



# Geography and regional economic growth: The high cost of deviating from nature

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## Abstract

We analyze the role of nature and geography in determining economic and social outcomes. We propose a theoretical model relating geography and nature to economic growth, and examine that model using data from NUTS 2 European regions. By doing this, we identify the predictive power of first-nature variables to explain regional population distribution. Then we analyze the effects of misadjustment between the actual and predicted distribution of populations on economic performance. Our results indicate that deviating from first-nature outcomes has a significant negative effect on economic growth. The main policy implication emerging from our analysis is that strategies that harmonize with nature and geography yield better social welfare than those policies that conflict with them.

## KEYWORDS

conditional convergence, geography, growth, inequality, institutions, nature, population

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, humanity has overcome the obstacles or conditioning factors of nature and geography, even using them to serve its aspirations and interests. Communities have been able to survive, develop, and flourish in settlements with hostile climates, to overcome the limits set by water—the barrier effects of large rivers and oceans—and the terrain, with its harshness and geological complexity. The vast knowledge acquired and applied over time has led to technological advancement and hence to the possibility of mankind adapting to its environment and vice versa.

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This progress has inspired claims on the *end of geography* (O'Brien, 1992) and the *death of distance* (Cairncross, 1955; 2001), and Friedman (2005) has described the new era as that of a *placeless society*, a *shrinking, flat world*, all due to advances in transportation, information, and communication technologies. At the same time, the most isolated places in the world have become easily accessible. This has allowed the development of prosperous settlements, now integrated into the global economy, that would otherwise have been challenged by the limiting features attributable to their natural environments. Human life has apparently become liberated from the constraints of space and frictional effects of distance (Graham, 1998).

Neglecting the role and restraints of nature and geography may be premature. Regarding the so-called *death of distance*, Rietveld and Vickerman (2004) pointed out that many economic activities have not become that "footloose," due to transaction costs and other reasons. Proximity to higher-tiered urban centers continues to be an important positive determinant of local job growth, despite the alleged death of distance (Partridge et al., 2008). International conflicts, past and current economic dilemmas and challenges worldwide also exhibit a strong relationship with geography and nature (Kaplan, 2012; Senese, 2005; Starr, 2005).

The role of nature and geography has been and still is crucial to understanding many of the social, political, and economic outcomes and prospects of human settlements. From a historical perspective, the capacity of the environment to support human life has commonly been considered a major restraint on population growth, density, and prosperity. Plato and Aristotle expressed concerns about overpopulation and limited resources. The issue was further discussed by Machiavelli (1519), Botero (1588) and Montesquieu and de Secondat, (1748), and formed part of the demographic theory of Malthus (1798). Thus, thinkers and scholars alike have long spoken of the importance of place and natural constraints and endowments for the location and density of human settlements and their effects on economic prospects.

In economic geography models, agglomerations are expected to be located and to develop according to a set of first-nature and second-nature determinants (Krugman, 1993). Among first-nature determinants, geography and nature play the most crucial role. Economic activity depends on the physical landscape, climate, access to the sea and to navigable rivers—among other factors. These natural factors are exogenous to the economy (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2013). Human action and incentives define the second-nature determinants that lead to increasing returns, due to scale and density economies, knowledge spillovers, and so on (Krugman, 1991). Labor migrations between regions are responses to market signals and they determine the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces (Krugman & Venables, 1990).

While migrations had a basic survival objective for a long time, modern migrations have become more voluntary and selective, and basic survival has been often replaced with the objective of improving the migrant's own economic and social position (Faggian et al., 2017, p. 130). In that regard, contemporary migration, particularly between developed economies, can be seen as a supply reaction to the creation of job opportunities in a region (Rajbhandari et al., 2020), involving migrants with higher human capital than the population that stays in their own origins. Moreover, locational advantages—attributable to geography and nature—favor the concentration and mobility of human and economic settlements (Black & Henderson, 1998; Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2003), leading to both the concentration of populations and the growth of productivity (Beeson et al., 2001; Mitchener & McLean, 2003).

The most extensive strand in the literature exploring this relationship is the one concerned with the role played by geography in relation to economic growth and development (Diamond, 1997; Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs & Warner, 2001). Mitton (2016) evaluates the determinants of economic development in 1867 subnational regions of 101 countries, focusing on within-country effects of geography and institutions. Several geographic factors had significant explanatory power for within-country differences in per-capita gross domestic product (GDP), including terrain ruggedness, tropical climate, ocean access, temperature range, storm risk, and natural resources such as oil, diamonds, and iron. Beyond the constraints imposed on economic prosperity, some authors have also argued that geography may have an impact on institutions, another relevant set of economic determinants (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003). Moreover, this strand of the literature points out that even though it is still a determining factor, once institutions are accounted for, the contribution of geography as a determinant of economic growth partially diminishes (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Easterly, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).

Geography and nature provide an endowment that may facilitate the location, concentration, and growth of some settlements or make these more difficult in the case of others. This dependence can be tempered or even completely reversed by the intervention of human capital accumulation that translates into knowledge and technical advances (Bhattacharyya, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2004) and/or by means of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2002), which use a framework of incentives, regulations, and investments.

In this article, we propose a theoretical model of the way in which features of geography and nature can account for regional economic growth, due to their effects on population density and distribution. This model is empirically examined using data from comparable European regions. We identify the strong predictive power of first-nature variables in explaining regional population density and capital city location, to the extent that we can estimate the degree of geographic harmonization of the actual distribution compared to the predicted distribution. This allows us to detect deviations produced by the forces of human action, led mainly by institutions, and to evaluate the predicted consequences in terms of relative economic performance. Our results indicate that deviating from nature's outcomes has a significant negative effect on economic growth and may also increase inequalities. This suggests that societies that opt to accommodate to the provisions of nature, and consequently, to exploit the opportunities of the best locations, rather than forcing a different distribution of the population across regions, perform better. A relevant policy implication emerges: policies that harmonize with nature and geography yield better social welfare than those policies that conflict with them.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, we propose the theoretical model. After that we present the data and the empirical model that allows calculating deviations by considering actual versus predicted population density and capital city location, across regions and countries. Then, we interpret the results focusing on the countries that deviate the most. The economic cost of deviations is estimated in the next section, where an econometric convergence growth model is estimated. Finally, we discuss our main results and conclude.

## 2 | REGIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL

This section provides a conceptual model for understanding how population distribution and geography could impact economic growth.

Let us consider a closed economy formed by  $M$  regions. Let us assume that all of them occupy an equal area (equal to 1 to normalize), have equal access to technology  $A$  and a neoclassical production function of the form:

$$Y_i = F(g_i, K_i, D_i) = G(g_i)AK^\alpha D^{1-\alpha}, \quad (1)$$

where  $K_i$  is the capital of a region  $i$ ,  $D_i$  the total population living in the region (since area is equal to one, this is density of population),  $g_i$  its geographic endowment and  $G(g)$  a function of geographic endowment such that  $\frac{\partial G}{\partial g} > 0$ . Total production of the economy is

$$Y = \sum_{i=1}^M Y_i. \quad (2)$$

### 2.1 | Firms' maximization problem

Let us consider that a number of firms face the classic problem of profit maximization under conditions of competitive labor and capital markets in every region  $i$ :

$$\prod_i = \max_{K,D} F_i(g_i, K, D) - R_i K - w_i D. \quad (3)$$





First-order conditions imply that capital and labor are paid their marginal contributions:

$$w_j = \frac{\partial F_i}{\partial D}, R_j = \frac{\partial F_i}{\partial K}. \tag{4}$$

### 3 | CAPITAL MARKETS

For there to be an equilibrium, assuming that financial markets are competitive and there are no externalities, we need the return on capital to be equal in all regions. Proposition 1 shows that there is equilibrium only in allocation of capital between the different regions.

**Proposition 1.** *Let us note by  $K$  the total amount of capital in the economy. Let us also note by  $K_i = t_i K$ , with  $0 < t_i < 1$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^M t_i = 1$ , the capital of the region  $i$ . Then, given  $D_1, \dots, D_M$ , there exist unique values  $t_1^*, \dots, t_M^*$  such that  $R_i = R_j$  for all  $i$  and  $j$ . These values correspond to a proportional allocation of capital with respect to production, that is:*

$$t_i^* = \frac{Y_i}{Y}.$$

*Proof.* Let us consider  $M = 2$ . By (1) and (4), return on capital is

$$R_j = \alpha \frac{Y_j}{K_j}.$$

Let us note that  $Y_i(t) = Y_i(g_i, tK, D_i)$ . Then,

$$R_1 = R_2 \Leftrightarrow \alpha \frac{Y_1(t_1)}{t_1 K} = \alpha \frac{Y_2(t_2)}{t_2 K} \Leftrightarrow \frac{Y_1(t_1)}{t_1 K} = \frac{Y_2(1 - t_1)}{(1 - t_1) K}.$$

Let us note that  $X_1(t) = \frac{Y_1(t)}{t}$ . Notice that  $X_1(t)$  is decreasing, since

$$X_1'(t) = \frac{\frac{\partial Y_1(t)}{\partial K} tK - Y_1(t)}{t^2} = \frac{\alpha Y_1(t) - Y_1(t)}{t^2} = (\alpha - 1) \frac{Y_1(t)}{t^2} < 0.$$

Using the same reasoning,  $X_2(t) = \frac{Y_2(1-t)}{1-t}$  is increasing in  $t$ . Then, since  $\lim_{t \rightarrow 0} X_1(t) = \infty$  and  $\lim_{t \rightarrow 1} X_2(t) = \infty$ , there exists a unique  $t^*$  such that  $X_1(t^*) = X_2(t^*)$ . □

Moreover

$$\frac{Y_1(t^*)}{t^*} = \frac{Y_2(1 - t^*)}{1 - t^*} \Leftrightarrow Y_1(t^*) = t^*(Y_1(t^*) + Y_2(1 - t^*)) \Leftrightarrow t^* = \frac{Y_1(t^*)}{Y}.$$

Consider now the case of  $M > 2$ . By induction hypothesis, let us assume that the results hold for  $M$  regions. We want to see whether it holds if we consider an economy with  $M + 1$ . Let us define,

$$X(t) = \sum_{i=1}^M \frac{Y_i(t t_i)}{t t_i},$$

where  $t_1, \dots, t_M$  are the unique  $t_i$  (which exist by induction hypothesis) such that  $\sum_{i=1}^M t_i = 1$  and  $\beta \equiv \frac{Y_i(t_i)}{t_i} = \frac{Y_j(t_j)}{t_j}$  for all  $i$  and  $j$ . Notice that  $t_i$  does not depend on  $t$ , because the last equality holds for all  $t \in (0, 1)$ .

As before,  $X$  is decreasing in  $t$

$$X'(t) = \sum_{i=1}^M \frac{\frac{\partial Y_i(t)}{\partial K} t_i^2 K - t_i Y_i}{(t_i t)^2} = \sum_{i=1}^M (\alpha - 1) \frac{t_i Y_i}{(t_i t)^2} = (\alpha - 1) \frac{\beta M}{t} < 0$$

and  $\lim_{t \rightarrow 1} X(t) = \infty$ . Note that  $X_{M+1}(t) = \frac{Y_{M+1}(1-t)}{1-t}$ . As in the case of two regions, there exists  $t^*$  such that  $X(t^*) = X_{M+1}(t^*)$ , and by the induction hypothesis, there exist  $t_1, \dots, t_M$ , such that  $X_i(t_i t^*) = X_{M+1}(t^*)$ .

### 3.1 | Household maximization problem

Let us assume that households can choose where to locate and can move without any costs. Let us assume that utility of region  $i$  is a function of the form:

$$u_i(w_i, D_i) = f(w_i + \tau_i) + e(D_i), \tag{5}$$

where  $f$  is a concave and strictly increasing function,  $w_i$  is the net income per capita after taxes in the region  $i$ ,  $\tau_i$  represents public transfers per capita at region  $i$  and  $e(D_i) = aD^2 + bD_i$  represents the externalities associated with density of population. Following theoretical models in urban economics (e.g., Duranton & Puga, 2020; O'Sullivan, 2007) we assume that increasing density in lowly populated areas has a positive effect (e.g., accessibility of a greater diversity of goods and services), but at a certain point externalities become negative (e.g., congestion or a rise in land prices). Thus,  $a < 0$  and  $b > 0$ .

The household maximization challenge is to choose the region  $i$  that maximizes utility. To illustrate which kind of equilibrium will be reached, consider, w.l.g., the case of two regions.

**Proposition 2.** *Let us note by  $D_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ , the population living in region  $i$ . Then,  $D = D_1 + D_2$  and  $D_1 = tD$ , with  $t \in [0, 1]$ . The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in population distribution between region 1 and 2, given capitals  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  are:*

- i)  $t = 1$  and  $u_1(D) > u_2(0)$ , or
- ii)  $t = 0$  and  $u_1(0) < u_2(D)$ , or
- iii)  $t \in (0, 1)$  and  $\frac{\partial u_i(D_i)}{\partial D_i} < 0$ .

When one region is empty, the equilibrium is Pareto optimal if, and only if, household utility of the nonempty region at  $D$  is higher than the maximum utility of the other region.

*Proof.* □

For there to be an equilibrium, expected utility gain from moving has to be nonpositive. First, for i) and ii), let us consider, w.l.g., that  $t = 1$ . If  $u_1(D) < u_2(0)$ , then the whole population would move to region 2, so  $t = 1$  is an equilibrium if, and only if,  $u_1(D) > u_2(0)$ . For iii), let us consider that there is an equilibrium between regions 1 and 2, and people living in both. Since there cannot be any utility gain from moving, utility in both regions has to be the same. Thus,

$$\hat{u} \equiv u_1(tD) = u_2((1-t)D).$$

Let us consider, w.l.g., that  $\frac{\partial u_1(D_1)}{\partial D_1} > 0$ . Then, the marginal gain from moving from 2 to 1 is:

$$u_1(D_1 + \varepsilon) - \hat{u} \approx u_1(D_1) + \frac{\partial u_1(D_1)}{\partial D_1} \varepsilon - \hat{u} = \frac{\partial u_1(D_1)}{\partial D_1} \varepsilon < 0$$

or all  $\varepsilon > 0$ , small enough. Thus, households would be better off moving to Region 1, and the distribution would not hold to a Nash equilibrium.


Figures 1 and 2 present examples of the two equilibria for an economy with  $\alpha = 0.3$ ,  $g_1 = 1$ ,  $g_2 = 1.1$ ,  $K = 200$ ,  $a = -5 \times 10^{-3}$  and  $b = 3.75 \times 10^{-2}$ . For the single region equilibrium (Figure 1), total population is 30. The red dotted line represents the utility people would get if they lived in the worst region. For the two-region equilibrium (Figure 2), total population is 100. The 10% relative difference in geographic endowment translates into a 22% relative difference in population density.

### 3.2 | Equilibria with migration costs


Proposition 2 shows that, as stated in Section 1, migrations can be seen as consequence of welfare differences between regions (e.g., Faggian et al., 2017, p. 130; Rajbhandari et al., 2020) and lead to a better social outcome, increasing productivity (see, e.g., Mitchener & McLean, 2003; Peri, 2012) and holdings of capital (Palivos, 2009), while having almost no negative effect on native wages (e.g., Card, 2009; Cortes, 2008; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012). However, cultural concerns, job insecurity, and stagnated disposable income trigger opposition to immigration (e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2020; Malhotra et al., 2013), leading institutions to severely restrict free movement of human capital, which entails a high cost in terms of foregone GDP (Clemens, 2011).

Hence, let us now discuss briefly how equilibria would change if there were moving costs  $c$  and information asymmetries, so that people from one region could not know exactly what their utility would be if they moved to the other region. If migration flows between regions have associate costs, potential migrants will remain in their regions if the expected increase in utility is lower than the moving costs:


$$u_2 + \varepsilon_1 - u_1 < c, u_1 + \varepsilon_2 - u_2 < c,$$



**FIGURE 1** Single region equilibrium where the whole population lives in the best region



**FIGURE 2** Two-region equilibrium



**FIGURE 3** Two-region equilibrium and Pareto efficient equilibrium

where  $\varepsilon_i$  represents the information asymmetry, that is, the error of households in region  $i$  when trying to anticipate what their utility would be after moving. Notice that derivatives do not play any role in this case. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that two-region equilibrium is no longer guaranteed to be Pareto efficient: those who move bear the whole cost of moving could deter people from doing so, even when the social gain from the utility increase produced by reducing the over-population externality could be much higher than the private cost of moving. In this situation, a government intervention could make everybody better off by, for example, subsidizing the moving cost. Thus, a non-Pareto efficient equilibrium with moving cost (left figure) can be Pareto improved (right figure) if moving costs—grey area—are subsidized (or if people are forced to move). Utility gains derived from the movement of people from blue to red region correspond to red and blue rectangles.

### 3.3 | Equilibria with spillovers and regional interdependences

In our model we have assumed that all regions had equal access to technology and that there were no spillovers or interdependences between them, besides the free movement of capital and population migrations, without and with costs. But empirical evidence suggests that economies' income levels are interdependent (e.g., Fingleton, 2003;



Postiglione et al., 2013) and all kind of interconnections/flows may create dependencies that exacerbate migration adjustments (e.g., Kang & Dall'erba, 2016). To provide causal mechanisms and a theoretical framework to the hypothesis that the relative location of an economy influences its economic growth and steady-state, theoretical extensions of the Solow-Swan model introducing spatial externalities derived from (physical and human) capital accumulation (Fingleton & López-Bazo, 2006; López-Bazo et al., 2004), and from technological interdependencies (Ertur & Koch, 2007), have been developed. These extensions preserve the main properties of the Solow-Swan model: diminishing returns on capital and labor, the existence of a steady-state, and conditional convergence. Hence, either we consider technological interdependencies or externalities from capital accumulation, the consequence for our model is that the net salary of a region depends also on other regions. The properties of the utility function are preserved. It is concave and strictly increasing in the net salary and public transfers and exhibits the same density externalities.

However, due to interdependence with other regions, capital investment or any technological, capital or labor shock affecting one connected region also affects the others. Hence, equilibria are of the same type than those analyzed before, but migration flows needed achieve and equilibrium after a shock or to move from a non-Pareto equilibrium to the Pareto equilibrium can be stressed or mitigated by regional interdependencies. For instance, assume an economy with three regions. Region 1 and Region 2 are highly interdependent, while Region 3 is independent. Let us also assume that at equilibrium all regions have the same density,  $D = \frac{1}{3}$ .

Now, consider the case where there is a technology shock in Region 1. If all regions have access to same technology, there would be no change in population distribution. If there are spatial spillovers and only Region 2 is interdependent with Region 3, then a migration flow is needed to achieve the new equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider that around the equilibrium, the first-order approximation of the utilities is  $u_1 = c - \gamma(D_1 - \frac{1}{3}) + \epsilon$ ,  $u_2 = c - \gamma(D_2 - \frac{1}{3}) + \rho\epsilon$ , and  $u_3 = c - \gamma(D_3 - \frac{1}{3})$ , where  $c$  is the utility of the three regions at equilibrium,  $\epsilon$  the technology shock and  $\rho$  the spatial interdependence factor. For utilities to be equal again, we need:  $D_3 = \frac{1}{3} - \frac{(1+\rho)\epsilon}{\gamma}$ ,  $D_2 = D_3 + \frac{\rho\epsilon}{\gamma}$ , and  $D_1 = D_3 + \frac{\epsilon}{\gamma}$ . Notice that the higher the interdependence between Region 1 and 2, the larger the migration flow from Region 3 to the other regions.

### 3.4 | Implications

The model has three main implications. First, population distribution tends toward extreme outcomes and over-population. Geographic differences may lead to empty and over-populated regions, with respect to their optimal level. Moreover, relatively small differences in geographic endowment can also lead to much larger differences in population density. Second, the model predicts that areas with better geographic attributes will have higher densities of population (as in Beeson et al., 2001; Mitchener & McLean, 2003), unless there is much more public expenditure in worse areas or a historical legacy that cannot be overcome because of moving costs or incomplete information. In both cases, the result will be a non-Pareto equilibrium with lower utility and higher inequality. Third, more densely populated areas will tend to have higher output and capital per capita (as in Krugman, 1991).<sup>1</sup>

Finally, notice that in our model we have not considered any potential density-related externality regarding production function (such as economies of scale). However, even with a simple neoclassical function, agglomerations emerge as an equilibrium as long as there are concave externalities with a monotonic change on population well-being. Including production externalities with a concave functional form, as for the

<sup>1</sup>In Krugman the causality channel is due to externalities in production.



households, will add an additional agglomeration force to the equilibrium, further reinforcing the implications of the model.

## 4 | DATA

In this section, we present the data used to estimate later the model on population density across European regions. The following data will serve to predict the gap between the real and the predicted regional allocation of population (according to their geographical endowment) and its consequences on their economic growth.

### 4.1 | Level of aggregation

We aim to identify to what extent geographic drivers explain differences in population density, we need delimited regions to be small enough to consider their geographic attributes as representative of the region, and large enough to preclude specific municipalities or metropolitan areas that are agglomerations within a region. We choose the level of aggregation denoted by NUTS 2 from the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics of Eurostat, which have population of between 800,000 and three million. The current NUTS 2016 classification, valid since January 1, 2018, lists 323 regions at NUTS 2 level.

We consider only EU member states, because key data are missing from Eurostat for other countries included in NUTS classifications, such as Switzerland or Norway. We also exclude EU territories located outside Europe: five from France (Overseas France), three from Spain (Ceuta, Melilla, and Canary Islands), and two from Portugal (Açores and Madeira). Moreover, we include Bremen (DE50) in Lüneburg (DE93), Hamburg (DE60) in Schleswig-Holstein (DEF0), and we group all five London NUTS regions into one single NUTS 2 area. We end up with 258 NUTS 2 specimens. We consider density of population as of January 1, 2019.

### 4.2 | Geographic indicators

We consider several potential geographic drivers of population density (as in Mitton, 2016): temperature, rainfall, access to navigable waters and unevenness of the land.

### 4.3 | Temperature

We use the daily heating and cooling degree days of each region. Degree days are used as an indicator of energy demand for the heating or cooling of buildings by comparing the day's average outside temperature against the optimal threshold of 18°C. The heating degree day (HDD) is the number of degrees below the threshold, the cooling degree day (CDD) the number of degrees above it. We compute the average of the HDDs and CDDs during the period 1977 to 2018, using data from Eurostat.

### 4.4 | Daily rainfall

Average daily rainfall ( $L/m^2$ ) has been calculated as the average of daily rainfall per year, using Copernicus Project data from 1977 to 2018.

#### 4.5 | Access to navigable waters

We have considered two main variables to capture access to navigable water. The first one is the distance in kilometers from the boundary of the region to the nearest sea (or ocean). The second variable is direct accessibility to navigable rivers; that is, the kilometers of navigable river per squared kilometer of the NUTS 2. We consider as navigable rivers those with more than 100 segments or with a Strahler index higher than 5, according to the European Environment Agency Spatialite file for rivers. Figure 4 shows the map of the navigable rivers considered.

#### 4.6 | Unevenness

We calculated unevenness as the interquartile range of the height of every Land Use and Coverage Area frame Survey (LUCAS) grid point of each NUTS 2 area. LUCAS is a survey carried out by Eurostat every 3 years to identify changes in land use and coverage. It contains observations from over 1,000,000 points.



**FIGURE 4** Main rivers in Europe

#### 4.6.1 | Natural resources

We have considered as natural resources the presence of coal mines or oil refineries within the boundaries of the region. Data have been obtained from the Refineries Sites in Europe Database (Concawe Organization) and from the European Commission. Table 1 describes the geographic data. Table A-1 in appendix provides detailed information on all variables and data sources.

It is important to highlight that in the Section Economic consequences of population misadjustment we build a conditional convergence model starting from 2001. To be consistent with this time span, we re-estimate HDD, CDD and daily rainfall from 1997 to 2000 for that model. Since, on average, the climate is very stable, changes happen on a geologic scale, and tend to affect all the regions simultaneously, the correlation between indicators built using data until 2000 or 2018 is higher than 99.5%.

## 5 | GEOGRAPHIC ENDOWMENT

To establish the relationship between geographic variables and population density we build a linear regression model over the logarithm of the density of population, using the geographic indicators described, that is:

$$GE(i) \equiv \log(\text{Density}_i) = \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_j G_{ij} + u_i, \quad (6)$$

where  $GE(i)$  refers to the geographic endowment given to the  $i$ th NUTS 2 region, which is defined as the logarithm of its density of population.  $G_{ij}$  is the value of the  $j$ th geographic indicator of the NUTS 2 region  $i$ , and  $u_i$  is the residual.

We exclude regions containing capital cities, since their population density can be strongly biased by political intervention. As the theoretical model suggests that small differences in geographic endowment can lead to substantial differences in density of population, the geographic indicators are included in quadratic form. Moreover, we distinguish between warmer and cooler seas by introducing an interaction between distance to the sea and temperature. Table 2 shows the results of a model built by weighting regions by their area size, so smaller regions are less important as the model is about density, and by selecting significant variables at 15% or higher. We perform two estimations. First, a Bayesian estimation using the *brms package* available in R (Bürkner, 2017), without a prior

**TABLE 1** Summary of the data set

Variable	Mean	SD
Daily HDD	7.93	2.35
Daily CDD	0.16	0.24
Daily rain (L/m <sup>2</sup> )	2.07	0.60
Distance to nearest sea (km)	116.67	145.55
River density (km river/km <sup>2</sup> )	17.34	17.83
Unevenness (km)	0.2440	0.2434
Natural resources (%)	39.45	48.97
N = 258		

Abbreviations: CDD, cooling degree day; HDD, heating degree day.



to avoid introducing any bias. The Bayesian estimation does not assume asymptotic properties of the estimates and therefore is more suitable for significance tests on small sample sizes (Figure 5). Second, we also provide ordinary least square (OLS) estimates. As can be seen in Table 2, estimates are almost identical.

Notice that CDDs are not important, and only HDDs matter, because Europe is a relatively cold area, with an average of only 0.16 CDD versus 7.93 HDD. Notice also that only distance to the sea is important in terms of access to navigable waters. It may seem counter-intuitive that rivers are not relevant, but the explanation is that most regions have a navigable river (72% of the regions, corresponding to 88% of the total European area). Since the river network is very dense across Europe, it has no significant impact at a regional level. However, as we see later, rivers do determine distribution within a region, that is, where to place a city within a region.

## 5.1 | Interpretation

Understanding why a model makes a prediction can be as crucial as the prediction's accuracy. It provides insight into how a model can be improved and supports understanding of the process being modeled. To do so, we evaluate feature importance and plot the marginal relation estimated by the model between explanatory features and the target (partial dependence functions).

To evaluate feature importance, we estimate SHapley Additive exPlanation (SHAP; Lundberg & Lee, 2017, 2019) values. Given an observation  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_j)$ , the SHAP value of feature  $j$  on the instance  $x$  corresponds to how the concrete value of feature  $j$  on  $x$  modifies the output of the model with respect to other instances that share some of the features of  $x$ , but not  $j$ . For a parametric model  $F(x) = g(\sum_j \alpha_j x_j)$ , where  $g$  is a function of the weighted features of  $x$ , the SHAP value corresponds to:  $\varphi_j(x) = \alpha_j(x_j - E(X_j))$ , where  $X$  is the set of observations and  $E(X_j)$  is the average value of the  $j$  feature on  $X$ . Noting by  $N$  the total number of observations, we can estimate the relative importance of the feature  $j$  in the model as follows:

**TABLE 2** Geography endowment model


Variable name	Bayesian estimation		OLS	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	Robust SE
Constant	1.65874*	0.42509	1.65620**	0.82357
HDD	0.13837*	0.06235	0.13642	0.11530
HDD <sup>2</sup>	-0.01687*	0.00289	-0.01680*	0.00645
Rain	2.01921*	0.31475	2.03330*	0.63571
Rain <sup>2</sup>	-0.36743*	0.06396	-0.37035*	0.13885
Unevenness <sup>-1</sup>	0.02243*	0.00431	0.02244*	0.00503
Unevenness <sup>-2</sup>	-0.00004*	0.00001	-0.00004*	0.00001
Distance to the sea	-0.01028*	0.00214	-0.01031*	0.00255
HDD: Distance to sea	0.00129*	0.00024	0.00129*	0.00029
Natural resources	0.29930*	0.08413	0.29795*	0.09853

Note:  $N = 233$  (capital regions not included). Errors weighted by area.  $R^2: 0.7727$ .  $F$ -statistic: 84.2 ( $p$  value: 0.000).

Abbreviations: HDD, heating degree day; OLS, ordinary least square.

\* $p < 0.01$ .

\*\* $p < 0.05$ .



**FIGURE 5** Distribution of the parameters of the model using a Bayesian estimation

**TABLE 3** Relative importance of the geographic factors

Factor	Relative importance (%)
Temperature	44.56
Rain	19.00
Access to navigable waters	13.12
Unevenness	11.81
Natural resources	11.51

Note: SHAPs weighted by area.


$$RI_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N |\varphi_j(x_i)|}{\sum_{k=1}^J \sum_{i=1}^N |\varphi_k(x_i)|}$$

Table 3 shows the relative importance of each driver.

Temperature is by far the most important geographic factor explaining population density. Access to navigable waters has a relatively low importance, although that might be a singular characteristic of Europe, because most of the continent is made up of small surface peninsulas, so navigable seas and oceans are relatively close everywhere.

Apart from overall feature importance, it is worth to understand whether the relationship between the target and a feature is linear, monotonic, or more complex. Partial dependence functions estimate the marginal effect that features have on the predicted outcome of a model (Friedman, 2001). Therefore, they correspond to SHAP values. In Figure 6, partial dependence plots show that geographic endowment decreases as the HDD increases; that is, the colder the region, the less attractive it is. In terms of rainfall, the curve suggests the more the better, but with diminishing returns.

The distance to the sea impacts differently according to temperature. For warm regions (in Figure 6, defined as having an HDD of less than 7, with an average of 4.99), such as Mediterranean countries, the effect is more relevant and positive: the closer to the sea, the better. For cold regions (in Figure 6, those regions with an HDD over 8, with an average of 9.61), the effect is almost not relevant and being closer to the sea does not increase geographic endowment. On the one hand, for cold countries with direct access to the sea, such as the United Kingdom or Finland, it is not relevant because almost all NUTS 2 areas have access. Moreover, the sea may not be always easily navigable, as it freezes. For cold countries without direct access to the sea, such as Austria or the Czech Republic, because they are crossed by navigable rivers, geographic dynamics are largely determined by the other factors.



**FIGURE 6** Partial dependence plots for nonbinary variables

As predicted by our theoretical framework, geographic endowment tends to produce extreme population density outcomes, as can be seen in the quadratic relationships with respect to temperature and rainfall, or the inverse relationship with respect to unevenness.

Assuming that the larger the number of people who want to live in an area, the higher is its attractiveness, the geographic endowment (*GE*) can be interpreted as a proxy for the attractiveness of a region (to European people) based on its geographic attributes. There are several other factors that may influence population density, such as historical events (e.g., wars), cultural and religious differences or public investment. However, the *GE* constitutes an



ideal framework for assessing to what extent population is distributed according to geography within a country and identifying the cause of misadjustment between current and expected distribution; and which of those, if any, are a consequence of deviating from geography.

## 6 | ANALYSIS OF POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY

Our analysis of population distribution by country comprises two parts. First, we analyze whether the choice of capital city is geographically optimal. Second, we estimate the degree of geographic harmonization for each country by the percentage of the population that would have to move to another region within the same country to achieve the expected distribution of population according to the geographic endowment.

### 6.1 | Capital cities

To evaluate the choice of the capital location, in terms of geography, we calculated the relative potential of the NUTS 2 region where the capital is located with respect to the maximum potential that could be achieved within the city. The potential of the capital city of country  $C$  is defined as:

$$\text{Potential}(C) = 100 \frac{GE(C)}{\max_{NUTS_i \in C} GE(NUTS_i)} \quad (7)$$

Table 4 presents the relative potential of the capitals of those countries considered in the analysis, except for countries that consists of a single NUTS 2 region. It also presents the difference between the geographic factors of the capital and the average of those across the country. Although access to navigable waters is captured in the model by distance, we also included whether the capital city has a river. Rivers play an important role in deciding where to place the city within a region: all but Madrid (Spain) have a navigable river.

As shown by our theoretical model, capital cities, which are highly populated areas with relatively high output per capita, are generally placed in nearly optimal areas, as their endowment almost reaches the maximum potential of the country (91.8 over 100). Madrid is the most notable exception, scoring only 59.5 over 100. It is placed in the middle of Spain and on the high Spanish plateau, completely isolated from the sea, in a relatively colder and less rainy area.

### 6.2 | Population misadjustment

The  $GE$  is an estimation of the logarithm of the density of population. Thus, it can be used to estimate the expected density of population that every region should have if population were distributed according to geographic characteristics. For each country, we estimate the theoretical size of the population that should live in each region, subject to the constraint that total population cannot change. Let us note by  $EP(NUTS_i)$  the expected population of region  $i$ , and by  $A_i$  its area. Then,

$$EP(i) = 100 \frac{e^{GE(NUTS_i)} A_i}{\sum_{k=1}^{N_C} e^{GE(NUTS_k)} A_k} P_C \quad (8)$$

where country  $C$  is the country where the  $i$  region is located,  $k = \{1, \dots, N_C\}$  are the regions that in country  $C$  and  $P_C$  is the total population of  $C$ .

**TABLE 4** Capital attractiveness

Country	Potential	HDD vs avg	Rain vs avg	Sea dist vs avg.	Uneven. vs avg.	River
Germany	100	0.8	0.2	53.2	146.1	Yes
Croatia	100	-0.3	-0.4	-110.8	-131.7	Yes
Portugal	100	0.6	-0.5	37.6	-216.9	Yes
Romania	100	-1.6	0.1	-27.8	-152.1	Yes
Italy	100	-1.1	0.1	-57.3	-286.6	Yes
Ireland	99.4	-1.4	-0.3	0.0	-129.0	Yes
Netherlands	97.7	-1.6	-0.5	-15.7	-86.6	Yes
United Kingdom	97.7	-0.3	0.1	-48.2	54.1	Yes
Bulgaria	95.6	0.0	0.2	-20.3	-6.8	Yes
Sweden	95.4	-0.9	0.2	0.0	-154.8	Yes
Slovenia	95.1	-1.1	-0.2	-5.0	-190.7	Yes
Denmark	94.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-4.3	Yes
Czechia	92.1	0.0	-0.4	27.7	-219.7	Yes
France	89.4	0.2	-0.1	-22.6	-39.7	Yes
Greece	89.1	0.0	-0.2	0.0	-0.8	Yes
Poland	88.6	-2.4	-1.1	113.2	-496.3	Yes
Austria	88.1	-0.7	-0.1	22.2	-169.8	Yes
Hungary	86.9	-0.1	-0.2	30.7	4.9	Yes
Belgium	86.7	-1.4	0.0	0.0	-18.3	Yes
Finland	85.0	-1.0	-0.2	-87.6	-188.9	Yes
Slovakia	80.2	-0.4	-0.1	-9.7	-32.0	Yes
Spain	59.5	0.4	-0.4	200.5	-171.2	No
Average	91.8	-0.6	-0.2	3.6	-112.3	Yes

Given the expected population and the real population of every region, we estimate the percentage of total population that would have to move to achieve the expected distribution. We also adjust for the capital bias. Capital bias is the result of differences in how countries classify their capital city. Some countries, such as Belgium, consider the capital city to be a NUTS 2 area. Others, such as Spain or France, consider the capital city with its metropolitan area to comprise the NUTS 2 zone. While others, such as Croatia, include their capital city in a NUTS 2 region that contains not only the city and its metropolitan area, but also a significant part of the country. The larger the territory included in the NUTS 2 sector, the lower the misadjustment due to the capital, since it is diluted among a larger area. To correct for this, we adjust the estimation of population misadjustment by country, delimiting the NUTS 2 area of all capitals according to the boundaries of their metropolitan region, splitting the given NUTS 2 zone into two regions, when needed.

Table 5 presents the results of population misadjustment. On average, 24.4% of the population would have to move within their country to achieve a purely geography-based distribution of population, in a range that extends from 14.4% (Bulgaria) to 35.6% (Spain). Without the correction for capital bias, results are very similar, except for Croatia and Ireland, whose misadjustment would be underestimated because they include their capital within a NUTS 2 region far larger than the metropolitan area.


Figure 7 shows the comparison between current distribution of population and the expected distribution according to geographic endowment. Figure 8 shows the necessary change for regions to transition from current to expected distribution. That is, it shows the percentage increase needed for the resident population of the NUTS 2 area to meet expected population distribution. Green regions are those that are underpopulated with respect to the expected distribution. Therefore, more people should live there so there should be a population increase. Red regions are the opposite. They are overpopulated areas, whose population should decrease to achieve the expected distribution. In Portugal, for example, we can see that there is a highly overpopulated region, Lisbon (the dark red point), which would need to reduce its current population by more than 50%, and two moderately overpopulated regions that would need a decrease in current population of between 25% and 50%: the northern region (Porto) and the southern region (Algarve).

The theoretical model presented above introduced three potential drivers of greater deviations in population distribution in the long run: information asymmetry, moving costs and policy interventions. From results displayed

**TABLE 5** Population misadjustment

Country	% misadjustment adjusted by capital effect	% misadjustment not adjusted by capital effect
Bulgaria	14.4	9.6
Slovenia	15.1	10.5
Czechia	16.0	15.9
Romania	16.3	16.4
Poland	16.9	14.8
Finland	19.2	18.7
Croatia	20.6	7.5
Slovakia	22.9	22.9
Sweden	24.0	24.2
Belgium	24.1	23.1
Germany	24.2	26.3
Italy	24.2	21.3
Austria	24.7	23.4
France	25.3	25.3
Netherlands	26.4	27.0
Hungary	26.4	26.1
Denmark	28.9	28.5
Ireland	31.5	30.0
Portugal	32.4	32.4
United Kingdom	34.1	35.3
Greece	34.2	34.2
Spain	35.6	35.6
Average	24.4	23.1





**FIGURE 7** Current population distribution in Europe (left) versus expected according to geographic endowment (right)


in Table 5 and from Figures 7 and 8, the latter seems to emerge as the most relevant, at least for those countries in which the misadjustment is particularly high (above 30%): Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Ireland.

These five countries share the trait of being peripheral in the context of the European continent. Hence, they are more isolated, which implies that any policy altering population distribution could be less affected by other countries' policies.

In the case of Ireland and the United Kingdom, parallel processes of consolidation took place as global hubs of large firms developed toward the end of the last century. Many multinational firms relocated to the Dublin area in the 1980s and 1990s (Gunnigle & McGuire, 2001), following Ireland's entry into the European Union (then the EEC) in 1973, and corporate tax reforms introduced in 1997 and 1999 lowered corporate taxes from 32% to 12.5%, thus laying the framework for Ireland's base erosion and profit shifting tools (BEPS), considered among the world's largest (Torslov et al., 2020). As a result, the Greater Dublin area has experienced an impressive population growth of 46% over the last 30 years (source <http://www.greaterdublindrainage.com/>) while the rest of the country grew by 30%, consolidating a secular trend for the preeminence of Dublin, which dates back to the end of the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) and the Civil War (1922–1923).<sup>2</sup>

In the United Kingdom, the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s (removal of controls on foreign exchange and fixed rate commissions, entry of foreign companies, switch to electronic trading, etc.), helped to kick

<sup>2</sup>After the Civil War, Dublin was consolidated as the political capital. Its population grew from around 500,000 inhabitants in 1925 to 1,025,000 in 1991. Cork, which was the main city opposing the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), lost political influence and economic relevance and its population only grew 112,000 inhabitants during the same period.



**FIGURE 8** Percentage change in population by NUTS 2 that would be needed to adjust actual population distribution with expected

off a financial transformation, dubbed the “Big Bang,” that cemented London as the global financial capital. Many financial institutions relocated to London, and its metro-area experienced a population growth like that of Greater Dublin. From 1991 to 2019 it grew by 34%, while the rest of the UK population grew by 16%.<sup>3</sup> This growth is far larger than that experienced in other large European capital areas such as Paris, Berlin, Rome, or Amsterdam. Among the large capital cities, only Madrid has experienced such a large growth of population (33% in Madrid vs. 20% in the rest of Spain).

Spain, Greece, and Portugal, besides the common trait of being peripheral countries in the European Union, share another characteristic: the three of them have French civil law systems and legal origin (La Porta et al., 2008). This has determined a type of nation-building based on the French model and a very centralized administrative tradition, which drive territorial policies persistently targeted to reinforce the political and economic role of the capital city in the country.<sup>4</sup> The paradigmatic case is that of Spain, which was analyzed in Bel (2011, 2012). Other studies have documented the extreme degree of political centralization in Portugal (Magone, 2011) and Greece (Ifantis, 2004).<sup>5</sup> One of the probable consequences of these nation-building policies has been a particularly strong promotion of concentration of the population in the capital city of the country, which is the most important factor explaining the extremely intense misadjustment of population in these countries.

<sup>3</sup>Data obtained from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/on> June 6, 2020.

<sup>4</sup>Recall that even though it is not a peripheral country, France has a misadjustment rate of 25.3%, slightly above the European average (24.4%). The fact that France is more centrally located in the continent may have palliated the effect of this type of nation-building, and derived administrative tradition and territorial policies on population misadjustment.

<sup>5</sup>In Lundell (2004), Spain, Greece and Portugal appear as the countries with the most centralized systems of party candidate selection for elections in the (then) EU15.



## 7 | ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION MISADJUSTMENT

According to the theoretical model presented above, deviations from nature in terms of population distribution lead to non-Pareto allocations of population, which may be perpetuated due to the high cost of moving, incomplete information, and overinvestment in overpopulated areas designed to compensate for overpopulation externalities. Hence, no matter the underlying reason (previous migration shocks, public investment, etc.), greater deviations from nature are expected to be associated with lower utility and, potentially, higher inequality (thus contributing to explain the increase of interregional inequality in Europe since 1980, emphasized in Cörvers & Mayhew, 2021; Rosés & Wolf, 2021). To test these two economic consequences of population misadjustment, we conduct an empirical estimation of the impact of population misadjustment on economic growth.

### 7.1 | Regional conditional convergence

Conditional convergence theory states that an economy grows faster the further it is from its own steady-state value (Barro & Sala-I-Martin, 1995), which is conditioned by different covariates such as the saving rate or human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). As it allows for different steady states, it is a widely used framework for analysis of the long-term drivers of economic growth (see, Barro 1998; Sala-I-Martin, 1997), and for testing convergence between regions located in different countries (see, Cartone et al., 2021).

To test whether population misadjustment influences economic convergence, we estimate a model of the form:

$$g_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 q_i + \gamma_2 s_i + \gamma_3 h_i + \gamma_4 pm_i + \gamma_5 c_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (9)$$

where  $g_i$  is the GDP per capita growth rate of the region  $i$  over the period 2000–2018,  $q_i$  is the natural log of the initial GDP per capita (year 2000),  $h_i$  is the human capital,  $s_i$  is the natural logarithm of the saving rate,  $pm_i$  is the population misadjustment of the country in which the region  $i$  is situated (as at the year 2000),  $c_i$  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the capital city is in the region  $i$ , and  $\varepsilon_i$  is the residual. Human capital is measured as the natural logarithm of the percentage of the population aged between 25 and 64 years that has the highest education level (ISCED Level 5–8, corresponding to tertiary levels), and the saving and investment rate is calculated as the natural logarithm of the percentage of the gross fixed capital formation a share of GDP. These variables also take values from the year 2000 (See Table A1 in the appendix, for details on the description of variables).

We considered a time span of 19 years, from 2000 to 2018, because it is the largest time window at Eurostat with available data of real GDP per capita at NUTS2 level for the 22 countries in the analysis. Moreover, more institutional homogeneity in economic regulation is ensured due to the Euro already being in place during the period. Indeed, studies of regional convergence are heterogeneous and consider time windows that range from less than 10 years (LeSage & Fischer, 2008) to more than 30 (Ertur & Koch, 2007; Mankiw et al., 1992).

We present three different estimations of Equation (9). In the first one, all regions are weighted equally in the quadratic error minimization. In the second estimation, we weight regions by total population. Therefore, regions with larger populations are considered to be more representative, to contain more information. Finally, we present an estimation that weights regions according to their relative population within their respective countries. Hence all countries contribute equally to the model.

Table 6 presents the results for the three estimations of the conditional convergence model. We only provide OLS results because they are almost identical to Bayesian estimates. Population misadjustment has a negative impact on economic convergence. This result is consistently statistically significant at 1% across models. Countries that deviate farther from nature tend to have less growth and lower steady states. Thus, the greater the deviation the lower the speed of convergence and the interregional inequality decrease, both non-weighted and weighted by population (Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality, as dubbed by Milanovic, 2005), and the lower the total welfare of

**TABLE 6** Regression estimates for conditional convergence model from 2000 to 2018

Variable	Equal weights	Weighted by population	Weighted by relative population
Constant	5.17886* (0.3598)	5.61842* (0.2787)	4.46462* (0.5991)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	-0.42146* (0.0351)	-0.47199* (0.0237)	-0.37592* (0.0519)
Misadjustment	-1.40105* (0.1706)	-1.24990* (0.2003)	-1.07203* (0.2656)
LogEducation	0.11069* (0.0244)	0.12838* (0.0265)	0.05603* (0.0381)
LogSavings	0.05482 (0.0541)	0.01127 (0.0528)	-0.03508 (0.1102)
CapitalCity	0.16702* (0.0506)	0.14164* (0.0319)	0.09247** (0.0566)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.6313	0.6921	0.5811
F	82.18	107.9	66.6

Note: (a) Estimations excluding Ireland, that changed their GDP calculations in 2015 which resulted in a greater than 10% increase that year, lead to results with higher predictive power (especially for the first and third estimation, where the R<sup>2</sup> increase up to ~0.72) and a less than 1% signification of the capital parameter in the third estimation. The estimated parameters are modified by less than 10% (relatively). (b) Including population growth, depreciation and technological progress as a covariate (as in Cartone et al., 2021) does not modify the results (less than 10%, relatively), since the variable is not significant. However, eight additional regions would be removed because of missing data.  $N = 246$ . Nine regions (six from Poland and three from UK) excluded because of missingness of data. Robust standard errors in brackets.

\* $p < 0.01$ .

\*\* $p < 0.1$ .

† $p < 0.15$ .

the population. Concretely, for each 10 percentage points of misadjustment, annual growth is reduced by around 0.5 to 0.7 percentage points. Moreover, as expected from the theoretical model, the positive estimate of the capital city parameter confirms that part of this effect consists of a rent transfer to over-populated regions by means of a public intervention.

To gain a complete understanding of the convergence model beyond the significance of the parameters, we estimate the relative importance of each variable included in the model. We use again the SHAP values methodology suggested by Lundberg and Lee (2017, 2019). Table 7 presents the relative importance of each variable in the conditional convergence model. The initial GDP is the most relevant variable and accounts for 50%–60% of the total predictive power of the model, depending on the estimation. Remarkably, the population misadjustment and the capital city effect jointly account for around 30% of the total importance, being even more relevant than human capital.

As discussed in Section 2, spillover and interdependences preserve the main economic implications of population misadjustments, but may affect its intensity. Hence, we re-estimate the model allowing for spillovers and regional interdependences. Following Rey and Montouri (1999), we use a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, including a spatial lag of growth rates from adjacent regions.<sup>6</sup> Table 8 presents the results for the three estimations

<sup>6</sup>See Elhorst (2014), for a detailed review of spatial econometric models and a critical discussion on when to use these models and how to interpret the results.



**TABLE 7** Relative importance of the variables of the conditional convergence model based on SHAP values

Variable	Equal weights (%)	Weighted by population (%)	Weighted by relative population (%)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	52.5	56.1	60.6
Misadjustment	23.4	19.9	23.1
LogEducation	15.4	17.0	10.1
LogSavings	0	0	0
CapitalCity	8.7	7.0	6.2

**TABLE 8** Regression estimates for conditional convergence model from 2000 to 2018 spatially augmented (SAR)

Variable	Equal weights	Weighted by population	Weighted by relative population
Constant	2.19304*** (0.3006)	3.87390*** (0.3344)	3.19753*** (0.3913)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	-0.18041*** (0.0250)	-0.33077*** (0.0278)	-0.27387*** (0.0317)
Misadjustment	-0.67252*** (0.1487)	-0.92829*** (0.1810)	-0.92638*** (0.2022)
LogEducation	0.06042*** (0.0193)	0.09736*** (0.0236)	0.03041 (0.0312)
LogSavings	0.00133 (0.0360)	-0.04972 (0.04675)	-0.07780 (0.0590)
CapitalCity	0.09983*** (0.0283)	0.14100*** (0.0281)	0.11458*** (0.0287)
Spatially lagged outcome (rho)	0.6347*** (0.0450)	0.3177*** (0.0415)	0.2651*** (0.0461)
Common factor test (LR)	134.59***	50.75***	34.94***
Test for residual autocorrelation ( <i>p</i> values)	0.2625	0.2115	0.1111
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.8117	0.7567	0.6784

Note: There are five NUTS2 that correspond to islands, whose adjacencies have been defined as: Balearic Island is adjacent to Catalonia and Valencia; Corse is adjacent to Sardegna; Sardegna is adjacent to Corse and Sicilia; Sicilia is adjacent to Sardegna and Calabria; Åland to Etelä-Suomi, Stockholm, and Östra Mellansverige. *N* = 246. Nine regions (six from Poland, three from UK) excluded because of missingness of data. Standard errors in brackets.

\**p* < 0.1.

\*\**p* < 0.05.

\*\*\**p* < 0.01.

**TABLE 9** Relative importance of the variables of the SAR conditional convergence model, based on SHAP values

Variable	Equal weights (%)	Weighted by population (%)	Weighted by relative population (%)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	26.2	39.2	42.2
Misadjustment	13.1	14.8	19.4
LogEducation	9.7	13.1	0
LogSavings	0	0	0
CapitalCity	6.1	7.0	7.2
Spatial effects	44.9	25.9	31.2

of the conditional convergence model, spatially augmented. As it can be seen, there is no change in signification of sign of the different coefficients (and their associated effects, which can be seen in the Table A-2, in the appendix) with respect the specifications without spatial effects. In terms of relative importance, notice that conditional convergence is also around two times more important than population misadjustment (see Table 9). Notice that the residuals do not exhibit spatial autocorrelation once the spatial lag of growth is considered. The relative importance of spatial effects is the largest in the model with equal weights (44,9%) and second in the rest of weighted models (25.9%–31.2%), only behind conditional convergence.

Finally, we also estimate a spatially augmented mixed model (SDM), to account for local spillovers of regressive variables, and because it may perform better in case of omitted variables (LeSage, 2014). As it can be seen in Tables 10 and 11, the conclusions in terms of significance and importance of the variables are the same as in the SAR model.

## 8 | DISCUSSION

Our results provide empirical evidence that large population misadjustments with respect to geographic endowment come at a cost. As expected from our model, the farther a country deviates from the expected population distribution based on its geographic endowment, the lower its regional convergence and the higher its economic inequality will be. Remarkably, part of the effect consists of a rent transfer to the capital city.

These results, together with those obtained in the section “Analysis of the population distribution by country; Population misadjustment,” suggest a potential novel causality channel by which institutions affect economic performance.

Recent economic growth literature has emphasized the role of institutions in economic growth and development (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005; Mitton, 2016; Rodrik et al., 2004, and among others). “Institutions” is a broad term that includes the diverse, complex interaction of individuals, firms, states, legislation, and social norms which make up a society's social, economic, legal, and political organization (North, 1981).<sup>7</sup> According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), these institutions are intimately linked to the distribution of political power in society and, as such, regulate the relationship between ordinary private citizens and elites with access to political power. Rodrik et al. (2004) propose a taxonomy of four categories of institutions that can impact economic performance. Institutions are (1) market-creating, (2) market regulating, (3) market stabilizing, and (4) market-legitimizing.

<sup>7</sup>The definition of institutions in North (1981, pp. 201–202) is “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interest of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.”

**TABLE 10** Regression estimates for conditional convergence model from 2000 to 2018 spatially augmented mixed model (SDM)

Variable	Equal weights	Weighted by population	Weighted by relative population
Constant	1.82822*** (0.3489)	2.08999*** (0.3925)	2.21110*** (0.4508)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	-0.18274*** (0.04498)	-0.31950*** (0.0354)	-0.25266*** (0.0415)
Misadjustment	-1.60870*** (0.3872)	-1.43479*** (0.2835)	-1.31050*** (0.3076)
LogEducation	0.09990*** (0.0302)	0.141661*** (0.0309)	0.10644*** (0.0382)
LogSavings	0.00155 (0.04410)	-0.00477 (0.05339)	-0.1060 (0.0691)
CapitalCity	0.05873* (0.03519)	0.07868*** (0.0283)	0.03115 (0.0310)
W · logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	0.03089 (0.0533)	0.13996*** (0.0450)	0.06528 (0.0521)
W · Misadjustment	1.19056*** (0.4245)	1.05395*** (0.3229)	0.85446** (0.3659)
W · LogEducation	-0.07195** (0.0362)	-0.11861*** (0.03719)	-0.09803** (0.04685)
W · LogSavings	0.03214 (0.0578)	-0.00280 (0.0660)	0.11814 (0.0817)
W · CapitalCity	-0.14565** (0.0612)	-0.15250*** (0.0525)	-0.10398** (0.04963)
Spatially lagged outcome (rho)	0.6860*** (0.0458)	0.63167*** (0.0512)	0.5426*** (0.0590)
Common factor test (LR)	125.14***	96.73***	64.42***
Test for residual autocorrelation (p values)	0.3441	0.2865	0.2353
R <sup>2</sup>	0.8316	0.8405	0.6784

Note: There are five NUTS2 that correspond to islands, whose adjacencies have been defined as: Balearic Island is adjacent to Catalonia and Valencia; Corse is adjacent to Sardegna; Sardegna is adjacent to Corse and Sicilia; Sicilia is adjacent to Sardegna and Calabria; Åland to Etelä-Suomi, Stockholm, and Östra Mellansverige. N = 246. Nine regions (six from Poland, three from UK) excluded because of missingness of data. Standard errors in brackets.

\* $p < 0.1$ .

\*\* $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**TABLE 11** Relative importance of the variables of the SDM conditional convergence model, based on SHAP values

Variable	Equal weights (%)	Weighted by population (%)	Weighted by relative population (%)
logGDP <sup>2000</sup>	25.8	28.8	36.8
Misadjustment	11.8	10.4	11.6
LogEducation	9.2	12.1	9.4
LogSavings	0	0	0
CapitalCity	5.2	5.6	3.7
Spatially lagged outcome	48.0	43.1	38.5

Thus, institutions have enough mechanisms to reverse the outcomes of nature and induce or promote the population distribution that best serves specific societal goals. As shown, by using a framework of incentives, regulations and investments, institutions are the most relevant drivers of a population distribution equilibrium with extreme deviations from nature (as in Acemoglu et al., 2002). In turn, population distribution influences economic growth and income distribution: by privileging certain regions with respect to others, institutions not only transfer rents to the privileged region, but also harm overall economic growth.

On the one hand, for the three European continental countries with the most extreme misadjustments (Spain, Portugal and Greece) the deviation is the result of an intentional political intervention by central government, based on the desire to maintain control over the territory by privileging their capital regions (Madrid, Lisbon, and Athens, respectively). Political intervention in the design of policies such as transportation infrastructure, prioritizing objectives related to the administrative and political concentration of power, and largely neglecting productivity-related objectives, has probably prevented the development of an efficient distribution system in the economy, thus damaging potential economic growth. This is shown in the evidence obtained, for example, in the case of Spain, in Albalate et al. (2012) and Bertoméu-Sánchez and Estache (2017). The result of such intense forced deviations from nature is, according to our econometric results, detrimental to economic performance.

On the other hand, the high concentrations of population in London and Dublin, which explain the greater misadjustment of the United Kingdom and Ireland, seem to be a consequence of public policies intended to promote the development of market forces and private industry located in those regions, taking advantage of the role of agglomeration economies with localized accumulated capital. However, this concentration may have come at the expense of other regions. For instance, in the case of the United Kingdom, "The Bank of England consistently pursued policies that favored the City's position as a world financial center, even when such policies were seen as harmful to the UK's mainland manufacturing needs." (Palan, 2010, p. 165). Inner London's GDP per capita was 328% of the European Union average in 2010, compared with 70% in West Wales—the biggest gap in any EU state, according to Eurostat.

Rising inequality and economic performance differences between regions have become a relevant policy debate, and a desire to redress the balance is expressed all the way up to the top. In 2014, the UK prime minister David Cameron said that for too long the UK economy had been "too London-focused and too centralised."<sup>8</sup> In 2009 he had already written that "Over the last century Britain has become one of the most centralized countries in the developed world."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>This statement was acknowledged in the news article, "Regions to get £6 billion in government funding", *BBC News/Business*, July 7, 2014. Retrieved on June 6, 2020 (<https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28190016>).

<sup>9</sup>David Cameron, "A radical power shift" *The Guardian*, February 17, 2009. Retrieved on June 6, 2020 (<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/17/cameron-decentralisation-local-government>).



## 9 | CONCLUSION

The expansion of knowledge and technological innovations in transportation and communication have led to claims of the end of geography; a world in which distance would not play any significant role in decisions about human settlements. In this article, we have analyzed whether the features of nature and geography still play a relevant role in economic and social outcomes, by facilitating or limiting location, concentration, and growth of human settlements.

We have proposed a theoretical model to represent the way in which geography and nature can account for regional economic growth, through their effects on population density and distribution. This model has been empirically examined using data from NUTS 2 European regions. This has allowed us to identify a strong predictive power of first-nature variables to explain the regional distribution of populations, and to estimate the degree of geographic harmonization of the actual distribution of population compared to the predicted distribution.

After estimating the misadjustments between actual and predicted regional population distribution, we have analyzed their impact on relative economic performance, together with the impact of institution-related factors, such as the conditional of being the capital of the country. Our main results suggest that deviating from nature's outcomes has a significant negative effect on economic growth and regional convergence. Hence, societies that choose to exploit the opportunities of the best locations, according to natural endowment, rather than promoting a different distribution of the population across regions by means of institutional intervention, achieve better economic performance. That is, policies that harmonize with nature and geography yield better social welfare than those policies that conflict with them. To what extent deviating from nature's outcomes has a relevant impact on within-country inequality and on social cohesion is an interesting issue that deserves future research.

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## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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