

The Vic Model: From School Redistribution to Xenophobic Voting

Abstract:

In 1997, the authorities of Vic, a municipality with one of the highest immigration rates in Spain, implemented a programme called the Vic Model, which was a plan for the geographical redistribution or desegregation of immigrant students. The aim of the programme was to avoid the concentration or segregation of immigrants, which was defined as a problem, and to thereby dilute ethnic and cultural differences. According to scientific research, implementing such measures intensifies xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes among local populations. To analyse the relationship between this redistribution approach, which views immigrants as a burden, and xenophobic voting, we first document the examined case and then perform a quantitative analysis at both the regional and local levels by using demographic and electoral data. The results show an association between the assisted dissemination of immigrants throughout the municipality and an increase in xenophobic voting.

Keywords: multicultural contexts, assimilation, acculturation, redistribution of immigrant students, xenophobic voting, extreme-right voting

Introduction

In 2013, Vic, a Catalan municipality 70 kilometres from Barcelona, Spain, had 41,647 inhabitants (INE, n.d.a.), 25.04% of whom were immigrants—that is, people with foreign nationalities (IDESCAT, n.d.). In 2013, the percentage of immigrants in Vic was considerably higher than that in Catalonia (14.60%) or in Murcia (14.45%), two of the autonomous communities with a higher percentage of non-communitarian immigrants in Spain (INE, n.d.b). Since 1990, like many other Spanish municipalities, Vic has received a large number of immigrants, most of whom have come from countries with a lower GDP than that of Spain. This has been one of the most common demographic dynamics in Spain in the last decades, and it reached a peak in the 2000-2005 lustrum, during which, for several years, Spain was second only to the U.S. in the number of immigrants received into the country. To maintain stability, social cohesion and genuine coexistence, this rapid increase of the immigrant population has required policies that treat race as a central component of population-environment advocacy (Sasser, 2013).

To “deal with the city’s sociological reality” and “to improve the city’s coexistence”, Vic authorities implemented in 1997 a set of measures called the “Vic Model”, the aim of which was to redistribute or desegregate immigrant students among different schools (Vic Education City Council, 2007). Scientific research had already proven that educational measures based on the redistribution of students under ethnic and cultural criteria do not increase academic success but increase violence and racism against minorities and diminish the social capital of vulnerable communities (Caldas, Bankston & Cain, 2007; Leeson, 1966; Oakes, 1985; Braddock & Slavin, 1992; Cecelski, 1994; Chandler, 1997). The social context that gave birth to such an exclusionary policy is the same social climate that saw the emergence and rise in 2003 of an extreme right xenophobic party, *Plataforma per Catalunya* (PxC), which became a prominent voice in Vic, and even in all of Catalonia. That year, the PxC obtained 7.48% of the votes in Vic’s local elections, becoming the fourth force within the local council; in 2007, it received 18.53% of the votes, and in 2011, it received 19.94%, thus becoming the second largest political force (MIR, n.d.). The social and political support for PxC contributed to increase the social exclusion of immigrants, while worsening the social cohesion of the region (Soler, 2017, p. 72).

Studies on the geography of education analyse the relations between spatial variations in sociodemographic structures and educational provision and results. While the inward approach focuses on aspects such as impacts of the desegregation of immigrants on their academic performance, the outward approach delves into how education policy affects cities’ cultures and politics (Thiem, 2009). Following the premise that what happens in schools has a strong impact on what happens in society and taking into account evidence of how formal policies intertwine with informal dynamics (Clough, 2017), the literature has illustrated the relationship between the adoption of desegregation measures in schools and an increase in conflict between diverse cultural groups and the emergence of racist and xenophobic behaviours outside of them (Bebber, 2015; Flecha, 2011).

This article aims to show that this increase in intolerance for and rejection of ethnic and religious minorities and hence in xenophobic voting among the Vic population had a significant impact on the spread and normalization of the premise upon which the redistribution policy was based: dealing with ethnic, cultural and religious differences poses a problem; thus such differences must be diluted and dispersed. Such

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121 views are rooted in assimilationist and acculturationist views of how to manage cultural,
122 ethnic and religious diversity in Vic's society and institutions.

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124 There are several reasons for studying the Vic case. First, the study of Vic
125 involves a paradigmatic city whose multicultural composition reflects a situation similar
126 to that in other municipalities in Spain. Second, the Council of Europe (2009, 2013)
127 considered Vic's intercultural city policies an example of good practice, and both
128 policymakers and practitioners in Catalonia also cite Vic as an example of good practice
129 in the fields of immigrant integration and social cohesion (Edwards, 2016); however,
130 this designation might need a more nuanced view by taking into consideration a
131 probable linkage between the educational policy of immigrant students and the political
132 behaviour among some Vic residents. An uncritical approach would impede seeing the
133 negative consequences that the model might have. Third, the Vic Model was presented
134 by *Convergència i Unió* (CIU), the main party in Vic's council, as a successful means
135 of achieving the immigrants' social integration and was considered to be a plan that was
136 applicable to other Spanish municipalities (La Xarxa, 2010; Osona.com, 2010a).
137 However, the proposal was presented without any scientific evidence and in spite of
138 some scientific evidence supporting an opposite view (Chandler, 1997). Fourth, Vic was
139 the first city in Spain where redistribution measures were implemented, and other
140 municipalities could draw proper conclusions from Vic's experience.

142 **Theoretical Framework**

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145 In this section, we examine theories that can account for the effects of different policies
146 regarding student diversity management on the population's beliefs, attitudes, and
147 electoral behaviours. We revise models of social integration and student diversity
148 management and the links that may be found between education policies and
149 xenophobic voting.

151 Models of the social integration of diversity

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153 A revision of the models of social integration allows for a better analysis of the
154 positions that Vic society and political parties hold in regard to immigration and cultural
155 diversity. It is especially desirable to assess the Vic Model and PxC's criticism and
156 political proposals. In the literature, several models of integration have been proposed to
157 analyse cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. As long as these are Weberian ideal
158 types, we might find among populations and institutions expressions that recall any of
159 these types. On one hand, Huntington (1997) assumes that achieving a proper
160 coexistence between different cultures is impossible. He believes that Western culture
161 clashes with other cultures and that as a result, conflicts appear between them. This
162 theory denies intercultural coexistence models and acknowledges that sharing territories
163 under rules of respect and dialogue is always problematic. This view can lead to one of
164 the following models of social integration described in the works of several authors
165 (Touraine, 1997; Taylor, Gutman, Rockefeller & Walzer, 2003; Flecha, 1999; Johnston,
166 Burgess, Wilson & Harris, 2006; Burgess, Wilson & Lupton, 2005; Habermas, 1998): a)
167 assimilation and acculturation or reaching a state of homogenization by trying to
168 convert other groups to the mainstream group; b) segregation respecting differences but
169 without providing equality or parallel living, having groups with different worldviews
170 live in the same territory, usually in separate neighbourhoods and without points in
171 common; or c) the expulsion of minorities from a territory. On the other hand, we find
172 pluralist conceptions that consider cultural diversity an asset and assert that through
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180 dialogue, different groups in a society can reach a consensus on which to build shared
181 rules and values, thereby providing ways of building cohesive multicultural societies in
182 which groups have an equal right to their differences and in which difference does not
183 mean inequality.
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185 However, there is a debate on the extent to which each of these models can
186 contribute to the development of a cohesive society. This is an issue in assimilationist
187 and acculturationist contexts, such as those found in France and Spain. Individuals and
188 government leaders who hold these views consider ethnicity, culture and religion as a
189 premise for integration; therefore, they advocate that minorities must adopt mainstream
190 culture and values and must be dispersed within a territory and diluted within the
191 majority. However, the French experience shows that even when someone with
192 Maghrebi roots acculturates to a French look and lifestyle, he or she faces racial
193 discrimination and social exclusion because of his or her skin colour and phenotype
194 (Wieviorka, 2007). According to pluralist conceptions, social integration is associated
195 with achieving normality in daily life and with participating in the social and economic
196 progress of a country regardless of one's cultural identity: securing a job, raising a
197 family, matriculating children into schools, having access to housing, and so on. To
198 achieve this, it is not necessary to renounce one's culture or cut ties with one's ethnic
199 group but to adopt new norms and show adherence and loyalty to the country, even to
200 the point of identifying with it, while maintaining one's own cultural identity (Parsons,
201 1971; Kymlycka, 1996; Habermas, 1999). Under this model, an ethnic minority can
202 decide to live within its own group or mix with other groups, and neither approach
203 would involve segregation or assimilation nor any problems of exclusion or racial
204 discrimination.
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206 Adopting a multi-faceted approach, Harris and Johnston (2018) conceive
207 segregation as “a ‘bundle’ of spatially contingent processes and outcomes that operate at
208 a range of scales that are both affected by and, reciprocally, contribute to the carving out
209 of a spatially differentiated social landscape where people come together in some places
210 but not in others—perhaps for reasons of their own choosing (or sense of collective
211 wellbeing and/or identity) and sometimes as the result of spatial inequalities (in
212 earnings, in housing, in education, and so forth)” (p. 1000). The two main components
213 of this approach are identity and inequality. According to this definition, depending on
214 the model of integration implemented, segregation can mean racial discrimination,
215 inequalities and disadvantages, or a free decision about the place and way one wishes to
216 live. Under the assimilation model, segregation may pose a threat to the identity of the
217 majority group, as it involves minority groups apparently dwelling and relating
218 exclusively among themselves and thus not assimilating and acculturating enough to the
219 mainstream. Likewise, it represents an inequality issue since ethnic minorities
220 concentrate in low-income and marginalized neighbourhoods. As Wieviorka
221 highlighted, the model is not likely to satisfactorily achieve both social inclusion and
222 equality without falling into racial discrimination. Under a model promoting parallel
223 living, segregation means exclusion for minority groups. These groups can maintain
224 their cultures and ethnicity, but they are mainly excluded from mid- and high-level
225 social positions and from upward social mobility. From an expulsion perspective,
226 segregation is the step that occurs before expulsion. Under the pluralist conception,
227 segregation may just mean certain groups wilfully living together.
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229 For some individuals, residential segregation can intensify their feelings of
230 discomfort when ethnic and cultural diversity increases. This experience may eventually
231 exacerbate or reduce their prejudices towards and rejection of immigration, which are
232 likely linked to enacted policies of diversity management. In the classical Schelling
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239 model of segregation, households make residential decisions based on the ethnic
240 composition of neighbourhoods (Schelling, 1969). This can lead to the “white flight”
241 phenomenon where majority members leave multicultural neighbourhoods due to the
242 arrival and growth of immigrant groups. Betts and Fairlie (2003, p. 1009) provide
243 evidence showing that racial prejudice can in some cases play an important role in such
244 decisions. It can also increase xenophobic voting within a population that feels
245 threatened by the continual arrival of immigrants to neighbourhoods in which they can
246 afford housing prices.
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248 From a pluralist point of view and regardless of housing markets, segregation is
249 not caused by racial discrimination but results from the freely made decisions of groups
250 and individuals. Under this assumption, the concentration of a certain culture or
251 ethnicity does not pose a problem. This may be the case for Chinese, Jewish, Latino or
252 Black neighbourhoods in New York City. Individuals may choose to dwell with others
253 of their group while mixing in schools, universities, workplaces or public spaces.
254 Alternatively, they may choose to live in more mixed neighbourhoods or suburbs.
255 Taking these theories into account, the Vic Model policy can be assessed based on
256 whether it addresses social and educational inequalities emerging from minority group
257 concentration in marginalized neighbourhoods or mainly focuses on pursuing
258 assimilation and acculturation.
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260 Managing ethnic and cultural diversity in schools

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263 Schools are intended to educate citizens by providing them with a common set of norms
264 and values to live by; therefore, for minority students, schools can be used either to
265 assimilate and acculturate them or to integrate them while respecting their differences.
266 Schools are widely used to develop a certain national identity (Apple, 2004). On a non-
267 ideological level, schools are also responsible for certain immigration management
268 administration and implementation tasks delegated by local governments. These tasks
269 may include some of the following: receiving newcomers, being a point of first contact
270 with the host society, providing immigrant families initial education in the host
271 country's culture and language, and distributing grants.

272 Within this context, an important debate concerns the educational actions
273 required to manage immigration and ethnic and cultural diversity in schools and
274 classrooms. These measures have usually been related to student groupings. Traditional
275 classrooms in which one teacher attends to a group of diverse students according the
276 principle of equal opportunity make it difficult for teachers to respond to the different
277 needs of all students, and in practice this model leaves those students with difficulties
278 behind (Valls & Kyriakides, 2013). Streaming involves tailoring curricula to different
279 groups of children based on their abilities in classrooms, schools or other educational
280 spaces. While streaming emerged as a means to manage diversity, such measures
281 worsen equity levels, exacerbate the achievement gap between students, impede
282 intercultural understanding and social cohesion, and reproduce power relations between
283 social and cultural groups (Braddock & Slavin, 1992; Oakes, 1985; OECD, 2010). The
284 best outcomes in terms of learning and intercultural coexistence are achieved with
285 inclusion, which involves “school organisations that attempt to respond to the needs of a
286 diverse student body in a shared learning environment to learn the general curriculum”
287 (Valls & Kyriakides, 2013, p. 23). We can find both traditional mixed classrooms and
288 streaming in the Vic Model: the former when a diverse body of students is educated
289 without an appropriate use of human resources to address their diverse needs and the
290 latter when Educational Welcome Spaces (EWSs) are created to teach recently arrived
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298 immigrant children the host country language and culture. As we will see next,
299 according to the research, neither of these approaches provide educational equity,
300 academic success, or social coexistence.

301 Among studies conducted by advocates of redistribution, Billings, Deming and
302 Rockoff (2014) argue that school segregation can isolate immigrants from mainstream
303 societal norms and values and lead to social disintegration. They thus advocate for
304 desegregating immigrant students and mixing minorities with the majority, which is in
305 line with the assimilationist and acculturationist positions. However, the results of
306 studies on this topic vary, and the associated debate is inconclusive. These authors link
307 academic failure to resegregation but are unclear about whether the negative effects of
308 resegregation are due to minority concentration or to neighbourhoods lacking proper
309 schools. In fact, Valencia (2012) argue that “deficit thinking” in schools explains school
310 failure among disadvantaged minority students.

311 North American 20th century history provides an example of how schooling
312 redistribution measures intensify racism towards and rejection of ethnic minorities.
313 When several measures were implemented in 1954 to redistribute African American
314 students, white students’ families rejected the idea of having these children in their
315 sons’ and daughters’ schools (Afrik, 1993; Bell, 2004; Tate, Ladson-Billings & Grant,
316 1993). The social atmosphere resulted in repeated incidents of white students and their
317 families inflicting violence on African American students in every territory where the
318 African American students were “redistributed” (Leeson, 1966). Evidence from
319 research shows that the redistribution of students increases their likelihood of academic
320 failure, worsens interracial and intercultural relations and intensifies students’ social
321 stigmatization (Chandler, 1997). This is consistent with some studies that link schools’
322 and classrooms’ ethnic compositions with the shaping of attitudes towards immigrants
323 (Cascio & Lewis, 2012) and determining that cultural diversity among immigrants
324 affects extreme-right voting more than the number of immigrants (Brunner & Khun,
325 2014). Thus, we should expect to find an increasing prevalence of xenophobic voting
326 when cultural differences increase in a neighbourhood or school due to immigrant
327 student redistribution.

328 The UK serves as an example of the parallel lives model, which respects cultural
329 and ethnic communities but keeps them segregated under conditions of inequality and
330 social exclusion. As a result, we find both residential ethnic segregation and ethnic
331 segregation in schools where the latter is substantially and significantly stronger than
332 the former (Johnston et al., 2006, p. 988). Geographic proximity is one of the main
333 criteria used to assign a family to a school. This has resulted in increased inequality
334 between the rich and poor, as the best schools are located in wealthier areas, while the
335 worst schools are located in poorer areas; therefore, “geography and space have become
336 the means for rationalizing and justifying the de facto allocation of resources away from
337 the relatively disadvantaged to the relatively advantaged” (Hamnet & Butler, 2011, p.
338 497), reflecting a phenomenon at odds with the traditional comprehensive model of the
339 equality of educational opportunity. As a result, parents with more residential choice
340 strive to move their households closer to “good” schools (Hamnet & Butler, 2011, p.
341 482). However, the authors harbour doubts about desegregation as a proper solution and
342 argue that maintaining segregation while improving schools in vulnerable zones would
343 be a better approach. Within this line of thinking, Rivkin (2000) finds that raising the
344 quality of education provided in schools attended by Black students in the US has a
345 stronger impact on their outcomes than reallocating these students across schools.

346 Research has shown that when grounded in racist conceptions, both segregation
347 and redistribution intensify social exclusion and inequality (Flecha, 1999). Damages
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357 resulting from racist ghettoization have been widely documented (Borjas, 2001; Massey
358 & Denton, 1998); likewise, some studies document damages under redistribution
359 (Chandler, 1997; Flecha, 1999; Leeson, 1966) and gentrification (Theodore & Martin,
360 2007). In any case, the current scientific literature indicates that ethnic concentration in
361 schools, even when showing high correlations with exclusion, school failure and
362 conflict, is not necessarily the cause of such problems; instead, they are related to the
363 management of available resources for the implementation of educational actions that
364 lead to school success in multi-ethnic and multicultural environments (De Botton,
365 Flecha & Puigvert, 2009; Flecha & Soler, 2013; Girbés-Peco, Macías-Aranda, &
366 Álvarez-Cifuentes, 2015; Valls & Kyriakides, 2013). We find high concentrations of
367 White Christian students in some religious private Catalan schools, and we find that the
368 children of Moroccan immigrants represent 85% of the students at a public school near
369 Barcelona; in both places, strong academic achievements have been demonstrated with
370 high levels of coexistence as well as school segregation. The literature shows that
371 school success or failure and conflict are, among other factors, attributable to modes of
372 school organization, forms of learning carried out, the allocation of resources, and
373 degree of family participation (Flecha & Soler, 2013; Valero, Redondo-Sama & Elboj,
374 2018). Therefore, focusing on the cultural, religious or ethnic composition of
375 classrooms and schools may be misleading and divert attention from the issues that are
376 worth debating and discussing.
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379 380 381 **Methodology** 382

383 We used a mixed method approach to collect and analyse the data. Our main goal was
384 to determine the association between the implementation of an educational policy (the
385 Vic Model of student redistribution) and votes for a certain party (an extreme-right
386 party) in a particular town (Vic in Catalonia, Spain). We conducted this study through a
387 quantitative analysis of statistical data at the local and regional levels, conducted a
388 documentary analysis, and conducted interviews with key informants from both
389 regional and local governments and local schools. The quantitative method was used as
390 our main approach, while the qualitative method was used as a supporting approach. We
391 delimited the period of examination, taking into account the year the Vic Model was
392 launched, the political and social support it has been given, and local and regional
393 elections taking place within this time; as a result, the 2003 to 2013 period was selected
394 as our reference period.
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396 For the quantitative data, we used demographic and electoral statistics. We
397 obtained demographic data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants provided by the
398 Population Register Office of the Vic Local Government and from the National Institute
399 of Statistics, and we obtained electoral data from the official website of the Department
400 of Digital Policies and Public Administration of the Autonomous Government of
401 Catalonia.
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403 We carried out a quantitative analysis at the regional and local levels. At the
404 regional level, based on the Index of Dissimilarity, which is used to measure
405 segregation in both primary and secondary education, we constructed a sample by
406 selecting 25 municipalities with over 10,000 inhabitants and that had experienced the
407 greatest increase in their Index of Dissimilarity and 25 municipalities with over 10,000
408 inhabitants and that had experienced the greatest decrease in their index. This provided
409 us with a heterogeneous sample (including, among other differences, different levels of
410 immigration, voting patterns, and educational levels), reducing bias risks. The analysis
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416 was performed by statistical descriptive analysis (frequencies, means, percentages, and
417 ratios) and statistical inferential analysis (correlations and linear multiple regression),
418 performed with either Excel or SPSS software. For the local level, the data use cover the
419 census population, accounting for the entire officially registered population.
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421 We conducted a documentary analysis of official reports and grey literature. We
422 also reviewed local online newspapers and opinion forums and extracted local
423 authorities', politicians', and citizens' statements containing the phrase "Vic Model".
424 Additionally, we conducted interviews with four regional and local political
425 representatives and one school director, who offered valuable insights that allowed us to
426 properly interpret the documentary, contextual and quantitative analysis results.
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428 **Results**

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430 This section first presents the results of the statistical analysis and shows the main
431 features of immigration in Vic by taking a glance at the immigrant composition with
432 respect to origin, age, spatial settlement, concentration and distribution among census
433 sections and the evolution of the immigrant composition along a time line. Second,
434 based on the collected information, this section presents the main features of the Vic
435 Model. Third, in the context of the implementation of the Vic Model, we present an
436 analysis of the electoral and demographic data in relation to the increase in xenophobic
437 voting in Vic. Fourth, to analyse the relationship between xenophobic voting and the
438 students' redistribution, this section discusses the results of a linear multiple regression
439 of data from a sample of Catalan municipalities.
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442 Immigration in Vic


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444 In less than one decade, Spain shifted from being a country with traditional immigration
445 to one with some of the highest immigration rates in the world. Immigration in Spain is
446 mainly economic immigration, that is, migrant people who come from countries with
447 less than 75% of the Spanish GNP per capita to earn a living. In 2008, Spain was the
448 leading country in the European Union in terms of the number of immigrants received,
449 followed by Germany and the United Kingdom (Eurostat, n.d.). That year, 726,000
450 people immigrated to Spain from all over the world; representing a total of 53.4% of all
451 of Spain's immigrants, Africa and Latin America were the most important sending
452 regions. Regarding the immigration from Europe, the immigrants came from countries,
453 such as Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, that were in more dire socioeconomic straits.
454 Immigrants from these countries settled in cities and villages that were closest to job
455 opportunities, specifically in the neighbourhoods where housing was more affordable.
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457 In Catalonia, immigration increased mainly because of job creation (OPI, 2010);
458 labour opportunities were provided in sectors such as construction and hospitality
459 services, which employed 39% of the immigrant workers (INE, 2010). The immigrant
460 population of Vic has evolved enormously since 1990. They went from being 1.36%
461 of the Vic population in 1991 to being 22.84% in 2009, an average yearly increase of
462 83.70%. In addition, some immigrant communities have higher birth rates than the
463 Spanish population has (INE, 2009); therefore, the increase in the immigrant population
464 is larger than these percentages reflect. Therefore, the residents of Vic were faced with a
465 new reality, of which cultural diversity was one of its main features.
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467 In Vic, during the 90's and the 2000's, we also find an economic immigration, in
468 which immigrants came into the area and were hired to work in agriculture, in industry,
469 and in construction. In this type of immigration, first, men came alone, and after some
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years, they regrouped with women who brought with them their sons and daughters; moreover, once settled, they had more children. There was a predominance of the African population, especially Moroccans. In addition, the first immigrant settlements were in already segregated neighbourhoods where the rents were lower and the housing conditions humble (Domingo & Sabater, 2010; Noguer, 2007). In observing the Municipal Register Census data, we can easily locate the census sections where the immigrant population was mainly established in 2003, 2007 and 2011 (Figure 1, Table 1), that is, in descending order, census sections 3-2, 2-1, 1-2, 3-6, 3-11, 4-1, 3-8, 3-5 (where the first number is the District and the second is the Census Section within it). There was a dissemination of the immigrant population in 2007 to census section 3-11, 3-6, 3-8 and 3-5 (expressed with pink traces in Figure 1). We see an usual settlement pattern among immigrants, trying upward housing mobility, moving to a better neighbourhoods as their economies improve; but anyway there is a noticeable threshold represented by Méder river, that points out a significative residential segregation (Madariaga, Martori & Oller, 2019).

Figure 1. Vic's Census Sections



Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants

Table 1. Census sections with the higher percentages of immigrant population in 2003, 2007 and 2011

2003		2007		2011	
District-Section	%	District-Section	%	District-Section	%
3-2	42.4%	3-2	58.8%	3-2	56.7
2-1	29.7%	3-11	42.3%	3-11	44%
1-2	28.2%	3-6	38.6%	3-6	41%
3-6	27.4%	3-8	36.4%	2-1	39.8%
3-11	26.6%	2-1	34.1%	3-5	37.5%
4-1	26.1%	3-5	33.6%	3-8	35.8%

Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants

Table 2. Ratio of total immigrants/total Spanish residents and the ratio of immigrant minors/Spanish minors residents in 2003, 2007 and 2011

District	Section	2003		2007		2011	
		Total's ratio	Minors' ratio	Total's ratio	Minors' ratio	Total's ratio	Minors' ratio
1	1	50.7	71.7	53.3	93.3	59.0	78.3
1	2	39.3	71.9	30.8	62.2	36.9	75.3
1	3	30.4	48.5	28.3	47.7	26.7	54.7
2	1	42.3	54.7	51.7	94.6	66.2	102.3
2	2	0.8	0.4	5.8	6.0	6.3	6.4
2	3	18.1	19.7	21.2	36.0	29.3	49.4
2	4	15.1	28.9	33.1	73.8	38.0	65.4
2	5	15.6	24.3	17.0	24.8	21.6	37.2
2	6	61.9	0.0	16.9	16.4	23.3	26.9
3	1	12.0	16.0	9.6	18.9	16.7	32.2
3	2	73.7	160.9	142.4	316.3	131.0	210.9
3	3	28.1	34.4	45.5	64.9	46.9	74.0
3	4	6.4	4.8	17.9	25.0	27.0	51.4
3	5	20.1	20.7	50.6	95.7	59.9	106.4
3	6	37.8	53.4	62.8	100.0	69.5	106.4
3	7	9.5	14.8	14.0	20.1	17.4	20.8
3	8	25.3	29.4	57.2	83.9	55.7	98.6
3	9	1.5	0.8	4.6	2.6	8.9	14.3
3	10	9.7	13.4	13.2	24.5	13.8	23.2
3	11	36.2	57.4	73.3	166.3	78.7	180.0
3	12	6.7	0.0	13.4	12.1	14.0	17.8
4	1	35.3	73.4	32.7	66.0	45.0	96.3
4	2	15.6	21.0	35.1	56.5	31.3	43.9
4	3	23.4	30.7	12.9	20.3	11.8	16.4
4	4	76.0	30.0	35.2	49.0	37.0	47.2
5	1	3.7	5.2	5.3	6.4	8.0	14.3
		21.2	29.1	30.0	45.9	33.1	50.4

Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants

To better observe the segregation within neighbourhoods and within schools, we have calculated a ratio of immigrant minors/Spanish minors; this ratio indicates how many immigrant minors we have for every 100 Spanish minors (Table 2). We can observe that the immigrant minors ratios are larger than the immigrant ratios, which shows that there are larger proportions of immigrants inside schools than within the neighbourhoods, which might create even a stronger feeling of the immigrants' presence in schools. These ratios clearly show in which sections the immigrant population is larger than the Spanish one; those with ratios over 100. Table 2 also provides information about the dissemination of the immigrant minors, and shows that the

591 sections that exceed a ratio of 100 have increased from one year to another: 3-2 (2003),
592 3-2, 3-6 and 3-11 (2007), 2-1, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6 and 3-11 (2011).

593 Our calculations show that for almost all census sections, the ratio of
594 minors/adults among immigrants is larger than that among Spanish residents. (We do
595 not include these and other data due to space constraints, but they are available upon
596 request). This shows that the proportion of minors has increased faster among
597 immigrants than among Spanish residents. The number of ethnic minority minors may
598 be higher than the number of minors counted here as immigrants because over time, an
599 increasing number of children are born in Vic and appear in the statistics as Spanish and
600 since these collectives show higher fertility rates than locals. We end this section by
601 concluding that the Vic Model, by intensifying the dissemination of the immigrant
602 minor population, has accentuated views that immigrants have been disseminating
603 within the town and even in neighbourhoods with lower percentages of immigrant
604 households.

605 The Vic Model

606 Vic authorities began to implement the redistribution of immigrant students in 1997 as a
607 way of avoiding what they considered were excessive proportions of immigrant students
608 of a certain origin (mostly from Morocco, of Maghrebi ethnicity and Muslim) in certain
609 schools. The immigrants attended these schools due to the schools' proximity to their
610 households. As a typical immigration settlement pattern, most of the immigrant
611 population was living in low-income, "cheap housing" quarters (Table 1) for economic
612 reasons and due to real estate dynamics. According to the existing system of student
613 allocation, immigrant children attended the nearest public schools, creating a correlation
614 between immigrant concentrations in certain neighbourhoods and in certain schools.

615 It is important to highlight that this redistribution occurred under an
616 assimilationist and acculturationist worldview. Vic's mayor, Jacint Codina, persistently
617 lead the Vic Model from 1995 to 2007. Under his communitarian personalist
618 conceptualization of politics, Codina attended neighbours' gatherings and school
619 meetings to discuss coexistence, community organizing and urban planning issues. He
620 held a noticeably assimilationist and acculturationist position on diversity, as he
621 believed that segregation would lead to isolated groups and communities that mostly
622 socialize among themselves, posing a threat to the town's identity, coexistence and
623 social integration. He stated that "I certainly know that Catalan culture, language and
624 values are our mainstay. I am not multiculturalist. When immigrants come to me asking
625 me for translators, I never satisfy their demands, but offer them Catalan classes instead.
626 I think this is the only way to integrate. If they suffer a little, it's not a big deal". Under
627 his leadership, all political parties and most schools and teachers ended up supporting
628 this project; however, with his paternalistic style, he ultimately implemented this plan
629 against the will of a considerable number of immigrant and native families: "I remember
630 a crowded meeting with families in a school; everybody was against our proposal"
631 (Giudici & Nadal, 2008).

632 On 5 March 1997, the territorial delegate of the Department of Education of the
633 Catalan Government, mayor Codina, the town Education Department and school
634 directorates signed a *Statement of Intentions* outlining the basic guidelines and goals of
635 the Vic Model (Vic Education City Council, 2007). Beyond this document, Vic's
636 council undertook redistribution through a combination of measures involving closing
637 schools with high proportions of immigrant students mainly of Moroccan origin and
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652 relocating them to other schools with low proportions. From 1997 to 2007, students at
653 Sant Miquel dels Sants (2-5), Jaume Balmes (4-1), and Montseny (3-2) schools, where
654 roughly 80% of students were of the same ethnicity, were respectively relocated to
655 Guillem Mont-Rodon (2-2, North-East), Andersen (4-2, North-West), and La Sinia (4-2,
656 South) schools (shown with blue arrows in Figure 1). A second measure involved
657 establishing a unique educational registration zone for the municipality and thus
658 abandoning the quarter's zonification, by which students were assigned to the schools
659 closest to their homes. Third, a unique registration commission would receive all
660 applications from newcomers to town and assign them to schools by means of a
661 complex set of criteria, including a fourth measure that involved allocating a maximum
662 of five seats per classroom for students with special educational needs (SEN) mainly of
663 the B category (i.e., students at risk of social marginalization), which mainly included
664 immigrant students. Donato and Hanson (2012) describe similar dynamics between
665 Americans and Mexicans in the US, where there is no explicit recognition of an
666 "immigrant" category when references are made to "students with educational needs",
667 but under this de facto redistribution system, immigrants are the students who fill these
668 seats.
669

670 Reserving five seats per classroom of twenty-five students complies with the
671 maximum 20% quota outlined by the Vic Model. The quota approach was being widely
672 used and exploited by the European extreme right at the time. For instance, Jörg Haider,
673 former leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ),
674 an Austrian extreme right political party, limited the number of immigrant students per
675 classroom to 30%. The same percentage was applied by the Italian Ministry of
676 Education (La Repubblica, 2009). The Vic Model limited levels to only 20%.
677

678 The redistribution generated new needs among the families of the redistributed
679 students. Most of these families had to take their children to schools located far from
680 their home, which entailed additional costs in transportation and school canteen meals
681 and sometimes interfered in the development of the migrants' personal networks, which
682 have a critical role in the migrants' integration process (Bolíbar, Martí & Verd, 2015).
683 Therefore, Vic's mayor committed himself to setting up grants for families with
684 economic needs. Thus, school redistribution turned many immigrant families into grant
685 seekers, which increased the feelings of unfair treatment among the local population,
686 who believed that immigrants were receiving a greater share of the public expenditure.
687

688 In 2007, the Vic Model was widespread and had already affected 1,628
689 immigrant students (i.e., 23% of all Vic students). However, more than a decade after its
690 initial development and implementation, it was not generating the results it vowed to
691 achieve. Instead, SEN students, especially those of Moroccan origin, were struggling
692 academically, and a sense of first- and second-class student status pervaded the
693 education community, creating conditions similar to those found under French
694 assimilationism (Wieviorka, 2007).

695 When evaluating the evolution of the Vic Model, the party promoting this
696 measure developed a document to implement a "New Vic Model", that, even though it
697 recognized the educative failure of the model, attributed its negative results to the
698 continuous arrival of immigrant students not to the model itself, and publicly
699 maintained that it could still be modified and improved, but not dismantled (La
700 Vanguardia, 2010a).

701 The "New Vic Model" document stated that arrivals of immigrant students had
702 increased in the preceding years along with the number of seats reserved for SEN
703 students in schools, thus excluding local students whose families had prioritized those
704 schools for their children's attendance. Again, this situation generated discomfort
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711 among local families and feelings of rejection towards immigrant families, which some
712 expressed in online forums. Locals complained about their children being forced to
713 share schools and classrooms with immigrants, about seat reservations that forced their
714 children to change schools, about the fact that reserved seats remained unfilled by the
715 end of some courses, about having to take their children out of a school because it was
716 receiving immigrants due to redistribution, and about being limited in their choice of
717 schools, blaming immigrants for forcing them to leave their neighbourhoods to
718 matriculate their children in localities with fewer immigrants (Osona.com, 2010a;
719 Vendrell, 2010). The last complaint is illustrated in a Catalan Government Ombudsman
720 report that gathered nearly one hundred families' complaints arguing that denying the
721 ratio's enlargement infringed on their right to choose schools (Síndic de Greuges, 2008,
722 p. 108). Thus, the policy spurred a great deal of discontent, and thus we can establish a
723 link among immigrant student redistribution, citizen discontent and immigrant rejection.
724

725 While some local families' complaints were not based in facts, they
726 unfortunately had real consequences on people's attitudes and behaviours, and the
727 prevalence of xenophobic voting increased within this population, likely because the
728 population was prone to believing such information. While some of the autochthonous
729 population was compliant and trusted that the model would achieve the stated goals,
730 others reacted against it and against immigration itself. Within such an assimilationist
731 context, we can consider both reactions to be quite predictable.
732

733 As long as Vic authorities blamed once again the number of immigrants as the
734 cause of the "problem", they proposed to strengthen their previous policies by creating
735 for the recently arrived children's families a streaming measure, segregated spaces so-
736 called "Transition Classrooms to City and to School". The goal was to obtain "more
737 families integration success", under a typical assimilationist assumption that they must
738 be educated and trained in integration (Vic Education City Council, 2007). Thus, more
739 specific spaces for immigrant children and youngsters in school age were created, and
740 the immigrant children were provided with low instrumental learning, which resulted in
741 them achieving only poor school performance (Simó, 2010).
742

743 In 2008, such conditions led to the creation of specific classrooms for immigrant
744 families and students called EWSs, which were designed to help recently arrived
745 families make contact with the town. In EWSs, immigrant children and their families
746 received guidance regarding the Catalan education system while their special needs
747 were diagnosed (physical, affective, psychological, cognitive, and socio-economic)
748 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009). After two years of tracking the EWSs, a research team
749 rejected them due to their vague and unrealistic goals, pointing to a need to change the
750 model (Simó, 2010). The study criticizes EWSs for not encouraging welcoming
751 attitudes towards immigrants among local students and teachers, who delegated this
752 responsibility to EWSs. While the European Commission (2003, p. 9) defines social
753 integration "as a two-way process that requires adaptation on the part of the newcomer
754 but also by the host society", as an unintended consequence of EWSs, the once
755 hospitable culture of the host society became passive, ceasing to be compelled to
756 participate.
757

758 The model responding to diversity with segregation was rejected by the
759 European Parliament, which in 2009 published an immigrant children's education
760 resolution that rejected any temporary or permanent solution based on or leading to
761 segregation and poor education (European Commission, 2009). Despite this
762 recommendation and evidence of the failure of EWSs, from 2010-2011 Catalonia was
763 still promoting redistribution by means of the Vic Model, spreading it to the rest of
764 Osona county's municipalities to secure their involvement in "helping" Vic "deal with"
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770 immigrant students. In this context, Josep Maria d'Abadal, then the new mayor, spoke of
771 the immigrant student ratio as a burden to be shared: “the Vic model applies to all and
772 everyone is assigned their own immigrant ratios” (Osona.com, 2010a). The discourse on
773 immigration was becoming so deeply rooted that institutions, the press, and citizens
774 were frequently discussing it.
775

776 The atmosphere created by discourses problematizing immigration and pressure
777 exerted by the PxC, which gained the second position in the council due to its anti-
778 immigration discourse, led the CIU, the party in control of Vic's government in January
779 2010, to place limits on immigrant residence registration, which is the main mode
780 through which immigrants obtain universal rights in Spain. Despite opposition from
781 immigrant associations and minority left-wing parties, the Vic council began this
782 process by allowing only immigrants with residence or work permits to register at the
783 Town Residence Registration and denying this right to the rest. As a result, immigrants
784 without such documentation could not access universal basic services such as health
785 care, education and social services, which both locals and immigrants had access to in
786 the rest of the country (El País, 2010). Thus, Vic, which had a 25.65% immigrant
787 population in 2010, became the first Spanish municipality to limit immigrants' town
788 residence registration. After a contentious debate among several political parties and
789 citizenship organizations and after the State Attorney's intervention regarding the
790 unconstitutionality of such a measure, it was finally voted down (La Vanguardia,
791 2010b). Limiting residence registration to the town would have rendered immigrants'
792 social integration even more difficult.
793

794 Vic authorities publicly complained about segregation and ghettoization (EFE,
795 2010), but what were they truly worried about when discussing these issues? Why
796 should student redistribution be a solution to their concerns? Ethnic and cultural
797 concentration pose a threat to the majority culture in an assimilationist and
798 acculturationist model of integration. Our analysis is consistent with the idea that the Vic
799 Model was not primarily trying to reduce social and educational inequalities, as it
800 promoted educational actions leading to higher levels of inequality. We believe that the
801 main concern was the supposed threat cultural differences posed to Vic's cohesion and
802 identity, which is in line with mayor Codina's words shown at the start of this section.
803 Had inequalities caused by segregation been the main concern of Vic authorities,
804 policies improving housing conditions and occupational measures would have been
805 applied. Instead, authorities focused on the redistribution of immigrant students to
806 achieve their assimilation and acculturation, which even interfered with their academic
807 progress. For more than 15 years after 1997, segregation and educational inequality
808 remained, and issues related to coexistence and delinquency grew more pronounced.
809

810 The Vic Model and the rise of xenophobic voting

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812
813 As we saw in Table 2, most of the census sections showed an increase in the ratio
814 immigrant minors/Spanish minors, and there was an increase and a dissemination of
815 census sections with ratios over 100, that is, an increase in sections having more
816 immigrant minors than Spanish minors (section 3-2 in 2003, 3-2, 3-6 and 3-11 in 2007,
817 and 2-1, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6 and 3-11 in 2011).

818 Within this context, the Vic Model appeared and assisted with this dispersion,
819 which also contributed to an increasing sense of being invaded among the native
820 population. Further, there were specific issues regarding immigrant children and
821 adolescents. At first, when the Vic Model was initially implemented, the immigrant
822 population was mainly composed of adult economic immigrants travelling from home
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to work and vice versa; industry was satisfied with this labour force, and the local population was not concerned because few immigrants were gathering on the streets, and most lived in low-income, segregated neighbourhoods. However, as the number of immigrant children and adolescents increased, perceptions changed, as after classes were over, they played in and occupied public squares and streets.

From 2003 onwards, simultaneous to Vic's immigrant students' redistribution, we find among some citizens a growing dissatisfaction with and rejection of immigrants, and a swift towards xenophobic voting. This situation was contemporaneously reflected in the press, as we mentioned earlier (Osona.com, 2010a). In the years that followed 2003, the support for right-wing parties increased, whereas that for left-wing parties decreased, as shown in Figure 2. In this figure, right-wing parties comprise *Convergència i Unió*, *Plataforma X Catalunya*, *Partit Popular de Catalunya* and *Solidaritat per la Independència*, while left-wing parties comprise *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*, *Partit Socialista de Catalunya*, *Esquerra Republicana*, *Iniciativa per Catalunya-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa*, and *Partit Republicà Català*.




Figure 2: Percentage of votes received by right-wing and left-wing parties in Vic's local elections 2003-2011

Source: MIR, n.d.

Within this context, in 2003, there was the founding in Vic of *Plataforma per Catalunya* (PxC), a xenophobic political party, “the most important Spain has ever had during democracy” (Noguer et al., 2011). The PxC founder, Josep Anglada, is a Vic citizen; he was a member of the Falangist party, *Fuerza Nueva*, and a candidate for the European Parliament of Blas Piñar's *Frente Nacional*, from which he was expelled (Noguer, 2010). He has even been christened the “new Le Pen”, and in his speeches, he emphatically linked immigration to citizenship insecurity, crime, unemployment, and state budget waste: “Waves of illegal immigration increase crime, unemployment and social spending, produce linguistic, religious and cultural conflicts, likewise a certain amount of social marginalization, constituting thus a serious threat to Catalonia identity and social cohesion” (PxC, n.d.b). Thus, in its election manifesto for the 2010 autonomic Parliament elections, the PxC required giving locals priority for subsidies: “Promote local citizens' priority in social subsidies for canteen meals' concession, seats in public kindergarten and grants and subsidies for studying, and, in general, whatever subsidies given directly or indirectly by the Administration. Ending thus the favouritism

towards immigrants” (PxC, n.d.b). The seventh point of their election manifesto clearly established the priority of the Catalan population: “Catalonia for Catalans”, and “First the local people” (PxC, n.d.a.). These slogans, very similar to those expressed by the extreme-right Belgian party *VlaamsBelang*’s slogan “Our people, first” supported the complaints of local families against redistributing immigrant students and awarding them grants. PxC was investigated by the Special Attorney of Hate and Discrimination Crimes in Barcelona because of an incitement to racial hatred that was carried out during the 2011 municipal elections campaign.

Anglada, who was viewed as smart and strategic among his political opponents, understood public discontent regarding the newcomers’ arrival and settlement (their differences, coexistence problems, the provision of subsidies, etc.) and gathered with people in public places such as squares, markets and school entrances to listen to their complaints, incite discord against immigrants, blame immigrants for problems experienced, and promise to address such problems upon being elected. Thus, Anglada’s strategy involved consulting with Vic’s citizens, being attentive to their views and complaints and circulating common rumours and prejudices about immigration.

By means of its xenophobic discourse, the PxC undermined the Vic council during the 2011 elections. In 2003, the PxC received 10% of the votes and several seats on the local council, as well as 5,000 votes in the autonomic elections. Since that time, it grew, and it not only grew in Vic, where it stood in 2007 as a second political force, receiving 18.49% of the votes and electing four city councillors but also in other Catalan municipalities, such as El Vendrell, Cervera, Manlleu, Manresa, Tàrraga, and Olot. In the municipalities, there were a number of PxC city councillors: El Vendrell (4); Cervera (2); Manlleu (2); Manresa, Sant Martí de Riucorb, Tàrraga, and Olot (1); and Roda de Ter (1). Seven years later, in the 2010 Catalonia Parliament elections, the PxC increased by a factor of six the number of votes achieved in its first municipal elections, obtaining 75,321 votes, 2.5% of the total votes, and nearly entering the Parliament (DPDA-GC, n.d.). In the 2011 municipal elections, they surpassed their 2007 results, receiving 66,007 votes and 2.3% of all Catalonia votes, obtaining 67 city councillors in 39 local councils and eight representatives in seven county councils. In Vic, the PxC obtained 19.94% of the votes, doubling their first results in less than a decade, turning themselves into the second most-supported party and obtaining the second largest number of city councillors (Table 3) (MIR, n.d.). As the General Directorate of Immigration of the Catalan Government expressed in the interview, even if the PxC did not enter Vic’s government, the number of votes and seats they obtained allowed them to influence the local government agenda and some decisions that is what probably happened with the proposal of denying irregular immigrants the local census registration.

Table 3. Percentage of votes by political party in 2003, 2007 and 2011 Vic’s municipal elections

Political parties*	2003		2007		2011	
	Votes	Councillor	Votes	Councillor	Votes	Councillor
CiU	38.38%	10	31.88%	8	33.40%	8
PxC	7.48%	1	18.53%	4	19.94%	5
CUP	3.68%	0	7.65%	2	10.83%	2
PSC-PM	19.05%	5	15.84%	4	8.78%	2
Esquerra - Som Vic - AM	18.04%	4	10%	3	8.55%	2
ICV-EUiA-E	6.64%	1	7.36%	1	5.70%	1

PP	4.83%	0	2.73%	0	2.74%	0
SI	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	5.43%	1
PRC	0.00%	0	1.36%	0	0.00%	0

* CiU: Convergència i Unió. PxC: Plataforma per Catalunya. CUP: Candidatura d'Unitat Popular. PSC-PM: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya-Progrés Municipal. Esquerra-Som Vic-AM: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya-Som Vic-Acord Municipal. ICV-EUiA-E: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa - Entesa. PP: Partit Popular. SI: Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència. PRC: Partit Republicà Català.
Source: MIR n.d.

To examine the link between PxC voting and the spreading of immigrants throughout Vic as promoted by the Vic Model, we analysed the data at the census level and through time. Table 4 shows the distribution of PxC votes among Vic's census sections. For the sake of clarity, we group census sections according to a typology based on the following: whether the ratio of immigrant minors/Spanish minors is high/low (over or under 50) or steady/increasing; whether PxC voting levels higher or lower than Vic's mean; and schools receiving redistributed immigrant students from dismantled schools Sant Miquel dels Sants, Jaume Balmes, and Montseny. We in turn obtain the following groupings:

- a) Census section with cheap housing and with the highest proportion of immigrants: 3-2
- b) Census sections with schools receiving more redistributed students, e.g., Guillem Mont-Rodon and Andersen: 2-2 and 4-2
- c) Census sections with high ratios of immigrant minors/Spanish minors and PxC voting levels higher than Vic's mean: 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-11, and 4-1
- d) Census sections with increasing ratios of immigrant minors/Spanish minors but PxC voting levels higher than Vic's mean: 2-6, 3-9, 3-10, 4-3, and 4-4
- e) Census sections with low ratios of immigrant minors/Spanish minors and PxC voting levels lower than Vic's mean: 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-1, 3-7, and 3-12

Table 4 reveals several issues. First, census sections with schools receiving more redistributed students present low proportions of immigrant minors but PxC voting levels over Vic's mean, showing evidence of the link between redistribution and PxC voting. Second, some census sections (those of group c) show a greater increase in immigrants over time and thus an increase in PxC voting. Third, some census sections, despite not showing high immigrant minor ratios nor an increase over time present PxC voting levels higher than Vic's mean. These second and third issues are consistent with some works (Schneider, 2008; Janssen, van Ham, Kleinepier & Nieuwenhuis, 2019) reporting a non-linear effect of minority concentrations on extreme-right voting. Therefore, some neighbourhoods with small immigrant populations may show higher levels of xenophobic voting than other neighbourhoods with larger immigrant populations. When there are few immigrants, there are low levels of extreme-right voting, and as the number of immigrants increases, fears intensify along with extreme-right voting; however, when the number of immigrants exceeds a certain threshold, daily contact with immigrants allows locals to become more familiar with them, decreasing extreme-right voting. We find that increasing levels of immigration (group c) alongside low immigration levels and proximity to a and c (group d) may affect extreme-right voting and that the PxC has likely contributed to this sentiment through its propaganda. Finally, the geographic distribution of these typology's groups shows

some continuities; that is, census sections can be grouped across a continuous geographical area.

Table 4. PxC percentage of valid votes in 2003, 2007, 2011. PxC voting base 100. Ratio immigrant minor / Spanish minor

	District	Section	PxC % valid vote			PxC vote with base of 100 for the mean			Ratio immigrant minors / Spanish minors		
			2003	2007	2011	2003	2007	2011	2003	2007	2011
a	3	2	7.5	23.9	30.9	102.3	131.3	155.0	160.9	316.3	210.9
b	2	2	8.2	19.8	20.6	111.2	108.7	103.4	0.4	6.0	6.4
	4	2	10.8	23.1	29.5	146.5	126.7	148.0	21.0	56.5	43.9
c	3	3	10.0	25.7	24.7	135.9	141.1	124.2	34.4	64.9	74.0
	3	4	7.7	27.2	30.3	104.6	149.1	152.2	4.8	25.0	51.4
	3	5	9.8	31.7	31.8	132.7	173.7	159.6	20.7	95.7	106.4
	3	6	8.8	22.7	24.6	119.4	124.7	123.4	53.4	100.0	106.4
	3	8	10.1	32.4	30.9	136.4	177.5	154.9	29.4	83.9	98.6
	3	11	11.3	27.4	23.3	153.5	150.0	116.9	57.4	166.3	180.0
	4	1	7.9	18.2	20.1	106.7	99.9	100.9	73.4	66.0	96.3
d	2	6	-	20.4	20.8	-	111.7	104.5	0.0	16.4	26.9
	3	9	10.3	20.8	25.8	140.3	114.1	129.3	0.8	2.6	14.3
	3	10	6.6	17.4	16.4	89.8	95.4	82.2	13.4	24.5	23.2
	4	3	10.0	21.1	21.7	135.5	115.9	108.9	30.7	20.3	16.4
	4	4	-	22.8	25.6	-	124.8	128.4	30.0	49.0	47.2
e	1	1	5.5	10.7	16.1	74.9	58.6	80.7	71.7	93.3	78.3
	1	2	5.2	11.4	8.9	69.9	62.5	44.7	71.9	62.2	75.3
	1	3	4.4	12.6	11.3	59.2	69.2	56.7	48.5	47.7	54.7
	2	1	5.8	8.4	12.3	78.0	45.8	61.8	54.7	94.6	102.3
	2	3	4.6	9.4	12.0	62.6	51.7	60.2	19.7	36.0	49.4
	2	4	6.9	14.7	16.6	94.0	80.8	83.4	28.9	73.8	65.4
	2	5	6.2	11.3	13.8	84.5	61.8	69.1	24.3	24.8	37.2
	3	1	2.8	9.6	11.1	38.5	52.8	55.7	16.0	18.9	32.2
	3	7	4.6	12.2	14.4	62.3	67.1	72.2	14.8	20.1	20.8
	3	12	-	12.2	15.6	-	67.1	78.3	0.0	12.1	17.8
	5	1	4.5	7.0	9.0	61.2	38.2	45.3	5.2	6.4	14.3
	Vic's mean		7.4	18.2	19.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.1	45.9	50.4


Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants. DPDA-GC.

In Table 4, we have seen the relation between the ratio of immigrant minors and PxC voting. The PxC vote is over the town's mean in those sections that have ratios of immigrant minors over or near 100: sections 2-1, 2-4, 3-2, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-11, 4-1. Being the opposite also a trend, those sections that have the lower ratios, PxC vote is under the town's mean: 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-4, 3-7, 3-9, 3-10, 3-11, 4-3, 5-1. To delve into this relation, we have performed a correlation analysis between these two variables, that we present the results in Figures 3, 4 and 5. We put the two variables, namely, the ratio of immigrant minors and the PxC vote, under a similar scale by creating a base 100 index, indicating that 100 is the base for the mean of each variable. On the one hand, we observe that in 2003, there is still no correlation, but we already find it in 2007. On the other hand, the relation increases as the years pass. In 2007, the relation is higher than in 2003, and in 2011, it is higher than in 2007. The coefficient of

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
the correlation is -0.009 (p-value 0.966) in 2003, 0.336 (p-value 0.094) in 2007, and 0.386 (p-value 0.052) in 2011.

Figure 3. Scatterplot of PxC voting and a Base of 100 for the mean in 2003 with Ratio of immigrant minor and a Base of 100 for the mean in 2003




Source: Municipal register of inhabitants. DPDA-GC.

Figure 4. Scatterplot of PxC voting and a Base of 100 for the mean in 2007 with the Ratio of immigrant minors and a Base 100 for the mean in 2007



Source: Municipal register of inhabitants. DPDA-GC

Figure 5. Scatterplot of PxC voting and a Base of 100 for the mean in 2011 with the Ratio of immigrant minors and a Base of 100 for the mean 2011



Source: Municipal Register of Inhabitants. DPDA-GC

Finally, we run a correlation analysis between right-wing voting (CIU, PP) and extreme-right (PxC) parties and find that the PxC and CIU present very significantly negative correlations in all years (-0.819 in 2003, -0.837 in 2007, and -0.853 in 2011 with p-values of 0.000). This means that when PxC votes increased, CIU votes decreased. The CIU was the government party that launched the Vic Model, which was designed with assimilationist and acculturationist aims, to dilute cultural and ethnic differences. A racist substrate among some sectors of Vic's citizenship might have arisen due to the large presence of immigrant minors, which was accentuated by the policy. At this point, the PxC appeared to enter a discourse of discontent and rejection, opposing the increasing presence of immigrants in general and their redistribution in particular and presenting a more extreme discourse and proposal, thereby preventing immigrants from obtaining grants, banning immigrants without residence documentation from obtaining census registration, defending criminal immigrants' expulsion from Spain, and gaining votes as a result.

As a consequence, desegregation measures appear to increase together with the PxC increase; at the same time that the CIU proposed desegregation, the support for the CIU decreased. In a certain way, the CIU and the PxC can be considered as different complementary expressions of racism, while the CIU favoured dispersing and diluting immigrants with the aim of assimilation, the PxC claimed that they did not want them sharing the same territory. This is what Flecha (1999) calls modern and postmodern racism: the first looks for homogenization and the second for living in different territories. Indeed, the differences of votes between 2003 and 2007 and between 2007 and 2011 shown in Table 5 suggest that there might have been a transfer of votes from the CIU to the PxC, a transfer that might reflect people with an assimilationist

worldview changing their vote because of the increasing presence of immigrant minors spread among Vic and because of the PxC xenophobic discourse.

Table 5. Difference of votes from 2003-2007 and 2007-2011 for the CIU and the PxC

District	Section	CIU	PxC	CIU	PxC
		2003-2007	2003-2007	2007-2011	2007-2011
1	1	-8.9	5.2	-7.5	5.4
1	2	-8.3	6.2	0.4	-2.5
1	3	-2.9	8.3	3.5	-1.3
2	1	-4.4	2.6	0.3	4.0
2	2	-1.7	11.6	2.1	0.8
2	3	-3.4	4.8	-0.7	2.6
2	4	-9.0	7.8	4.8	1.9
2	5	-4.1	5.0	-2.2	2.5
2	6	24.9	-	4.7	0.5
3	1	3.1	6.8	-6.6	1.5
3	2	-13.0	16.4	1.9	6.9
3	3	-11.1	15.7	5.0	-1.0
3	4	-6.5	19.5	4.8	3.1
3	5	-7.6	21.9	2.3	0.1
3	6	-7.7	13.9	2.5	1.9
3	7	-7.6	7.6	-0.7	2.2
3	8	-10.7	22.3	5.6	-1.5
3	9	-7.4	10.5	3.9	5.0
3	10	-8.2	10.8	4.6	-1.0
3	11	-4.2	16.0	4.5	-4.1
3	12	40.1	-	-1.5	3.4
4	1	-8.6	10.4	0.6	1.9
4	2	-7.6	12.3	-1.0	6.4
4	3	-5.2	11.1	-0.6	0.6
4	4	18.8	-	4.8	2.8
5	1	1.9	2.5	-1.1	2.1

Source: DPDA-GC

Association between redistribution and xenophobic voting in Catalonia

Undoubtedly, voting for extreme-right parties may be due to countless factors. For this article's purpose, we analyse whether the immigrant students' redistribution was a significant reason for this type of voting. In the Introduction, we accordingly narrowed down the period of analysis between 2003 and 2013 and depicted the context within which it takes place. Spain experienced the most important increase of its immigrant population in its history, multiplying it by a factor of six between 2000 and 2010, and in some years, representing the highest increase in Europe and in the world.

To further show the link between redistributing immigrant students and the extreme-right voting, we conducted a quantitative analysis, by running several linear regression models in which voting for the PxC in 2011 municipal elections was the dependent variable and considering redistribution measures was one of the main independent variables. We controlled it with the following: the percentage of immigrant population over 16 years old in the municipality in 2011; the population size of the municipality in 2011; the voter turnout in the 2011 municipal elections; the voting in the 2011 municipal elections for right wing parties other than the extreme-right ones; the indexes of dissimilarity for segregation in primary and/or secondary education during 2010-2011; having schools that deployed inclusion measures; the population mean age

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1301 in 2011; the population mean level of education in 2011; and the percentage of the
1302 unemployed population in 2011.
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1304 Description of the variables of the multiple linear regression analysis:
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1306 *2011 Plataforma x Catalunya voting.* This variable denotes the percentage of valid
1307 votes received in the 2011 municipal elections by the PxC party and other very similar
1308 extreme-right, xenophobic and anti-immigration parties (such as Partit x Catalunya, Via
1309 Democràtica, Moviment Social Republicà, Falange Española y de las JONS or
1310 Democràcia Nacional).

1311 *Immigrant students' redistribution actions.* To build this variable, we have documented
1312 which Catalan municipalities during the period under study officially and formally
1313 performed among their schools the immigrant students' redistribution that was mainly
1314 accomplished by establishing a maximum quota of socioeconomic SEN students per
1315 classroom (Bonal, 2012; Síndic de Greuges, 2008, 2016a, 2016b; interview with the
1316 Secretary of Equality, Migration and Citizenship of the Catalan Government). These
1317 were Banyoles, Olot, Vic, Mataró, and Manlleu.

1318 *Immigrant students' inclusion actions.* This variable denotes those municipalities that
1319 had at least one school developing immigrant inclusive measures based on successful
1320 educative actions (Flecha & Buslon, 2016), such as the Learning Communities project
1321 or interactive groups, before 2011. Instead of repelling students, these kinds of actions
1322 attract the students' enrolment, and there is sound evidence that the achieved
1323 intercultural coexistence and the implemented dialogic model of conflict resolution
1324 transcends the walls of the school to impact the neighbourhood life and to improve it
1325 (Girbés-Peco, Renta-Davis, De Botton & Álvarez-Cifuentes, 2018; Serradell, Ramis, De
1326 Botton & Solé, 2019). Mare de Déu de Montserrat school in Terrassa, awarded with the
1327 *Ensenyament 2018* honour (Europa Press, 2018), is one of the main exponents of this.
1328 This school, having around an 85% immigrant student population in 2018, offers
1329 documented evidence that the concentration of socioeconomic SEN students is not the
1330 cause of academic failure nor of intercultural coexistence conflicts. We documented
1331 those schools performing these actions by means of the webpage of the Department of
1332 Education of the Catalan Government, checking the year they started through each
1333 school's webpage.
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1335 *Dissimilarity Index in primary and secondary education 2010-2011.* This index
1336 "conceptually represents the proportion of minority members that would have to change
1337 their area of residence to achieve an even distribution, with the number of minority
1338 members moving being expressed as a proportion of the number that would have to
1339 move under conditions of maximum segregation" (Massey & Denton, 1988, p. 284).
1340 Therefore, it measures the proportion of immigrant students that would have to move to
1341 another school in order to achieve a perfect egalitarian distribution among all
1342 municipality schools. It ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes a perfect egalitarian
1343 distribution and 1 denotes a maximum inequality distribution. Its formula is $D = 1/2$
1344 $\sum_{\text{schools}} \text{absolute values} ((\text{school's immigrants} / \text{municipality's immigrants}) - (\text{school's}$
1345 $\text{Spanish} / \text{municipality's Spanish}))$, and it has been calculated in the Obdusman 2016
1346 report (Valiente, 2007 in Síndic de Greuges, 2016a).
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1348 *Voting right wing parties in 2011 municipal elections, excluding extreme-right parties.*
1349 This variable denotes voting for right wing or centre-right wing parties. This includes,
1350 among other, parties such as Convergència i Unió, Partit Popular de Catalunya,
1351 Ciudadanos or Solidaritat per la Independència, but also includes a myriad of
1352 independent local parties. We documented their ideological position by looking at their
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webpage's content, the source of their recruiting, or the post-electoral alliances and coalitions they made. We excluded extreme-right wing parties in order to avoid endogeneity with the dependent variable.

Voter turnout in 2011 municipal elections. This variable denotes the percentage of people over 18 years old that did not vote in the 2011 municipal elections.

2011 municipality's population. This variable denotes the municipality's population in January 2011 and is based on the official Register of Inhabitants.

2011 percentage of immigrant population over 16 years old. For this variable, we excluded immigrants under 16 years old in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity with the Dissimilarity indexes.

2011 municipality's population mean age and 2011 municipality's population mean education level. This variable denotes the education level as measured in the 2011 Census and takes the following values: a value of 1 indicates no studies; a value of 2 indicates a primary education; a value of 3 indicates a secondary education; and a value of 4 indicates a tertiary education.

2011 municipality's percentage of unemployment. This variable denotes the percentage of people registered in Work Offices and who do not have a formal job.

Table 6. Non-standardized beta of three linear regression models on Plataforma x Catalunya 2011 municipal elections' voting

	Non-standardized beta		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Constant)	45.904	29.588	12.672
Immigrant students' redistribution actions	4.087**	6.978***	14.687***
Immigrant students' inclusion actions	-.689	-.952	-2.419
Dissimilarity Index primary 2010-2011	-2.301		17.388*
Dissimilarity Index secondary 2010-2011		-3.584	1.471
Voting for right wing parties excluding extreme-right parties in	-.071	-.065	-.042
Voter turnout in the 2011 municipal elections	.013	.009*	-.252
2011 Population	2.75E-005	2.42E-005	-1.0E-005
Percentage of 2011 immigrant population over 16 yrs. old	.069	.183**	.099
Population mean age 2011	-.521	.002	.343
Population mean education level 2011	-7.205*	-8.761**	-4.442
Percentage of unemployment 2011	-.084	-.157	-.193
N	49	48	20
Adjusted R2	.251	.405	.558
F	2.641**	4.266***	3.297**

Dependent variable: Percentage of vote for Plataforma x Catalunya in 2011 municipal elections

*** denotes the p-value <.01; **denotes the p-value<.05; and * denotes the p-value<.10.N=49.

Prior to the regression analysis, we want to highlight some findings of the performed quantitative analysis. First, there is a medium-size and statistically significant correlation between the redistribution of immigrant students and Plataforma x Catalunya 2011 voting ($r=0.349^{***}$). Likewise, the regression with redistributing immigrants as the only independent variable is also statistically significant and accounts for 11.5% of the explanation of the 2011 PxC voting. Second, it is symptomatic that we find a negative significant correlation between redistributing immigrants and the dissimilarity index; this means that the more you redistribute, the smaller the dissimilarity index and the segregation obtained ($r=-0.257^*$). Third, we have run all the

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1419 regressions with the log of the variables in order to normalize them, and both the
1420 models and the impact of redistribution on 2011 PxC voting continue to appear
1421 statistically significant. Fourth, we have run the three regressions with the 2013-2014
1422 Dissimilarity Index because we have many more cases (N=102); taking into account
1423 that the 2013-2014 index is a very good proxy of the 2010-2011 dissimilarity index
1424 because they present a high and significant correlation ($r=0.770^{***}$), we obtain very
1425 similar results regarding F, the beta coefficients and to their significance. Fifth, we
1426 found no significant multicollinearity among the independent variables regarding
1427 Tolerance and FIV statistics.
1428

1429 We are including in the article three models, and all of them include the
1430 aforementioned independent variables. The only difference between them is that in
1431 Model 1, the Dissimilarity Index belongs to primary schools, in Model 2, it belongs to
1432 secondary schools, and in Model 3, it includes both of them. A quick and straight-
1433 forward summary of the quantitative analysis is that all three models are statistically
1434 significant: Model 1 and 3 at a 0.05 level of significance, and Model 2 at 0.01. In
1435 addition, that in all of them, the main independent variable, redistributing immigrant
1436 students, has a positive and statistically significant impact on 2011 PxC voting: in
1437 Model 1, redistributing immigrants increases the 2011 PxC voting by 4.087 percent, in
1438 Model 2 by 6.978 percent, and in Model 3 by 14.687 percent.
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1440 The main implication of these results is that the redistribution of immigrant
1441 students has a positive and statistically significant impact on PxC 2011 voting, when
1442 holding the rest of the independent variables constant. Therefore, compared to not
1443 redistributing the immigrant students, carrying out the immigrant students'
1444 redistribution in primary schools increases by 4.087 percent the PxC vote in the 2011
1445 municipal elections. With this, we have a quantitative proof that supports the hypothesis
1446 we upheld through the literature review that redistributing immigrant students is linked
1447 to xenophobic voting.
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1449 **Discussion and conclusion**

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1451 The aim of this article was to show how an educational policy can affect cities' cultures
1452 and politics. More concretely, we analyse to what extent, under the premise that the
1453 immigrant student concentration poses a problem, the redistribution of immigrant
1454 students among schools in a municipality is related to xenophobic voting. In extending
1455 beyond an analysis of the effectiveness of this educational policy and following recent
1456 contributions highlighting the relevance of research focused on social impact (Flecha,
1457 Soler-Gallart & Sorde, 2015), in this article, we illustrate the link between how
1458 educational systems and policies conceive cultural, ethnic and religious minorities on
1459 one hand and how society does so on the other. Thus, in investigating the outward
1460 geography of education (Thiem, 2009), what is experienced in schools not only affects
1461 students' achievement and coexistence but also impacts social dynamics and societal
1462 behaviour (Amador, 2016; Girbés-Peco, Renta-Davis, De Botton & Álvarez-Cifuentes,
1463 2018; Serradell, Ramis, De Botton & Solé, 2019).
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1465 The Vic Model had noticeably assimilationist and acculturationist goals and
1466 features. We observe the principles of its promoters, including the CIU and mayor
1467 Codina. However, we also identify certain a view that was widespread among Vic's
1468 population. The mayor achieved consensus and support from all political parties and
1469 most teachers but faced significant opposition from families. His communitarian
1470 personalism and proximity strategy worked well to convince part of the population.
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One of the main problems of the Vic Model was that the educational measures implemented following assimilationist and acculturationist perspectives were not based on scientific evidence as a means to improve children's education or community coexistence. In contrast, the model adopted measures that scientific evidence had already shown to be ineffective in delivering such outcomes, resulting in school failure, coexistence problems, and social exclusion. In addition, the model had several unintended effects: complaints from residents reluctant to engage with immigrants, immigrants feeling forced to change schools, and autochthonous populations feeling forced to engage with immigrants within schools. The consequences of such undesired effects had not been favourable in the past (e.g., the busing experience in the US in the 1950s). In Vic, the PxC took advantage of this situation by intensifying discontent through its political programme and thus attracting votes.

From the results of other studies, we know that ethnic concentration itself, even when presenting strong correlations with exclusion, school failure, conflict, and so on, is not necessarily the cause of such problems (De Botton, Flecha & Puigvert, 2009). The existing evidence shows that when grounded in racist conceptions, both segregation and redistribution intensify rejection from the host population and cause low academic achievement and self-esteem among redistributed students. The quantitative correlation found between immigrant settlement patterns and the evolution of xenophobic voting we document is consistent with the preceding affirmation. When immigrants are considered or defined as a problem, a clear correlation can be observed between receiving immigrants (redistributed students for group b and neighbourhoods for group c) or being afraid of receiving them (as in group d) and xenophobic voting.

In addition, we prove that the Vic Model has affected the local population's culture and political behaviour. The European Commission (2003) established social integration as a two-way process in the 2000s. In Vic's assimilationist context, authorities implemented redistribution and segregation, according to Simó (2010), by removing social integration responsibilities from local students and teachers. As an unintended consequence, the host society's once hospitable culture became passive, and these important actors ceased to feel compelled to participate. From these observations, the words and thoughts of mayor Codina, and the consequences of such measures, we may question to what extent the Vic Model achieved coexistence and academic improvement.

From statements made by Vic's mayor, the PxC's leader, and citizens in online forums in the period under study, immigrant populations and their cultural differences were experienced as a threat to cultural identity and social cohesion among Vic's population. Immigrants' residential segregation was likely not a problem for citizens who complained about student redistribution and were reluctant to share spaces with these students. However, despite residential segregation, concerns regarding how social cohesion would evolve while immigrants were segregated remained. Some locals struggled to imagine how immigrants could learn about local values and cultural norms while segregated. As a result, the Vic Model was launched to acculturate the immigrant population through schools but without any intention of intervening in the real estate market or dismantling residential segregation.

The Vic Model did not achieve social integration; instead, we observe a situation that is similar to the existing racial discrimination in France despite, or perhaps because of, the assimilationist policies (Wieviorka, 2007). When a host society and locals do not have the will to grant equality immigrants and respect their differences, distinctions between first- and second-class students will remain in schools along with distinctions between first- and second-class citizens overall. Sooner or later, citizens treated as

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1537 inferior will protest this unfair treatment. Forced redistribution is far from being a
1538 successful model and may be rejected by ethnic minorities who feel discriminated
1539 against (Licona & Maldonado, 2013). Unfortunately, most of the perpetrators of
1540 terrorist attacks in Barcelona in August 2017 were students subjected to a quite similar
1541 redistribution model in Manlleu, a town very close to Vic.
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1543 The Vic Model is still in place today but is showing its limitations. The town is
1544 struggling to determine how to manage an increasing proportion of students who are
1545 ethnically and culturally Arabic and Muslim, who are no longer newcomers and were
1546 born in Vic, and who cannot be treated as immigrants with SENs under category B nor
1547 redistributed as a "burden". Assimilationism and acculturation have not served as an
1548 effective approach to coexistence and social cohesion, and redistribution has not been
1549 an appropriate solution either.

1550 Future research should employ qualitative methods to analyse in more depth
1551 potential factors affecting the extent to which civil society's perceptions, educational
1552 community practices and policy strategies have contributed to reactions to the Vic
1553 Model. It would be of particular interest to consider the voices of the families of
1554 redistributed immigrant students, of the autochthonous families of receiving schools,
1555 and of students themselves to see how the model has impacted their lives. This would
1556 allow a further understanding of the discourses, motives and mechanisms behind the
1557 associations observed between redistribution and xenophobic voting.
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1559 The rise of racism and xenophobia in Europe is a reality that must be effectively
1560 confronted across many social fields. It is possible to help overcome racism and
1561 xenophobia by transforming educational practices precisely because scientific research
1562 has shown that success does not correlate with the number of immigrants within a
1563 classroom but rather with the educational actions carried out in diverse cultural contexts
1564 (De Botton, Flecha & Puigvert, 2009; Elboj, 2015; Gómez, Munté & Sordé, 2014;
1565 Hermansen & Birkelund, 2015; Serradell, 2015). Racism cannot be fought with
1566 paternalistic measures but by means of knowledge and by implementing what has
1567 succeeded in similar situations (Sordé, 2010). There is literature available on policies
1568 and methodologies adopted in multicultural neighbourhoods that have reduced school
1569 failure and school dropout rates and encouraged successful coexistence within schools
1570 and beyond them (García-Carrión, Molina-Luque & Molina Roldán, 2018; Valero,
1571 Redondo-Sama & Elboj, 2018). Redistribution policies can be substituted with inclusive
1572 immigration policies, which are already contributing to the development of more
1573 democratic and cohesive societies. This necessarily implies moving from assumptions
1574 to evidence, some of which can be found in this article regarding the Vic Model.
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AUTHOR DECLARATION

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We confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by all named authors and that there are no other persons who satisfied the criteria for authorship but are not listed. We further confirm that the order of authors listed in the manuscript has been approved by all of us.

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