared in any great danger. Both cheered the American entry as a turning point in the conflict, a promise of new vigor and resources in the war against Hitler. The issue became not Axis defeat, but its time and cost. In spite of the pressure to wage a war of revenge against Japan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt remained committed to the concept of a "Germany First" strategy, championed by Churchill and Stalin, which would require an Anglo-American expeditionary force to land in northern Europe and create a "second front" in combat with the Wehrmacht. This war would repeat the successful campaign against Napoleon, 1813-1814, and the incomplete Allied effort against the Central Alliance of 1918. As the American armed forces grew to their peak power in 1944, the "second front" against Hitler grew in complexity and became an American-led campaign.

To the dismay of his senior military advisors, Roosevelt chose to commit American air, ground, and naval forces to the British Mediterranean-African

campaign against the Italian armed forces, a token German commitment, and the Axis-manipulated colonial forces of Vichy France. This American commitment meant there would be no northern European campaign until 1944. As Stalin did, one could argue that the Mediterranean-African theatre would not weaken the Wehrmacht and reflected a British plot to spread its imperial influence in the Balkans and Middle-East, thus confronting Soviet imperial designs. It also provided FDR an excuse to divert forces to the war with Japan. Stalin's complaint had some merit, which grew when the Commonwealth-American forces invaded Sicily and Italy in 1943, where they were joined by Polish, Brazilian, and Free French divisions. The Mediterranean campaign did, however, produce useful consequences. It ensured Allied-leaning neutrality from Turkey and the Iberian nations; it encouraged resistance movements in Greece and Yugoslavia; and it destroyed Mussolini's Italy, which dissolved, in effect, into a communist-fascist civil war. In terms of Allied strategic advantages, the Allied campaign of 1944 allowed the bombers of the U.S. 15th Air Force to reach the untouched resource areas of eastern Germany, central Europe, and the Balkans. The German air defenses could hardly cope with a "two front" bombing campaign.

   Hoping to avoid an invasion of northern Europe into the defenses of an unweakened Wehrmacht, Churchill urged Roosevelt to endorse a strategic bombing campaign against Germany's urban, industrial heartland. The Royal Air Force (RAF) already had a night-bombing campaign underway with a small U.S. 8th Air Force, based in England, as its daylight-bombing junior partner. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) endorsed this campaign with enthusiasm since such an anticipated air campaign had shaped the pre-Pearl Harbor USAAF. Military aviation seemed to provide a true "American way of war," based on mass-produced, advanced technology aircraft flown by heroic, intelligent young American males fresh from classrooms and baseball fields. The champions of aviation from the Boeing, Douglas, Grumman, North American, and other corporations were the heirs of Andrew Carnegie and Henry Ford, not Jules Verne. For USAAF planners, the challenge was building a large enough bomber force to smother industrial target areas and absorb losses. The decisiveness of the strategic doctrine was not an issue since the air war could not help but weaken Germany. In his January 1943 meeting with Churchill at Casablanca, FDR approved a combined bomber offensive or Operation Pointblank. The campaign would be, Stalin heard, "a second front in the air."

   Although the strategic bombing of Germany never met its most ambitious goals and did not reach its maximum effect until months after the Normandy landings (June 6, 1944), the RAF and USAAF bomber

forces distorted the German war effort and reduced the potential destructiveness of the Wehrmacht. The Nazi obsession with air defense meant that the Luftwaffe disappeared over the land battlefields of 1944-1945, thus allowing the massing of Allied armor and artillery without much concern about air attacks. Production of the feared dual-purpose 88mm cannon took priority over other artillery and went more often into massive flak towers, not tank turrets or anti-tank batteries. High-value German scientific and engineering resources flowed into an aborted nuclear weapons program and the dangerous but tardy deployments of a jet fighter-interceptor (Me 262), a city-busting cruise missile (V-1), and a city-busting ballistic missile (V-2). The "v" stood for *vergeltungswaffe* or "vengeance weapon" and the vengeance was for the destruction wrought by Allied bombing on German cities. Finally, in the war's last eight months, the Allied bombing campaign wrecked German oil and synthetic fuel production, electrical power systems, the transportation of coal and food, and the air defense system. Whether or not these effects might have come more quickly and at less cost will remain a matter of debate. That strategic bombing contributed to Germany's defeat is undeniable.

However belated, the Anglo-American campaign in northern Europe (June 1944-May 1945) created a "second front" ground war that the Germans could only slow down, not defeat. Much to his dismay, Hitler was not Frederick the Great, and the Battle of the Bulge was not the Prussian winter campaign of 1757-1758. By early 1945, the U.S. Army provided two-thirds of the Anglo-American divisions in France and Italy. In addition to the sixty-eight American and thirty-two British divisions, there were five Canadian, eighteen French or French-African, four Polish, one Brazilian, and four Italian divisions. Without French and American divisions redeployed from Italy in August 1944, there would have been no "second, second front" in southern France, where ports provided forty percent of the tonnage of supplies that reached the Allied divisions battering their way toward the Rhine. The USAAF tactical air forces also made a large contribution because air operations made it virtually impossible for German mechanized and motorized units to move during the day.

American industry supplied something to all the allied air and ground combat units fighting Germany, even the Soviet Union. Under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act (1941), the United States provided $50 billion in the form of 37,000 tanks, 792,000 trucks and other vehicles, 43,000 aircraft, and 1.8 million rifles to the allies. Half the dollar value of aid went to Great Britain; one quarter, to the Soviet Union. The United States received only $10 billion in aid from its allies, most of which it paid

for. In addition, the United States built the Liberty ships and tankers that brought supplies at critical times to distant allied forces, 1941-1943. To protect the supplies bound for Liverpool or Murmansk, the U.S. Navy and American-flag carriers joined the convoys organized by the Royal Navy and provided the numbers of escort warships essential in driving off the U-boats. Even if the British provided the technical expertise in anti-submarine warfare, the Americans contributed the numbers of warships, merchantmen, and aircraft that won the Battle of the Atlantic. In addition, in almost every phase of anti-submarine warfare, the U.S. Navy improved the techniques and technology it borrowed from the Royal Navy.

The United States armed forces defeated Japan with little significant aid from its allies. Chinese forces fought the Japanese army with limited success, and the Indian-British 14th Army survived defeat to liberate Burma in a brilliant campaign in 1945. The road from Mandalay, however, goes to Singapore, not Tokyo. Australian and New Zealand forces with token expatriate Dutch units fought with distinction in the Southwest Pacific theatre. The war with Japan, however, was a war about the control of sea lanes, naval and air bases, and the vastness of the Pacific Ocean as the approaches to the Japanese Home Islands. The hundreds of amphibious landings, large and small, had a common thread: base seizure and base denial. The fleet actions, surface and in the air, occurred in campaigns to establish allied operating bases in the Solomons, New Guinea, New Britain, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Carolines, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The central strategic truth of this war is that the U.S. Navy destroyed the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet, air and surface. The destruction of Imperial Japanese army units and aviation became a by-product of the naval war. Had not General Douglas MacArthur persuaded FDR and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that liberating the Philippines was a matter of national honor and moral duty, the U.S. Army would not have sent twenty-one divisions to the Pacific. The Fleet Marine Force conducted all its landings with only six divisions. The most significant campaign – the capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in mid-1944 – required six Marine and army divisions and the full fighting strength of the Pacific fleet, which ended the threat of Japanese naval aviation in the battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19-20, 1944). The three largest islands of the Marianas group became bases for the USN submarine operations and the bombing of Japanese cities by USAAF B-29's.

Plagued by torpedo misfires and inexperienced commanders, the USN submarine force did not reach its full destructive potential until 1944 when its forward basing at Guam doubled the numbers of patrols to Japanese

waters and the shipping routes of the South Seas resource area, principally the Dutch East Indies. Merchant sinking reached one million tons in 1944 with an emphasis on sinking 700,000 tons of oil tankers. The submarine campaign cost the USN forty-five boats and 3,500 lives, a bearable sacrifice for the damage wrought to the Japanese economy. In addition, USN submarines sank about half the troops, weapons, and construction supplies sent to Japan's island defenses in 1944-1945.

The 20th Air Force, USAAF began bombing Japanese industrial targets with little effect in November 1944, because of weather and wind conditions and mechanical problems with the B-29. In March 1945, the USAAF adopted the RAF's city-busting, city-burning tactics and in five months killed an estimated 500,000 Japanese and destroyed 60 percent of urban Japan in an orgy of fire-bombing. On August 6 and 9, two American B-29's leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear bombs. Within a week, Japan surrendered and agreed to conditions that ended the Japanese empire, armed forces, and those domestic institutions (less the emperor) that fed militarization. Although the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific war and the fear of Communist revolution (like Russia in 1906 and 1917) had influenced the Emperor's peace faction, the American armed forces, not the Russians pillaging their way through Manchuria and Korea, alone had opened the Yamato to possible extinction.

For all the final hecatomb of the fire-bombing of Japan and the slaughter on Okinawa in which Japanese soldiers murdered Okinawan innocents, the sudden end of the Pacific war left seven million Japanese service personnel and sixty-five million civilians alive. They provided the human capital that built a new modern Japan. Whatever American base motives and hatreds, the basic fact remains that the United States spared Japan the horrendous campaign of revenge waged by the Red Army as it plowed through western Russia, eastern Europe, Austria, and Germany.

American generosity in victory may have reflected a conscious policy of turning enemies into allies for the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, but it also produced a cultural memory of a "good" World War II strikingly different from other nations' enduring sadness and sense of loss. A few demographic statistics catch the essence of American wartime exceptionalism. The United States entered the war with a population of 135 million (1940) and left the decade with 152 million (1950). Of this population, 36 million were males 18-60 years of age and thus in theory available for military service and a labor draft. Manpower planners thought 60 million would have to participate to form an adequate military-industrial workforce. The actual wartime workforce reached 73 million, only 16 million actually in uniform. Ten million men received medical

deferments, and more than ten million males qualified for occupational exemptions. The armed forces included 1.5 million minority group members and 350,000 women. Women and minority group members accounted for most of the seven million Americans who found their first job during the war.

The United States, spared direct attack by distance and limited Axis technology, experienced the lowest number of casualties of any major belligerent. During the war 292,000 service personnel died in combat and another 113,000 died in service from disease, murders, suicides, and accidents. The Soviets lost greater numbers in single campaigns. Military service could be relatively safe if a GI were not an infantryman or an aviation crewman. Combat deaths numbered 30 per 10,000 compared with 182 per 10,000 in the Civil War. The armed forces of 1941-1945 had become capital intensive with mounting investment in weapons platforms (a bomber, a tank, a carrier, a howitzer) and ordnance. Planners estimated that it required 4-7 tons per man to deploy a unit and 1 ton per day to maintain a single soldier. Some statisticians estimated that the U.S. Army fired 1,500 shells for every German it killed. Only one in four service personnel actually engaged the enemy in combat. By comparison, the United States spent $350 billion in direct costs to fight the war, the highest investment of a major belligerent. Moreover, current revenues paid for about forty percent of the war's cost, and the remaining sixty percent came in bonds sold to the American people. Civilian deaths and property damage to the continental U.S. was negligible. The direct civilian sacrifices in terms of daily living conditions were real but limited. Except for training accidents, the casualties were two oceans away. For most American civilians, World War II may not have been a "good" war, but it was little more than inconvenient.

The "good war" image of America's World War II experience was justified, but only in retrospect. Avoiding catastrophe is not the same as positive betterment. Improved living conditions are never evenly distributed, complicated in the United States by the effects of regionalism, social class, race, level of education, and cultural diversity. In the macro-economic sense, however, the Home Front mobilization was an unparalleled stimulus program, underwritten by the federal government. The biggest effect was that one-third of American families reached or returned to secure middle class economic status, the most dramatic redistribution of income in the nation's history. Gross domestic product rose from $91 billion (1940) to $166 billion (1946). The economy created 14 million new jobs. Per capita income doubled and wage increases outpaced inflation (68 percent to 23 percent). Personal savings rose from $2.6 billion to $14.5

billion and allowed young families to buy homes, cars, and appliances after the war. The wartime generation created the next generation of consumers and wage earners (the baby boomers) when the birthrate increased from 15 births per 10,000 to 26 births per 10,000 (1947-1957). The Veterans Readjustment Act of 1944, nicknamed the GI Bill, invested $14.5 billion in the advanced education and technical training of eight million veterans, which in effect doubled their lifetime income and ensured that their children would use more education as a road to economic security and personal fulfillment. The postwar years - almost to the end of the century - gave the concepts of "progress" and "equal opportunity" new life to Americans, including some of the African-American minority population and a flood of non-European immigrants.

The war, of course, produced social disruption in the 1940s that did not end in 1945. Seventeen percent of the population moved from their state-of-residence to another state, most often to find new employment. The population of the South and Pacific coast (the "Sun Belt") showed the most dramatic population growth. So did industrial cities in every region, sunny or not, because of the arrival of farmers seeking steady, union-protected manufacturing jobs in Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Atlanta, Birmingham, and St. Louis. Wartime internal migration completed the urbanization and nationalization of African-Americans - and redefined the nation's problems with racism. Wartime cultural clashes, especially among youths, plagued Detroit and Los Angeles. Rivalries for employment, housing, commercial vice, and extortion domains fed the traditional antipathies of whites, Hispanics, Asians (but not the interned Japanese-Americans), and African-Americans. Instead of the ethnic-religious riots of the 19th century, American cities now experienced "rainbow" urban violence, sometimes extended to include members of armed forces and factory workers.

The impact of World War II on American foreign policy can still be felt seventy years later. Even a progressive era imperialist of Theodore Roosevelt's persuasion could hardly imagine that American forces would fight major wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan or be part of an elaborate European alliance system for more than sixty years. What would TR make of terms like strategic nuclear deterrence and forward collective defense? What would Woodrow Wilson think of United Nations' peacekeeping missions or World Bank global expeditionary debt service? World War II destroyed almost every variant of imperialism but it also guaranteed decades of vicious decolonization that produced nothing more than non-European police states hurtling toward genocide, home-grown oppression, environmental and resource destruction, and public-health

disasters. Many of the post-colonial tyrants learned how to organize violence in the colonial armies or resistance movements. The United States then had to deal with them in Africa, the Middle-East, and Asia.

The wars of decolonization became tangled with the formation of NATO and the post-imperial recovery of some of the alliance members: the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, France, and Great Britain. Acting on behalf of its alliance partners and then trapped in its commitments, the United States became involved in internal struggles in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Angola, Zaire (Belgium Congo), Nigeria, South Africa, and Somalia. In the Arab world, the United States became caught between its de facto alliance with Israel (Holocaust compensation) and its de facto alliance with Saudi Arabia (oil). In Latin America, the United States favored democracy and market economics, but few nations in the region, especially in the Caribbean basin, could make either work - or even wanted to. American advisors, armed contractors, military task forces, and armed surrogates fought in Cuba, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile. Mexican-American tensions shifted away from the movement of farm laborers to the movement of drugs. With the fall of serial authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, the big three finally abandoned their anti-communist façade, an extension of World War II and Cold War cooperation with the United States. In Luso-Hispanic America, the "good war" spurred some very bad wars that often found the United States aligned with unsavory allies, governments, and rebels.

The widespread distribution of nuclear weapons among the American armed forces stationed abroad complicated alliance relationships and encouraged embarrassing protest movements in host countries like Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Germany. For the United States, a distant and isolationist country for most of its independent existence, such lack of appreciation encourages public ire about all kinds of foreign assistance, reflected in Congressional action. The internationalism of World War II and the early Cold War was not a permanent change in American wariness about foreign entanglements. The only international commitment rooted in U.S. domestic politics is support for Israel, and even that bond has weakened since the end of the Cold War. Americans of Croatian and Serbian descent learned during the Yugoslavian wars of dissolution in the 1990s that they were powerless in influencing American intervention to their causes. Ending apartheid in South Africa was a triumph for American private corporations and non-governmental

organizations, albeit under pressure from African-Americans, not official pressure from Washington.

In sum, the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union created a special, bounded sort of internationalism that extended America's World War II global activism. Postwar prosperity made this internationalism tolerable in domestic political terms, but this license to intervene waned after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the same decade. The current political furor over immigration policy is simply another reflection of America's drift away from internationalism. In the absence of an immediate crisis, like the al-Qaeda aerial attacks of September 2001, the United States is likely to bury the military interventionism that began in World War II, another casualty of that war.

Critical approach to the main sources for the study of the participation of the United States to Second World War

The study of the American national experience in World War II should begin with David M. Kennedy, *The American People in World War II* (Oxford University Press, 1999), the second volume of Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War* (2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1999).[1] To put the American experience within the war's global context, see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Harvard University Press, 2000)[2] and available in Spanish as *La guerra que había que ganar* (Editorial Crítica, 2002).[3] An analytical review of the United States participation in the war may be found in Allan R. Millett, "The United States of America," in Vol. III of Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.) *Military Effectiveness* (3 vols., revised, Cambridge University Press, 2011).[4] For an

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[1] David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[2] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000).
[3] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *La guerra que había que ganar* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002).
[4] Allan R. Millett, "The United States of America," in *Military Effectiveness*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

official summary, see also War Records Section, Bureau of the Budget *The United States at War* (Government Printing Office, 1946).[5]

The American conduct of its part of World War II has created a mountain of literature that can be climbed only slowly and selectively. For reference purposes, see Spencer Tucker, ed. and comp. *Encyclopedia of World War II* (5 vols., ABC-CLIO, 2005)[6] and I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot, eds. *The Oxford Guide to World War II* (Oxford University Press, 1995).[7]

The experience of the American "Home Front" is treated with clarity and care in John Morton Blum, *V was for Victory: Politics and Culture during World War II* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976);[8] Richard Polenberg, *War and Society; The United States, 1941-1945* (Lippincott, 1972);[9] Arthur Herman, *Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II* (Random House, 2012);[10] James T Sparrow, *Warfare state: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (Oxford University Press, 2011),[11] and Paul Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945* (University Press of Kansas, 2004).[12]

The majoritarian social experience, 1941-1945, is sampled in Richard R. Lingeman, *Don't You Know There's a War On? The American Home Front, 1941-1945* (Putnam, 1970),[13] while the minority social experience is described in Ronald Takaki, *Double Victory: A Multi-Cultural History*

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[5] War Records Section, Bureau of the Budget, *The United States at War* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946).

[6] Spencer Tucker, ed. and comp., *Encyclopedia of World War II: A Political, Social and Military History* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005).

[7] I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, eds., *The Oxford Guide to World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[8] John Morton Blum, *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

[9] Richard Polenberg, *War and Society; The United States, 1941-1945* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972).

[10] Arthur Herman, *Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II* (New York: Random House, 2012).

[11] James T. Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[12] Paul Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

[13] Richard R. Lingeman, *Don't You Know There's a War On?: The American Home Front, 1941-1945* (New York: Putnam, 1970).

of America in World War II (Little, Brown, 2000).[14] See also Michael C.C.
Adams, *The Best War Ever: America and World War II* (Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994)[15] and Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time:
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II* (Simon
& Schuster, 1994).[16]

The conduct of the American war at the strategic and operational level
is covered in exhaustive detail by the multi-volume official histories of the
war sponsored by the historical divisions of the headquarters of the U.S.
armed forces, which for World War II are the Army of the United States
(the ground and service forces), the U.S. Army Air Forces (now the U.S.
Air Force), the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. All of the historical divisions maintain on-line bibliographies
through complementary agencies, such as the U.S. Army Heritage and
Education Center or the Air Force Historical Research Agency. In
addition, the office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, includes a
historical office that published a multi-volume strategic history of World
War II. The official histories (and document collections they reflect) and
the private papers of the political and military leaders of the United States
are the foundation of World War II research in the United States. For the
civilian side of the war, the key collections may be found in the
Presidential libraries of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, as
well as in the papers of Henry Stimson (Yale University), Robert Patterson
(Library of Congress), Frank Knox (Library of Congress), James V.
Forrestal (Princeton University), James F. Byrnes (Clemson University),
Robert Lovett (Yale University), and Cordell Hull (Library of Congress).
The papers of the members of the JCS and the principal theatre
commanders may be found at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library, the George C. Marshall Memorial Library, the Douglas
MacArthur Memorial Library, the Air Force Historical Research Agency,
the libraries of the Naval War College and the U.S. Naval Academy, and
the Marine Corps Library and Research Center, all of which maintain on-
line reference services. Creating a reference library for American
participation in World War II is a matter of personal choice, but for the
general reader, see especially James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The*

[14] Ronald T. Takaki, *Double Victory: A Multi-Cultural History of America in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2000).
[15] Michael C. C. Adams, *The Best War Ever: America and World War II* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
[16] Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Soldier of Freedom (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970);[17] Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall* (4 vols., Viking, 1963-1987);[18] Dik Alan Daso, *Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower* (Smithsonian University Press, 2001);[19] Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Naval Institute Press, 1995);[20] D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* (3vols., Houghton Mifflin, 1970-1985);[21] Carlo d'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (Henry Holt, 2002);[22] E.B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Naval Institute Press, 1976);[23] Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (MacMillan, 1971);[24] and David Mets, *Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz* (Presidio, 1988).[25] Collective portraits of American leaders may be found in D. Clayton James, *A Time for Giants: Politics of the American High Command in World War II* (Franklin Watts, 1987)[26] and Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War* (Harper & Row, 1987).[27] The relationship of politics and strategy is explained in Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000)[28] and Gerhard

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[17] James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970).

[18] Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall* (New York: Viking Press, 1963-1987).

[19] Dik Alan Daso, *Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000).

[20] Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

[21] D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970-1985).

[22] Carlo d'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002).

[23] E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976).

[24] Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

[25] David R. Mets, *Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1988).

[26] D. Clayton James, *A Time for Giants: Politics of the American High Command in World War II* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1987).

[27] Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987).

[28] Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 2000).

Weinberg, *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).[29]

At the theater and institutional level, see D. Clayton James and Ann Sharp Wells, *From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day: The American Armed Forces in World War II* (Ivan R. Dee, 1995);[30] Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (Free Press, 1985);[31] Donald McIntyre, *The Battle of the Atlantic* (MacMillan, 1961);[32] Charles B. MacDonald, *The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II* (Oxford University Press, 1969);[33] Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War* (Little, Brown, 1963);[34] Conrad C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (University Press of Kansas, 1993);[35] Kenneth P. Werrell, *Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers Over Japan During World War II* (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996);[36] Clay Blair, *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* (Lippincott, 1975);[37] Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II* (Oxford University Press, 1985);[38] Mark Clodfelter, *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power* (University of Nebraska Press, 2010);[39] Joseph H. Alexander, *Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific* (Naval Institute Press, 1997);[40] Joel Ira

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[29] Gerhard Weinberg, *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[30] D. Clayton James and Ann Sharp Wells, *From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day: The American Armed Forces in World War II* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995).

[31] Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

[32] Donald McIntyre, *The Battle of the Atlantic* (New York: MacMillan, 1961).

[33] Charles B. MacDonald, *The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[34] Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).

[35] Conrad C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

[36] Kenneth P. Werrell, *Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan During World War II* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996).

[37] Clay Blair, *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974).

[38] Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[39] Mark Clodfelter, *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

[40] Joseph H. Alexander, *Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).

Holwitt, "*Execute Against Japan": The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare* (Texas A&M Press, 2010);[41] Edward G. Miller, *Nothing Less than Full Victory: Americans at War in Europe, 1944-1945* (Naval Institute Press, 2007);[42] John C. McManus, *The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II* (Presidio, 2000);[43] and Peter Schrijvers, *The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe During World War II* (New York University Press, 1998)[44] and *The G.I. War Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific During World War II* (New York University Press, 2002).[45]

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[41] Joel Ira Holwitt, *"Execute Against Japan": The U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2010).

[42] Edward G. Miller, *Nothing Less than Full Victory: Americans at War in Europe, 1944-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

[43] John C. McManus, *The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II* (Novato: Presidio, 2000).

[44] Peter Schrijvers, *The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe During World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

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CHAPTER FOUR

CITIES UNDER THE BOMBS:
THE TARGETING OF CIVILIANS
IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

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During the Spanish Civil War, tens of thousands of people living in cities hundreds of kilometres from the frontline suddenly found themselves in mortal danger. What had happened to change the conduct of war so completely?

The answer, obviously, is the role of air power. The theory behind the use of aviation in war had been set out in the early 1920s, by Giulio Douhet, an Italian general[1]. Douhet foresaw new, more powerful aircraft

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[1] Giulio Douhet (Caserta, 1869-Rome, 1930), the son of an official of the Kingdom of Savoy, entered the Military Academy in Modena in 1889 and at the same time studied an engineering degree at the Polytechnical University of Turin. On leaving the academy he joined the *Bersaglieri,* with the rank of second lieutenant. During the war in Libya, the first in which aerial bombing was used, Douhet was ordered to draft a report on this novel technique. In 1913, now a major, he was entrusted with the command of the *Battaglione Aviatori*, a forerunner of the Italian Air Force. During World War I, he was involved in a fierce dispute with the Army commanders, whom he urged to build bomber planes. A letter reiterating his criticisms of his superiors sent to Leonida Bissolati, a member of parliament, was intercepted, and Douhet was court-martialled for revealing military secrets. He spent a year in the military prison of Fenestrelle. With the fall of General Cadorna after Caporetto, the new chief of staff, General Armando Diaz, called on Douhet to take charge of the War Ministry's Central Aeronautic Bureau. Douhet would leave this post some time afterwards, also in controversial circumstances. After the

which would be able to sow destruction far behind enemy lines in the form of systematic bombing of the civilian population. The effect on morale, it was contended, would be devastating.

So the main proponent of the use of aviation as a revolutionary new way to break down enemy resistance, at the same time redefining the very concept of the enemy, was a controversial Italian soldier. This is no great surprise, since Italy had been the first country to use bomber planes. On 1 November 1911, during the Italo-Turkish War, a pilot named Lieutenant Gaviotti had dropped bombs from his plane over the city of Tripoli. During the First World War, Douhet had had disciplinary problems with his superiors by insisting on the need for a more extensive use of aviation. Once the conflict was over, he wrote *Il Dominio dell'Aria* (The Command of the Air) which was published by the Italian War Ministry – an indication that the experience of the war had altered the perceptions of senior military commanders.[2] The book was quite revolutionary; it proposed a new kind of war, in which psychological aspects and the role of the home front would be decisive factors in achieving military success. According to Tullio Scovazzi, Douhet and his theories on aviation ushered in the concept of state terrorism,[3] seen as a conscious, deliberate decision to adopt terror and to establish it as one of the most potent weapons that states have at their disposal for winning the wars of the twentieth century.

The words of the Italian general leave no room for doubt: "We need only envision what would go on among the civilian population of congested cities once the enemy announced that he would bomb such centres relentlessly, making no distinction between military and non-military objectives. In general, aerial offensives will be directed against such targets as peacetime industrial and commercial establishments; important buildings, private and public; transportation arteries and centres; and certain designated areas of civilian population as well. To destroy these targets, three kinds of bombs are needed – explosive, incendiary and poison gas – apportioned as the situation may require. The explosives will

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publication of his *Il Dominio dell'Aria* (The Command of the Air) in 1921, which presented his theories, he managed to clear his record and was promoted to the rank of general. He died in 1930 of a heart attack. As a curiosity, it is worth noting that he never flew a plane.

[2] The book was published in 1921 by the War Ministry and was reprinted after his death along with other documents in 1932, under the Fascist dictatorship. The new edition had an introduction by the Minister of Aviation, Italo Balbo. See Giulio Douhet, *Il Dominio dell'Aria* (Verona: 1932).

[3] See Tullio Scovazzi, "Il terrorismo di stato nell'opera di Giulio Douhet", *Rivista di Diritto Internazionale*, 3 (2005): 35-38.

demolish the target, the incendiaries set fire to it, and the poison-gas bombs prevent fire fighters from extinguishing the fires."[4] Douhet uses the word terror and, in deliberately aseptic language, foresees a formidable role for it in the wars of the future, contrasting it to the old *art of war*: "In terms of military results, it is much more important to destroy a railway station, a bakery, a war plant, or to machine-gun a supply column, moving trains, or any other behind-the-lines objective, than to bomb or strafe a trench. The results are immeasurably greater in breaking morale... in spreading terror and panic...".[5]

Douhet also reflected on the power of new chemical weapons in aerial warfare. As is well known, the Geneva Conference of 1925 limited the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict (with the glaring exception of colonial wars, with the result that most European powers saw fit to use them: Spain and France in Morocco, Italy in East Africa, and Britain in the Middle East). But in spite of the Conference's good intentions, the scene was set for a revolution – the use of aircraft in war. From this point onwards, the acceptance of the practice of terrorizing and killing civilians and the determination among rival states to establish themselves in the forefront of technological innovation provoked an upward spiral of military competition.

The soundness of the chilling arguments of Douhet and others would soon be borne out: not only did many military experts in other countries embrace and develop these theories on paper, but the British experience in Iraq – a conflict in which the western power's numerical inferiority was more than compensated for by its technological superiority – demonstrated their validity on the ground.[6] Using chemical weapons,[7] the British air force literally took hold of the territory. The success of the operation was proof that aviation and the use of technology guaranteed effective results with no need to deploy other resources.

So at the time of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the theoretical and practical demonstrations of the importance of aviation, and in particular the techniques of bombing, were uppermost in the minds of the military and politicians of all the major powers both in Europe and in the

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[4] Giulio Douhet, *Il Dominio dell'Aria* (Verona: 1932), 24
[5] Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air,* editors Joseph P. Harahan and Richard H. Kohn (Washington, D.C.:1983), 126
[6] Dwight W. Parsons, "British air control", *Air & Space Power* (1994)
[7] For an overview of British control over Iraq from the end of the First World War to the 1930s, see: Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007)

rest of the world. They were also well aware of the urgent need for large-scale investment to build up their air power.

The conquest of the skies:
the development of military aircraft
in the early twentieth century

The First World War had been a catalyst for the adaptation of the new technologies to aerial warfare. New innovations were developed by industrial sectors in both combatant and non-combatant nations and introduced at a remarkable speed. For example, the first aircraft built, in 1915, did not carry arms, but within only three years the presence of machine guns in the cockpit was commonplace.[8]

In Spain, despite the country's absence from the First World War, the aviation industry had developed at a tremendous rate. Although dependent on state orders, it also received significant amounts of private capital. Basically, it used the nascent automotive industry to copy the models of engines that were being developed in other countries. Progress was fast, and the 140 hp engine was built at the Hispano Suiza factory in Barcelona in 1915, specially designed by the Swiss engineer Birkigt and produced in its entirety in the Catalan capital. This engine eventually met with some success in the European market (a total of 50 thousand pieces, one fifth of them built in Barcelona, are reported to have been sold), and contributed to the Allied victory in the First World War.[9]

In countries that had been directly involved in the First World War, however, the process was even faster. Large-scale resources were made available and there was a strong political, military and organizational commitment to the development of air power. The dates of formation of national air forces and their early development present interesting similarities. In general, the embryonic air forces date from the beginning of the century in the form of small units linked to the navies (though the German and Russian aviation services were linked to their land forces) and became consolidated in the 1920s and 1930s after the experiences of the Great War. The pioneers in this respect were the British, who created the Royal Air Force as a separate military structure in April 1918. In 1923 the

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[8] See Gregorio Cayuela Fernández "Guerra, industria y tecnología en la Edad Contemporánea", *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*, 18 (2000):188.
[9] See Antonio Gómez Mendoza and Santiago López García "Los comienzos de la industria aeronáutica en España y la Ley de Wolff (1916-1929)", *Revista de Historia Industrial*, 1 (1992): 158-159

Italian *Regia Aeronautica* was created, succeeding the *Aviazione della Regia Marina* set up in 1912. In France, the process was similar, though it occurred slightly later: the *Aéronautique Naval* was founded in 1912, and the *Armée de l'Air* in 1933. The case of Russia was slightly unusual: the Imperial Air Force was created in 1912, but in the aftermath of the Revolution in 1917, it ceased to exist as such and its services were integrated into the structure of the new Bolshevik army. The directors of the new Soviet military were quick to grasp the importance of aviation and in 1918, they created the *Voyenno Vozdushnye Sily* (VVS, the Soviet Air Force), which in time would become the largest air force of all and would remain in operation until the break-up of the USSR in 1991. The US case also presents distinctive features of its own, as the Navy, the Marines, the National Guard and the Army itself all set up their own air forces (in 1911, 1912, 1916 and 1917 respectively). In fact, the United States Air Force (USAF) was not created until 1947, when the Second World War had ended and the Cold War had begun.

The 1920s and 1930s saw huge changes in perceptions of aerial warfare. General Douhet's theories had made a profound impression on the military staff and politicians in the US and Europe, who now began to take technological research into aviation very seriously and shifted the emphasis in aircraft production away from fighters towards bombers. And, as the 1930s progressed, the Spanish Civil War became a showcase for the technical developments achieved: by late 1936 the world's most modern bombers were making their way to Spain, such as the Italian S-81s and S-79s, the German He-111s, and the Russian "Katiuskas". In 1935, a prototype of the B-17, known later as the "Flying Fortress", had flown for the first time; in operation from 1941 onwards, the Fortress made the planes that participated in the Civil War totally obsolete.

All the industrialized countries of the world, from liberal democracies like the United States and Britain to totalitarian states such as Germany and Italy, were engaged in a race to improve their air forces, and in particular their aerial bombing capacity. The old-fashioned myth of the aerial duel had gained immense popularity during World War I and had turned pilots into folk heroes; it continued to exert a certain romantic appeal, but by the 1930s aerial warfare was firmly associated with great industrial processes, and more generally with the military might of an entire army, its organization, and its ability to use and apply technology. In this new situation, Germany acquired a certain advantage (especially over France) and was able to achieve command of the air in the early stages of the Second World War, roughly until the Battle of Britain and the first months of the invasion of the Soviet Union. But during that same period,

the country that made the greatest steps forward in terms of aircraft development was the US, which achieved absolute mastery of the skies of Europe and the Far East from around 1942 onwards.

The political, financial and military commitment made above all by the United States and Britain to build a huge number of aircraft of a strategic nature was especially strong during the years of the Civil War. This commitment was based on limited but significant experience, and in particular on the conviction (shared by other theorists around the world, including the British general Trenchard and the US general Bill Mitchell) that Douhet was right. In this way, a sort of general consensus was created around the infallibility of aviation bombing: hundreds of aircraft carrying huge loads of bombs, it was believed, could win a war on their own.

The Second World War would prove the theory wrong; the weapon that ultimately brought the conflict to its end was the atom bomb. But in the meantime the policy was put into practice on a massive scale, causing thousands of casualties and destroying dozens of cities in Europe. It was Germany that suffered most, but some French cities were also badly bombed, especially in the months before the Normandy landings. This strategy of prioritizing bombing had a clear limitation in that it restricted the resources available for the production and acquisition of technology and materials at the front.[10] The Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, felt this pressure acutely and were often unable to strike a balance between supplying their armies and producing this type of aircraft in sufficient numbers.

Going back to 1936, by this time the new bombers had the ability to hit practically any target. In principle, the strategic military objectives included ports, roads, factories producing war materials, hydroelectric plants and command posts. But the technological potential of the new aircraft opened up the possibility that any city or town in the enemy's homeland could become a military target. In this regard, the bombers proved devastatingly effective as thousands of civilians became the victims of this new form of warfare.

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[10] Just to give an idea of the cost of producing large bombers, the first American B-17, called the Flying Fortress, was launched in 1935 at a cost of 240,000 dollars of the day.

Death that comes from the skies: Gernika
and the bombing of civilians in the Spanish Civil War

The late 1930s saw the intensive use of aerial bombardment of civilian populations for the first time, during the Spanish Civil War and during the Japanese invasion of China. In Spain, this was possible because during the course of the war the technical design of the aircraft and their destructive capacity increased dramatically. At the beginning of the war the Spanish aviation was totally obsolete, but with the aid of foreign powers such as Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union the best bombers in existence in 1936 and 1937 were shipped to both sides: Italian S-81s and S-79s, German He-111s to Franco's Nationalists and Russian Tupolev S-B2s, known as "Katiuskas", to the Republic. With their arrival, aviation became a decisive weapon and the action of the Italian and German aircraft was instrumental in the victory of Franco's army.

Obviously, the experience gained by the German and Italian Air Forces would prove useful after the outbreak of war in September 1939. Nevertheless, they had gained this experience in a situation of total superiority; in the context of World War II, in which the balance was more even, they were less successful.

Some bombing tactics, like the effect of mixing explosive and incendiary bombs, were tested for the first time in what was beyond any doubt the most famous bombing raid of the Spanish Civil War, the attack on Gernika.[11] The decision to carry out the attack was taken after a lengthy meeting on the night of 25 April 1937 between the Nationalist general Mola and the German general von Richthofen. The idea was that the bombardment from the air would help Franco's troops in their advance towards the north of the Peninsula and in the occupation of the Basque Country. The plan that emerged from the meeting, then, was very clear: just after lunchtime on market day, the German planes began the systematic destruction of the small town with a population of 3,700. By the end of the attack, the town was a heap of smoking rubble. Over a thousand people are believed to have died. The bombing of Gernika was the awful material proof of the impact of Douhet's theories on the army staffs of the countries attacking the Republic. On the one hand, Gernika was the sacred city of the Basques, the symbol of their freedoms: in

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[11] After decades of political and diplomatic controversy surrounding the bombing, the first scientific reconstruction of the tragedy of Gernika remains the most useful: Klaus A. Maier *Guernica 26-4-1937: la intervención alemana en España y el "caso Guernica*." (Madrid: Sedmay, 1976)

October 1936, after the approval of the Statute of Autonomy, José Antonio Aguirre had been sworn into office as *Lehendakari* (the Basque president) in front of the Tree of Gernika, a tradition that survives today. And on the other hand, the town was the perfect target for crushing Republican resistance.

The attack on Gernika was a declaration of the new military theories which made bombing a priority and thus reversed the way in which war had been waged until that time. It was now considered more important to destroy a small town of high symbolic value and to kill or terrorize civilians than to attack, for example, an arms factory or an enemy trench. However, the step that had been taken, and the conditions in which it had been taken, created a new problem: how these actions could be reported and defended against public opinion both at home and abroad. Thanks to the work of foreign correspondents, news of the attack and its aftermath spread quickly. As Paul Preston notes,[12] it was not easy to tell the story of Gernika faithfully – especially in Britain or France, where the choice of governments not to intervene had to be justified to the public practically every day.

The *Times* correspondent George Steer was one of the first to arrive in Gernika and wrote a long and detailed report. It was published on April 28, but before going to print the editor, Geoffrey Dawson, had gone over the text several times and had removed the most distressing details, the full horror of which would have placed the British government in a very embarrassing situation given its refusal to support Spain's legitimate government. So the final article printed was a sanitized version. Nonetheless, its reconstruction of the events was faithful and potentially explosive: it speaks of the bombers, the amount of bombs dropped, and fighter planes that "machine-gunned those who ran in panic from dugouts". For all its obliged omissions, this account left no room for ambiguity.

What happened in Gernika was an act of pure violence and terror that proved to the world that bombers could revolutionize the very nature of war. The concern of the Francoists regarding the possible reactions of the public, in particular that of their Catholic supporters, grew quickly in the days following the attack and led to a huge if remarkably crude operation of disinformation. The government press offices in Burgos violently attacked Steer in an attempt to discredit him; at first they baldly denied that anything had happened in Gernika.

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[12] Paul Preston: *La Guerra Civil Española*, (Barcelona: Mondadori, 2003), 186

However, just like aviation, the field of communications and information had made great strides forward in the early part of the twentieth century. It was now almost impossible to cover up what had happened. Photos of Gernika existed, and therefore, were published. So the Francoists had to change strategy: as they could not deny the reality, it was necessary to distort it. The official government line on Gernika (which many hagiographers of the regime upheld as late as the 1960s) was that it had been the Republicans who set the town on fire before fleeing.

The efforts of Franco's propaganda machine met with little success. Nonetheless, the horrors of Gernika and the media controversy did not stir the Committee of Non-Intervention to change its course. This passivity on the part of the liberal democracies demonstrated that there was a kind of tacit acknowledgement between all the countries directly or indirectly involved that tragedies of the characteristics and the magnitude of Gernika would be an inevitable feature of the new age of warfare.

Another experiment that the Germans tested during the Civil War was the use of dive bombers. The Junkers Ju-87s, or Stukas, later to become famous, honed their skills in Spain. The Germans were obsessed with maintaining the presence of these aircraft and their capability in the utmost secrecy – so much so that when the Civil War ended in April 1939, all the Condor Legion's aircraft were handed over to Franco, with the exception of the Stukas.

So from July 1936 onwards, every corner of Spain was a potential battleground. Gernika was only the most obvious example. Until then, warfare had been limited to battlefields covering a few kilometres and the victims were exclusively men of military age. In the Spanish Civil War the victims might be defenceless members of the civilian population, hundreds of kilometres from the front.

Military and non-military targets

Of course, bombing aircraft often exclusively targeted military objectives. Ports on the Mediterranean coast, like Barcelona (where 36 boats were destroyed when the city was occupied by Franco's troops in January 1939), Valencia (38 boats destroyed when the war ended), Tarragona, out of action from March 1938, Alicante and Cartagena were successfully bombarded and suffered significant damage. Power plants in La Pobla de Segur and Cabdella in the Pyrenees, which supplied Catalonia's electricity, were bombarded with relative success between 17 and 19 February 1937 by a squadron of He-70s led by Lieutenant Heinz Runze. Fuel depots in Bilbao were bombed on 12 May 1937, and fuel depots in Barcelona

bombed and set on fire several times until 7 June 1938.[13] The smoke caused by the fires lasted several days and blocked out the sun. Of the bombings in Barcelona, the historian Alcofar Nassaes wrote many years ago:[14] "the number of thirty-seven attacks to destroy a target that was not particularly large, like CAMPSA Barcelona, boxed in under the mountain and the fortress of Montjuic, was much better than that obtained with more modern techniques during World War II. Moreover, the flyers obtained great success in their bombing of the enemy's industrial targets. For example, they destroyed more than twice the number of fuel depots that had existed in the Republican zone at the outbreak of war, causing many difficulties in the storage of these products, following the destruction of the depots in Malaga, Almeria, Bilbao, Santander, Barcelona, Cartagena, etc."

However, to evaluate the success of these bombing raids on military targets, we find an illustrative example in the attempts of Franco's aviation and navy to destroy the railway bridge in Colera and the railway station in Port Bou. By blowing up the bridge they would have severed railway communication between the Republic and neighbouring France. In fact, the bridge remained intact despite continuous bombing, but the town was destroyed: civilians were forced to evacuate as the bombs destined for the bridge hit the built-up areas in the town instead. The nearby border town of Port Bou was also heavily bombed in the attempt to reduce or halt rail traffic. But the attacks were unsuccessful: one of Franco's secret service agents reported on 30 December 1937 that "despite the shelling, effective railway service resumed quickly."[15]

Not surprisingly, industrial areas and factories suffered numerous attacks, but again the success of the raids was debatable. Some of the plants were hit by the bombs, but very few of them were forced to stop production. The steel furnaces and rolling mills in Sagunto and the Cros chemical factory in Badalona, for example, continued functioning.

One of the bombing raids on the latter factory was reported in the Italian press, in an attempt to celebrate the effectiveness of the Italian air attacks on the industrial areas and to stress that the civilian population had not been harmed. Despite the Fascist propaganda's trumpeting of this alleged efficiency – as echoed by the Corriere della Sera on the cover of its

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[13] The communiqué of the *Aviazione Legionaria Italiana* for 7 June says: "7 S-81.-bombardment of the port of Barcelona causing a huge fire in the CAMPSA fuel depot."

[14] Luís Alcofar Nassaes. *La aviación Legionaria en la guerra civil española*. (Barcelona: Editorial Euros, 1975), 232.

[15] AHEA, Exp. A-83

evening issue of July 25, which even included an aerial photograph – [16] and its insistence on the fact that the factory was strictly a military target, 60 civilians were killed in the raid, a high figure for the time.

In the province of Valencia the records show that at least eight armament factories were hit. In the steel mills at Sagunto, factory nº 15 suffered eleven raids, but neither the steel furnaces nor the rolling trains stopped functioning. The second factory most affected by the bombs was SAF nº 15 in Alicante, followed by Rabassa, which endured five bombing raids, the shipyards of factory nº 22 of the Subsecretariat of Armaments, and factory 2 b. Surprisingly, the factories in the Vinalopó basin and the town of Ibi, home to most of the ammunition industry, were not bombed, and the IMAS workshops in Alcoy which produced large quantities of weapons were hit only once.

The bombing of the industrial areas of Catalonia, which became established as the Republic's productive base after the collapse of the north in 1937, was not particularly successful. Many factories suffered airstrikes, and in some cases the bombs hit the sites of production, but very few were actually forced to halt production. The first bombardment of Barcelona, from the sea, was a sign of what was to come:[17] the shells fell in the Gràcia neighbourhood, in the heart of the city, but the target, the Elizalde factory, was undamaged and continued operating until the end of the war. Workshops like Vulcano in the Barceloneta, next to the port, also kept up production until the eve of Franco's entry in the city, when it was badly hit in one of the last raids of all.

Just outside Barcelona, in the industrial city of Badalona, a number of factories and facilities producing military equipment and supplies were bombed several times. The Andreis G.de Metalgraf factory which produced missiles was hit and some of the workers killed, but production was not affected. This was also the case of two chemical factories, Cros in Badalona and Gallart in Montgat, and the SAF-3 aircraft factory in Reus (previously CASA in Getafe). When the Subsecretariat of Aviation moved SAF-3 to Sabadell the factory did not suffer any further bombing.

In some cases the raids caused serious damage. The destruction at SAFA, a factory producing artificial fibres in Blanes, Girona, was valued at 7 million pesetas; considering that the total losses in the textile industry in Catalonia due to the war were valued at 80 million pesetas, the damage to this factory represents 9% of the total.

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[16] The caption speaks of an "armaments factory". See *Il Corriere della Sera* (Edizione del pomeriggio), 25 July 1938, p.1
[17] Carried out by the Italian ship Eugenio di Savoia, on 13 February 1937.

The relative lack of success of most of the attacks on specific targets such as industrial areas or key communications posts can be attributed to the fact that the degree of accuracy that the bombers could obtain remained very low, despite all the advances made. The planes did not relent in their efforts to destroy enemy factories, but the bombs very rarely hit their targets. To improve their strike rates substantial technical alterations would have been required in the planes themselves; far more aircraft would have had to be sent on the missions, and their bomb carrying capacity, and the size of the bombs, would have had to be increased. These improvements did not materialize until three years after the end of the Civil War, and in fact one of Franco's allies, Nazi Germany, would pay the consequences. By this stage of World War II, bombing raids no longer targeted specific objectives; the number of aircraft on each attack would not be half a dozen but several hundred, the bombs would be far larger, and the bombardments were planned to wipe out large areas or entire cities.

During the Spanish Civil War, despite the propaganda operations of the Fascists and the Francoists, bombing raids were also carried out on cities with aim of spreading terror among the civilian population. Gernika was not the only example, or even quantitatively the most significant. In the late autumn of 1936 Franco ordered the bombing of Madrid, as Alfredo Kindelán records[18] "... and this was demonstrated in the following days, when Franco ordered bombing raids in order to demoralize the population." The bombing of Valencia was ordered by Ciano in August 1937 and in March 1938 Mussolini himself gave instructions for the bombing of Barcelona, in a telegram that read "From tonight, start violent actions over Barcelona with repeated attacks spread out over time." The raids of 16, 17 and 18 March in Barcelona killed a thousand people, the highest casualty rate in a city until that time.[19] Overnight, schools, hospitals, churches, libraries, factories, markets and bus queues became potential targets for the planes of the Italian legionary force and the German Condor Legion. Among their victims were the children at the Lycée Français in Lleida on 2 November 1937, the parishioners attending Mass in the church of Santa Maria in Durango, the nuns of the convent of Santa Susana in the same town on 31 March 1937, the inhabitants of

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[18] Alfredo Kindelán, *Mis Cuadernos de Guerra*, (Planeta: Barcelona 1982), 91.
[19] On this bloody episode, see Joan Villarroya Font *Els bombardeigs de Barcelona durant la guerra civil 1936-1939* (Barcelona: Abadia de Montserrat, 1999) and Paola Lo Cascio and Susanna Oliveira *Tres dies de març* (Girona: El Punt, 2008)

Tarragona on 19 July 1937,[20] the readers at the library in Reus on 17 September 1937, the families waiting at the train station on 22 December 1937 at Sagunto, the children hiding in the church of St. Felip Neri in Barcelona on 30 January 1938, the passengers on the bus in the Ronda de Sant Pau in Barcelona in the early morning of 17 March 1938, the women shopping at the market in the mid-morning of 25 May 1938 in Alicante, and the women queuing at 8 am on 31 May in Granollers. In late January and early February 1939, when the outcome of the war was no longer in doubt, thousands of women and children were bombarded with impunity on the streets of Figueres.

These and the many other bombings caused thousands of casualties among the civilian population in towns and cities in the Republican zone. Barcelona had the highest casualty rate, over 2500, followed by Madrid and Valencia. But other smaller cities like Alicante, Durango, Gernika, Lleida, Alcañiz, Tarragona, Granollers, Figueres and Cartagena all lost more than 200 inhabitants to the bombs. In Alicante, 460 people were killed between 5 November 1936 and 7 December 1938, and 684 wounded. In other cities like Bilbao, Reus, Badalona, Castellón, and Xàtiva, the death toll was close to 200.

In small towns with a thousand or two thousand inhabitants the loss of even small numbers of people could be totally demoralizing. Six or seven deaths in a bombing raid could leave an indelible mark in the minds of a town's inhabitants.

Imagining defences: policies for civilian protection

The bombing of the cities of the Republican zone forced the authorities to try to protect their citizens in the most efficient way possible. Of course, they had no model to follow. Calling on citizen participation, in many towns and cities the authorities began to organize passive defence measures such as the construction of thousands of shelters, first in an improvised way and then more systematically. In Valencia, for example, 173 shelters were built with a capacity for 38,564 people, and in Barcelona around 1300,[21] which, along with the tunnels of the underground railway network, could provide protection for around 300,000 people.

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[20] Although the city of Tarragona suffered dozens of raids, the one on 19 July 1937, carried out by three low flying S-81s, killed 51 people and wounded 104 – a quarter of the number of victims of the entire war.
[21] By the end of the war Barcelona had suffered 194 bombardments, mostly aerial. Before the raids became a regular occurrence, the civil authorities in Barcelona had already begun to raise awareness of the threat from the air. In September 1936 the

In Alicante the authorities also began to build shelters to protect the civilian population following the first bombing at the end of 1936. In August 1937 the city had 41 shelters with capacity for 24,200 people, and a plan was drawn up for the construction of a tunnel across the mountain of the Castle of San Fernando, 519 metres long by 7 metres wide, with passageways and drains and capacity for 15,000 people. The cost was budgeted at 1,200,000 pesetas. All this building work was carried out under the direction of the city's Board of Passive Defence, created on 10 July 1937.

The board built new shelters and expanded some existing ones. By the end of July 1938, the 55 shelters constructed could house more than 38,000 people, and the plan rather optimistically aimed to provide protection for 108,590 people – more than the entire population of the city. In fact, if the plan had been completed, the actual figure would have been somewhat lower, around 70,000. Some of the city's businesses and offices provided shelters for their workers. The largest was the tobacco factory, with capacity for 1,500 people. As in other cities in the Republican zone, some of the shelters planned were not eventually built.[22]

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city council created a Passive Antiaircraft Defence Service, which was in charge of designing early preventive measures including inspection of basements for use as shelters. Later specific instructions were given to the public regarding the course of action in case of attack, and information leaflets were published. In the city 1300 shelters were set up, thanks largely to the work of the residents. Most of these bomb shelters were in the basements of houses and private properties. Seventeen thousand inspections of basements were carried out; in the end, only 700 were considered eligible. The city of Barcelona, or rather the new underground city, was divided by zones, each one with a leader. The city was divided into twenty zones and maps were made of the various sections within each zone. One of the most important members of the Passive Antiaircraft Defence Service was the architect Ramon Parera. At the end of the Civil War, some English friends helped him to seek asylum in London and participated in the debate in that city on the model of defence to be used in the Blitz. Parera had been one of the architects of the Barcelona model, in which the government assumed a great deal of responsibility for the building of group shelters. The British Conservative government, on the other hand, planned to leave the passive defence to the initiative of individual citizens. Finally, the latter model was implemented, with the disastrous result of over 40,000 civilian casualties. See Elisenda and Santiago Albertí *Perill de Bombardeig. Barcelona sota les bombes 1936-1939* (Barcelona: Albertí 2004)

[22] Rafael Aracil and Joan Villarroya, *El país Valencià sota les bombes (1936-1939)*. (Valencia: PUV, 2010), 49.

In Alcoy, a town in the province of Alicante, 19 group shelters were built, 70 in factories, and 80 in basements in private homes. Together these structures could protect a total of 29,219 people.

In Albacete, in January 1937, the authorities created a Commission for Protection and Shelters which proved highly effective in spite of all the problems it faced. By the middle of April it was estimated that a third of the city's population could be protected, even though most of the shelters were ditches built in the manner of trenches on the frontline. In 1938 the situation improved and in April sixteen public shelters and five shelters for schools were in operation, although some were not finished due to lack of materials.

In Murcia the construction of 38 shelters began in 1937. At the end of the war, eighteen were finished with capacity for 7800 people. The unfinished shelters had room for 6,625 people.

Despite the efforts, in many cities the passive defence measures could not provide protection for all the inhabitants. In Valencia, for example, the shelters had room for only 12% of the population. More fortunate in this regard were the inhabitants of Tarragona, where 20,000 people could be sheltered in March 1938. The passive defence tasks were not limited to the construction of shelters, but they also provided advice to the civilian population,[23] organized brigades to rescue and care for the victims and to clear away the rubble after the attacks, set up health care networks, and so on. With the support and the commitment of thousands of people, the Republican authorities did what they could to protect the civilians from the danger of the bombing raids.

Once again, these enormous efforts were often undermined by the lack of manpower and material resources such as iron and cement – particularly from mid-1938 onwards, when defeat seemed inevitable. Above all in the larger cities, these efforts were unable to protect the majority of a demoralized population placed under immense strain by the bombardments.

Passive defence represents only one aspect of the enormous task of planning and implementing measures for civilian protection. To defend the towns and cities properly, antiaircraft guns and fighter planes were needed, but after the summer of 1937 the Republicans had none at their disposal. The only city with an effective air defence system was Cartagena, because of its military importance and the presence of artillery prior to the outbreak of the war. A squadron of fighter aircraft loyal to the Republic was also based at a nearby airport.

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[23] The *Generalitat* (the Catalan government) created the *Z services*, which provided guidance to the population regarding possible chemical attacks.

In fact, it is worth discussing the defences of Cartagena in more detail. The port was defended by six batteries of Vickers 10.5 cm antiaircraft guns. Four of them, in Cabo Negrete, Monte Roldán, El Conejo and Atalayón, had been built before the start of the war. When hostilities commenced, the defence was completed with four-gun batteries in Dolores and Sierra Gorda. There were also 20 mm machine-guns in the castle of La Concepción, and the castle of Atalaya and Trincabotijas. This set of defences prevented enemy planes from bombing at a height of less than 12000 feet. Thanks to this defensive system, the damage to the Republican fleet and the military infrastructure of the base was minimal, but the city itself suffered enormously and the wail of the warning sirens was a constant feature of everyday life.

Cartagena's defences were an exception, and elsewhere Italian and German aircraft could carry out their raids practically unchallenged. Very few aircraft were shot down. Suffice to say that the S-79s based on the island of Majorca did not did not suffer a single casualty during its bombing missions, which numbered in the hundreds.

The civilian population was defenceless against this terrifying new form of warfare. The people reacted to the danger in many ways: with courage and stoicism, with terror and panic, with anger and thirst for revenge. But there was also some room for humour. The planes were sometimes given nicknames: "Tio de los molletes" (literally, a man giving out bread rolls) in Malaga, the " milk-cart donkey" in Madrid, "trams" or "little birds" in Bilbao, and "turkeys" along the Mediterranean coast. Some situations were tragicomic. A grim story was told in Catalonia: as the aircraft approached with their bombs, the radio would broadcast the imminence of the attack and would end the announcement with the words "The government is looking after you." The radio repeated the warning several times, until eventually the record got stuck and said only: "after you... after you... after you...".

Spain, Europe and the world: aviation and total war

With the Spanish Civil War a journey began that passed through Madrid, Durango, Gernika, Cartagena, Alicante, Cartagena, Valencia, Alcañiz, Reus, Tarragona, Lleida, Barcelona, Badalona, Granollers, and Figueres. It then went on to Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where momentarily it ended: momentarily, because ever since then air power has continued to demonstrate its terrifying capacity to bring desolation and death to every corner of the earth.

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM COLD WAR
TO ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS:
PLAYERS, VALUES AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF WARS IN THE SECOND HALF
OF 20TH CENTURY (1945-2012).

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The Cold War

The memory of the Second World War and its terrible toll in human lives (over 50 million dead) had a lingering effect on later generations, especially in Europe and the Far East (Japan and China), which lived with the constant threat of nuclear war and the knowledge that any conflict that broke out could be the last. However, the fact is that over four decades of Cold War, conflicts were relatively regulated in so far as behind each new dispute there was always the long shadow of the two superpowers, which, although they never actually faced each other directly, exercized a certain amount of control over world conflicts. Hence the Cold War was characterized not so much by an absence of conflicts, but by the regulation of conflicts depending on the regional interests throughout the world of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, China.

After the end of the Second World War, the balance of power system was reduced to a bipolar system involving just two economic, military, nuclear superpowers – the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) – which split the world into two ideologically opposed camps, capitalism and communism, divided territorially and with their respective spheres of influence. In the years immediately following the war, it was in Europe that differences were settled through the distribution of power agreed at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences (in February and July 1945

respectively). Hence it was established that the occupation of Germany and its capital, Berlin, along with Austria, which regained its independence after the *Anschluss* of 1938 was declared null and void, would be divided into four sectors corresponding to each of the Allied Powers (the USA, the USSR, the UK and France). Poland lost part of its eastern territories but in return received Pomerania and Silesia from Germany. The USSR annexed eastern Poland, the Baltic countries and the German region of Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Limited changes were also made to the borders of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Finland. In the years that followed, all the countries of Eastern Europe set up people's democracies allied to Moscow which, with the exception of Yugoslavia, joined together in 1949 to create the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and, in 1955, the Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, better known as the Warsaw Pact, in counterpoint to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set up in 1949.

In Asia, Japan lost the territories it had conquered at the beginning of the Second World War. Manchuria, which had been occupied by Soviet troops, was handed back to China and became territory claimed by both Chinese nationalists and communists. Korea, in accordance with agreements made at Potsdam, was occupied north of the 38th parallel by the USSR and to the south by the US, and its future reunification was postponed and remains pending. China was given Formosa (Taiwan), which, after the civil war (1945-1949), became the last stronghold of the Chinese nationalists. The USSR annexed the islands north of Japan (the Kurils and the southern part of Sakhalin), while the US occupied Japan and Japanese archipelagos in the Pacific (the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall islands). Finally, Italy lost its colonies in Africa (Ethiopia – which regained its independence and annexed Eritrea – as well as Somalia and Libya).

At around the same time the British and French mandates in the Middle East were coming to an end, and between 1946 and 1948 Lebanon and Syria became independent, while in 1948 Israel unilaterally declared independence, thereby giving rise to the longest still open conflict. In south-east Asia, Ho Chi Minh and Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Vietnam and Indonesia respectively in 1945. That same year the founding Charter of the United Nations set itself the objective of avoiding new wars and preserving peace: "We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind (...) have

resolved (...) to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security".[1]

Very soon, however, ideological differences between Washington and Moscow would determine the immediate future. In 1946, George Kennan, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Moscow, defined the theoretical concept of the Cold War in a long telegram (some 9,000 words) sent from Moscow to Washington, which a year later was published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym X. Over the four decades that followed the two former allies fought to extend their influence throughout the world as newly independent countries shrank the huge French and British colonial empires forged at the end of the 19th century. This fight divided the world up into two great blocs, the western bloc led by Washington and the eastern by Moscow. Military deterrence and containment became the cornerstones of the Cold War and gave rise to an arms race that would become its main feature governing relations between the two superpowers.

The first friction between Washington and Moscow occurred in 1948 when, because of disagreement over how to run the occupation and division of Berlin, the Soviets blockaded the former German capital and the Americans organized an airlift to ensure the city was not cut off. In 1949 France, the US and the UK decided to unify the sectors they occupied in Germany, founding the Federal Republic of Germany, to which the USSR responded by creating the Democratic Republic of Germany. One year earlier, the so-called "Czech coup" made Czechoslovakia a definite part of the eastern bloc. In 1949, after the victory of Mao Zedong's communist party, this bloc grew larger with the incorporation of China. With the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the eastern bloc also reached into Latin America. In fact it would be in Cuba that the two superpowers came closest to direct confrontation due to the missile crisis of 1962, although in the end they never reached that extreme. That same year, the independence of Algeria under the National Liberation Front, and before that Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power and the war of 1956, then years later the establishment of Arab socialist regimes in Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Libya all increased the spectrum of Moscow's allies. The downside came with the communist insurrection against the US and UK-backed monarchist government in Greece, which ended in 1949 with the defeat of the communists, brought about by splits

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[1] "Charter of the United Nations: Preamble", last accessed February 25, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml.

among their allies in Yugoslavia (Tito broke with Stalin in 1948) and Greece's entry into NATO.

The first significant armed conflict of the Cold War was the Korean War (1950-1953), which would be the prototype for armed conflict typical of the Cold War, with the direct participation of one superpower and the involvement of the other through allied countries (in this case China). The war did not bring about any great changes in the status quo and the country continued to be divided along the 38th parallel with the appearance of two states: the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea).

One of the other two big wars of the time which pitted the two superpowers against each other was the Vietnam War (1959-1975), in which the US supported the regime in South Vietnam while the USSR and China supported North Vietnam. The occupation of Saigon in 1975 meant the withdrawal of the last US troops and victory for the National Liberation Front for Vietnam – or *Viet Cong* – which in 1976 unified the country as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a new ally for the USSR. The defeat of the US army and its high number of casualties sustained in the conflict (more than 50,000) was a huge shock to public opinion in the US, and it would take years before it recovered.

The complete opposite happened in Afghanistan. In 1979 the Red Army entered the country in support of the communist regime in Kabul, which was isolated and facing the armed opposition of the mujahideen, who had been encouraged by tribal and religious leaders to fight against a government which was undermining the country's traditional ways with its reforms. For over a decade the mujahideen received aid and support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – both allies of Washington – and the US, and then finally in 1989 the Red Army was forced to retreat from Afghanistan, defeated and corrupted by the effects of a dirty war that had undermined troop morale with arms, drug and fuel smuggling.

Though on a smaller scale, similar characteristics could be seen in the civil wars that broke out in many African countries after independence (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia-Somalia, etc.), where the superpowers acted behind the scenes or, in the case of the USSR, through military advisers or Cuban troops.

Of a very different nature were the wars between Arabs and Israelis that followed Israel's unilateral declaration of independence in May 1948. On four occasions (1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973) the Arab and Israeli armies fought each other with support from different sources: the USSR backed the Arab socialist regimes while the US backed Israel and its Arab allies (Saudi Arabia and other Arabian Peninsula monarchies) which, with

the exception of Egypt which Anwar al-Sadat moved towards Washington's sphere of influence in the early 1970s, did not participate directly in the conflicts.

Also of a very different nature was the main war of the period, Iraq against Iran (1980-1988). In this case one of Moscow's allies, Saddam Hussein, obtained the USSR's acquiescence and the support of the US and its Arab and European allies to invade Iran and thereby bring to an end Khomeini's revolution, which was threatening to affect the oil monarchies of the Gulf and the Soviet Muslim republics of Central Asia.

Finally, it should be mentioned that there was a noticeable increase in armed tensions between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s as a result of the decolonization process in Africa, and these often turned into long-lasting civil wars. There were also conflicts of this type in Asia, while in Latin America coups and the subsequent dictatorships decimated opposition movements and indigenous communities, often giving rise to guerrilla movements that still exist today (Colombia). In some Central American countries the actions of the army and the dictatorships often resulted in war crimes and bordered on genocide among rural and indigenous communities (Guatemala, El Salvador).

In short, according to the definition of war used by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, which believes that we can speak of war when there are at least a thousand deaths a year directly related to the same conflict, between 1946 and 1991 there were a total of 125 wars[2] which can be classified into different groups according to their characteristics:

- Wars resulting from the USSR's expansion into Eastern Europe after the Second World War: Lithuania (1946-47), Ukraine (1946-48), Hungary (1956).
- Colonial and decolonization "pacification" wars which sometimes lead to civil wars: Madagascar (1947); Kenya (1953-56); Algeria (1955-61); France/Algeria (1961-62); Tunisia (1961); Mozambique (1972-73, 1981-92); Western Sahara (1975-80), Angola (1975-94).
- Civil wars – or wars with an armed or guerrilla internal opposition, sometimes with foreign support, or with violent military oppression of the opposition – wars of secession (with or without foreign support),

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[2] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen et al., "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5, (2002): Appendix 3. The people mainly responsible for compiling the list reproduced in the appendix were Margareta Sollenberg and Mikael Eriksson.

and wars resulting from coups or attempted coups: Greece (1946-49);
Cyprus (1974); Yugoslavia/Croatia (1991); North Yemen (1948, 1962-
64, 1966-67); Lebanon (1958); Syria (1982); South Yemen (1986);
Iraq (1991); the Philippines (1946-54, 1978, 1981, 1982-86, 1989-92);
Pakistan (1971 – Bangladesh, 1974); India (1947-48, 1948, 1948-51,
1988-92, 1990-92, 1991); Indonesia (1950, 1953, 1975-78, 1976-78,
1990); Myanmar (1948-49, 1948-53, 1961-75, 1964-70); Sri Lanka
(1971, 1989, 1989-93); Sudan (1963-72, 1983-92); Chad (1965-88,
1990); the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Zaire (1964-65); Nigeria
(1967-70); Ethiopia-Eritrea (1974-91); Rhodesia (1976-79); Ethiopia
(1976-91, 1977-78); Uganda (1979, 1981-88, 1989, 1991); South
Africa-Namibia (1980-83, 1986-88, 1989-93); Somalia (1989-92),
Liberia (1990); Bolivia (1946); Paraguay (1947); Costa Rica (1948);
Guatemala (1969-87); Argentina (1975); Nicaragua (1983-88); Peru
(1981-85, 1988-93); Colombia (1989-90).

- The Chinese Revolution and its associated uprisings in Taiwan and
  Tibet: China (1946-49); China-Taiwan (1947, 1949, 1952-54, 1958);
  China-Tibet (1956, 1959). This section could also include other
  revolutionary wars that resulted in the overthrow of previous regimes –
  Cuba (1958); Nicaragua (1978-79) – or that ended by agreement after
  years of fighting and fierce repression – El Salvador (1981-90) – or
  that broke out between those who had participated in the revolution –
  Iran (1981-82).
- The Korean War with China's involvement: South Korea (1948-50);
  North Korea/South Korea (1950-53).
- Wars fought between two or more states with serious international
  implications and often the involvement of the superpowers: Malaya-
  Malaysia (1948-57); Afghanistan (1978-2001); Iraq-Iran (1980-88);
  Iraq/Kuwait (1991); India-Pakistan fighting over Kashmir (1947-48,
  1965, 1971); China-India (1962); the various forms of the Chad-Libya
  War (1987); El Salvador-Honduras (1969); Argentina-UK (1982). This
  category would have to include the long-running struggle of Kurdish
  pro-independence groups to achieve independence for Kurdistan,
  which at different times has involved Iran, Iraq and, after 1991,
  Turkey: Iraq (1961-63, 1965-66, 1969, 1974-75, 1988, 1991); Iran
  (1979-80, 1982).
- Wars to some degree connected with the lengthy conflict in Indochina-
  Vietnam, which combine almost all possible variations as they include
  elements of civil wars, revolutionary movements, secessionary
  movements, wars between states, serious international implications and
  confrontations between superpowers (the US and the USSR along with

China), and in one way or another they had an effect on almost all the countries of the Indochina peninsula with the exception of Thailand: Indochina-Vietnam (1946-54); South Vietnam (1955-64); North Vietnam-South Vietnam (1965-1975); Laos (1959-61, 1963-73); Cambodia (1967, 1970-75, 1978, 1989); Myanmar (1968-78); China-Vietnam (1979).

- The various Arab-Israeli wars, sometimes with the explicit intervention of other countries, after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948: Israel-Egypt et al. (1948, 1967, 1973); Israel-Egypt with French and British involvement, (1956); Israel-Syria-Lebanon (1976, 1980-82, 1989-90).

To summarize this section we will give an overview of some of the basic aspects of Cold War geopolitics:

- For four decades armed threats and alliances were determined by the struggle between the two superpowers to increase the influence of their respective blocs. However, no direct armed confrontation between them ever took place. The worst trouble spots with the most wars over these four decades were Asia with 48, the Middle East (from Egypt to Afghanistan-Pakistan) with 28 and Africa with 24.
- The Non-Aligned Movement (Bandung, 1955) was an attempt to forge a third way independent of the two superpowers. However, the truth is that most of the countries in the movement never managed to free themselves of the dichotomy of having to choose between Washington and Moscow. In addition, the inclusion of countries like Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, Laos, India, Egypt and so on progressively compromised its credibility.
- The arms race became the economic driving force of the US and the USSR. However, the inflexibility of the Soviet system meant that technological advances in military industry were not transferred to civil industry, while this did happen in the US, where many technological advances originating in the military industry brought about improvements in its citizens' standard of living and the development of high added value consumer industries.
- The concept of two economic and military superpowers is misleading and inexact because the Soviet economy and military industry, except at the start of its conquest of space, was never on the same level as the US. Hence while US production represented around 40% of world production in the 1940s and 1950s, that of the USSR accounted for barely 20%.

- As Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole[3], the Cold War was a period of much armed tension, especially in the years following the end of the Second World War, the years of decolonization, and the years immediately before and after the implosion of the USSR. Paradoxically, however, this tension was finely regulated and conflicts appeared to be controlled, either from close quarters or from a distance, by the two superpowers.

Similarly, the following table based on data also supplied by Monty G. Marshall shows that the Cold War saw the start of 19 wars involving 500,000 or more casualties, whereas since 1991 only one war of a similar magnitude has begun (in the table the war in Afghanistan resulting from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 is considered an extension of the period of war that started in 1978; and the war resulting from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has not reached 500,000 casualties).[4] Thus it can be expected that the world after the Cold War will be one with less armed tension but with conflicts that are less controlled and regulated, and it is this aspect which, especially after 9/11, has increased the feeling of insecurity.

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[3] Monty G. Marshall, Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011. Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011).

[4] The best known conflicts or those most widely reported in the media are not always those that produce the most casualties, and neither does a higher casualty count necessarily mean a greater magnitude since this depends on the impact of the armed conflict on civil society and its destructive capacity taking into account the years it lasts and the population potentially affected (inhabitants of the country or countries in the conflict).

Main wars between 1946 and 2011 by numbers of casualties[*][5]				
Years	Magnitude*[6]	States involved	Description	Deaths
1945-54	6	Vietnam	Indochina independence	500,000
1946	6	India/Pakistan	Partition	1,000,000
1946-50	6	China	Civil war	1,000,000
1948-2011[+]	4	Myanmar (Burma)	Ethnic war	1,000,000
1950-51	4	China	Landowner repression	1,500,000
1950-53	6	North Korea/South Korea	Korean Civil War	1,500,000
1956-72	5	Sudan	Ethnic war	500,000
1958-75	7	North Vietnam/South Vietnam	Vietnam War	2,000,000
1965-66	5	Indonesia	Communist/Chinese pop. repression	500,000
1966-70	6	Nigeria	Ethnic war (Biafra)	200,000
1966-75	5	China	Cultural Revolution	500,000
1971	6	Bangladesh/Pakistan	Ethnic war (Bangladesh independence)	1,000,000
1974-91	6	Ethiopia	Ethnic war (Eritrea)	750,000
1975-78	6	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge repression of dissidents	1,500,000
1975-2002	6	Angola	Civil war	1,000,000
1978-2002	7	Afghanistan	Civil war	1,000,000
1980-88	6	Iraq/Iran	International war	500,000
1981-92	6	Mozambique	Civil war (RENAMO)	500,000
1983-2002	6	Sudan	Ethnic war	1,000,000
1996-2011[+]	5	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Civil war	2,500,000

(*) 500,000 deaths or over

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[5] Reworking of data compiled by Monty G. Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2012," Global Conflict Trends, last accessed February 25, 2013, http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm.
[6] Calculates the impact of the armed conflict on civil society and its capacity for destruction taking into account the years it lasts and the population potentially affected (inhabitants of the country or countries in the conflict). Ranges between 1 (low) and 10 (high).

- Finally, the ideological and territorial rivalry between the two superpowers did not always manifest itself in open armed conflicts, but also in the shape of coups (Latin America, Africa) and changes of regime and alliances. With the exception of Iran in 1979, the pieces lost by Washington were taken by Moscow and vice versa. In the Middle East, the Cold War adopted a model of its own: conservative Islamic regimes (Saudi Arabia) against Arab socialist regimes which included a nationalist version (pan-Arabism) that did not come about in other parts of the world.

The implosion of the USSR and its consequences

Between 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall) and 1991 (the end of the USSR) world geopolitics underwent a radical change that has still not become fully defined despite the efforts of the *neocons* during George Bush Jr's two terms in office to reaffirm the absolute hegemony of the US by the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. Among the main consequences of the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the following points should be included:

- The disappearance of the USSR gave rise to the appearance of fifteen new states: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation.
- It meant the end of the balance of power system which, to some extent, had regulated international relations and conflicts since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) put an end to the Thirty Years' War and the war between Spain and the Dutch Republic. Its final phase was the bipolar system of the Cold War, a balance between only two powers.
- It brought about a power vacuum in regions that previously fell within Moscow's sphere of influence (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia), and its former allies (Iraq, Syria…) no longer had the protection of Moscow, or only in a weakened form.
- New geostrategic movements took place aimed at filling this power vacuum with the sights set on hydrocarbon reserves and consolidating and maintaining the hegemony of the US as the only superpower. The power vacuum was at times temporary and did not cause excessive conflict, as in the case of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Yugoslavia), where most countries ended up joining NATO and the EU apart from those with frontiers bordering the Russian Federation (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia). A great deal more conflict has been involved in filling the power vacuum in the Caucasus, in Central Asia

– where the collateral effects of the war in Afghanistan and the spread of fundamentalist movements in opposition to the continuing presence of certain surviving dictatorial leaders from the Soviet era are becoming a problem – and among Moscow's old allies (Iraq, Syria, Libya…).

- The disappearance of the old arch-enemy also meant the end of military deterrence, which has had negative repercussions on the arms industry, especially in the US, and hence the need to conceptually formulate a new arch-enemy, a need undoubtedly strengthened by Samuel P. Huntington with his now famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.[7] After 9/11 that new arch-enemy was identified as Al-Qaida and, by extension, Islam – whose religious principles, Huntington alleges, are incompatible with democratic values.

- The appearance of a new religion-based international terrorism, new asymmetric-type conflicts and new neo-imperial wars (Afghanistan, Iraq).

- The persistence of certain conflicts as a legacy of the Cold War or which still have their roots in the inter-war period, as is the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

- The apparent loss of regulation and control of armed conflicts now that there is no longer the superpower involvement that there was during the Cold War. In spite of this it should be pointed out that, as can be seen from the table by Monty G. Marshall, there are currently fewer armed conflicts that turn into wars, and this is no doubt due to the success of the mediating role played by the international community and the United Nations.

- Finally, following Joseph Nye,[8] in an increasingly globalized world there is a general trend towards the consolidation of a diffuse multipolarism in which the US retains military supremacy and the use of force (unipolar level), competes with other powers (EU, Japan, China, Russia and other emerging countries) in the economic sphere (multipolar level) and where there is a third scenario which spreads beyond the borders of nation-states and where great many powers act using global criteria – the world is their market – and are capable of

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[7] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[8] Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Joseph Nye and Alexandra Scacco, "La gobernabilidad del globalismo," *La Vanguardia Dossier* 3 (2002): 35-40.

creating problems for a superpower and its allies (diffuse transnational level): these powers range from multinationals and big financial concerns to drug cartels and international terrorist organizations.

The new conflicts of the global era

After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, conflict continued and in the decade immediately afterwards (1991-2001) there is a total of 37 open wars. In some cases these wars are actually the continuation of conflicts or wars that had already started before 1991. Indeed some of them are long-running conflicts with various intermittent stages of intensity and violence which span all or almost all the second half of the 20th century. However, a number of differences can be seen in the regional distribution of the conflicts compared to the previous four decades. Hence the regions of the world with the most conflicts and the most wars in the decade 1991 to 2001 were Africa with 15, Europe with 8 and Asia with 7. Two things need to be stressed here: firstly, that the Al-Qaida attack on the US on 11 September 2001 means that the United States appears on the list of open wars for the first time, and secondly, that due to the end of the decolonization process in the mid-1970s, wars connected to colonial "pacification" and decolonization disappear.

The 37 wars that appear in the period 1991-2001 can be classified into different groups according to their characteristics:

1. Wars resulting from the collapse of the USSR and the implosion of Yugoslavia. As new states appear – or will appear in the immediate future as a result of war – some of these should be considered wars between states, sometimes with international implications: Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-93, 1993); Azerbaijan-Armenia (1992-94); Georgia (1993); Russia-Chechen Republic (1995-96, 1999-2001); Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1998, 1999); Tajikistan (1992-93).
2. Civil wars, or wars with an internal armed or guerrilla opposition, sometimes with foreign support, or with violent military repression of the opposition; wars of secession, with or without foreign support; and wars resulting from coups or attempted coups: Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan (1992-97); South Yemen (1994); Myanmar (1992, 1994); Sri Lanka (1985-2001); India (1999-2001); the Philippines (2000); Algeria (1993-2001); Rwanda (1991-92, 1998, 2001); Liberia (1992); Sudan (1995-2002); Congo Brazzaville (1997, 1998-2000); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1997, 1998-2000); Burundi (1998, 2000-02); Guinea Bissau (1998);

Sierra Leone (1998-99); Angola (1998-2001); Guatemala (1992); Colombia (1992-93, 1998-2001).

3. Wars that set two or more states against each other and had strong international and often superpower implications: India-Pakistan (1999); Eritrea/Ethiopia (1998-2000); United States (2001).[9]

In short, there is a total of 37 open wars during the decade 1991 to 2001, giving us an average of 3.7, which stands in contrast to the average of 2.8 for the Cold War period (1946-1991) and could initially give the impression of greater levels of conflict in the decade following the Cold War. However, that would not be quite true. What happens is that, as we saw in the graph by Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s there is constant growth in the number of wars between states, many of them the result of the decolonization process. Civil wars, meanwhile, show points of greater intensity in the second half of the 1940s, the end of the 1960s and between 1977 and 1987. Hence the overall behaviour of armed conflicts, highly influenced by wars between states, shows clear and intense growth between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s, then decreases. For Marshall and Cole, the evolution of wars between states is marked by the decolonization process, by the Arab-Israeli wars and their consequences, by Indochina-Vietnam and its regional offshoots, by the permanent war in Afghanistan since the end of the 1970s, by the wars between India and Pakistan, by the war between Iraq and Iran, by the confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, by the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. Except for the latter and the Iraq-Iran War, all the others had an initial component of internal conflict which was later internationalized.

Lotta Harbom (Lotta Thémner in 2011) and Peter Wallensteen (2007, 2010 and 2011) have carried out an in-depth analysis of what happened in the twenty years after the Cold War.[10] Starting with the total number of armed conflicts between 1989 and 2010, they first analyse the intensity, the countries affected and the appearance of new conflicts, then they go on to analyse the characteristics or type of armed conflicts (internal or internal with international involvement – one or various countries giving support to one or more of the parties involved – or between states) and the location of the armed conflicts by regions and continents.

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[9] The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan have already been considered as being in the previous period as the country had been at war since 1978.

[10] See Lotta Themnér, Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2011," *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 49 no. 4(2012): 565-575, accessed February 18, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0022343312452421.

Hence between 1989 and 2010 a total of 133 armed conflicts were recorded, of which 86 (65%) were of lower intensity and 47 (35%) were wars (one thousand or more deaths a year directly related to the conflict). Until 2006, little over half were new conflicts, while the rest were a continuation of pre-existing ones. Indeed many of the armed conflicts are long-running (ten years or more) and often after a short period of peace lasting one or two years there is a resumption of the conflict which statistically appears new when it is in fact the continuation of a previous phase of violence. To give one of the most obvious examples, in Colombia the confrontation between the government and the various guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19…), paramilitary organizations and drug cartels has been continuing on and off for more than four decades. When a conflict takes hold it becomes very difficult to resolve because it undermines, confuses and receives support from the social fabric, the stances become more radical, and all the parties know how to oppose or hinder peace initiatives and show little interest in negotiating. In Western Europe there were two other obvious cases of this type of conflict involving the IRA and ETA. At the same time, however, this type of armed conflict does not often escalate into open warfare, although it may sometimes happen as it did in Colombia in 1989-90, 1992-93 and 1998-2001. To some extent this is a measure of the success of the international community, which, although unable to prevent armed conflicts, has managed to noticeably reduce them in number and is able to prevent any escalation which may lead from armed conflict to war.

Eighty countries were affected by armed conflict between 1989 and 2010, i.e. 41% of the total members of the United Nations (193 after the Republic of South Sudan joined in July 2011). In the last three years of the Cold War the total number of armed conflicts varied between 43 (1989) and 51 (1991). The maximum was reached in the first year after the Cold War with 53. From then on the number decreased rapidly and never exceeded 47, falling to a low of 30 in 2010. The number of wars follows a similar evolution and the peak of 1990, 16 wars, has not only not been reached again, but between 2002 and 2010 the total number of open wars fluctuates between 4 and 7. Also the appearance of new conflicts has plummeted since 1990 and between 1995 and 2006 fluctuates between 0 and 4. The same happens with the number of countries affected by armed conflicts, which has also dropped since the mid-1990s.

Thus the end of the Cold War did not mean an increase in armed conflict and wars but the complete opposite because there was a gradual decrease. This downward trend became more obvious after the mid-1990s

as regards both the total number of armed conflicts and open wars, and the appearance of new conflicts and the total number of countries affected.

Classifying the armed conflicts between 1989 and 2006 according to their typology shows that most were the result of internal conflict (73%), either resulting from civil war or confrontations between the government and opposition groups or guerrillas. If those internal conflicts which had international involvement (foreign countries supporting one or more of the parties involved) are included, then internal conflict explains 94% of the armed conflicts. Only in the case of the remaining 6% are we looking at wars between states with certain periods of intensity (two wars) which are connected with the collapse of the USSR and the political changes in Eastern Europe (1989-1991), or the post-war in the Balkans and Kosovo (1996, 1998-2000) or the invasion of Iraq (2003). It should also be mentioned that the number of armed conflicts decreased considerably after 1991-92, which peaked with 52.

Locating the armed conflicts between 1989 and 2010 by region or continent shows that the continents with the most conflicts were Africa (with 32% of the total) and Asia (29%). The periods with the most conflicts in the former were 1991, 1994 and between 1997 and 2002, while in the latter they were around the end of the Cold War and the 1990s, from 1989 to 2000, then decreased significantly afterwards. Next was Europe (17%), where again the armed conflict was in connection with the collapse of the USSR and the political changes in Eastern Europe, especially the war in the Balkans. The greatest number of armed conflicts were therefore concentrated between 1991 and 1995, dropping rapidly afterwards (only in 1999 did the conflict in Kosovo raise the number to 3, though still a long way below the 7, 8 and 9 that were recorded between 1991 and 1993, or even the 5 recorded for 1994 and 1995). The Middle East also shows notable levels of conflict coinciding with the end of the Cold War (between 1990 and 1996), but then this decreases moderately until 2005 when a new period of armed conflict appears to start up. Meanwhile the period of greatest conflict in America coincides with the end of the Cold War and the years immediately following (1989-1995), then undergoes a sharp fall.

Finally, leaving aside the war in Afghanistan with its origins in the 1970s and the Al-Qaida attack on the US which was prolonged by the occupation of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, the only important war (more than 500,000 casualties) to break out after 1991 was the one that remains open in the region of the Great Lakes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), which has already been responsible for around 2.5 million deaths. It is therefore the conflict that has so far caused the highest number of casualties since the end of the Second World

War. The start of the conflict was connected with the flood of refugees in the mid-1990s trying to escape the ethnic and civil wars in Rwanda and Burundi, with the overthrow of Mobutu by the opposition led by Laurent-Desiré Kabila, assassinated in January 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila, and with the activities of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which is made up of Hutus who control the DRC provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu from where they launch attacks against Rwanda. Military forces from Rwanda and Uganda also operate in the region, the latter having more or less explicit US support. The war is financed by the illegal mining of minerals in the eastern provinces of the DRC, especially coltan, which, when converted into tantalum, is vital for the mobile phone industry. The complex web of international involvement and the ethnic and political confrontations connected with coltan mining have been turned into a novel by John Le Carré.[11]

In conclusion, levels of armed conflict diminished after the Cold War despite the fact that conflicts were no longer regulated or controlled by the two superpowers once the USSR disappeared. Indeed the nature of armed conflict has changed and new deadly forms of confrontation are becoming more common. A globalized world has taken the place of the old Cold War paradigms and smashed them to pieces, opening up a future that remains uncertain.

The new wars

The end of the Cold War sees the restructuring of world power because the globalization process and the technological revolution in communications – from satellite dishes and big international news channels to mobile phones and the internet – were rapidly transforming geopolitics and the nature of armed conflict. Hence we start to notice the appearance of new types of conflict which, for want of a better term, are dubbed asymmetric conflicts or wars. According to Cabrerizo, the term describes those that break out

> between two contenders usually with different military capabilities and basic differences in their strategy model. One of them will seek to beat the other by openly using military tactics at a particular time and place and observing traditional legal and ethical restrictions. Its opponent will try to wear them down and gain the upper hand by acting using unconventional tactics involving isolated successes that hugely affect public opinion,

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[11] John Le Carré, *The Mission Song* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2006).

exhausting its adversary by prolonging the conflict, using methods outside the laws and traditions of war, or employing weapons of mass destruction. The main objective of all this is to influence public opinion and the political decisions of the adversary[12]

or, if we prefer, for Baud, "asymmetric conflicts set against each other adversaries whose rationale for war is different [whereas symmetric] conflicts set against each other adversaries who follow a similar rationale".[13]

One of the first authors to draw attention to the changes that were taking place in armed conflicts in the global era was Mary Kaldor. On the basis of experience acquired monitoring the armed conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh,[14] which between 1992 and 1994 pitted Azerbaijan against Armenia, and the Balkan wars, this British academic wrote that

during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organized violence developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the current globalized era. I describe this type of violence as 'new war'(…) I use the term 'war' to emphasize the political nature of this new type of violence, even though (…) the new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals).[15]

For Kaldor the new wars should be interpreted in the context of globalization, the impact of which is visible in the shape of international

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[12] Antonio Cabrerizo Calatrava, "El Conflicto Asimétrico" (paper presented at the Congreso Nacional de Estudios de Seguridad, Granada, Spain, October 21-25, 2002.)

[13] Jacques Baud, *La Guerre asymétrique ou la Défaite du vainqueur* (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2003), 89.

[14] The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, populated by Armenians, is today a de facto independent state - in 1991 the creation of an independent state was approved by referendum, thus causing Azerbaijan to react - although it is not recognized by the United Nations. Between 1992 and 1994 it was the scene of violent armed conflict between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia which ended in a ceasefire negotiated by Russia. Armenian troops still remain in Nagorno-Karabakh and successive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far failed to resolve the conflict.

[15] Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), 1-2.

presence, from armies, military advisers, foreign mercenaries and journalists, and diaspora volunteers to international institutions (UNHCR, EU, UNICEF, OSCE, OAU and the United Nations and its peacekeeping armies)[16] and non-governmental organizations (Oxfam, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, International Red Cross…). She also points out that the aims of the new wars often involve

> identity politics in contrast to the geopolitical or ideological goals of earlier wars… By identity politics, I mean the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic (…) [whereas] these earlier identities were linked either to a notion of state interest or to some forward-looking project – ideas about how society should be organized".[17]

But at the same time, "the new wave of identity politics is both local and global, national as well as transnational" given the growing weight of the new means of communication – digital television, internet, mobile phones – and of the emigrant collectives and diaspora communities which, from other countries, try to exert influence in their countries of origin through contacts and "provide ideas, funds and techniques". All this has also brought about changes in the way wars are fought. Hence in conventional warfare, including guerrilla warfare aimed at avoiding direct combat, the goal was to capture territory and politically control the population, whereas

> the new warfare borrows from counter-insurgency techniques of destabilization aimed at sowing "fear and hatred". The aim is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a different opinion) and by instilling terror. Hence the strategic goal of these wars (...) often involves population expulsion through various means such as mass killing and forced resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological and economic means of intimidation.[18]

As a result, in the new wars the number of civilian casualties increases (in the wars of the early 20th century the ratio between military and civilian casualties was 8 to 1; now this ratio has been reversed and stands at 1 to 8), as does the number of displaced persons and refugees.

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[16] UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; EU: European Union; UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund; OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; OAU: Organization of African Unity.
[17] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 7.
[18] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 9.

In short, in the new wars the combatants tend to blend in with the civil population, acting and living on the terrain using all the economic elements they can: smuggling, looting, appropriating "humanitarian aid", illegal trading in arms, drugs and valuable goods (petrol, jewels, works of art which are diverted to the black market, etc.). Some of these factors were already present in the war fought by the Red Army against the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, finally undermining morale and corrupting the Soviet army. The essential issue, however, is undoubtedly the fact that this type of behaviour also ends up affecting invading or militarily superior armies, which have to deal with two types of insoluble problem: the role of civilians in the conflict, and the possibility of winning in the conventional conflict – where the military force deployed continues to be decisive – but losing the occupation.

The first aspect has been carefully considered, on the basis of his long military experience, by Rupert Smith.[19] This British general believes that there is no military solution to asymmetric conflicts because the use of "military force" may not be effective. We find ourselves in a time when the paradigm is changing: "the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force",[20] as has been shown by the difficulties arising from the occupation of Iraq.

On the second aspect, an answer can be found in the real-life military experiences of the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq (and the occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel in the 1990s). In both cases the conventional conflict was won without any problems in a few weeks thanks to the complete superiority of the US (and UK) Army and its control of the airspace. In Afghanistan, the conventional phase of the conflict was considered to have been concluded on 7 December 2001 with the taking of Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold. The war had lasted exactly two months since the bombardments started on 7 October. In that time the US troops had suffered a total of 12 casualties. Then began an occupation which by April 2012 had claimed a total of 2,956 casualties among the members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),

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[19] Rupert Smith was in command of the 1st Armoured Division of the British Army during the Gulf War in 1991 and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in 1995 and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for NATO during the 1999 Kosovo campaign.

[20] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 3-4.

which means an average of 288 casualties a year or 24 a month, four times the average involved in the conventional conflict.

21 March 2003 saw the start of massive bombing raids on Baghdad and the main cities of northern Iraq, Mosul, Tikrit and Kirkuk. On 1 May 2003, aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush officially announced the end of hostilities. Only 40 days had passed and so far there had been a total of 170 casualties among US/UK troops (48 of them by mistake or "friendly fire"), which gives an average of 4.25 casualties a day. By April 2012 the total number of casualties from the international coalition forces of occupation had risen to 4,804, of which 4,486 were US soldiers, giving an average of 1.35 casualties a day.[21] In short, only 3.8% of the casualties were due to conventional warfare, while the occupation, in hostile territory and with an enemy that blended in with the civilian population, supplied the remaining 96.2%. In Afghanistan the percentages were even more unequivocal: only 0.41% of the casualties corresponded to the period of conventional warfare. And none of these figures include casualties among members of security companies and mercenaries, who were increasingly involved as the war was privatized in both countries.

As Pere Vilanova points out, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the analyses and "debates about global security, world governance, their interactions and knock-on effects, are still caught up in a framework of considerable *strategic confusion*… because we are in the midst of *global transition*, i.e. in the middle of structural change on a planetary

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[21] During this same period (March 2003-April 2012) there was a total of 318 casualties from other countries that participated in the international coalition occupation – or that had participated at some time or another – distributed as follows: United Kingdom, 179; Italy, 33; Poland, 23; Ukraine, 18; Bulgaria, 13; Spain, 11; Denmark, 7; El Salvador and Georgia, 5; Slovakia, 4; Latvia and Romania, 3; Australia, Estonia, the Netherlands and Thailand, 2; Azerbaijan, South Korea, Hungary, Fiji, Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic, 1. As far as Iraqi casualties are concerned, these were calculated to be over 10,000 members of the so-called Iraqi Security Forces and around 50,000 civilians, the latter only since 2005. In February 2009 the same sources gave a total of over 1,300,000 Iraqi deaths since the start of the occupation. "iCasualties.org., – Iraq Coalition Casualty Count" last accessed February 25, 2013,
http://www.irazoo.com/ViewSite.aspx?q=CNN+Iraq+Casualty+List&Page=&irp=&Site=http://icasualties.org/; "Home and Away: Iraq and Afghanistan War Casualties – CNN.com," last accessed February 25, 2013,
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/index.html.

scale".[22] The same happens when it comes to defining the type of conflict that characterizes the post-Cold War period. The new wars and the new armed conflicts, which for want of a better definition we have agreed in some cases to call "asymmetric conflicts", retain certain elements of traditional armed conflicts, but they also incorporate new ones which are not always easy to describe and define. Also, the scenario has changed enormously and globalization has become the new *playing field*, where it is not clear who is playing the role of referee and what the new rules of the game are (if indeed there are any). The Cold War ideologies have in many cases been replaced by "formidable cultural constructions (or reconstructions, to be more precise) of a religious, cultural-linguistic, ethnic or other type as forces for collective mobilization".

Theories as to the causes of conflicts were systematized some time ago and in general the following points have been made:

- Poor economic conditions are the most important long-term causes of intra-state armed conflicts today;
- Repressive political conditions are also war-prone, especially in periods of transition;
- Degradation of renewable resources (specifically soil erosion, deforestation and water scarcity) can also contribute significantly to the likelihood of violent conflict, but are in general not as central to the problem as political and economic determinants;
- Ethnic diversity alone is not a cause of armed conflict, but parties to a conflict are often defined by their ethnic identities.[23]

Nevertheless, none of these causes – not even all of them together – in themselves explain the causes and nature of the new conflicts. Armed conflicts are not always restricted to the poorest countries or communities, or those with the least freedom, or those with the greatest ethnic diversity or where the worst degradation of natural resources has taken place.

9/11 brought it home via the media: a small religious-based radical group (militants of one of the most extreme versions of Islam), highly organized and well trained, with economic resources and a thorough knowledge of new technologies and the strategic use of mass media, transnational, with no territorial ambitions – beyond the tenuously vague

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[22] Pere Vilanova, ed., "Actores armados no estatales: retos a la seguridad global," Cuaderno de Estrategia 152 (2011): 11-12, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.ieee.es/documentos/cuadernos-de-estrategia/detalle/Cuaderno_152.html.
[23] Dan Smith, "Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict," *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (2002): 7, accessed February 19, 2013, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2576/pdf/smith_handbook.pdf.

ideal of re-establishing the Caliphate, preferably throughout the world –
and apparently no territorial power base, which makes any claim
unnegotiable; but capable of going to the extreme of sacrificing its most
skilled members – and causing the deaths of the plane passengers and
crews – in order to fulfil its aim of launching a spectacular attack on the
economic-financial, political and military heart of the "Empire". Nothing
to do with the economic, social, cultural, ethnic or political causes usually
mentioned. Just like the organization and methods of the commandos who
later carried out attacks in Madrid and London had little to do with the
attacks in New York and Washington.

It is a different matter that economic conditions, degrees of freedom
and respect for human rights, identity attributes (ethnic, cultural and
linguistic), degradation of the environment and religion may often be used
by politically organized groups to legitimize their armed actions and
obtain support from society. And yet another matter is that the material
conditions of life (economic, social, cultural, political) are one thing and
how those conditions are *perceived* – or are caused to be perceived in a
particular way – by people potentially at risk of being affected by armed
conflicts are something else entirely. In short, if a situation is perceived to
be unjust – regardless of whatever that elusive concept "objective reality"
may be – by a particular collective, community, ethnic group or country,
and if that collective, community, ethnic group or country comes to the
conclusion that the only way the situation can be changed is through
armed struggle, then it is more than likely that a conflict will break out:
"An exploitable sense of injustice, arising out of the underlying divisions
of power and prosperity in a society or between different countries, is thus
the basic material for political mobilization".[24] And while globalization
and the communications revolution have certainly made it easier for
people to move around the world, they have also made it easier to see the
inequalities – the injustices – between countries and, more especially,
between collectives and communities in the same country. It is not
surprising, therefore, that after the Cold War the rise in the number of
intra-state conflicts has been much greater than the drop in inter-state
conflicts.

So the problem lies in finding out how these different *perceptions* of
injustice can combine without leading to confrontation. The case of the
wars in the Balkans provides insight. In the former Yugoslavia the
perception of the inequalities between the various republics and the two
autonomous provinces as injustice was always buried but always present.

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[24] Smith, "Trends and Causes," 9.

The same happened with identity attachments, with the exception of the few people, often springing from mixed marriages, who considered themselves Yugoslavian rather than Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian or Bosnian (as opposed to Muslim). The power ambitions of some political leaders (especially Slobodan Milosevic, but also leaders from the other communities) converted religious and identity differences into ruptures, and these were used as mechanisms to mobilize for war. A war – just as later in Kosovo – in which the combatants really believed that they were fighting because of the injustices committed against "their group", "their identity": in short, "their ethnic group". The episodes of ethnic cleansing that came about during the war would end up proving everyone right and further strengthen their sense of identity in opposition to that of "the others", the enemy *par excellence*. Similar things could be said about other conflicts, such as the one that for decades has set Hutus against Tutsis, even beyond the borders of Rwanda and Burundi.

In addition it must be taken into account that globalization also has ambivalent effects on the perceptions and attachments of identity, ethnic group and nationality.

> On the one hand, it is a force that homogenises cultures and life styles and promotes a more cosmopolitan awareness. On the other hand, the fast relocation of investment capital and the integration of markets worldwide create new winners and losers, which can lead to fragmentation and marginalisation of some ethnic and national groups and a reaction against cultural homogenisation.[25]

But at the same time the sense of identity has diversified, has become more complex in more developed societies, where a single individual often shares identities that are different but simultaneous (national, religious, ethnic, cultural…) and even hierarchically interchangeable depending on time and place. This complexity also comes about in other contexts and shows "the difficulty in [establishing] the predominance of a single identity mechanism… The geopolitical space of Central Asia is a good example: the variety and scale of loyalties and priorities that confront a Tajik, an Uzbek, a Pakistani or an Iranian are more diverse than we can imagine".[26]

However, the important thing to emphasize here is that it is not ethnic diversity but ethnic policies that explain the conflicts – and never as a single cause since the political and geopolitical context is also a

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[25] Smith, "Trends and Causes," 11.
[26] Vilanova, "Actores armados", 13.

determinant – because, as happened in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic policies often give rise to an opposing reaction from "the others", who also respond with ethnic policies that are equally exclusive of anything considered different. Hence the growing importance taken on by the mechanisms of ethnic cleansing and homogenization in armed conflicts over the last two decades. Of course ethnic cleansing is not a new phenomenon and there are plenty of examples from the past, but what is new is the intensity with which ethnic cleansing policies have resurfaced in some of the most recent armed conflicts: Russians / Chechens; Hutus / Tutsis; Serbs / Slovenians / Croats / Bosnians / Kosovo Albanians in the former Yugoslavia; Sinhalese / Tamils in Sri Lanka; Muslims / Christians in Nigeria; Shi'ites / Sunnis / various other religious minorities in Iraq, Pakistan. All of them have stories about the injustices suffered at the hands of others. All of them have their reasons. In all cases what are perceived as injustices suffered for belonging to a particular ethnic group are highly effective at mobilizing and legitimizing. In addition,

> in many armed conflicts today, the tactics and strategy of one party or both involve direct attack on civilians – ethnic cleansing, massacre and systematic rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, bombing civilian areas in Chechnya. The memory of these horrors perpetuates a bitter sense of group identity, serving as fertile ground for mobilization for the next time around.[27]

In short, rather than aiming for conceptual precision in defining the new type of armed conflicts, a more workable approach is to recognize that they share – sometimes to an intense degree – many of the elements normally mentioned to explain traditional armed conflicts, but which incorporate new elements and operate in a different scenario forged in the effects of globalization.

A review of these intensified old elements and the new elements connected with the conflicts of the last two decades would provide us, non-exhaustively, with the following characteristics:

1. The appearance of *deterritorialized* conflicts in which the conquest, the liberation and control of a particular territory, understood in conventional terms according to the borders that define states, is no longer the main objective. An extreme case is that of Al-Qaida, whose aim, at least theoretically and according to its programmatic statements, is a global jihad whose stage is therefore the whole world,

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[27] Smith, "Trends and Causes," 13.

although in practice most attacks have been carried out in Muslim countries. Also the Great Lakes conflict, at the meeting of the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Republic of South Yemen, contains elements of deterritorialized conflict, as do some of the conflicts associated with the drug trade, guerrillas and paramilitary groups in Colombia and neighbouring countries, and the more recent conflict in northern Mali, where the Tuaregs of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in a precarious alliance with the Islamic North African Al-Qaida, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and other fundamentalist groups, proclaimed the independence of Azawad (northern Mali).

2. The presence of a diffuse combatant which blends in with and enjoys the complicity of part – or all – of the civilian population and does not constitute an army as such. This is the case with jihadist cells, but it also applies to people who carry on with their normal civilian professions and then at certain times take up their arms and fight, and whom we could describe as part-time combatants. This aspect is connected with Rupert Smith's reflections mentioned earlier. When the people involved are peasants or shepherds, the points of violence follow the patterns of the harvests or seasonal migrations. To a certain extent this is the case of the Hezbollah and Hamas, but more especially the Taliban and the Iraqi insurgence. We also find combatants of this type in Yemen and many African countries. It is not a new phenomenon given that there have been many liberation movements of this type throughout history; the novelty lies in the technological resources and combat strategies they use.

3. The reappearance of ethnic policies that lead to ethnic cleansing aimed at the homogenization of a particular territory which is incompatible with the existence in it of other ethnic groups.

4. An increase in civilian as opposed to military casualties to the extent that in the course of a century the ratio between them has reversed. In the wars and armed conflicts of today are mainly civilians who die and fewer and fewer military personnel, who, especially in the case of occupations, benefit from security measures that – even when provided by private security companies – civilians do not have.

5. Indiscriminate attacks are obviously nothing new. What is new is the way they have proliferated and intensified – along with suicide attacks – over the last two decades in countries at war or under occupation (Iraq, Afghanistan…), in regions with armed conflicts (Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Sri Lanka…) and as a way of exporting the conflict.

6. The risks to civilian populations that see themselves threatened by ethnic cleansing, by armed conflicts which are no longer confined to battlefields or by indiscriminate attacks have contributed to increasing the numbers of refugees and displaced people over the last few years. This is clearly not a new phenomenon, as shown by the fact that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), set up in 1949, is currently the oldest refugee organization and pre-dates the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created in 1950.

Hence, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, we see an increase in numbers of refugees, especially in Europe and Asia and a little later in Africa. However, after 1993 their numbers began to decrease rapidly, and after 1995 they totalled fewer than in the final years of the Cold War.

However, in the first decade of the 21st century, coinciding with the invasion of Afghanistan, there was a significant increase in total numbers of refugees, which, despite slowing down over the years that followed, have never returned to the values of the 1990s. In addition, the numbers of internally displaced persons resulting from armed conflicts (and natural disasters) also reached high levels, and these had increased even further by the end of the decade. Indeed the needs of internally displaced persons demanded greater efforts from the UNHCR to the extent that, after it introduced the cluster approach at the end of 2005,[28] the total number of displaced persons doubled and exceeded the total number of refugees dealt with by the United Nations. This notable increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons dealt with by UNHCR is no doubt connected with improved coordination and efficiency when responding to humanitarian crises brought about by natural disasters, but also with the characteristics of the new armed conflicts, as shown by the fact that the numbers of people dealt with had already been increasing for two years prior to the introduction of the cluster approach.

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[28] In September 2005, following the General Assembly's request for a more forward-looking, efficient and responsible system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) agreed to the creation of the "cluster approach". The agreement aimed to create a more forward-looking and responsible leadership in a total of nine response clusters made up of UN agencies. "The protection of internally displaced persons and the role of UNHCR," UNHCR, last accessed February 25, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=45dd5a712.

Total refugees (thousands), 1989-2000*[29]

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Africa	4,609	5,580	5,274	5,488	6,417	6,752	5,973	4,361	3,482	3,345	3,523	3,627
Asia	6,759	7,926	8,865	7,657	5,873	5,065	4,887	4,813	4,736	4,748	4,782	5,383
Europe	788	872	1,173	2,914	2,996	2,895	3,062	3,235	2,904	2,544	2,543	2,310
Lat. Amer.	1,200	1,194	881	886	125	109	94	88	83	66	62	38
US and Canada	1,447	1,508	1,020	764	806	818	775	746	689	653	645	635
Oceania	110	110	55	74	62	64	70	75	73	74	71	68
Others	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	14,914	17,190	17,268	17,199	16,280	15,703	14,861	13,317	11,966	11,430	11,626	12.063

(*)People recognized as having refugee status according to the 1951 Convention, the OAU Convention of 1969 and UNHCR statutes; people who have been given humanitarian status or equivalent and those who have been given temporary protection. Figures rounded up or down and from information held by UNHCR for those years.

[29] "Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR - 1998 Statistical Overview," (for 1989 to 1991), UNHCR, last accessed February 25, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/3bfa31ac1.html; "Statistical Annex. UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001," (for 1992 to 2000), UHNCR, last accessed February 25, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/3dcb71f9e4.html.

Chapter Five

Refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers, 2001–2010[30]
Refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers (millions at end of year)

Category	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Refugees	16.0	14.6	13.7	13.8	13.0	14.3	16.0	15.2	15.2	15.4
Internally displaced persons	25.0	25.0	24.6	25.3	23.7	24.4	26.0	26.0	27.1	27.5
Asylum seekers	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.8
TOTAL	**42.1**	**40.7**	**39.3**	**40.0**	**37.5**	**39.4**	**42.7**	**42.0**	**43.3**	**43.7**

[30] UNHCR, "Global Trends 2010," (2011): 15; UNHCR, "Statistical Yearbook 2010," (2011): Table 23: 154.

   In short, according to UNHCR, by the end of 2010 there were 43.7 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, the highest number in 15 years. Of these, 15.4 million were refugees: 10.55 million under UNHCR's mandate and 4.82 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA. The overall figure also includes 837,500 asylum seekers and 27.5 million internally displaced persons of whom 14.7 million were also under UNHCR's mandate, which gives a total of 25.2 million people dependent on the United Nations High Commissioner. Four-fifths of the refugees were hosted by developing countries; three-quarters resided in countries neighbouring their country of origin; 7.2 million were stuck in protracted situations – the highest figure since 2001 – and were living in 24 different countries; 42% resided in countries whose GDP per capita was below USD 3,000; by country of origin, refugees from Afghanistan (3 million) and Iraq (1.7 million) accounted for almost half of all refugees under UNHCR's responsibility worldwide.

7. The nature and characteristics of the new wars and armed conflicts can also be seen via a paradox that can be defined as follows: the military powers are in a position to win a victory, even an overwhelming one, in the conventional stage of the conflict, but they are clearly defeated in the following stage, that of the more or less permanent occupation of a particular territory. Indeed superiority in the air, the range and firepower of the latest missiles, the use of electronics and new technologies (including satellites), etc. enable a conventional enemy to be defeated almost without having to set foot on the terrain or to do it when the enemy no longer has the capacity to respond. This is what happened in Serbia-Kosovo in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006… However, except in the first case where it was not necessary to occupy Serbian territory as it was a question of leaving Kosovo in the hands of the Kosovo Albanians who made up the majority of the population in this former autonomous province, in all the others either the ground operation was a failure (Lebanon, where the Israeli Army did not manage to defeat the Hezbollah militias) or the occupation turned into a war of attrition that caused the occupying forces many more casualties than the conventional stage of the conflict and forced them to abandon the occupation without having reached the objectives given to justify the war.

8. The growing complexity of the new armed conflicts has also brought about changes in conventional military responses. On the one hand, the privatization of war whether in a "bottom-up" direction "in which sub-state armed groups take on the functions characteristic of states,

threatening their stability and legitimacy" or in a "top-down" direction "based on the growing tendency of governments in states in the so-called "first world" to outsource functions traditionally associated with the armed forces or the police".[31] And on the other hand, the use of new combat technologies that enable lives to be saved among the attacking forces, but which are less accurate and efficient than we are told since they very often cause collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties. The most well-known and commonly used of these new sophisticated combat techniques is the use of drones to bomb enemy targets.

The increasing levels of privatization are a result of the state's inability to impose its institutions and administration over the territory as a whole. This usually happens, therefore, in unsuccessful or semi-unsuccessful states where organized groups take advantage of the power vacuum to impose their own rules or administration. This is the case of the warlords in Afghanistan and Somalia and in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are generally funded through the trafficking of arms, much-demanded minerals and hydrocarbons, through demands being made on the population, through seizures of goods, illegal immigration … The drug trade has also become an important source of funding for these groups in countries like Colombia, Afghanistan, northern Mali and northern Mexico. Sometimes these armed groups even end up taking the place of the state in providing basic services (health, education, social welfare…) when these do not exist in certain areas of the territory, and this brings them legitimacy and the support of local communities. This is the case of the warlords in Afghanistan and Somalia and in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It could also be said of the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, which, although formally part of the political structure and even of government, have nevertheless not renounced their autonomous military power. On occasion they can even jeopardize the continuity of the government leading to coups and civil wars.

A relatively frequent variation in African countries is the distinction between the national army, normally with little training and resources and obsolete weapons, and a well-trained elite force with resources and modern weapons, composed of mercenaries in the service of the president,

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[31] Mario A. Laborie Iglesias, "Actores armados no estatales y modelo de estado," in Pere Vilanova, "Actores armados", 50.

who act as bodyguards for whichever dictator is in power. The most well-known case was that of Gaddafi's Libya.

An extremely perverse variation is the use of child soldiers, who are currently estimated to total between 300-500,000 worldwide. These are children abducted from their schools, their houses, in the streets or handed over by their parents in exchange for money, or sometimes even enlisted in the army by the government. Over the last two decades this phenomenon has spread like an oil stain and has affected – or still affects – more than a score of countries, especially in Africa (Angola, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda), Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and Latin America (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador), although there have also been reports of them in armed conflicts in Europe (Northern Ireland, Kosovo and the Chechen Republic). They are used in combat, but more especially for deactivating minefields, as sex objects and for dangerous missions and heavy work.

Top-down privatization is increasingly normal practice in western countries for military operations abroad. The use of private military and security companies has taken place most in the US and the UK. By 2011 there were already over 300 private security companies offering combatants under contract worldwide, which had their headquarters in the US, the UK, Hong Kong, Israel, South Africa, India, Australia, Uganda, the Philippines, Cyprus, Romania, the Czech Republic... Among the most well-known are the Blackwater Security Company and DynCorp International in the US.[32] The main advantage for governments is that they can depend on better trained forces (those employed are usually ex-soldiers with combat experience who have become mercenaries) and, above all, avoid the social outcry that accompanies the death of soldiers in their own armies. In July 2007, the 160,000 privately contracted personnel paid by the US outnumbered the total US combat troops deployed in Iraq.[33]

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[32] "List / Directory of PMCs or Private Military Companies (contractors, firms)," PrivateMilitary.org, last accessed February 25, 2013,
http://www.privatemilitary.org/private_military_companies.html; James Glanz, "Report on Iraq Security Lists 310 Contractors," *New York Times*, October 28, 2008, last accessed February 25, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/world/middleeast/29protect.html.
[33] T. Christian Miller, "Contractors outnumber troops in Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 2007, last accessed February 19, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4.

In conclusion, the end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in the nature and characteristics of armed conflicts. It is still proving difficult to find a term that can be used to exactly define these new types of conflict (new wars, asymmetric conflicts, etc.), but it is not as difficult to describe some of the main characteristics that can be seen in many of the armed conflicts after 1991. The most important undoubtedly include the role played by civilians, the use of new technologies, the privatization of war, the confrontation with a diffuse enemy, the apparent lack of territorial objectives in some conflicts, the new forms of international terrorism, the use of ethnic cleansing and ethnic policies to justify certain confrontations, the indiscriminate attacks, the increased numbers of refugees and displaced persons, the ease of victory in conventional war and the ease of defeat in occupation … In other words, globalization also manifests itself in the global dimension of the new conflicts, not so much – with the partial exception of Al-Qaida and other groups linked to international terrorism – in the territorial dimension as in the use of new technologies, increasingly sophisticated weapons and media coverage of armed conflicts, along with other characteristics that are not necessarily new but certainly of a range, an intensity and a magnitude hitherto unknown.

CHAPTER SIX

FINAL REFLECTIONS: RETHINKING MILITARY HISTORY; ENHANCING COMPETENCES, SHARING KNOWLEDGE

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On April 12, 2012, the University of Barcelona's (UB) *Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals* (Center for International Historical Studies; CEHI) organized *Soldiers, Bombs and Rifles: Military History of the 20th Century.* Hosted by the UB's Faculty of Geography and History, this day of study in memory of Professor Gabriel Cardona was a true success in terms of the quantity and quality of the scholars, students and military history enthusiasts who attended. During this long and fruitful event, participants were presented with a rich overview of some of the most important armed conflicts of the twentieth century, laying the groundwork for a debate that seems to be in its infancy. Indeed, we hope that this book represents just the first step in this journey.

Conclusions

Fortunato Minniti, professor of Contemporary History and the History of Warfare and Military Institutions at the Università di Roma Tre, opened the day of study with some reflections focused primarily on the major historiographic issues of World War I.

Minniti framed the debate by presenting a key question which seeks to understand the seemingly inexhaustible interest stirred up by the Great

War among both experts and the general public: Why do we continue to "be obsessed" by a conflict which took place so long ago? As Minniti himself pointed out, there are many possible answers to this question. However, if forced to name just one factor that contributes to our understanding of why the war of '14-18 continues to be a "special" war, a clear choice is the radical and tragic contrast between the lofty expectations the war originally engendered – before it started and in its initial phases – and its traumatic results, both direct and indirect.

Even today, the dramatic incongruence between expectations around the war and its consequences still gives rise to reflection, inevitably underscoring the need to assess and analyze the complexity of this "total" war – or in the words used by Minniti, this "Urkatastrophe" – which shocked Europe a century ago. This incongruence would result in a new historiographic approach that moved beyond traditional analyses of diplomacy or big picture strategy to investigate the cultural history of World War I. Though it dates to the early seventies, this new approach is still valid to this day. Indeed, in addition to the contemporary rise in "new histories," it owes its success to a series of essays that focused on diverse depictions of culture – in the broadest sense of the word – which allow us to rethink the conflict. The best-known such works, by Fussell, Leed and Mosse, focused on "memory," myth and depictions of the Great War, thus setting out on a new path that would rethink the war and especially the *culture de guerre* that marked the fateful four-year period lasting from 1914-1918.

This new approach would give rise to the major topics of study in the cultural history of the First World War. As Minniti notes, the first – and perhaps most debated – of these topics is consent (which we could also dub the "consent/dissent/adaptation" debate), which pertains both to soldiers and the population touched by the war. This issue still kindles at times controversial arguments (such as the one in France between the historians associated with the Historial in Péronne and the CRID in Craonne), as scholars seek answers to the difficult question of why the front "held out," both militarily and internally (with the exception of Russia), despite growing disillusionment about the goals and methods of the war itself.

The second major issue in the cultural history of the Great War is the role of violence. Closely related to the first topic, it is at times seen as one possible answer to the aforementioned question about how the front "held out." In this new approach, scholars research not only the violence endured as millions were killed, wounded and maimed, but also – in a new twist – the violence that was inflicted. They also look into the physical and

emotional traumas caused by the violence, investigating not only those in the military sphere (soldiers at the front, prisoners, and deserters, among others) but also – after years of relative disinterest – the civilian victims of the war. This approach is crucial, since the explosion of violence itself, a characteristic element of the conflict, was what transformed it into a total war that so differed from the wars of the past.

Minniti takes up a third, equally central topic, that of death, grieving, and the general feeling of loss among the populations stricken by the war. Historiographical publications in this sphere – such as the key work by Winter, who introduced the concept of a "community of mourning" – have shed light on the society-wide grieving process reflected in numerous monuments and shrines and a variety of ways of commemorating the dead, which took place both in private and in public after the conflict ended.

Minniti's fourth and final topic is that of memory, particularly with regard to the processes by which it is formulated and reformulated. These ongoing processes transmute memory itself, generating a space where History and Memory coexist and transcending collective memory, thereby shaping the much-needed process of "historical remembrance." This topic is of paramount interest in terms of the way in which public discourse around the war is shaped; historians must take advantage of disturbing events (such as the shooting of the French in 1917) as a cue for reflection.

Minniti wraps up his chapter by reaffirming that cultural history is a valid approach for fully understanding the "entirety" of the Great War, a cultural approach which must by necessity complement more technical and traditional frameworks. Indeed, by now it has been accepted as an irreplaceable component of World War I studies, even in works that are more general in nature.

Giovanni Conti's contribution – the only piece in this book that spans the entire twentieth century – helps us to contextualize the specific issues involved in studying military intelligence in the context of war. It is based on a clear premise: that the major challenge in this field has traditionally been a scarcity of sources. This problem is not unique to this field: indeed, those who research other major historiographic issues also struggle with it. However, given the nature of intelligence agencies, this challenge has been amplified by a wealth of spurious sources. These "pseudohistories" have further complicated the work of researchers, who are forced to find the balance between the challenging task of verifying the authenticity of these sources and the extreme and at times unhealthy way in which public opinion – encouraged by literature and cinema – has focused on this topic.

Given this, Conti focuses on how major historiographic issues in studying intelligence agencies are essentially connected to the impact this

intelligence has in military operations as a whole. Magnified by the general public and reshaped by historians who have worked on the question, the impact of intelligence has been relativized, as historians examine its importance in the military decision-making process, the preserve of captains and generals. (Conti notes Keegan's argument that intelligence was necessary but by no means sufficient for winning a war in the conflicts of the twentieth century.)

The development of technology for carrying out computing tasks represents another major issue which inevitably must figure in any overview of the history and historiography of intelligence and information agencies. In the late nineteenth century, the invention of the telegraph would represent the beginning of a journey that exponentially magnified the importance of intelligence agencies; this is reflected in a significant number of new sources for historical research. Conti notes how "Sigint" – a field that grew especially quickly after World War I began and entailed applying different kinds of technology to intelligence work – represented an authentic revolution in the field of intelligence. This stood in contrast to "Humint" (traditionally referred to as "espionage"), where flesh and blood agents use both traditional and less traditional information-gathering techniques.

The birth of a new, technologically-undergirded form of intelligence gathering leads Conti to make an extremely interesting argument about the balance between Sigint and Humint. The two tools coexisted during World War II, when both grew quite significantly. Obviously, in this complex, highly technified war, Sigint gained an important role, demonstrating the importance of technology. (Simply consider the Allied use of Ultra to decode Enigma, the Nazi system for sending encrypted messages, which greatly complicated the latter's Battle in England, as well as the results of similar technologies in the conflicts of the Pacific.) Yet Humint was also extremely important at this juncture, especially in light of the moral and ideological implications of the conflict, even if recipients often refused to accept this information, thus reducing its impact (as was the case with intelligence on Germany's invasion of the USSR).

In any case, the Second World War provided a powerful boost for Sigint. During the Cold War, it would also be complemented by Elint, intelligence gathered from electronic signals.

In truth, as Conti notes, starting in the 1950s, and especially after the end of the Cold War, the world saw a true "digital temptation," a period which overvalued technological tools and overlooked a major new problem, namely how to process all of the information which has been and could be acquired. In this context, the first Iraq war (Desert Storm) was a

bona fide litmus test: given the technology available, it was relatively easy to pinpoint the enemy's placement and resources, but it was quite difficult to find the (human) instruments necessary to interpret their intentions.

To conclude, Conti renounces the suggestion that instruments and techniques can perform miracles and argues that recent trends are a response to a need to rebalance all of the systems developed over the course of the twentieth century, taking an integrated approach in which humans are called upon to play an unavoidable role.

Joan Villarroya, a tenured professor of contemporary history at the University of Barcelona, and Paola Lo Cascio, who teaches at the same university and is a researcher at the UB's *Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals*, have offered up a chapter in which they analyze a key aspect of one of the most-studied conflicts of the twentieth century, the Spanish Civil War, a conflict which, despite its limited quantitative and geographic scope, has marked a veritable watershed in the history of the so-called "art of war." Obviously, this major aspect has to do with military aircraft, which were used in a large-scale, generalized way to support operations on the ground and especially to attack the civilian population, creating a sadly "innovative" use of military aircraft. Based on an argument that has now been taken up by historians and scholars of international relations, Villarroya and Lo Cascio discuss how military aircraft were used for terrorism, which would prove to be a truly historic development during the Spanish Civil War.

Along these lines, the chapter briefly analyzes the theoretical underpinnings for employing bomber airplanes, noting that the Italian general Giulio Douhet was the first to systematically argue for doing so in his now famous *Il Dominio dell'Aria* (The Command of the Air). Douhet had fought in the First World War, during which he already argued for bolstering the resources of the air forces – which probably were the decisive weapon in the new conflicts that arose after World War I – and the manner in which they were used. Villarroya and Lo Cascio also touch on the ways in which Douhet's theories spread among the leadership of major armies and how the air force developed as an independent body. During a key period during the First World War and the '30s, this proved to be of interest to nearly every army across the globe, leading states to take institutional, technological and financial steps to acquire ever more powerful and expensive bombers.

As Villarroya and Lo Cascio note, these initial considerations help us to understand how Spain quickly became the privileged setting for military experimentation in the field of aviation when the war broke out in the mid-thirties. This is especially the case in light of the German, Italian, and to a

lesser extent, Soviet participation in the war. In a precursor to World War
II, aerial warfare represented a real revolution: widespread bombing of
civilians would redefine the concept of war itself, which expanded and
became more pervasive among society. Based on the idea that it was
necessary to strike the enemy not only directly, on the open field, but also
indirectly, damaging his ability to move, resupply the troops and maintain
normalcy far from the front lines, these types of attacks essentially caused
the traditional, rigid boundaries between the front and rearguard to
disappear, in turn terrorizing citizens and wearing down their morale.
Consequently, the entire country and the front became synonymous;
infrastructure, which had previously been considered civilian property,
now became a primary military target. These changes would forever alter
the perception of war among both civilians and the military, as World War
II and subsequent conflicts would demonstrate.

The second part of the chapter analyzes the impact of aerial warfare on
specific incidents in the Spanish conflict. Here too, the authors ground
their work in a powerful premise: namely, that Franco's superiority was to
a large extent the result of aircraft supplied by the Germans and Italians. In
fact, the governments of these two European dictatorships sunk high-
quality financial, human and technological resources into the conflict,
which proved particularly decisive in the case of bomber planes. Though
the Soviets managed to compete in chases as they came to the help of the
Republic, the forces of Francisco Franco had a truly shocking superiority
when attacking the rear guard.

As Villarroya and Lo Cascio point out, this superiority translated into a
more effective use of aviation in warfare on almost every front. German
and Italian aircraft prepared for, carried out, and wrapped up nearly every
one of Franco's offensives, both laying the groundwork for the attacks and
"cleaning up" after them. Indeed, in almost every direct skirmish, they
tipped the balance in favor of the rebels.

Furthermore, their superiority was dramatically manifest when bombing
the civilian population, a topic Lo Cascio and Villarroya take up in a
concise but complete analysis that provides figures on both material
destruction and the victims of the war. They also offer a short digression
focusing specifically on the bombing of Gernika.

The chapter concludes by analyzing two issues. First, the concept of
passive defense, e.g. the devices and tools used to protect the population in
case of aerial attacks, began to spread during the Spanish Civil War; the
authors point out how building shelters and training and mobilizing
residents represented a new challenge for civilian institutions, who were
forced to organize themselves, gaining experience which would prove

priceless just a few years later during World War II. Second, aerial bombing came to be seen as a way to bring a conflict to its end. Highly entrenched during the Spanish Civil War, this idea undoubtedly carried over in the minds of military leadership when World War II broke out. Indeed, we would see its sad effect during the Second World War, as it was shown that aerial attacks only proved decisive when armies utilized new types of bombs; increasing the number of aerial attacks that used techniques which had by this point become traditional did not tip the balance in World War II.

Finally, Villarroya and Lo Cascio note that despite its strengths, the Spanish Civil War played a decisive role in making aircraft an integral part of warfare, especially for the purpose of bombing. We have never looked back: in every subsequent conflict of the twentieth century, "death from above" has proven both crucial and decisive.

A chapter written by Allan R. Millett focuses on World War II, especially examining the U.S. involvement in the conflict. Professor at the University of New Orleans, the Director of the Eisenhower Center for American Studies, and the senior military advisor at the National World War II Museum, Allan Millett is a leading international expert on American armed forces and U.S. wars of the twentieth century.

Millett has split his chapter into two distinct sections in order to underscore the crucial importance of the U.S.'s participation in the conflict – an importance which, as the author points out, is widely recognized and accepted by all scholars – and to portray the international and domestic consequences of the war.

In the first section – which focuses on the consequences of U.S. military involvement in World War II – Millett notes how the United States, despite participating for less time than the United Kingdom and doing less than the Soviet Union to destroy the German land troops, nevertheless was the only one of the three major Allied nations to play a major role in defeating all three of the countries which comprised the Axis. Indeed, after entering the war in late 1941 (and thereby bolstering the shaky position of the United Kingdom and USSR), the United States – following a strategy which prioritized defeating Nazi Germany – carried out a series of crucial operations which would break the German resistance. These included the campaign of 1942-43, which, in addition to guaranteeing Allied control of the Mediterranean and Northern Africa, also removed the Mussolini regime from the conflict. Furthermore, by strategically bombing Germany, the United States helped to weaken the Nazi war machine and take the Luftwaffe completely out of the picture. Finally, the landings in Normandy would make the U.S. armed forces the

clear leaders in the final phase of the European conflict and the liberation
of Western Europe.

When Millett turns to the war in the Pacific, he cannot help but
highlight the fact that the United States played an even more decisive role
in defeating Japan: in a war which basically boiled down to controlling the
oceans and the bases which resupplied their powers, the American navy
took on the task of completely destroying the Imperial Combined Fleet.
Furthermore, US submarines were also key, strangling the Japanese supply
lines, while the American air force crushed the enemy's industrial
capabilities, and, with the two atomic bombs, put an end to the war in the
summer of 1945.

Millett concludes this section by noting how producing weapons of
war was an especially decisive component of the American role in the
Allied victory, since the United States, the "arsenal of democracies,"
provided enormous quantities of materiel (and loaned huge sums of
money) to all of the other Allied powers.

In the second half of his chapter, Millett turns the question on its head,
moving from an analysis of how the United States changed the war to a
consideration of how the war changed the United States. As the author
notes, the war itself is still seen as a "good war" due to several factors,
including the American loss in manpower, which, after all is said and
done, was quite limited (especially in contrast to the enormous losses of
other powers), and the general goodwill with which the United States
treated the losers (though this may have been required based on strategic
considerations). Obviously, a positive image of World War II would arise
as the American public looked back on the war, and improvements in the
quality of life were not completely uniform for the entire population.
Nevertheless, one of the conflict's most visible effects on American
society in the forties can be seen in the extraordinary economic
transformation which took place, allowing a third of Americans to enter
the so-called middle class in an unprecedented redistribution of wealth. By
creating millions of new jobs, the war would also lead to an enormous
increase in per capita income and savings for tens of millions of citizens,
thus laying the groundwork for the colossal financial growth of the post-
war period.

As Millett points out, consequences were not limited to the financial
sphere; in fact, the war also gave rise to many significant social effects.
Millions of Americans uprooted themselves to start new jobs in major
cities and in the South and Southwest, thus speeding urbanization
(especially among African Americans) and thereby increasing social and
racial tensions. Furthermore, the Second World War left behind another

legacy for the United States, as America became a superpower and took an interventionist approach to global politics. Though this legacy has diminished to a certain extent and is perhaps destined to disappear in the future, at the moment it still remains, leaving a powerful mark on international politics. As Millett points out, if not for the extraordinary impact of the war from 1941-1945, it would be inconceivable to envision the incredible scope of American politics and the consequences this has had on nearly the entire planet.

Antoni Segura i Mas, specialist in conflicts and geopolitics who teaches Contemporary History at the University of Barcelona and director of the *Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacionals*, has contributed the final chapter of this volume. In it, Segura presents a broad, in-depth analysis of the general characteristics of the bloody post-World War II armed conflicts, from the Cold War to the fall of the USSR to the wars we are currently facing.

The first part of Segura's contribution focuses on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1991. After noting the territorial and political changes which followed in the footsteps of World War II and pointing out the milestones that led to the break-up of the anti-Fascist alliance at the beginning of the Cold War, Segura overviews the major conflicts which took place before 1991. The most important of these, the Korean War, Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, saw one of the two superpowers participate directly in the conflict and the other do so indirectly by means of the actions of the allies. Segura also brings up other conflicts, including the civil wars in Africa (Ethiopia, Angola) and Latin America (Guatemala, Colombia) and the wars in the Middle East, particularly those between Israel and the Arab nations. Segura outlines the major characteristics of the armed clashes which can be identified as wars, splitting these into eight different categories as per the definition given by the University of Uppsala. He then briefly recaps some of the key geopolitical aspects of the Cold War, noting that an extremely large number of armed conflicts took place between 1945 and 1991, but that, paradoxically, these were more regulated and controlled than post-1991 conflicts thanks to the participation or arbitration of the two superpowers.

Segura's second point focuses on the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, bearing in mind not only the territorial changes which came about as a result of the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc but also their geopolitical and strategic consequences, including the end of the balance of powers which had lasted since 1648 and the birth of new tensions and

conflicts in the so-called "global era." Segura divides these new conflicts –
37 in all between 1991 and 2001 – into three major groups: wars resulting
from the implosion of the Communist Bloc (such as the war in former
Yugoslavia or the Caucasus); civil wars, secessions, or coups (in Rwanda,
Algeria and Congo); and wars between nations (such as the war between
India and Pakistan), which would have significant international
implications. Based on detailed statistics and a clear analysis of the major
characteristics of the conflicts of the "global era," Segura confirms that
their number has gradually decreased in comparison to previous decades.
In fact, with the exception of the war in Afghanistan, whose origins
actually date back to the seventies and which is closely tied to the US
involvement in Iraq starting in 2003, the only conflict of significant
importance that began after 1991 was the war in Congo, which has already
killed more than two million people and has yet to be resolved.

Finally, Segura analyzes the so-called "asymmetrical conflicts" which
arose from 1991 on, conflicts which typified a new era of globalization in
the spheres of finance, technology and communications. These conflicts
are characterized by armed skirmishes between parties with radically
different strategic visions and abilities to wage war. While one of the two
parties usually adopts a traditional strategy, the other – which is militarily
less prepared – responds with quick, impressive strikes, often using
nonconventional methods that aim to gradually reduce their rival's
willpower and morale. Furthermore, asymmetrical wars tend to include a
significant number of international participants (a consequence of
globalization); since the civilian population serves as shelter and
protection for the theoretically weaker party, these conflicts nearly always
fail to distinguish between civilian and military targets.

As has been noted time and again, these wars present enormous
challenges, especially with regard to occupying the enemy territory (cf.
Iraq), and are perplexing precisely because traditional political and
military actors are unable to understand the geopolitical transformation
that has been occurring since 1991. In fact, as Segura notes, numerous
factors (including poverty, repressive political systems and ethnic
differences) give rise to asymmetrical wars. Nevertheless, a key factor
often tends to be one party's perception of (real or presumed) injustice.

Rather than attempting to offer a sweeping definition encompassing
the conflicts which came about after 1991, Segura concludes by noting
that we are much better served by aiming to understand their major
characteristics: growing deterritorialization; the blurring of the lines
between soldier and civilian targets; a resurgence of ethnic cleansing; a
growing increase in the ratio of civilian to military victims and a rise in the

number of refugees; attacks; the privatization of war itself (as powers turn to militias, mercenaries, and private companies); and the use of new technologies.

Directions for future research

The pieces published in this volume do not limit themselves to painting a picture of technical incidents for a specialized audience. Rather, they conscientiously transcend the traditional boundaries of military research. In doing so, they aim to bring up questions which arise from standard military history frameworks and offer new perspectives. We must take these perspectives into consideration in order to integrate the study of military processes into a more general study of history, especially twentieth century history. To do so, we must draft a series of criteria – even if these are general – which will promote this process of integration, thereby avoiding the risk of spinning off a new specialized and sectorial approach in this field of study.

First, specialists in this field must take steps toward integration. Regardless of their area of specialization, historians must be the first to move in this direction, promoting interdisciplinary approaches that embrace a multiplicity of topics and do not relegate military history to a narrow, more or less explored position within History as a whole. We must highlight the fact that studies of this type are an essential tool for understanding the past. Many such steps have already been taken, but there is still room to grow in order to guarantee that military history enjoys a much more significant position within general historiographic works. Furthermore, we must take care to guarantee that pieces on military history are not printed solely in niche publications intended strictly for a small group of enthusiasts.

Second, it is essential to ensure that this field enjoys greater visibility in universities. All too often, in fact, the study of military processes is excluded from teaching, as if it consisted of useless technicalities of little interest for students of History. In contrast, we believe that the study of military history must be granted a favored position in universities, both by including it in required courses – as a necessary complement to the basic knowledge covered in training future historians – and by fostering parallel initiatives, such as specific courses or seminars, which help to construct a necessary dialogue between military history and History tout court.

It is even more important for military history to have a presence in doctoral and graduate studies, which are found especially – although not exclusively – in the English-speaking world (cf. Roma Tre University in

Italy), regardless of whether these programs are taught in person or offered online. Many American and British universities, such as Norwich, Buckingham and Reading, offer a Master of Arts or doctorate in this field, although American experts – like the University of North Texas' Robert M. Citino – tend to argue that this should be even more widespread in this field.[1]

We should also devote at least a few words to the worthy attempts at integration that centers and research programs specializing in studying military history have made, regardless of the degree to which these are connected to universities. In terms of research centers, there is no doubt that English-speaking countries have been the most active in this field for a long time: since, 1937, the U.S. Society for Military History (born in 1933 as the American Military History Foundation) has been publishing the *Journal of Military History*, while in the United Kingdom the Military Historical Society dates back to 1948, and in Australia the Military Historical Society of Australia came about in 1957. Furthermore, major centers can be found in many other countries: for example, in France, the *Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire*, which dates back to 1938, merged with two other institutions – *l'Institut de Stratégie Comparée* and *l'Institut d'Histoire des Conflits Contemporains* – in 2010 in order to give new life to the already highly active *Institut de Stratégie et des Conflits* (ISC-CFHM); the Netherlands headquarters the equally important International Commission of Military History, which publishes the *International Bibliography of Military History* every year; and the *Società Italiana di Storia Militare* has been around in Italy since 1984.

In addition to these associations, governmental bodies or bodies related to the military of a single country have also made fundamental contributions. To cite just a few of these, in the United States, the history departments of various branches of the U.S. armed forces, which release official publications about the conflicts they have participated in and offer online bibliographies prepared by entities that work with them – such as the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center – are essential for historiographical research; in Germany, the federal body for studying this discipline is the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt* (Military History Research Institute), which oversees a major series of publications and the two German museums dedicated to Military History (the long-standing museum in Berlin and its recently opened counterpart in Dresden); while

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[1] Cited in Justin Ewers, "Why Don't More Colleges Teach Military History?", *U.S. News & World Report*, April 3, 2008, accessed January 2, 2013.
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/04/03/why-dont-colleges-teach-military-history

in the United Kingdom, the Imperial War Museums not only make available their interesting collection to the public but also contribute to research through conferences, seminars and collaborations with other bodies and institutions.

The military archives also deserve a special mention. Obviously, these constitute privileged research sites for military history scholars. In general, we have seen these gradually open their doors in recent decades, making available a considerable number of documents and leading to ongoing growth in the number of visitors and scholars who examine these archives. Their visibility in both the academic sphere, and more generally speaking, on the internet, has also increased significantly. However, we still have quite a long way to go to fully assess the incredible wealth of resources in their possession.

Despite differences from one country to another, and even between military archives in the same country, which are often quite significant, it would be beneficial to move forward in two directions. On the one hand, in order to respect the individual prerogatives of each military body harboring an archive of interest to scholars, it seems useful to progressively professionalize the offices in charge of managing these archives. In other words (and in saying this, we by no means aim to question their leadership or independence), it seems useful to bring the services and operations of these military archives in line with the standards employed by public archives or private archives open to the public. This entails harmonizing regulations for accessing and duplicating documents, digitalizing documents and inventory (finances permitting), and training the military personnel who work in the archives to the greatest extent possible. On the other hand, this means strengthening the historical offices of various military bodies (normally the units in charge of managing archives) so that they can collaborate with university-level institutions. We should also aim for these to be true research centers, places which conduct research independently or collaboratively, publish collections and volumes, and organize conferences and seminars, as some particularly dynamic historical offices have already done in recent years.

Finally, we should note the value of academic events, both those which focus specifically on military history and those which are more general, but where military history plays a prominent role. These could provide opportunities for positive interactions between the worlds of general historiography and military historiography, which seemed destined to be separate for too long. Our crucial challenge is to force these fields to interact. Indeed, this was the basic goal that led us to organize the day of study whose results are now compiled in this book.

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