




Coalition Politics in Catalan Local Governments, 1979-2011

Santi Martínez Farrero

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Coalition Politics in Catalan Local Governments, 1979-2011.

Dissertation presented by Santi Martínez Farrero to obtain the grade of
Doctor en Ciència Política i de l'Administració

Under the direction of Dr. Josep M^a Reniu Vilamala

Program: "Dret i Ciència Política"

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Introduction

Since the local arena is the place where democracy has always taken place face to face, where the politician, as a unique person, beats for a political option or for a way of understanding life, with the aim of servicing and reaching consensus with her/his neighbours, the arena where the *policies* are more relevant than the *politics* (Botella, 1992, p. 153), we thought that this was an area where we could explore a huge variety of agreements under the discipline of the political parties, but also outside the boundaries of the traditional political establishment. We learnt from Aristotle that the ideal city, in terms of population, should not be too small, since this would make impossible to be self-sufficient, neither too big, since the citizens would not know each other¹ (Aristotle, 2005, pp. 360-363), thus placing the city as the nest of the democracy.

When talking about local politics, the grass-roots politics, we are in the domain of the non-professional politicians, the ones expecting to serve the members of the community and/or also the ones expecting to climb to the upper levels of the political organizations, after a training period in the local administration, mixing the knowledge about managing an administrative body, and the dynamics of the party politics. This is an experience valid for the candidate as well as for the party structure and leaders, in order to recognize the candidates for building-up future electoral lists, based on their behaviour in the City Councils, and also within the party, in the evolution described by Guérin and Kerrouche: *“Increasingly, politics become a “career” or even a “profession”, overturning the traditional image of voluntary or amateur local government representatives devoting themselves to the service of the public cause: in many European countries the sacrosanct principles which characterise collective local government representation (its voluntary basis, the equality of all in the eyes of the law, and amateurism) have been given up.”* (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008, p. 180)

As an example of the deep impact caused by the proximity, while the name of the Ministries has experienced few changes during the last decades, and the changes have to do with the organization of the State according to the view of the different political parties, the name of the Municipal Departments is giving us some information about the evolution of the society and the needs of its citizens. Actually this is the closest level of the Administration, the one reacting immediately to the social changes.

Table 1. Historical evolution of some Municipal Departments

Name of the Department	First time used	Last time (2011 = current)
Human Resources	1991	2011
Mobility	1995	2011
Eldest People	1987 (1 city. None in 1991)	2011
New Technologies	1999	2011
Solidarity	1995	2011
Sustainability	1995	2011
Equality	1999	2011
Enterprise	2007	2011
Innovation	2003	2011

¹ Knowing each other was considered necessary to rely on the promises of the politicians, since you must know if their private behaviour is matching with their public promises (Book VII).

Knowledge Society	2003	2011
Water supply	1979	1999
Public Relations	1979	1991
Ecology	1979	1999
Charity	1979	1983

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Within the municipalities under study, a Department called Human Resources was created for the first time in 1991. This can be seen in table number 1. Maybe, it existed before, but in 1991 two cities had the need of informing their citizens about a Department with this name, and a Councillor was assigned to such a responsibility. In 2011, 58 out of the 131 municipalities participating in the research have a Department with this name.

Probably, we could guarantee that all the cities and towns had this type of responsibility, but 58 still considered that it was important to make it public.

So this is an Administration whose political members are receiving direct inputs from the citizens, who are their neighbours. When we are so far from the professional politics, from the influence of the media, and from the battle between the ideology and the macro-economy, which is the political behaviour of the elected candidates, from a local perspective, at this stage of the Administration?

The coalitions in the local government are the result of a bargaining which can take into consideration the multilevel negotiations or, simply, the combination of personal affinities of the candidates but, anyway, the result will have a direct impact on the daily life of the citizens, as far as the decisions taken in the local administration are having an impact in the domain of the micro-world of each one of the citizens, having to do with local taxes, permissions for repairing the house, public gardening, public library and so on. Thus, we would like to check to what extent the coalitional agreements forged in the national or regional parliaments, are conditioning the decisions of the local politicians when selecting their partners for a municipal coalition.

At the same time, it is not only conditioned by the agreements in the upper political arenas, but also by the electoral marketing of the parties, which is concentrating the economic resources in promoting their candidates of the Province capital, rather than spreading their investments all along the territory. Thus, the citizens of the towns and cities receive continuous publicity impacts, related to the candidates for the City Council of the Province or the County Capital, while the information about the candidates of their own Municipality will reach them via banners in the streets, direct publicity in the mailbox, but never by means of the television. It is very common for the citizens living in the boundaries of the Metropolitan Areas, to watch on TV the debate between the candidates of the capital which is, usually, very far from the specific needs and expectations of the citizens of any other town and city.

In order to understand the behavioural patterns, we need some historical records covering a certain period of time, so when talking about modern Spain and about democracy, we must

focus on the politics since the death of the dictator², in November 1975, bearing in mind that *“...the life of the Francoist councils was prolonged artificially until April 1979, almost four years after the death of Franco. In large cities like Barcelona, the Francoist councils faced a severe urban crisis which, given their lack of democratic legitimacy and authority, they were unable to tackle”* (Blakeley, 2007, p. 151), representing four long months of huge demonstrations, when the only non-democratic administration was the local one.

1979 was the year of the first local Democratic Elections, which was a challenge for the parties and citizens, since the machinery of the parties was fully concentrated on stabilizing the democracy at a national level, while the citizens were confronted for the first time with their neighbours. Therefore, voting for the Spanish Parliament was an exercise with a lower level of social risk, while voting to the local candidates implied the reopening of the wounds still fresh within the neighbours of the towns and small cities, most of them participating in the Civil War and being active or passive actors of the very long post-war period.

Prior to the elections for the local governments in 1979, the Spanish Constitution was approved the 27th of December of 1978, after a referendum was hold. *“The question of the territorial structure of the state and the integration of the peripheral nationalities within the new democratic system was, a priori, one of the most complex problems to be faced in the course of the democratization process”* (Gunther, et al., 2004, p. 331)³.

In addition, the Constitution, in the article number 2, describes: *“The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to have autonomy for all different nationalities and regions of which it is composed, as well as the solidarity among all of them”*

In the study “Democracy in Modern Spain” (Gunther, et al., 2004, p. 283), we can read, extracted from Solé Tura’s – one of the so called “fathers of the Constitution” - text *“This complicated and redundant formulation was clearly intended to tranquilize those who were made uneasy by threats to national unity posed by the processes of political change, while at the same time it gives constitutional support to the right of self-government and provides the framework for the institutional order that ultimately emerged”* (Solé Tura, 1985). If the article in the Constitution relevant for facilitating the “Estado de las Autonomías” (The State of the Autonomous Regions) can be qualified as complicated and redundant by one of the participants in the original writing, we have to think about the risk of creating a multilevel decentralized administration which tends to be quite complex and redundant⁴, because the need of satisfying a variety of stakeholders

² Francisco Franco was dead the 20th of November of 1975, after a variety of health problems starting on 19 July 1971, when Juan Carlos (the King of Spain, after the death of Franco) took over, acting Head of State. On 30 October 1975, Franco fell into a coma until the 20th of November. Franco’s funeral was attended by Prince Rainier of Monaco, Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean dictator, Hugo Banzer, the Bolivia’s dictator, Jordan’s King Hussein, and Nelson Rockefeller, the US Vice President, as the only international personalities.

³ Chapter number 6 of the book receives the explicit title of “The Many Spains”, where the authors explain in detail the historical difficulties for merging some nationalities with historical differences in one single country, which was solved many times through history by the use of the force.

⁴ We must bear in mind that seven persons participated in the negotiation for the text of the Constitution of 1978, within a wide political range which embodied some former Francoist ministers, as well as a representative of the Communist Party, but under the hidden surveillance of the army and the economic establishment which had grown around the regime.

with different views and expectations about the future of the country, made impossible a fast way from the dictatorship to a full democratic system.

Altogether, it meant the construction of a scenario with a lot of constraints on the one side, and the need of advancing in democracy on the other, in order to be accepted by the advanced European countries as a regular partner in terms of politics and also in terms of economy, far away from the protected economy under the dictatorship, based on monopolies and high custom duties to protect the inefficient local industries, and an overall power corruption.

For the politicians involved in the writing of the 1978's Constitution, the perfection was not a must. The must was to create the legal basement to facilitate the creation of democratic institutions without offending the holders of the power, which were, still for many years, the same ones of the dictatorship.

The redundancy was not only an issue when comparing the Central Administration with the Regional one. Having in mind the lowest level of the decentralized administration, the local one, the risk of redundancy becomes a fact if we pay attention to the budgetary issue, which derives from a lack of clarity in the definition of the services to be delivered to the citizens.

When analysing and comparing the services that the law foresees for the local administration to be offered to the citizens, and the services effectively provided, we will be able to notice that the confusion drives to a certain level of freedom for the municipalities when deciding which services will offer to the citizens, while the income is strictly controlled by Law, making very difficult, or almost impossible, a balanced budget.

The problem has its origin in the regulation applying to the local administration, the Article 25 of the Law 7/1985⁵ about the competencies of the local organization: *"The municipality, for the management of their interests and in the scope of their powers, **CAN** promote all kinds of activities and provide as many public services as possible to contribute to satisfying the needs and aspirations of the local community"*

The Law 7/1985 had some chapters updated by the Law 27/2013, which means that it has been lasting for 28 years, and it has been absolutely decisive in drawing the local administration of the new democracy. So for the purpose of this study, the Law 7/1985 will be the main legal reference, while the amendments of the Law 27/2013 will be commented in footnotes. In fact, the period of the study, 1979-2011, falls under the domain of the 7/1985. Actually, only the elections of 1979 and 1983 took place before the Law, which explains the lack of official information, because most of the legal obligations of the municipalities, in terms of responsibilities and public information, were born with the Law 7/1985.

If the rights and responsibilities of the local administration in front of the citizens were properly defined, assuring the necessary financial resources, it would be nonsense to allow them to "promotion of all kind of...", because no one would guarantee the income for a long term provision of extra services. If the ordinary income of a municipality is under control and audit, and legally limited to a number of local taxes, we should pay attention to the explosion of services of the administration closer to the citizens and their needs, which could be described

⁵ The Article number 25 of the Law 27/2013, replacing the 7/1985, maintained exactly the same text

as unlimited. Mr. Joan Majó, former Minister of Industry 1985-1986), and Major of Mataró (1979) declared that *"the relation between the income and the competences [of the local administration] is inadequate, thus, being forced to depend on the financial transferences of the upper administrations"* (Majó, 2014)

There is a joint manifesto/agreement signed by the two entities grouping the Catalan Municipalities⁶, dated May 2010, which is a position paper of the Municipalities in relation to the economic downturn⁷. They manifest: *"The local world has carried out for many years other's competences, assuming all of its cost in many cases. A historical debt that has not been repaired...."*, which gives some evidence that the Municipalities have assumed themselves some services for which no income was foreseen, out of the legal framework, simply because of the pressure exercised by the citizens, and the difficulties for the local politicians for rejecting the possibility of solving the problems of their neighbours, even when there is an evidence of the lack of economic resources. Unfortunately, the difficulties of the local administration is not an exclusivity of the Catalan Municipalities, and we can learn that *"the local government faces a disproportionately high share of the UK spending cuts with the most deprived local authorities in England facing the biggest cuts"* (Asenova, et al., 2014, p. 1), but also in France, (Martinet, 2014), where the overall expenditures of the Municipalities grew a 4,5% between 2012 and 2013, while the income only a 1%. We only retrieved the opposite evolution in Germany, described as: *"In 2012, the German state and municipal budgets continued to recover in comparison with previous years"* (PWC, 2014, p. 2)

The economic resources of the local administration are the ones detailed in the Chapter 1, Article 2, of the RDL 2/2004, approved the 5th of March of 2004:

- a) The income obtained by the exploitation of their assets.
- b) Taxes, special contributions and the eligible percentage on the taxes charged by the Autonomous Community or other local administrations
- c) The participations in the National and Autonomous Communities taxes.
- d) Grants
- e) Public prices
- f) Income from loans and credits
- g) Penalties and fees related to activities under their competences
- h) Other income of Public Right

It is because of the level of amateurism of the local politicians⁸ and the constraints to execute their political programs, sometimes being conditioned by multilevel agreements, budget

⁶ Acord de la Comissió Municipalista de Catalunya en Relació a les Mesures Urgents per Reduir el Dèficit Públic <http://ves.cat/jU7U>

⁷ The economic downturn created the Barcelona Model (Blakeley, 2007, p. 163), since *"in a context of economic recession, globalised competition, low local government spending and an inadequate welfare system, participation became a crucial element of Barcelona's model of governance. The emergence of governance in Barcelona was driven by the recognition of the city council that, in the face of significant policy challenges, it could not succeed alone, but required the co-operation of actors from a variety of spheres, in particular the economic elites and voluntary associations within civil society. In short, participation became a subject of public policy in its own right"*

⁸ The issue has to do with the skills of the politicians getting a portfolio, which can differ with the ones required for a proper executions of the specific policies within a highly professionalized area, *"there also appears to be a broad consensus on the type of skills required by councillors and leaders, although the research highlights the difficulties of providing adequate training and preparation when individuals are catapulted into positions of leadership with only limited experience with almost no notice"* (Bochet & Bochet, 2010, p. 735)


limitations, and the exigencies of the neighbours, that the local administration is a special subject for research and that the budgetary balance becomes a nightmare. As a matter of fact, most of the budgetary difficulties have a direct relation with the lack of clarity in which administration will be responsible for providing a specific service, but also reinforced by a tradition of lack of transparency (Guillamón, et al., 2011).

Having said that about the administrative redundancies, we should mention the differences between Spain and Catalonia in terms of political options. In fact, understanding how the political map is drawn, the researcher will have the opportunity of comparing with other regions in democratic countries for validating, or not, the conclusions of our research.

While in Spain, as a whole, only two parties (PP and PSOE)⁹ accumulate a share of 71% of the votes, in Catalonia you have to add four parties to get the same share, only one of them being the same than in the rest of Spain (PSC-PSOE). Hence, the research is limited to Catalonia because of the specificity and variety, in terms of political options, compared to other Spanish regions, or in other words: the more parties in the arena, the more options for coalition negotiation.

This permanent leadership of only two parties at sub-national level in most of the Spanish Provinces, is also reproduced in the Spanish Parliament, where all the governments since the restoration of the democracy have been running under the form of single party, in majority or minority, as a consequence of only two parties capturing more than 80% of the votes, and alternating in power, at a huge distance from any other political option. Both main parties have been fighting for the vote of the ideological centre, while any other is differentiated by ideology, such as the eco-socialists, the former communists, or by being a nationalist in the sense of fighting for a decentralized mode of managing the State. The mentioned distribution is reproduced in the Graph number 1

Graph 1. Distribution of Seats in the Spanish Congress of Deputies. Two main parties



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

In Graph number 2 it can be appreciated the impact when voting at local level, confirming that the same two parties (PP and PSOE), with the minor participations of IU, so the three state wide parties, concentrate the majority of the votes, as well if the figures are aggregated at national or at regional level. See the blue bars, and notice that in seven regions there are not regionalist parties. Vázquez and Delgado explain perfectly this situation: "...[in such regions] the existence


⁹ The ANNEX number 1 contains a brief description of each party and the colour code used in any graph within this research.

of minority parties is considered, most of the times, as an illegitimate intromission in the game of the two main parties” (Vázquez & Delgado, 2013, p. 253). In Andalusia, Castilla-La Mancha, Castile and León, Madrid, Extremadura, La Rioja and Murcia, the local politics are led by the State Wide Parties. The effect of the above continued situation makes that, when looking at the local administration paying only attention to aggregate figures, lecturers describe the competition in the local arena as “since the local politics is getting nationalized, we are in front of municipal but not local elections, given the fact that the independent options at local level are minoritarian and diminishing since the beginning of the democracy” (Ruiloba, 2014, p. 101), which we will demonstrate is totally wrong. The Administration of the Autonomous Communities was created under the umbrella term of “coffee for all”, which means that no historical differences were taken into account when deciding the level of autonomy of each region. The application of this policy is quite problematic, since some communities without historical wishes of autonomy obtained regional Parliaments, with the whole costs but without content or regional expectations, which has resulted in Regions identical to the State. Could anybody expect that a regional branch of a State Wide Party should be able to question the decisions of the central direction of the party, when the State is confronted to the region?

According to Simón, in five of the above Autonomous Communities, Castilla-La Mancha, Castile and León, Madrid, Extremadura, and Murcia, the “imperfect two-party system” of the regional parties, which are identical to the national ones, is the reason for the absence of coalition governments in the mentioned Autonomous Communities since 1975. According to his study, “the low level of identification of the citizens with the Autonomous Community results in the lack of demand for specific regionalist parties” (Simón, 2014, pp. 396-397)

Paying attention to the votes at the 2011 local elections, aggregating them at Autonomous Community level, from a total of 19 communities, the two main Spanish parties (PP and PSOE) got around 70% of the votes in 7, more than 80% also in 7, and almost the 85% in one. In only four communities, the ones with a strong feeling of national difference, the regional parties got a number of votes higher than the average: the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Navarre and the Basque Country.

Graph 2 . Percentage of votes per Autonomous Community. 2011 local elections.



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

The detail of the figures is displayed in the table number 2. It can be appreciated, within the absolute figures, the dimensions of the different Autonomous Communities, and the weight of the parties, which are sorted out in alphabetical order. When comparing the figures between different Autonomous Communities, we must bear in mind that the sizes are extremely different, from the autonomous cities/communities in the North of Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, with a little bit more than 30.000 voters, to Andalusia with more than 4 million. This fact implies a patchwork formed by a variety of territories with a wide range of industrialization levels, incomes and infrastructures.


Table 2. 2011 local elections, distribution of votes per Autonomous Community

	Andalusia	Aragon	Canary Islands	Cantabria	Castilla-La Mancha	Castile and León	Catalonia	Ceuta	Melilla	Madrid	Navarre	Valencia	Extremadura	Galicia	Balearic Island	La Rioja	Basque Country	Asturias	Murcia
Bildu											37.017								276.141
Bloc-Compromis												180.832							
BNG														261.466					
Caballas								4.407											
CC			202.720																
CxI																			
CpM									7.394										
CIU							778.551												
EAI																			326.052
ERC							257.705												
FAC																			121.713
IU/ICV	488.046		22.629				242.021			324.776	15.050								80.245
NABAI											36.262								
Nca			51.220																
PAR		77.593																	
PP	1.604.170	251.188	252.272	152.423	548.884	695.887	363.948	20.054	16.852	1.447.701	19.053	1.171.126	295.422	710.192	188.958	83.498	146.728	142.090	367.698
PRC				70.634															
PSM																			19.308
FSM-APIB																			10.744
PSOE	1.324.278	213.913	201.819	70.882	466.080	439.902	721.476		2.683	725.205	50.795	703.197	267.268	411.389	101.549	55.235	177.224	178.896	160.222
UPN											88.156								
%	82,6%	78,1%	77,5%	84,9%	84,7%	77,1%	81,0%	78,9%	77,9%	81,6%	76,1%	80,9%	83,1%	85,9%	77,2%	81,3%	84,2%	86,1%	78,7%
State wide Parties	3.416.494	465.101	476.720	223.305	1.014.964	1.135.789	1.327.445	20.054	19.535	2.497.682	84.898	1.874.323	562.690	1.121.581	290.507	138.733	323.952	401.231	527.920
Regional Parties	0	77.593	253.940	70.634	0	0	1.036.256	4.407	7.394	0	161.435	180.832	0	261.466	45.246	0	602.193	121.713	0
Other Parties	717.239	152.465	212.072	52.444	182.650	336.961	556.141	6.542	7.660	564.670	77.543	484.797	114.423	227.694	99.056	31.958	173.790	84.343	142.800
TOTAL	4.133.733	695.159	942.732	346.383	1.197.614	1.472.750	2.919.842	31.003	34.589	3.062.352	323.876	2.539.952	677.113	1.610.741	434.809	170.691	1.099.935	607.287	670.720

Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

Out of this table, it is in the graph number 3 that we can appreciate the number of parties needed for reaching a percentage of votes around the 80%. The above four regions are also displaying a minimum of four parties, and two more, the Balearic Islands and Asturias are also showing a higher number of parties, but due to a high fragmentation of the Socialist party in the Balearic Islands and the appraisal of a personal party in Asturias.

Graph 3. Number of parties needed for reaching the 80% of the votes. Local elections 2011



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es


In fifteen Autonomous Communities, the political options can be easily understood on the basis of the traditional left/right axis, the so called ideological axis, whereas in four Communities there is need of a national axis to understand properly the variety of political options. As a matter of fact, it is only paying attention to the centralization/decentralization political proposals that it is possible to create a matrix for positioning the parties, and thus, understanding the connection distances between the parties which will be needed for forecasting the possible coalition agreements.

In Catalonia, 4 parties accumulated 80% of the votes, and adding one more party, the 90 was reached, opening the door to a variety of coalition agreements, since reaching the absolute majority is quite difficult because there is a certain balance between the votes reached by the variety of the regional parties and the ones of the state wide parties.

Living a social climate of rejection of the political activity, where casting the ballot seems to be an expensive activity for the citizens or, at least, an unrewarding activity for the week-end, which means that the marketing of the parties has to create messages following the path of the commercial marketing in order to attract voters, only the abstention is growing, followed by the poor brother of the democracy: the None Of The Above vote (NOTA, or the so called “vote in white” in some Latin countries). In graph number 4 it can be noticed that each election has different levels of participation, but all of them show a common pattern which is the increase of the abstention, also with different speeds, but quite stable in each type of election. As Font describes: *“We are talking about citizens which only follow the political life from the distance, paying only attention to minor facts, providing them information enough to understand what is happening in a world which occupies a secondary position within their interests”* (Font, 1999, p. 170).

At this point we want to mention the work of Franklin, showing the relation between having a social network and participating in politics, at least at the extent of voting. *“The effect of length of residence for young adults is substantial, greater than education. Young adults who lived all their lives in the same neighbourhood would be 12 percent more likely to vote than those who had recently moved there”* (Franklin, 2005, p. 19), because as far as the mobility of the families, in search of work opportunities, increases, the motivation for voting is reduced. A high level of unemployment, as the one in Spain, incentives mobility. Certainly, we can state that there are recognisable trends in the party system, such as the party-voter ties that have weakened, the fact that the voters tend to be more volatile (Dalton, 2006), and that many party systems display signs of ideological depolarization and elections campaigns tend to be more important (Ekengren & Oscarsson, 2011, p. 660), which was confirmed by Martínez and Sanz Labrador, in the sense that *“the electoral campaign tends to reduce the dispersion of the voters which show very low interest in the politics”* (Sanz Labrador & Martínez i Coma, 2007, p. 101)

Graph 4. Evolution of the participation in Catalonia



Source: Author's elaboration on data from Department of Interior, Generalitat of Catalonia

The difference between the various types of elections is explained in the quarterly report of the CEO (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió) called Baròmetre d'Opinió Política (Political Opinion Barometer), showing consistent results through time, in the sense that the citizens give more importance to the elections for the Parliament of Spain, followed by the elections of the Catalan Parliament, then the local elections, and finally the elections of the European Parliament.

In the Survey number 652, issued in June 2011, one month after the 2011 local elections, only a 13,4% of the answerers selected the local elections as the most important ones, and a 7,6% were for the option "all the elections the same importance". The summary of the survey is displayed in table number 3.

Surprisingly, if we merge the results of the survey and the evolution of the participation in the elections, the level of participation in the Regional and Local elections is quite the same, while the importance level is rather different.

Table 3 Importance of the national and sub-national elections

% Verticals	Total	Record de vot eleccions autonòmiques											
		PPC	CiU	ERC	PSC	ICV-EUIA	C's	SI	Altres Nul	En blanc	No va votar	No rec	No cont
29a. Dels diferents tipus d'eleccions, quina és per vostè la més important...?													
B: Total entrevistes M Pond	2500	112	734	146	349	159	45	45	67	129	466	66	180
B: Total entrevistes M Real	2500	107	759	175	322	126	30	51	69	122	460	78	201
Al Parlament de Catalunya (autonòmiques)	27,0	3,2	37,7	44,2	21,3	20,3	4,4	58,3	31,3	28,0	16,6	16,3	27,5
Al Congrés dels diputats (generals)	37,5	70,7	31,3	21,5	45,8	39,6	66,1	5,4	23,3	26,0	48,3	37,0	23,4
A l'Ajuntament (municipals)	13,4	5,7	11,9	12,8	16,0	12,3	13,7	16,4	18,0	17,3	12,2	17,9	17,4
Al Parlament europeu	3,9	8,6	1,7	3,4	2,1	4,8	1,1	4,4	0,0	5,1	6,0	7,1	7,1
Autonòmiques i Generals	3,4	2,4	4,3	5,9	1,7	2,1	4,4	4,4	6,6	4,1	3,2	0,0	1,5
Autonòmiques i Municipals	2,0	0,0	4,2	1,9	0,1	2,9	0,0	7,1	1,4	2,7	0,3	0,7	0,7
Generals i Municipals	0,7	0,7	1,0	0,3	1,1	0,3	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,8	0,0	0,6
Altres opcions	1,3	4,0	1,1	0,0	3,1	1,2	0,0	0,0	3,4	0,2	0,0	3,0	1,1
Totes igual	7,6	4,2	5,4	9,0	8,3	14,6	9,7	3,1	12,5	9,9	3,8	5,2	17,7
Cap	1,7	0,0	0,4	0,7	0,0	0,3	0,0	1,0	2,9	4,2	5,3	4,2	1,5
No ho sap	1,4	0,4	0,8	0,3	0,5	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,7	1,9	3,1	8,6	1,1
No contesta	0,2	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,0	0,2

Source: CEO's BOP (Political Opinion Barometer) survey 652

It is quite interesting to notice a different level of importance assigned by the electors, depending on her preferred political option. In that sense, the voters of PP and C's, the two parties focussing their policies in a central view of the government and asking for a lower

presence of the Catalan language in the administration and schools, are the only ones in classifying first in importance the elections to the Congress of Deputies, then Municipalities and in the last position the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, while voters of the Catalan nationalist parties, CIU and ERC, classify first the Parliament of Catalonia, then the Congress of Deputies and the local elections last. The voters of SI are more radical when assigning their preference to the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, sending the ones to the Congress of Deputies to the last position.


The two left wing parties having presence in all the Spanish territory, PSC and ICV, show strong positions according to the average. More radical is the position of the other state wide party, the PP (PPC in the table), whose voters consider that the elections to the Congress of Deputies are the only important ones.

Consequently, the level of abstention shown in graph number 4 is in accordance to the average level of importance assigned by the voters to the different elections; Congress of Deputies, then the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, the local elections and last the Elections to the European Parliament.

However, in graph number 5 it is visible the impact of the high participation held in 2012, when electing the Parliament of Catalonia, which is explained by an exceptional level of popular mobilization, since the electoral day was the 25th of November, after the demonstration of more than one and a half million citizens in Barcelona on the 11th of September, in behalf of the independence of Catalonia from Spain. This elections where the response from the Catalan Government, for which was hoping to reach a high level of votes that could accompany the government party (CIU) the next four years, which were expected to be of extreme difficulties in anything relating the relations with Spain, since the popular mandate was to perform a referendum relating the status of Catalonia, being the independence the option.

The distribution of seats after the elections maintained the unbalance between Spanish centric parties, in minority, and the Catalan centric ones, but under a more radical scheme, with CIU losing some power in behalf of ERC.


Graph 5. Participation behaviour. Elections to the Parliament of Catalonia in 2012



Source: Author's elaboration on data from Department of Interior, Generalitat of Catalonia

The Elections to the European Parliament, held the 25th of May 2014, showed a new profile for such elections, since always had the lowest levels of participation. As it is visible in Graph number 6, the trend of the ones to the Parliament of Catalonia in 2012 was confirmed, in terms of increasing participation, and also in the parties receiving the majority of the votes, since ERC was the absolute winner, followed by CIU.

Graph 6. Participation behaviour. Elections to the European Parliament in 2014



Source: Author's elaboration on data from Department of Interior, Generalitat of Catalonia

The participation in Catalonia raised from the 34,96% in 2009 to the 47,5%, while in the whole of Spain, including Catalonia, it changed from the 44,9% in 2009 to the 45,6% in 2014.

We must be aware that at the time of the elections to the European Parliament in 2014, the political confrontation between the Catalan Government and the Spanish was *in-crescendo*, basically because the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, Mr. Artur Mas, made public the 12th of December of 2013 the date of the referendum for the independence of Catalonia, which was considered illegal by the Spanish Government. The announced date was the 9th of November 2014. The evolution of the last two Graphs confirms one of the conclusions of Ubasart-Gonzalez although referred to the independent parties, in the sense that “the disaffection with the political class is not equivalent to disaffection about politics” (Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2012, p. 160)

Given the explained facts, trends and relations, we thought that it was relevant to investigate about the relationship between parties within the local governments, limiting the scope to Catalonia and the recent democratic period, which started after the death of the dictator. For such a purpose there was a need of collecting some information for creating a database, in order to have the opportunity of creating tables, graphs, and applying statistical tools to validate, or to reject, the hypothesis.

The local government, the small size government, is a source of figures and records that can allow us to perform a quantitative analysis, not only in relation to a time line, as it is usual in the works studying the coalitional relations at national or regional level, but also within a given period of time thanks to the high volume of records available.

With the aim of using the data and getting a realistic view on the relations between parties, we have proceeded and structured our study as it will be explained in the following paragraphs

searching, at the same time, for the opinions of local politicians of different parties and historical moments for validating the conclusions.

For the comprehension of both, the Catalan and the English readers, the English terms¹⁰ have been taken from the English version of the Barcelona website pages.

The Catalan cities with more than 10.000 inhabitants in 2008, and the County Capitals in any case, so a total of 132 municipalities were taken into consideration. Finally it was reduced to 131, because of the difficulties for getting information about Vielha e Mijaran, through anyone of the sources used for this research.

We will start by writing the research hypothesis, and explaining the data collection methodology, which was the main task in terms of time investment and the one that gave us a better view over the (lack of) organization of some stages of the public administration. The Fieldwork was needed for collecting information which was classified, sorted out, and manually added to our database.

The database contains information, only, about the candidates getting a seat in a local government, and for each municipality / election, and only about the first government issued after the elections, since any other government formed during the four years of each period is very difficult to trace. There are many situations resulting in a change of the power equilibrium between the parties, due to the action of faithless electors, to a new coalition in the upper levels, to the changes in the fidelity of the independent parties, or any other that makes unstable what was considered stable until then. When such changes arrive, there is no a standard legal communication, which means that this would be a manual and difficult work to keep track of the mentioned changes in the local governments. We considered that 1052 observations were enough to reach statistically valid results, so we restricted the data collection to the first government issued after the elections.

10

Catalan	English
Alcalde	Mayor
Tinent d'Alcalde Primer Tinent d'Alcalde, Segon Tinent d'Alcalde...	Deputy Mayor ⁽¹⁾ (DM) First Deputy Mayor (FDM / 1DM), 2DM....
Regidor	Councillor ⁽²⁾
Ajuntament	City Council ⁽³⁾
Municipi	Municipality
Regidoria	Portfolio, Department, Area of Responsibility
Comarca	County

(1) Away from the discussion about the equivalent level of responsibility between a US DM and a Spanish Tinent d'Alcalde according to the current legal framework

(2) Within the quantitative part of the study, a Councillor is considered as far as hi/she has the responsibility of a Department, so he/she participates in the government

(3) Includes all the elected members, but this is a generic name of the entity. The Plenary, composed by the same persons, is an executive organ

Once the database was almost complete, we started to produce some tables and graphs. It was only then when we noticed that we needed a system to classify, per order of importance, the different portfolios. Without this classification we shouldn't be able to detect whether the distribution of portfolios between parties within a coalitional negotiation was equivalent to the number of votes, of whether there was any other pattern to understand why and what was being assigned to each Councillor. For solving such issue, we prepared a survey which was sent to 813 active local politicians. The results will be deeply commented, and the enquiry is reproduced in the ANNEX VI.

In the second chapter, the theoretical approach, we review the formal and the multidimensional theories, looking for the link with the local level of government, since most of them have always been exemplified paying only attention to the national politics.

The third chapter will be devoted to explain the context, historical, geographical, demographical and legal of the Catalan municipalities, within the years covered by this study.

The research results will be reported in chapter number four, in two main groups, starting with the morphology, which is followed by the research for clarifying who gets what.

In the Morphology part, we use the database for understanding the different structures created when governing in coalition. We pay attention to the number of parties participating in coalitions, in order to validate if there is any trend. We also investigate the role and evolution of the IND/OTH parties, the independent ones, mainly local single issue parties, but also the new political proposals created with the structure of the traditional *catch all* parties. We analyse the different coalition types at quantitative level, and the connections between the parties governing in coalition. Another analysis is performed at the level of comparing the behaviour of the main parties, in term of votes, with the small ones, and the impact of certain coalition governments in the next elections. The cooperation patterns between parties will be described, in order to verify if there is a standard behaviour when distributing portfolios after the elections. Finally, the longevity of the parties in each city is quantified. This part ends with the definition and valuations of the Power and the Representativeness concepts, needed for assigning a quantitative value to each one of the concepts.

The *who gets what* part starts analysing the role of the Deputy Mayor, since this is a position whose attributions and rewards go far beyond what is regulated by Law. The gender differences are treated in the second part of the chapter, comparing the Equality act issued in 2007 with the current role of women in local politics, paying attention not only to the composition and gender distribution of the electoral lists, but also to the portfolios assigned to the women reaching a seat in the City Council and participating in the government of the City.

Chapter number four ends with a summary called What is given to who?, since our aim was to explain that the machinery of the parties overrules any Law which goes against their freedom for deciding who gets what, only paying attention to the party preferences in terms of policies and power-seeking

The last one, chapter number five, contains the conclusions, not only related to the findings, but also to the morphological evidences, and to the experience of being in close contact with the local administration for more than three years.

I- Hypothesis and Data Collection

With the exception of the different studies performed by Márquez Cruz, and the report about local government (Magre, 2006), covering the Catalan cities with more than 10.000 inhabitants in 2003, and County Capitals, there is no other research, in Spain, with the level of detail of the current one, in anything relating to the portfolio distribution among the elected Councillors, covering a period of 32 years, which makes possible to formulate, not only some hypothesis about the behaviour of the parties in coalition in terms of paybacks and gender, but also to conclude some trends and facts relating the morphology of the coalitions.

1- Hypothesis

A number of doubts have risen when thinking about certain public decisions in the local politics, such as the way the electoral lists are conformed for the local elections, the messages of the local politicians before and after the elections, among others. There are a lot of “how”, “who” and “why” to be answered about the local politics, and the best way for answering it was by formulating the research hypothesis which would imply a certain fieldwork.

We will start with the first hypothesis (H1), about the cooperation patterns between parties in coalition, in the sense that we would like to know if there are any cooperation or competition links between certain parties. In such cases we would like to identify if the payoffs after the coalition agreements, in terms of portfolios, are related to the mentioned pattern, thus, allowing the parties to get their preferred portfolios or not. We thought that the most likely situation would be that of cooperation, since a coalition agreement has been reached.

H1: The portfolio distribution between parties in coalition reflects the priorities of the parties, only when it is based in cooperation patterns.

The second hypothesis (H2), which is about the Deputy Mayor has the origin in what we consider to be a peculiar figure, since they have a very limited legal role. However, she holds a number of privileges in terms of representativeness, number of them and salary. Such privileges, not linked to further responsibilities, seem to advert that in case of coalition government this role could be used as a part of the paybacks to the minor parties. Since no other possible explanation could be in the researcher’s mind, the hypothesis H2 was formulated in that sense.

H2: The Deputy Mayor is a role used by the leading party as a payback for the coalition concessions made by the small ones.

Finally, the third (H3) hypothesis is related to gender. We have the impression that the Equality Act has had an impact on the gender distribution within the electoral lists, but not beyond, in the sense that the local governments have a percentage of women much lower than the percentage in the lists. Looking at the composition of the local governments, and to the assignment of portfolios, it seems that there is a certain bias, gender related, regardless which is the party holding power. Taking into consideration that some parties have already had for some years party quotas, the H3 was formulated in order to challenge this option.

H3: Gender party quotes don’t guarantee equality in portfolio distribution.

2- Data Collection Methodology

This research started with the expectation to collect the data from official sources, and the only expected difficulty was to identify who was the holder of the files. Such expectations were not easy to accomplish, since we realized that in the different levels of the administration there is no interest for the historical view, apart from the different levels of support received from the civil servants, to the exceptional ones, those who were in charge of specific areas, as being the archive responsible, and those who had basic administrative roles, and appeared to be quite reluctant to answer our questions, or help us in finding the way to a certain document type.

The records of the database have been filled with information collected from different sources, the ones displayed in table 4, some of them retrieved by chance, because nobody was able to give us a clear view about the path followed by the electoral documents after each electoral contest.

Table 4. Sources used to complete the database

	Municipality Website	Internet Archive	MUNICAT	PADICAT	BOP	Municipal Archive	County Archive
1979	√					√	√
1983	√					√	√
1987	√				√	√	√
1991	√				√		√
1995	√				√		√
1999	√	√			√	√	√
2003	√	√		√	√		√
2007	√	√	√	√	√	√	
2011	√				√		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Taking into account that all the needed dataset has the origin and the end from/in official sources having to do with the electoral process, which is under the direct supervision of different administrations, it was an unexpected and disappointing surprise to discover that the information was not collected in a single point, but even worse than that, neither in several steps of the responsible levels of the administration, nor in the Justice Department, hosting the Electoral Committees, the so called *Juntas Electorales*.

Another relevant point is the lack of an overall view of the civil servants who are involved in the electoral process, from which, too many times we received the proposal of investigating in another Administration or department "just in case", but never pointing into a clear direction.

In the following chapters we will give details of the sources that have been used for collecting the data, receiving the support of people fully committed with their isolated tasks, distanced

from the whole process. We have noticed a lot of voluntarism and dedication, and a lack of regulation and standardization. The administrations expected to take care of the different specialties only play the role of the budgetary constrictor, far from any motivational work, on behalf of the ones having to deal with different tasks which benefits are not easily understood by the citizens. We must bear in mind that behind anyone of the following sources there are persons whose self-motivation is directly impacting in the quality of the service.

2.a) The Website of the Municipality

It could be a relevant source of information, but only for a few of the main cities covered in the study it was really useful. In general it is remarkable the lack of historical information or, in general, the low level of services offered to the citizens. Only 55 of the 131 municipalities analysed, made public the email addresses of the Councillors.

We had the need of visiting many official websites which meant the opportunity of paying attention to many city websites. The differences are huge, but even among the best ones from the point of view of the usability by the citizens, it can be noticed a lack of overall on-line service mind-set of the creators. Two examples are to be found in Sant Cugat and Badalona, whose websites offer a lot of services to the citizens, but for anything not available in the website, a mail was never enough. They required an official form, to be delivered at the reception desk of the City Hall.

Is it understandable an administration partially on-line? This kind of gaps, probably tell us about the fight between the different forces holding administrative power when facing a change. Being on-line is not only a matter of having a website, but it requires adapting the internal processes to the new way of dealing with the citizens, which must be quicker and more transparent. Any change in the traditional processes is damaging any kind of organization if it is not properly explained, until it has the complicity of the pertinent employees. Whereas, when the organization is the Administration, the changes are still more difficult to implement due to the low level of motivation of some of the civil servants, as well as the lack of ability of some politicians, which in their professional career have never been managing human resources. It cannot be understood that a City is entitled ad Smart City, while the e-government is not in the mind of their leaders, or in other words *“Spanish local government websites make a very poor showing, suggesting that economic development and the development of e-government are not necessarily correlated”* (Cárcaba & García-García, 2010, p. 679)


An exceptional case could be found in the City of Manresa which has a website containing, not only the documents issued by the Plenary, but also an mp3 file with the Mayor’s speech of the first session after any election that has taken place since 1979. Anyway, if this would be a “best practice”, we wonder if there is a forum where to explain it. As we said before, this could be an act of voluntarism without further impact.

2.b) The Internet Archive

The Internet Archive (www.archive.org) is an organization scanning continuously the web, storing the pages “as it is” in their servers, so you can have a full view of the world in the internet “as it was”¹¹.

This tool has been used for getting data about the elections since 1999, when no local sources were available. It was in some of the pages stored by the Internet Archive, that the information about the composition of a government was displayed, in an embedded file, or as an information page for the citizens, or as the City Council’s organization’s chart.


Image 1. Internet Archive's input screen



The so called “wayback machine”, as visible in image number 1, requires a full and exact URL. It does not work as a search engine finding the names typed in the input box.

It means that the only option for surfing within an old website is by knowing the exact name at the historical time which is of the researcher’s interest. Once this is known, the system will offer a view on the dates that the website was stored. The next image, number 2, shows the timeline for the Municipality of Barcelona under the URL www.barcelona.es

Image 2. Internet Archive results for www.barcelona.es



The high of the bars is informing you about the number of captures for a given month.

Concerning the Municipalities, the only problem was the change in the URL’s of the Catalan cities, because since September 2005 most City Councils changed in order to use the new sponsored TLD “.cat”.

Before 2005, some municipalities had their website under the umbrella of a province organization or administration such as .altanet (in Tarragona) or .diba (in Barcelona). This fact means that looking for the previous web address of a city it is not only a matter of replacing .cat by .net or .org, but of doing a deeper investigation about the way that a City Council used to be present within the internet world, sometimes based in a test and trial procedure.

An example of the changes in the website URL can be seen in the Image number 3, where it is visible the evolution of the web pages of the Municipality of Amposta, which was “under


¹¹ In their website, they define their goal as: “The Internet Archive, is building a digital library of Internet sites and other cultural artifacts in digital form. Like a paper library, we provide free access to researchers, historians, scholars, the print disabled, and the general public.”

construction from 1999 until 2002, using the “altanet.org” domain. From 2002 until 2004 they had their own domain, that can be translated as “MunicipalityAmposta.org”, but we can suppose a very limited activity and technical capacity, since the e-mail was still managed by the altanet organization.

It was in 2005 when they changed to the “amposta.es” domain, and since 2007 the “amposta.cat” one.

It means that tracing back the domain of the website was not an easy task which required some strategies based in the evolution of other cities in the same region, searching for similarities, or searching in the current page information about the former domains. In that sense, Goggle was also very useful for any kind of tracing back.

Image 3. Historical view on the Amposta's Website



And finally <http://www.amposta.cat> from 2007 till nowadays

Source: the Internet Archive

2.c) MUNICAT

This is a site created by the Generalitat of Catalonia (<http://www.municat.cat>) , from which we could get detailed data related to the 2007 elections, but not any information from 2003, because the civil servants being responsible for the maintenance of the website erased it when overwriting the 2007 records. The purpose of the site is to concentrate information about the services offered to the municipalities by the upper administrations.

Unfortunately, the hard work done which is required to keep the information updated was lost because overwriting. In the Internet Archive we could retrieve a file from Municat, created in 2003, containing the details about the Mayors of each city and town, but any other information was lost. Actually nobody who we contacted by phone or by mail working for this website, was able to inform us whether the historical records were archived somewhere. The result of the lack of a clear mandate by the management of the different organizations is that the civil servants are forced to focus on their official tasks. In this case, as in many others, the civil servants had a partial knowledge of the contents, and the managers and /or political responsible were unreachable.

2.d) PADICAT

It is similar to the Internet Archive, in concept (<http://www.padicat.cat>). However, it's better organized but having less content, since it only contains Catalan or Catalan related websites. Anyone can ask for the follow-up and archive of a website or blog by means of a simple electronic application form.

It is expected to become the Digital National Archive of Catalonia. The persons in charge were absolutely available and helpful. We had two face to face meetings in their premises, which simplified our research to the extent of their stored data. There is a search engine, in the website, which makes very easy to retrieve information about a certain subject, but unfortunately the service only started in 2005, so it was in the period 2008-2009 when they actually started to capture a relevant volume of information which can be retrieved in their database.

2.e) BOP (Butlletí Oficial de la Província)

This is the Official Gazette of the Province, where any official decision of the municipalities should be published for the knowledge of the citizens. Unfortunately, concerning the post-electoral mandatory ones, the Constitution of the City Council, and the Delegations one, no one single city or town did it in 1979 or in 1983¹².

There is one Gazette per Province. For the period 1987-2011 there is a variety of situations:

Barcelona. (<http://bop.diba.es>)

None of the books was digitalized.

Since there is a legal timeframe for the constitution of the City Council¹³, but not for the assignment of the delegations¹⁴, the option was to search for the information within the six months after the elections date, basically for having a limitation, because of the difficulty and time consumption of this part of the fieldwork.

¹² [JJanés] Mayor of Molins de Rei for 12 years, said that they were too busy learning about the democracy and the way to manage a municipality, to pay attention to formal requirements. In fact, the problem is that the obligation for publishing such agreements in the Official Gazette started in 1985 with the Law 7/1985

¹³ Royal Decree 2586/1986, article 37, which clearly refers to 20 days after the elections day, and the method for proceeding

¹⁴ Royal Decree 2586/1986, article 38, it refers to within 30 days after the constitution of the City Council, but the only mandate is to inform about the Delegation, if any. There is no a clear mandate in terms that the negotiation must be ended before such a date

We were not allowed to use a handy scanner, by unknown reasons, so we had to read each page of the 6 months after the elections, and asking for photocopies when we retrieved information about the composition of a new City Council. The difficulty is related to the time investment to go through the printed materials, since one year in the Official Gazette of Barcelona means three or four volumes with hundreds of pages each one, where you can read about any kind of agreement, as well as traffic penalties, building permissions, permissions for starting a new business, and so on.

Girona. (<http://www.ddgi.cat/bop/faces/consultaF/index.html>)

All the documents are digitalized, accessible from the internet. Only two documents were not available, because two numbers of the Official Gazette were published the same day, and only one was digitalized, by mistake, but they provided us with photocopies, reacting very fast to our request.

Lleida. (<http://www.diputaciolleida.cat>)

All the documents are digitalized and accessible from the internet, but there is a search tool difficult to use, in the sense that compared to the search tool of Girona, using the same search pattern, the output resulted in a number of documents impossible to handle. The option that we selected for getting a limited list of documents with a high probability of success was to try with the names of the candidates with options to become the Mayor, taking into consideration the result, in votes, of the elections, and the party of the Mayor in the previous elections.

Image 4. Tremp's Delegations agreement

B.O. de la P.--Núm. 151	10 desembre 1987	2283
<p>LLEIDA Gestió Urbànica--Ejepe. N.º 305/87</p> <p>ANUNCI L'Excm. Ajuntament Ple en sessió celebrada el dia 27 de novembre de 1987, acordà aprovar inicialment el Projecte de dipòsit i nova conducció d'alimentació a les barriades de Paritanyes i Secà de Sant Pere.</p> <p>Aquest Projecte s'exposa al públic, als efectes oportuns, en el termini de quinze dies, comptats des de la publicació d'aquest Anunci en el Butlletí Oficial de la Província, en el Negociat de Gestió Urbànica i Unitat de Pla-nol Municipal.</p> <p>Lleida, a 4 de desembre de 1987.-El Paer en Cap, signat: Jaume Manuel Oronich i Miravet.</p> <p>Número de Registro 6844</p>	<p>BALAGUER EDICTE</p> <p>En José Pérez Alonso, ha demanat a aquesta Alcaldia llicència municipal per a establir una indústria dedicada a cafeteria de 3 tasses a la plaça Fou Casals, N.º 6 - baixos.</p> <p>Atès el que disposa l'article 30, Núm. 2, apartat a) del Reglament d'Activitats Molestes, Insalubres, Nòcives i Perilloses, de 30 de novembre de 1961, s'exposa aquesta sol·licitud a informació pública durant un termini de deu dies naturals, perquè qui es consideri afectat per la indústria esmentada, pugui efectuar les observacions i les reclamacions que cregui convenientes. Es podrà examinar l'expedient a la Secretaria d'aquest Ajuntament durant les hores d'oficina.</p> <p>Balaguer, a vint-i-set de novembre de 1987.-L'Alcalde (il·legible).</p> <p>Número de Registro 6808</p>	<p>me Albent i Baira.</p> <p>Tercer.- Notificar aquest Decret als interessats, els quals s'entendrà que accepten les delegacions efectuades si en el termini de 5 dies hàbils comptadors des de l'endemà de la notificació no manifesten la seva oposició.</p> <p>Quart.- Donar compte d'aquest Decret al Ple i publicar-lo en el Butlletí Oficial de la Província.</p> <p>Assí ho mana el Sr. Alcalde en lloc i data indicats.- L'Alcalde, M. Verdery.- Rubricat.- Davant meu: El Secretari, E. Vicent.- Rubricat.- Hi ha estampat el segell que utilitza aquest Ajuntament.</p> <p>Tremp, a 28 de novembre de 1987.-L'Alcalde, signat: Miquel Verdery i Toña.</p> <p>Número de Registro 6826</p>
<p>LLEIDA EDICTE</p> <p>Aprovat per l'Excm. Ajuntament Ple en sessió celebrada el dia 27 de novembre de 1987, l'expedient de Modificacions de Crèdits en el Pressupost Municipal 1987 (111) per un import de 99.781.777.- Ptes.</p> <p>L'esmentat expedient segons allò que disposa l'article 446.1 del Reial Decret Legislatiu 781-1987 de 18 d'abril, s'exposa al públic per plaig de quinze dies hàbils, durant els quals s'admetran reclamacions i suggeriments d'acord amb aquesta Corporació.</p> <p>Lleida, 28 de novembre de 1987.-El Paer en Cap, signat: Manuel Oronich i Miravet.</p> <p>Número de Registro 6845</p>	<p>TREMP EDICTE</p> <p>Aquesta Alcaldia amb data 27 de novembre de 1987, ha dictat el següent:</p> <p>«Decret N.º 62.- Font ús de les competències que em conferiren els articles 21.3 de la L. 785 de 2 d'abril (B.O.E. del 3) 43 a 45 i 114 a 118 del R.D. 2.568/86 de 28 de novembre (B.O.E. del 22 de desembre) i d'altres concordants.</p> <p>HE RESOLT:</p> <p>Primer.- Efectuar les delegacions específiques que a continuació s'esmentaran.</p> <p>Segon.- Acceptar la renúncia presentada per Isabel Majoral i Carrobo el dia 20 d'octubre amb el Núm. 1.240 i en conseqüència deixar sense efecte la delegació de Tàrea d'ensenyament efectuada al seu favor pel Decret Núm. 34 de 27-7-87.</p> <p>Segon.- Efectuar les delegacions específiques que a continuació s'esmentaran.</p> <p>Aquestes delegacions comporten les facultats de dirigir i gestionar en general els serveis però sense resoldre mitjançant actes administratius. Quant a l'ordenació de despeses i llevat que es modifiqui s'entendrà al que disposen les bases d'execució del pressupost.</p> <p>Delegacions que s'efectuen:</p> <p>Arca.- Titular de la delegació.</p> <p>- Serveis Socials.- Comprèn servei municipal de Llar d'Infants, Escola de Música, serveis socials de base i altres serveis relacionats.- Isabel Majoral i Carrobo.</p> <p>- Ensenyament.- Comprèn centres escolars, educació i altres temes relacionats.- Victor Orell i Ambrosio.</p> <p>- Polítics agregats.- Comprèn la gestió i agilització dels temes relacionats amb els municipis agregats, combinació d'un consell de representants dels municipis i altres temes relacionats.- Ju-</p>	<p>me Albent i Baira.</p> <p>Tercer.- Notificar aquest Decret als interessats, els quals s'entendrà que accepten les delegacions efectuades si en el termini de 5 dies hàbils comptadors des de l'endemà de la notificació no manifesten la seva oposició.</p> <p>Quart.- Donar compte d'aquest Decret al Ple i publicar-lo en el Butlletí Oficial de la Província.</p> <p>Assí ho mana el Sr. Alcalde en lloc i data indicats.- L'Alcalde, M. Verdery.- Rubricat.- Davant meu: El Secretari, E. Vicent.- Rubricat.- Hi ha estampat el segell que utilitza aquest Ajuntament.</p> <p>Tremp, a 28 de novembre de 1987.-L'Alcalde, signat: Miquel Verdery i Toña.</p> <p>Número de Registro 6826</p>

Source: BOP Lleida December 10th 1987

Specifically, from the three first candidates of the expected winning lists, take the name or family name more unusual (less common), because there is a high level of probabilities that one of these candidates to become Mayor or Deputy Mayor. Image number 4 shows the result after filtering using the name of the candidate number one of the CIU's list for the County Capital Tremp. To pay attention that this was published seven months after the local elections


Tarragona. (<https://www.diputaciodeltarragona.cat/ebop/>)

Any document was digitalized. We were allowed to use any technical device for keeping the records, but the province has few municipalities so we decided to work like in Barcelona, which means reading each page of the 6 months after the elections, searching for any relevant information.

In general, an extra difficulty when searching for data, is the lack of standardization. This issue takes place because not all the municipalities are publishing the same kind of acts in the Official Gazette, and it is still worsened because for the same act, they not always use the same terminology.

In the following example, from the 1999's elections, image 5, two municipalities (Abrera and Badia del Vallès) reproduced the act of entitling the Deputy Mayors, but one classified the Act as EDICTE (edict), while the other uses the act type ANUNCI (Announcement). In fact, the Edict must be signed by the Mayor, while an Announcement has to be signed by a Delegate Councillor, but the same act, in this case naming the Deputy Mayors, can be published under both forms, which makes more difficult any research for a given document.

Image 5. Edict and Announcement. Different names for the same legal action



Source: BOP Barcelona, July and August 1999

The electoral process for the Municipalities is repeated every four years in a strict and standard way, so it is not comprehensible the level of freedom of the local Secretaries (City Lawyer) in naming the documents issued by the Plenary of the City Council. As an extra issue for the research, if willing to trace the political evolution of a candidate, there is also a high level of freedom when making the names public. The Spanish Citizens must hold an identity card, where the official name is written, and no nicknames are accepted. This is the name used for any relation with the administration. However, in the electoral process, the candidates can use their nicknames, as seen in image number 6.

Image 6. Nicknames used in electoral list

<p>PARTIT DELS SOCIALISTES DE CATALUNYA (PSC-PSOE) – PROGRÈS MUNICIPAL (PSC-PM)</p> <p>Candidatura número: 156</p> <p>01. Pere Gatmau Roca 02. Concepció Garnica Rovira. "Araceli" 03. Teresa Güesta Riera 04. Josep Antoni Ajustes Atero 05. Francesc Reixachs Escolà 06. Andreu Morales Bermejo 07. Marta Navarra Núñez 08. Josep Maria Mene Mansilla 09. Victoria Rodríguez Faks "Viky" 10. Josep Antoni Moncada Ferragut</p> <p>BOP 26th of <u>April</u> 2011 Mollerussa</p>	<p>CIRCUMSCRIPCIÓ ELECTORAL: PALAFOLLS</p> <p>Candidatura nombre: 1</p> <p>INICIATIVA PER CATALUNYA VERDS-ESQUERA UNIDA I ALTERNATIVA-ENTESA (ICV-EUIA-E)</p> <p>Ordre Nom i cognoms</p> <p>1. Senyor JUAN ANDRES OSORIO PIÑEIRO 2. Senyor ALEJANDRO GIL BAYO 3. Senyora TAMARA VERGEL BORREGO 4. Senyora MONICA MOLDERO CASO 5. Senyor OSCAR MARTÍN LÓPEZ 6. Senyor MARIANO MARIA MAÑÉ MAS 7. Senyora IMMACULADA ORTEGA CARRASCO</p> <p>BOP 26th of <u>April</u> 2011 Palafolls</p>
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
Source: Official Gazette of the Girona Province

2.f) The Municipal Archive

Not many cities have a proper archive. Actually just few answered to our emails asking for the availability of specific documents, even though we had some replies after contacting them on the phone. The fact is that only big cities have an archive. That is to say that an archive needs an archivist taking care of it in order to have the documents ready for the needs of the administration but also available for the citizens, and this is an economic cost which is not always recognized as necessary although being mandatory.

A well-organized archive, like the one of Igualada, makes easier to have the opportunity of working with hand written documents like the one in image number 7.

Image 7. Handwritten document from 1979



Fifth Agreement (Cinquè): To put the Catalan flag alongside the Spanish one in the schools and the municipal buildings

Source: Igualada's Register, May the 14th, 1979

2.g) The County Archive

Each County has its own archive but not all of them contain in their files the same kind of documents. The best documents, for our research purposes, were the local magazines or journals, as image 8, whereas some of them were produced by the municipality, some were created by private entities. Just a few archives had stored and sorted out this type of documents, where you can read not only the composition of a new Plenary, but also the criticism to it.

When visiting the different County Archives, we have seen from magnificent new buildings, to rooms without natural light in old premises with a high level of humidity, from brand new electronic systems to broken old PC's and prehistoric photocopiers, from very well organized archive systems, to old cardboard handwritten register never enough updated, which made impossible the task of retrieving the requested documents. Also from coming across responsible persons who gave us their business card and an official email address, to those offering you a Gmail or Hotmail email address since the official one was not working properly. Sometimes it was a real mess, with a variety of conditions for equivalent services. This reality could be an example of a "complicated and redundant" (Solé Tura, 1985) decentralization, which is deployed all along the different levels of the Administrations, not only at political but also at organizational level.

Image 8 La Voz del Penedès May the 5th, 1979



Source: on-line Penedès' County Archive

As a general remark and after more than one year visiting different institutions, observing their behaviour, capacities and services, we should request from the responsible authorities or

managers to assume the role of standardizing and optimizing the resources in their hands, in order to avoid local decisions taken with a lack of a global vision of the needs of the Country and their citizens.

2.h) Interviews to politicians

In order to bring some qualitative value to the research, and to be able to establish some contrast with the final conclusions, some local politicians have been interviewed.

Each interview had the same structure, which started firstly with an introduction to the study, explaining them the fieldwork and the main goals, secondly, asking them about their view on the local politics, in terms of negotiation, expectations, satisfaction, and so on. Finally, showing them some graphs and tables about the specificities of the Deputy Mayor, Gender un-equality, importance of the departments and cooperation patterns.

Each interview has been adapted to the requirements and interests of the local politicians. In terms of timing, each interview lasted from one to three hours, and the time devoted for each specific matter was according to their own decision.

Within the text, the references to each one of the politicians will be made in footnotes, by using the name between brackets []

The interviews were performed in January and February 2014, to the following politicians:

- Josep Salom [JSalom]. CiU. Mayor of Tona 2007-2011 and from 2011.
Councillor since 1999
Member of the Diputació of Barcelona, Deputee in the area of Sports.
- Josep Mayoral [JMayoral]. PSC. Mayor of Granollers 2004-2007, 2007-2011 and from 2011
Councillor since 1979
Vice-president of the Diputació of Barcelona 2009-2011
In 1983, being elected, renounced, since he was the director of a public school in town, and it was not legal to be a city employee and at the same time to participate in the government.
- Jordi Solé [JSole]- ERC. Mayor of Caldes de Montbui 2007-2011 and from 2011.
Deputee in the Parliament of Catalonia since 2012.

Molins de Rei

- Jordi Romeu [JRomeu]. ICV. Councillor 1987-2003 2007-2011 and from 2011
The right name of the group is Esquerra x Molins. This is a list with ICV as main reference, but very near to the ERC positions. Surprisingly, the office of the group in the City Hall was decorated with flags for the independence of Catalonia, and a picture of the President Macià, the leader of ERC and President of the Generalitat of

Catalonia before the Civil War. The 6th of June 2014, they announced the dissolution of the party, which was no going to participate in the 2015 elections.


- Josep Janés [JJanes]. ICV. Mayor 1991-1995, 1995-1999 and 1999-2003. He was the director of the high school in town, and several parties asked him to become their candidate. He only accepted under two premises, the first one to make a joint list, and the second one to have veto rights¹⁵.
- Alexandre Maymó [AMaymo]. CUP. Number one of the list in 2007 and 2011

The specificity of Molins de Rei, for anything relating to the parties holding power and participating in the elections since 1979, made it an interesting study case.

The County of Baix Llobregat, in the so called Red Belt of Barcelona, is the kingdom of the left wing parties, specifically the more Spanish centric factions, since the County concentrates a high percentage of population who immigrated from other Spanish regions attracted by the job opportunities offered by the industry of the region, from the 60's.

We can extract that in Molins de Rei, graph number 7, as many of the other towns/cities within the County, the local governments have always been in the hands of the PSC/PSOE, or ICV, with the only exceptions of the towns having in their territory some high standard urbanizations, which inhabitants prefer to vote the conservative party CIU¹⁶.

Graph 7. Party of the Mayor. Baix Llobregat County



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Anyway, there is a difference of great interest in Molins de Rei. Only two cities in this County had lists of the CUP, which is a radical left wing party clearly positioned for the independence of

¹⁵ [JJanes] explained us the difficulties for someone like him, out of the discipline of the parties, to survive to such expectation of the party leaders.
¹⁶ Pallejà, as a good example, is a Municipality with several "Urbanitzacions", which are urbanized areas separated of the urban continuum. The services of this kind of residential areas are provided by the municipality but being always difficult and expensive to manage, since they cannot participate of the common public services. One of them is Fontpineda, with high standard neighbours, ideologically far from any leftist political options.

Catalonia, having participated in the local elections in 2007 and 2011. One was Martorell, the capital of the County, with a Mayor which belonged to CIU, and the other one was Molins de Rei. On top of this, in 2007 the party had one Councillor in Molins de Rei, and in 2011 the CUP succeeded to place 4 Councillors in the City Council, which were the only ones in the whole County. In 2011 only 20 Catalan Municipalities had Councillors from the CUP, most of them in Counties with a stronger traditional support to the options favourable for the independence of Catalonia, despite the fact that in Barcelona or its influence area, they never succeeded to get enough votes to have Councillors in the City Councils. The bias of the city is also noticed in the streets, where, opposite to most of their neighbour cities, most of the people, most of the children, and most of the shops use the Catalan language as the common language, since in the vast majority of the cities of Baix Llobregat the Spanish language is leading in the daily relationships between citizens. This can be appreciated in table number 5, where any skill relating the knowledge and use of the Catalan language has a higher percentage in Molins de Rei than the average of the Baix Llobregat County, but also than the average of the whole Catalonia. It is important to notice that the main difference in behalf of Molins de Rei is in the capacity of writing, the more complex of the group.

Table 5. Skills in Catalan language in Molins de Rei

Skills in Catalan language	Molins de Rei	Baix Llobregat	Catalonia
Understands	97,70%	94,26%	95,12%
Speaks	82,08%	67,97%	73,16%
Reads	84,12%	75,34%	78,71%
Writes	65,11%	52,02%	55,70%
Doesn't understands	2,30%	5,74%	4,88%

Source: Author's elaboration on data from idescat 2011

When talking with the politicians from Molins de Rei, we can establish a direct connection between such special sociological specificity, and the two main reasons given by them. One of them is the fact that there have always been, since many years, two main Real State agencies in Molins de Rei, one of them having the main part of the market. This agency is owned by a man who has taken care, through the years, of renting or selling apartments and houses, mainly, to people born in the same town, which has meant blocking the massive entrance of immigrants. Another reason could be the existence of a number of local entities and associations, which are rooted upon traditions, much more than in any of the nearby cities, which constitutes the backbone of the social structure of the local society, which is able to integrate the minoritarian, that is to say, mostly, job seeking, immigration.

We must say that the result of the several meetings with the different politicians of Molins de Rei was very fruitful, but in the opposite sense than the expected one. We couldn't perceive any difference with any other local politician, this is to say that the people engaged in local politics is there, mainly, to serve their neighbours, accepting, understanding and promoting any local specificity which use to be, often, the result of some historical events, or the result of a series of coincidences.

3- The database

The aim of the fieldwork was to collect primary information in order to create a database containing detailed information about the councillors getting a seat in each one of the municipalities since 1979

We created a database with the following 21 fields:

Table 6. Structure of the Database

Field Description	Example	Origin
Year	1979	
Municipality Name	Abrera	
Municipality Official Code	0800180001	
County Name	Baix Llobregat	
County Official Code	11	
Province Name	Barcelona	
Range of Population	10.000 – 20.000	
Name of the Party	ENTESA MUNICIPAL DE ABRERA	
Acronym	EMDA	
Grouping Acronym	OTH	
Grouping Code	6	
Ranking of the candidate in the list	3	
Name of the Candidate	JOSE	
Family Name 1	ALMANSA	
Family Name 2	FRANCO	
Gender	Male	
Number of parties in Coalition	3	
Total number of Councillors in the Plenary	11	
Belongs to the party of the Mayor	Yes	
Charge	First Deputy Mayor	
Department	Employment, Youth, Leisure	




Image 9. Official Gazette Barcelona Province March the 12ve, 1979




Image 10. Abrera Municipal Monthly magazine June 1979

Only the first City Council constituted after the elections has been recorded, not taking into consideration any change of parties or Councillors which occurred during the four years of mandate.

The Municipalities used for the study, and the party Mayors are the following¹⁷: We will start with a total of 11 Counties of the Barcelona province, including 80 towns and cities, displayed in table 6. There is a clear dominance of the red colour (PSC) in Baix Llobregat, Barcelonès, Vallès Occidental and Vallès Oriental, and also a lot of green colour (ICV). The Barcelona Province has traditionally concentrated the leftist vote. Less Mayors from CIU (orange colour) and ERC (yellow colour). The PP (light blue) has hold for many years the position of Mayor in Sant Andreu de Llaveneres, as their only Catalan City.

Table 7. Municipalities under study and Mayor's party. Barcelona province

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Barcelona	Alt Penedès	Sant Sadurní d'Anoia	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Vilafranca del Penedès	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Anoia	Igualada	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Piera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Bages	Vilanova del Camí	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Manresa	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Baix Llobregat	Sant Joan de Vilatorrada	Abrera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
			Castelldefels	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
		Corbera de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Cornellà de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		El Prat de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Esparreguera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Esplugues de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Gavà	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Martorell	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Molins de Rei	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Olesa de Montserrat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Pallejà	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Sant Andreu de la Barca	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Sant Boi de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Sant Feliu de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Sant Joan Despí	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Sant Just Desvern	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
	Sant Vicenç dels Horts	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
	Vallirana	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
	Viladecans	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
	Barcelonès	Badalona	Badalona	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
			Barcelona	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
		L'Hospitalet de Llobregat	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Santa Coloma de Gramenet	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Berguedà	Sant Adrià del Besòs	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Berga	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Garraf	Cubelles	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Sant Pere de Ribes	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Maresme	Sitges	Sitges	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
			Vilanova i la Geltrú	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
		Arenys de Mar	Arenys de Mar	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
			Argentona	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
		Calells	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Canet de Mar	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
El Masnou		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Malgrat de Mar		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Mataró		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Montgat		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Pineda de Mar		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Premià de Mar		Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Sant Andreu de Llaveneres	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red			
Osona	Tordera	Tordera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
		Vilassar de Mar	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	
	Manlleu	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
	Torelló	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		
Vic	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red			

¹⁷ In Annex I the colour code is explained

County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Vallès Occidental	Badia del Vallès									
	Barberà del Vallès									
	Castellar del Vallès									
	Castellbisbal									
	Cerdanyola del Vallès									
	Montcada i Reixac									
	Palau-Solità i Plegamans									
	Ripollet									
	Rubí									
	Sabadell									
	Sant Cugat del Vallès									
	Sant Quirze del Vallès									
	Santa Perpètua de Mogod									
	Terrassa									
Vallès Oriental	Caldes de Montbui									
	Canovelles									
	Cardedeu									
	Granollers									
	La Garriga									
	La Llagosta									
	La Roca del Vallès									
	Les Franqueses del Vallès									
	Lliçà d'Amunt									
	Mollet del Vallès									
	Montornès del Vallès									
	Parets del Vallès									
	Sant Celoni									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In table number 8 we can see the 8 Counties of the Girona province, with 20 municipalities. The colour changes into orange, meaning Mayors belonging to the CIU lists, and the green is almost gone, so the Mayors from ICV. It shows a conservative Catalanist bias, since the presence of the PP, representing the Spanish centric conservatives is extremely limited.

Table 8. Municipalities under study and Mayor's party. Girona province

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Girona	Alt Empordà	Castelló d'Empúries									
		Figueres									
		L'Escala									
	Baix Empordà	Roses									
		Calonge									
		Castell-Platja d'Aro									
		La Bisbal d'Empordà									
		Palafrugell									
		Palamós									
		Sant Feliu de Guíxols									
	Cerdanya	Torroella de Montgrí									
		Puigcerdà									
	Garrotxa	Olot									
		Girona									
	Gironès	Salt									
		Banyoles									
	Pla de l'Estany	Ripoll									
		Blanes									
	Selva	Lloret de Mar									
		Santa Coloma de Farners									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In table number 9 we can appreciate the colours of the 11 Counties of the Province of Lleida, the more rural Province, and 11 towns and cities, since most of the Counties are rural and the towns very small, so only the County Capital participates in the study, even being smaller than 10.000 inhabitants. Only Lleida, the capital of the Province has more than 10.000 inhabitants, and is the only one with a continuous tradition of Socialist Mayors.

Table 9. Municipalities under study and Mayor's party. Lleida province

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Lleida	Alt Urgell	La Seu d'Urgell									
	Alta Ribagorça	El Pont de Suert									
	Garrigues	Les Borges Blanques									
	Noguera	Balaguer									
	Pallars Jussà	Tremp									
	Pallars Sobirà	Sort									
	Pla d'Urgell	Mollerussa									
	Segarra	Cervera									
	Segrià	Lleida									
	Solsonès	Solsona									
	Urgell	Tàrraga									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Finally, Table number 10 contains the 10 Counties of the Tarragona Province, and 20 towns/cities. The main evidence is the higher presence of the IND parties (in dark blue) compared to any other province. This over-activity of the IND parties in the Province of Tarragona will be studied in the chapter devoted to the IND parties.

Table 10. Municipalities under study and Mayor's party. Tarragona province

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Tarragona	Alt Camp	Valls									
		Cambrils									
	Baix Camp	Mont-roig del Camp									
		Reus									
		Deltebre									
	Baix Ebre	Tortosa									
		Calafell									
	Baix Penedès	Cunit									
		El Vendrell									
		Montblanc									
	Conca de Barberà	Alcanar									
		Amposta									
	Montsià	Sant Carles de la Ràpita									
		Falset									
	Priorat	Móra d'Ebre									
	Ribera d'Ebre	Salou									
		Tarragona									
	Tarragonès	Torredembarra									
		Vila-Seca									
		Gandesa									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

This makes a total of 40 Counties out of 41, because Vielha e Mijaran was excluded, and 131 Municipalities.

In the ANNEX number III there is a table detailing the number of parties in coalition in each municipality and year.

When all the collected records were imputed in the database, it created 8.778 lines, per 21 columns, as displayed in table number 6, so a total of 184.338 records coming from primary sources.

To complete the database, we used the ICPS's (Institut Català de Ciències Polítiques i Socials) databank, which brought 1.721 more lines, but covering only seven of the fields, meaning that it will only be valid for gender analysis, and partially for morphology. As an example, in table number 7, there is information concerning the Party of the Mayor in any town/city of the

Barcelona Province, thanks to the ICPS databank, but the database does not contains information about the Councillors or the parties in coalition for the same cities.

According to the quality and completeness of the records, and looking at the initial database only with the data extracted from the primary sources, we can classify it in three groups in a time line, as visible in table number 11.

Table 11 Percentage of municipalities with information from primary sources per year

1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
36,72%	41,09%	73,85%	70,00%	75,57%	90,08%	91,60%	100,00%	100,00%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

A first group for the years 1979 and 1983 with an extremely limited set of information available, a second group from 1987 till 1995, with a certain volume of records, and the last one from 1999 till 2011, which is almost complete. Table number 12 shows, in white colour, the missing records once the data collection from primary sources was finished.

Table 12. Missing records -in white colour-

Inhabitants	Name	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
1- < 10.000	El Pont de Suert									
	L'Escala									
	Móra d'Ebre									
	Puigcerdà									
	Sort									
2- 10.000 a 20.000	Alcanar									
	Badia del Vallès									
	Berga									
	Calonge									
	Castellbisbal									
	Castelló d'Empúries									
	Castell-Platja d'Aro									
	Corbera de Llobregat									
	Cubelles									
	La Bisbal d'Empordà									
	La Seu d'Urgell									
	Sant Andreu de Llavaneres									
	Sant Carles de la Ràpita									
	Santa Coloma de Farners									
3- 20.000 a 50.000	Vallirana									
	El Masnou									
	Lloret de Mar									
	Manlleu									
	Salou									
	Salt									
	Sant Andreu de la Barca									
	Sant Joan Despí									
	Santa Perpètua de Mogoda									
	Sitges									
	Vic									
	Vilafranca del Penedès									
	4- 50.000 a 100.000	Castelldefels								
Rubí										
5- > 100.000	Sant Cugat del Vallès									
	Badalona									
	Lleida									
	Mataró									
	Tarragona									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In fact, the main source of information of the two first elections, in 1979 and in 1983, were the magazines retrieved in the County Archives, and a few Websites of the Municipalities which have some information stored and available, but this is not related to the size of the town/city.

In table number 12, the white cells indicate that there is no information at all for the year in the column. It can be confirmed that this is not a matter related to the size of the municipality, but it has to do with the quality of the City or County archives. It is simply unbelievable that in the four cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants in the mentioned table, there is no one single organization printing a magazine about the activity of the city. It is basically because nobody took care of archiving and making the archive available for the citizens.

The distribution per provinces it is quite identical, when looking at the whole universe, in table number 13

Table 13. Percentage of municipalities with information from primary sources per province

	available	total	completeness
Barcelona	553	720	76,81%
Girona	128	180	71,11%
Lleida	75	99	75,76%
Tarragona	130	180	72,22%
TOTAL	886	1179	75,15%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The total of 1.179 observations is the result of multiplying 131 towns and cities under the scope of the study, by 9, the number of local electoral contests within the timeframe of the study. There is a quantitative improvement when adding up the records provided by the ICPS, visible in table number 14, but only thanks to the records relating the province of Barcelona, because there were few records available for Municipalities in the other three Provinces within the ICPS databank.

Table 14. Municipalities with information from primary sources and ICPS per year

1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
75,00%	74,42%	86,15%	83,85%	91,60%	96,18%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The percentages per provinces are shown in table 15, also having added the extra records retrieved in the ICPS's databank'.

Table 15. Municipalities with information from primary sources and ICPS per province

	available	total	completeness
Barcelona	716	720	99,44%
Girona	130	180	72,22%
Lleida	76	99	76,77%
Tarragona	130	180	72,22%
TOTAL	1052	1179	89,23%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The figure of 1052 observations will be used many times within the study, since there is valid information for most of the analysis performed in all the events (town/electoral year).

Once the database was complete, the next hard work was to standardize the names of the Portfolios. In total we registered 1.733 different names, used since 1979, for recognizing the Portfolios and/or Municipal Departments. We needed to be able to assign each one of the 1.733 names, to the 24 common portfolios used within the years of the study. We made a fist selection based on extracting key-words from each name, but the variety was too high for getting a useful result, so the only way was to do it manually, that is to say, one by one.

The improvement of the information may be also seen in table number 15, which is the update of the table number 16, including the ICPS records.

Table 16. Missing records -in white colour-, including ICPS databank

Inhabitants	Name	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
1- < 10.000	El Pont de Suert									
	L'Escala									
	Móra d'Ebre									
	Puigcerdà									
	Sort									
2- 10.000 a 20.000	Alcanar									
	Badia del Vallès									
	Berga									
	Calonge									
	Castellbisbal									
	Castelló d'Empúries									
	Castell-Platja d'Aro									
	Corbera de Llobregat									
	Cubelles									
	La Bisbal d'Empordà									
	La Seu d'Urgell									
	Sant Andreu de Llavanera									
	Sant Carles de la Ràpita									
	Santa Coloma de Farners									
	Vallirana									
3- 20.000 a 50.000	El Masnou									
	Lloret de Mar									
	Manlleu									
	Salou									
	Salt									
	Sant Andreu de la Barca									
	Sant Joan Despí									
	Santa Perpètua de Mogoda									
	Sitges									
	Vic									
	Vilafranca del Penedès									
4- 50.000 a 100.000	Castelldefels									
	Rubí									
	Sant Cugat del Vallès									
5- > 100.000	Badalona									
	Lleida									
	Mataró									
	Tarragona									

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

4- The Survey about the importance of the portfolios

Since we wanted to focus on “which” portfolios, rather than dealing with “how many”, it was important to know which portfolios were considered more important by the members of the City Councils. For us it was not of main interest to perform a regression in order to establish the relationship between portfolio salience and the proportionality of the payoffs. We expected to deepen in the relation between any portfolio and the position of Mayor, as Warwick and Druckman did, but we can't forget their conclusion relating the position of prime minister, “...*the relative value of the prime ministership: it becomes nearly six times as valuable as the typical other portfolio. In fact, it would have to be more than four times as valuable just to produce any significant over-compensation at all...*” (Warwick & Druckman, 2001, p. 648)

Having said that, we couldn't retrieve any recent paper or survey which brought some clarity to the evaluation of the portfolios, which thing was needed for being able to assign a certain level of power to the members of a government. This classification was required to transform a portfolio name into a figure showing the level of power acquired by the holder of the portfolio in relation to any other, as well as having the possibility of comparing, at least, limited to a more/less ranking relationship. By objectivizing the value of the portfolio, it opens the door to establish some comparisons between the payoffs of the coalesced parties, the *formateur* and the minor ones, and it also gives the chance to compare the payoffs received per gender or per any other variable.

Bearing in mind the importance of such a goal, we started a new research in order to get the relative portfolio salience evaluated. The option was to perform a survey among the active Councillors, and the only available option for performing it was via email. This means that we had to surf each one of the websites of the municipalities under study in order to obtain the City Council's members email addresses. This information, or database, was not available in the public bodies of the administration. At the level of the Diputacions there are some files, which are limited to the email address of the Mayors of the municipalities.

In March 2012, for such a purpose, an enquiry was sent to the 813 Mayors, Deputy Mayors and Councillors, in government or opposition, whose email addresses were available in the websites of the Municipalities, which means only 55 out of 131. 240 answers were collected in a Google Docs enquiry, of which 232 had the required data integrity. Copy and details can be seen in ANNEX VI

Taking into consideration that 1.322 was the number of Councillors in government in 2011 in the 131 Municipalities, so the Universe, 232 answers were the sample. Requiring a Confidence Level of 95%, it represents a Margin of Error of +/- 5,84%

The message was asking them to answer an enquiry related to a Doctoral Dissertation, with the aim of exploring the importance of the different areas of responsibility in a municipality.


For demographical purposes they had to inform us about Gender and County, which allows us to understand to what extent the preferences are gender related. Actually, this objective was not explained in the message, on purpose.

They had to answer according to a limited list of 24 responsibilities (Health, Environmental affairs, Social Services, Economy, New Technologies....), all common in the current structure of the local governments existing in 2007 and 2011.

The answers came from politicians in 28 Counties, 42,24% of which were from women.

The correlation coefficient between gender and portfolio was 0,1333, so no correlation at all, resulting that the importance is not gender related. As far as there is no connection between Portfolio and gender, we will use the overall classification, as it is displayed in Graph number 8, for classifying the importance of the Departments/Portfolios

Graph 8. Level of importance assigned by the Councillors to the Portfolios



Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

Looking at the graph resulting from the answers of the Councillors, there is a clear and more important responsibility:

- Economy (including taxes)

And there is a list of the six main ones,

- Urban Planning
- Social Services
- Economic Promotion
- Public Works and Maintenance (including the water supply and services)
- Governance (Internal Services, Fire Brigade and Local Police¹⁸)


¹⁸ We received two radically different points of view about the local police. From one side some of the politicians preferred no to have information from the activity of the police, since as one said: "you know your city in day time, but with the daily reports of the local police you discover the other one, the night time city, which is terrible, when you know the name of the one who mistreats his wife, the ones in the drug business...". In the other side, the Mayor [JMayoral] recognizing two needs for knowing the pulse of the city: the daily report of the local police and reading two or three requests of the citizens, randomly selected every day.

- Education

Any other was only selected by a minority of the Councillors.

If analysing per County, no differences are noticeable, other than in Vallès Oriental and Vallès Occidental, which are located in the second ring of the Metropolitan area of Barcelona city, they consider the Social Services to be the second one in importance, but maintaining Economy as the main one, as it is displayed in graph number 9


Graph 9. Five more important portfolios. Vallès Oriental and Occidental



Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

In graph number 10, referred to the five more important portfolios according to the answers received from the Councillors of municipalities within the Baix Llobregat County, Urban Planning equals the importance of Economy, but also Urban Housing is considered to be one of the main five, which is telling us about the need of urban organization of a County which has received a huge volume of immigrants during the last decades.

Graph 10. Five more important portfolios. Baix Llobregat



Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

In the following table, number 17, it is possible to notice, while maintaining the general structure of preferences, a different way of understanding the importance by a number of Councillors.

In the first column we can see the departments which received the higher scores as “the more important”. In the second column the answer to the “second more important”, according to what the Councillor answered to the previous one. The same structure is valid for the third column.

As an example, 10 Councillors voted Economy as number 1, Urban Planning as number 2 and Social Services as number 3 in importance. We may interpret different ways Councillors understand how to approach servicing the community, which seems to be linked to a kind of intellectual or professional bias.¹⁹

Table 17. Preferences of the Councilors in terms of importance of the Departments

The more important	Second more important	Third more important	#
1-Economy	2-Urban Planning	3-Social Services	10
		4-Economic Promotion	4
		11-Participation	3
		5-Public Works and Maintenance	3
	3-Social Services	4-Economic Promotion	6
		2-Urban Planning	3
		7-Education	3
		5-Public Works and Maintenance	2
	4-Economic Promotion	3-Social Services	5
		2-Urban Planning	3
		7-Education	1
		5-Public Works and Maintenance	1
	6-Governance	2-Urban Planning	2
		3-Social Services	2
		7-Education	2
		17-Society of Knowledge	1
2-Urban Planning	1-Economy	13-Culture	7
		4-Economic Promotion	3
		9-Security	1
		11-Participation	1
	3-Social Services	6-Governance	1
		7-Education	1
		13-Culture	1
		1-Economy	1
	4-Economic Promotion	4-Economic Promotion	1
		11-Participation	1
		13-Culture	1
		1-Economy	1
	13-Culture	7-Education	2
		1-Economy	2
3-Social Services	7-Education	4-Economic Promotion	3
		1-Economy	3
		11-Participation	1
		13-Culture	1
		14-Environment	1
	1-Economy	4-Economic Promotion	1
		2-Urban Planning	1
		9-Security	1
		7-Education	1
		13-Culture	1
		6-Governance	1
	2-Urban Planning	1-Economy	1
		4-Economic Promotion	1
		7-Education	1

Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

There are some specific issues to pay attention:

Only when the first election is Social Services they select Education as for the second one, and Environment as third. Culture is only the selected one when the first option is Urban Planning or

¹⁹ Some of the interviewed politicians confirmed the need of some professional knowledge for succeeding in managing some of the departments, being Urban Planning the best example, in the sense that when the Councillor has not technical knowledge, the department tends to be managed by the official architect of the municipality, making very difficult, or impossible, to apply the party policies.

Social Services. When the first choice is Economic promotion, Commerce is not the second one, but the third one. Anyway, nobody selected Commerce in one of the three positions.

This variable will be used in order to understand how the power is distributed among the parties in coalition, in the sense that Economy is the main option for any party willing to have some visibility among their voters.

For the purposes of the study, once the names of the Portfolios were standardized and ranked, each Councillor received the number of the higher responsibility assigned for the mandate, under the so called "*delegated responsibilities*", since the Mayor is the only one having all the responsibilities, and the Councillors can exercise a certain portfolio only after the legal delegation of the Mayor.

II- Theoretical Context

1- Definitions

Definition: “A political coalition is an association between political entities, time bounded, for the consecution of specific goals by joint action” (Márquez Cruz, 2007, p. 75), clarifying that “the collaboration is usually time bounded, in relation to the goals, or it can go through several mandates”

Paying attention to the moment in time that a coalition is negotiated and the agreement is made public, we can differentiate three modalities.

- Electoral coalitions, created before the elections, and for the sole goal of going together to certain elections, reinforcing the common goals and ideology
- Governmental coalitions, issued after the elections, when the results are known. The partners receive different portfolios according to the distribution and government agreements.
- Parliamentary coalitions, when no seats are occupied, but the party in power has a certain level of granted support, for creating *jumping majorities*.

The electoral coalitions are created for the presentation of its unique lists in the elections. The agreement about the positions in the list conditions the success (*office seeking*) of each party. The main example for the local elections is that the number one in the list will be the only one able to get the position of Mayor.

The governmental coalitions refer to the governments where the seats are occupied by members of different political parties. The governmental coalitions can be Minimum Winning, meaning as less parties as possible to have the Majority of the votes in the Plenary or Parliament, Oversized, which means including parties that would not be necessary to have the majority of the votes, or in Minority.

The Parliamentary coalitions are based on *ad-hoc* agreements, in the sense that, in general, are related to agreements linked to certain matters, but without sharing seats in the government.

In terms of political timing, each one corresponds to a different moment in reference to the elections date. While the electoral coalitions must be borne before the elections, for merging different parties in a single list, the governmental coalitions are the ones negotiated just after the elections in order to create a government in coalition, and the last ones, the parliamentary ones, for different purposes during the life of a mandate.

The three modalities are possible in the municipal government, but this study will concentrate on the governmental coalitions for two main reasons:

- To fulfil the aim of the study, since the coalition patterns in terms of who gets what, are the result of the Delegations, so a consequence of a government coalition.

- Because of documental simplicity. For knowing that a party takes part in a governmental coalition, the only need is to confirm whether a party gets a seat or not. For such a purpose there are only two legal documents to retrieve, the first one after the elections day, which is the Constitution of the City Council, and the second one, which contains the Delegations, in other words the distribution of Departments to each one of the elected Councillors.

In 1961 some new theories raised in order to explain the formation process of the political coalitions²⁰. Two different views are going to be described in the following points 2 and 3, being the first one the rational election, formal theories, linked to the theory of games (The formation process of a political coalition is treated as a normal social interaction. We can read Gramson (1961) W.H.Riker (1962), M. Leiserson (1966), A. de Swann (1973), K.Shepsle (1979), D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1988) and D.P. Baron (1989), among others), and the second one the multidimensional theories, willing to generalize based on real examples (The explanation of the coalitional phenomena goes beyond the mere description of the coalitional game), described by R. Axelrod (1970), E. Browne (1971 and 1973), M. Taylor (1972), V. Herman and J. Pope (1973), L. Dodd (1976), G. Pridham (1986), I. Budge and H. Keman (1990), M. Laver and N. Shofield (1990), K. Strom (1984 and 1990), or T. Bergman (1995)).

We must always bear in mind that the coalition governments and minority governments have been considered as a kind of second quality governments by many kind of lecturers through the years. In that sense, Dodd described the myth of multipartidism in the sense that multiparty parliaments are in minority or coalition governments, which are transitory governments, so multiparty systems must be rejected because of being transitory, while Laver and Schofield argued: " *With one or two notable exceptions they [the minority governments] have tended to be treated as pathologies, as deviations from the "norm" by which government parties control a majority of legislators. We will argue [...] that minority governments in Europe are simply one among several perfectly "normal" European manifestations of the politics of coalition*".

²⁰ Gamson in 1961 and Riker in 1962

2- The formal theories:

Each theoretical model explains by means of different variables the coalitional government to be created, and the reasons for such structure instead of any other possible option. Thus, each theoretical model will result in different explanations about the coalition types to be formed, according to the motivation and goals of the participating parties. The foundation ideas of such theories are the following basic assumptions:

- The participants in the coalitional process are political parties, which will be treated as unitary actors.
- The governmental coalitions must have a parliamentary majority
- Any combination of parties resulting in a winning coalition must be treated as a possible coalition
- The goals of the parties can be classified under two different types: to be rewarded by participating in the government, thus receiving portfolios, or to be able to influence the government policies.

Each one of the above assumptions will be explained in the following lines.

2.a) The political parties seen as unitary actors

“There is no doubt that the parties are not unitary actors, however this consideration has not a big impact in the theories based in the opposed assumption” (Reniu, 2001).

This is a basic issue for the researchers, in the sense that considering the parties as unitary actors solves the problem of who taking into consideration when trying to understand the coalition formation.

The internal divisions are considered as part of the *black box* of the parties, not necessarily to be taken into consideration when analysing the negotiation process. In fact, there is a high level of discipline within the parties in Europe²¹ (Budge & Herman, 1978).

In fact, this is a difficult area for researchers, because of the limitations created by the parties when having relations with the *external world* (Reniu, 2001), and because most of the factors impacting in the discipline and linearity of the behaviour are to be treated and analysed *ad-hoc*.

Nevertheless, the researchers have to face a scenario with a high level of fragmentation, and the complexity of a relationship network with *“various levels of direct and indirect participation by individual party leaders, party fractions, party study bureaus, and party bureaucrats. In addition to party-related actors, there are shifting roles for various economic and social groups. Not only are the actors diverse, but their roles are diverse and overlapping”* (Peterson & De Ridder, 1986). They must recognize that the parties are composed of sub-coalition or groups of activists who might disagree over the goals and how to pursue them (Kitschelt, 1989, p. 47), and

²¹ *“Parties are sometimes highly fractionalized. Counterbalancing this, factions are usually all committed to some broad objectives and they cannot drift too far in their main policies without seceding one from the other and suffering electoral consequences. Most parties do maintain a high degree of parliamentary cohesion, especially when they are in government. Thus treating them as single actors represented by their spokesman does not unduly distort reality”.*

that the party's governing faction is the coalition component that is better positioned to impose its preferences (Harmel & Tan, 2003, p. 411)

In order to be more specific and simplify the research, the scientists consider that a political party may be assumed as a unitary actor under two circumstances:

- A strong party leadership. The behaviour of the party leaders is conditioned by the need of generating a broad party consensus at the time of forming a coalition. Such consensus derives in payoffs for the activists of the party²² (Maor, 1995)
- A strong party discipline. The boundaries of the inter party negotiations are, basically, the need to satisfy the followers and the threat of an internal revolt of the members laying out of the government, being the worst effect, the existence of the faithless electors (Reniu, 1996, pp. 265-290), which status, keeping the seat but staying out of the party discipline is a conflict for the party and for the electors, we should bear in mind that in most democratic countries the vote is given to a list not to a candidate.

The difficulty is to know how unitary is going to be the behaviour of a party within a coalition negotiation, thus, the above circumstances will be, usually, hidden by the party to anyone external to the core of the organization.

Not to be forgotten that the party leaders are highly motivated by reaching portfolio, but also for maintaining their position as party leaders, so keeping the leadership, the unity and the internal cohesion of the party (Luebbert, 1983).

2.b) The coalition governments as majority governments

If the traditional starting point for considering a winning coalition is based on controlling the majority²³, thus "*containing over half the membership or votes or weight in the decision-making system*" (Riker, 1962, p. 256), there is a need for a different point of view for explaining the number of minority and oversized coalition governments.

It is relevant to know the expectations of the negotiating parties for understanding any kind of non-majority coalition, since the expectation of short term benefits should drive to the need of majority governments, in order to guarantee the continuity in power. Any other option, based on the long term view, and the wish of being visible while taking part of the government, mainly because it gives the chance of being an active policy maker, then any other option can be acceptable for governing apart from the majority government.

Parties based in *office-seeking (policy-blind)*, tend to maximize the short term benefits, because are the ones to fight for a majority since their goal is to be in power, while the parties seeking to implement their policies, so *policy-driven*, thus giving value to the long term results of their current decisions, are the ones to accept "*the influence differential between government and opposition*"²⁴ (Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 75), which can also condition the number of parties in coalition since "*If the parties are solely interested in the distribution of payoffs or office, such as*

²² In the sense that the organizational decentralization can explain the lack of consensus

²³ Riker (1962), Axelrod (1970), De Swan (1973), Dodd (1974), Franklin and Mackie (1984), Roberston (1986)

²⁴ "*Government incumbency tends to result in subsequent electoral losses... a decision to remain in opposition temporarily implies no lack of interest in governing in the long run, but rather a willingness to wait for more favourable circumstances*"

cabinet portfolios, then this would lead to a prediction that government coalitions would be minimal winning (MW). If motivations were defined by party ideology, then the natural prediction is that government coalitions would be minimal connected winning (MCW)" (Schoefield, 1993, p. 1)

Once it's known the policy-driven goal of the participants in the negotiation and the constraints, perfectly described for the 2010's UK coalition (Bennister & Heffernan, 2014), we can talk about *political viability*²⁵, and to be able to understand that the need of a majority is not the only resulting option in coalition formation, mainly because the parties in the opposition may influence with the so called "external support", based in government agreements signed by government and opposition parties.

A good example of the statement mentioned above is the agreement between the two main parties after the 2012 elections to the Parliament of Catalonia. The main party, CiU (30,7% of the votes and 37,04% of the seats), signed a parliamentary agreement with the main party of the opposition, ERC holding 15,5% of the seats²⁶ in the Parliament, but rejecting office, and giving priority to the political expectations of their supporters.

Graph 11. Seats distribution in the Catalan Parliament after the November 2012 elections



Source: www.gencat.cat

When an agreement makes the difference between majority and minority, we have to consider the so called "*formal minority governments*". In any other case we are in front of the "*substantive minority governments*" (Strom, 1984, pp. 204-205).

In that sense, we can notice that limiting the goal to a majority government is a constraint for analysing the different the coalitions, because of the variety of many other different options that can be accepted by the parties depending on their view on politics.

2.c) Any Winning Coalition (WC) is an option

According to the theory of games, which will try to predict the government formation based on n-persons games, but in fact ends up in a list of the options representing minimal winning

²⁵ No other alternative option can be considered as a "better solution"

²⁶ The leaders of both parties signed a pact covering the following items, and committing ERC to support the CiU government: 1- To approve the Declaration of Sovereignty of Catalonia in the first plenary of the Parliament. 2- To approve an Act for public consultations (end January 2013). 3- Open the negotiation process with the Spanish government in order to be able to exercise the Right to Decide (First Semester 2013). 4- To Create the Catalan Committee for the National Transition. 5- To call the citizens to a referendum in 2014.

coalitions, without any consideration to constraints, such as the political connection. This is an option that can only be considered if all the parties are in the fight for office, but anyway it will result in a list of options which mathematically represents a majority, out of any other consideration.

Advancing a view on the multidimensional theories, it is important to pay attention to the constraints, because the list of winning options will be reduced in a number of politically unnatural options, such as a coalition only with parties of the extreme left and the extreme right, having to pay attention to the politically viable ones. A constrainer element is *“any restriction on the set of feasible cabinet coalitions that is beyond the short-term control of the players”* (Strom, et al., 1994, p. 308)

Reniu²⁷ provides a list of the constraining factors²⁷ in the Spanish scene, some of them useful for the local arena in Catalonia (Reniu, 2001, pp. 26-27):

- In the national axis, not only the ideological distance must be considered, but also the distance and connection between parties, so as to in order to validate the viability of a coalition.
- For the Faithless elector, since the lists are blocked, in the sense that the electors don't vote the candidates, but the list as a whole, and the fact that the candidate participates personally in the City Council, the result is that when a candidate steps down the party within the mandate, he/she can keep his/her place in the City Council, which thing can represent a relevant change in the balance of power.
- Concerning the electoral system, explicitly the rules for government formation, in the sense that eventually there is a need for a majority, even if it is only for one vote of difference.

On top of the above, it shouldn't be forgotten the flexibility of a certain party or party leader in the negotiation process, among the personal affinities between leaders, which can be visible not only in successful coalitions, but specially in mathematical and connected possible coalitions that had never succeeded.

2.d) The motivation of the political parties. *Office seeking / Policy driven*

The summary of the above items reflects the office-seeking motivation described by Riker (Riker, 1962), which can be summarized as following:

If the parties assign priority to office seeking, at the extent that office-seeking is the goal, so this is their main motivational driver for their negotiation strategy when having the possibility of participating in a coalition, then the cabinet portfolio is the only expected award. We must bear in mind that in any level of the administration there are portfolios, at national, regional or local level, with different budgets and capacity for implementing policies, but getting a portfolio is the only expression of office-seeking success.

²⁷ The constraints are classified in three main groups: Politico-territorial related, Ideological and Law-institutions related, but paying special attention to the distance between parties in the extremes of the national axis, Catalan sovereignists versus the Spanish Centralist options.

Obviously, in any level of the administration, there is a limited number of portfolios to share, which means, as the result of a quantitative approach, that the less parties are in a coalition, the more opportunities for getting a portfolio.

If we agree that a government in majority guarantees the stability, the Minimal Winning Coalition is the best choice for any party focussed in office-seeking, as a consequence of the above statements.

To minimize the number of parties, maximizes the utility, so the payoffs. At the same time, the smaller the number of parties is, the easier the management of the coalition²⁸. (Leiserson, 1970, p. 90).

But if the motivation is to influence the government action, to have some impact in the public policies, we should pay attention to the ideology, assigning to each party a position in the continuum left-right. In order to be accurate in placing a party in a position, making it comparable not only with the rest of the political options, but also at an international level, two methods are commonly used:

- 1- The opinion of the *experts*
- 2- Opinion polls, which will measure the citizens' perception in relation to the ideology of the parties, from extreme left to extreme right.

These statements introduce a new concept, called the *Ideological Distance*, which can be calculated, based on the position occupied by the parties in the ideological axis.

The *Ideological distance* derives in the *minimum distance* theory, which is based on the assumption that it will be always easier to manage a government composed of parties with similar political preferences, but it also explains why in some negotiations a party is invited to participate and gets payoffs for being needed to complete a connected continuum, deriving in the Minimal Connected Wining Coalition (MCWC), which will be useful to explain some oversized coalitions.

A MCWC is easy to explain to the voters of each one of the participating parties, but when thinking about the next elections it is difficult to explain the differences to the voters allocated in the ideological boundaries of each one of the coalescing parties, in order to capture the maximum number of votes.

Finally we must also consider the possibility that *office-seeking* should be the way for the *policy-driven* parties to implement their programmes, so we shouldn't avoid the risk of categorizing without further analysis, as done by Shikano and Linhart concluding: "*it is not sufficient to consider either policy or office motivations of political parties on their own*", after the study performed on the basis of empirical data from German state-level coalition formations.

²⁸ "*The members of the smaller coalition will prefer to form it, since negotiation and bargaining are easier to complete and a coalition is easier to hold together, other things being equal, with fewer members*"

3- The Multidimensional theories

The critics to the formal theories, based on the low capacity to explain the complex grid of variables influencing, conditioning and limiting the coalitional phenomena, derived in the multidimensional theories, which tend to manage a wider type of variables in order to explain the diversity of the elements interacting, and overcoming the basic task of predicting the political coalitions.

If the formal theories talk about options, the multidimensional ones refer to the credibility of the options, which means that what is mathematically possible can be politically impossible (Pridham, 1986, pp. 15-16).

The new theories opened the door to the research about informal coalitions and minority governments, which are so common in the current political scenario, and which were not reflected under the formal theories, which were limited to formal or governmental coalitions.

3.a) The historical dimension

It takes into consideration the experience of the negotiating parties, and the specific moment in the life cycle of the parties. The main example of the first approach, in Spain, is the continuity of the overall agreements between the PSOE and IU since 1979, which makes it much easier for both parties to reach agreements in a variety of situations, whereas in the second approach we must pay attention to the study of the life of a coalition government²⁹ (Mitchell, 1995). We must start identifying the historical context, to continue studying the political programs and the electoral strategies, allowing us to understand the coalitional preferences and the different possible agreements.

The main assumption, in order to study the vital cycle of the coalitions, is that the coalition governments are in equilibrium at the moment of creation but they are immediately subject to destabilizing events.

That is to say that as soon as the government has been agreed and constituted, the first priority is to identify the destabilizing events or agents that can interact and prepare the responses of the coalition, only taking into consideration that the main goal is to keep the coalition alive, thus the relevancy of the *“combination of formal and informal machinery”* (Hazell & Yong, 2012, p. 68) in order to avoid disputes which can derivate in mistrust between the coalesced parties.

The accumulation of coalitional experience in the Municipalities represents a new culture, influencing the strategy of the political parties and a double impact in the local institutions in terms of organizational structure and behaviour of the local authorities. The continuity of the local authorities implies acquiring experience in working under coalition environment and relationship between members of the Plenary. Thus, the civil servants must be adapted to different government structures, in majority, minority or in coalition.

²⁹These elements will be analysed after the elections, paying attention to the correlation of forces, and during the life of the coalition studying the facts that can destabilize the coalition and the reactions of the parties in order to keep is alive.

3.b) The institutional dimension

It is based in the hypotheses that the structure of the political system includes, as well as the constraints, the stimulus for coalition creation.

Within the rules of the game, the central element is the quality of the agreements signed before joining a coalition. The party leaders consider that the payoffs of participation in a consistent and well organized coalition are higher, in the long term, than the ones of a scenario in which the players can resign freely.

When considering this dimension, applied to the municipal level, we must pay attention to the specificity of the local elections in terms of the mandate duration. The local elections are held every four years and because of that the local elections are qualified as *administrative* instead of *political*. The direct consequence is that it is impossible for a Mayor or party to call for advanced elections. In this sense, instability can only be solved by a negotiation, therefore the coalitional agreements are of a very high relevance. However, there are some solutions to the political crisis in the City Councils, as in the case of resignation of a number of Councillors higher than one third of the City Council, or when the consequences of the political decisions derive in extreme prejudice, or when the City Council acts or speaks in behalf of the terrorism. The solution foreseen is to call for partial elections, which means covering the seats of the Councillors that resigned or the ones legally disabled to be in charge of public positions.

“The local entities ... are not subordinated to any other hierarchical levels of government, but they are limited to the management of their competencies ... ” (Márquez Cruz, 2007, p. 85)

The municipal coalitions are incentivized by the corporative government model, characteristic of the City Councils, since there is no an executive board out of the members of the City Council, but a group of Councillors, under the presidency of the Mayor.

We can expect the complexity of the agreements to be in inverse proportion to the number of participants and the internal coherence, and the connection between political options. The pact should be more rigid when creating a MWC than an oversized one³⁰ (Strom & Müller, 1998, p. 17).

The procedure for electing the Mayor is also limiting the negotiation process, since there is no option for blocking attitudes that could delay without ending date the election of the Mayor. The Mayor must be elected by the absolute majority of the elected Councillors, favouring the creation of coalitional majorities when there is not a single winner of the elections. In case the negotiation is not solving the issue, the position of the Mayor will be automatically gained by the candidate number one of the most voted list.

3.c) The Motivation

The main motivation of the participants is to optimize their payoffs. A relevant difference is the target of the office-seeking players, or the policy-driven ones. In fact, office-seeking can be a

³⁰ *“we expect coalition agreements to be more comprehensive the fewer the participating parties and the longer their time horizon. We expect “tighter”, or more centralized coalitions, manifested in more explicit and detailed agreements as well as more elaborate institutions for their reinforcement, in more vulnerable coalitions and in situations of greater preference diversity”*

goal for the parties willing to apply their policies³¹ (Márquez Cruz, 2007, p. 95). During the negotiation process, the motivation can be linked to the exclusion or inclusion of a third party based on political or personal affinities. Coalitions can be connected, when the parties have close ideological or national positions, or disconnected, when intermediate positions are not covered, so that, some parties can be invited to participate in order to complete an ideological continuum. In the local arena, other than the ideology, the personal affinity between leaders must also be considered for understanding some anti-natura coalitions.

The governmental coalition agreement, established in May 2010 in the United Kingdom, between the Conservative and the Liberal Democrats, was a main topic for the studies about the coalitions and their impact in the society as well as in the inter and intra-party relations and also about the motivation. We can read *“Conservatives believed that they had made too many concessions to the Liberal Democrats and it even looked as a thought Cameron had misled his MPs into accepting his offer of a referendum on the Alternative vote. Further, the Liberal Democrats occupied valuable ministerial space and this created resentment among those Conservatives who had been excluded as a result. There was thus no great enthusiasm for the establishment of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in the parliamentary Conservative party in May 2010”* (Evans, 2012, p. 485)

We must be aware of the individual expectations, in the sense that not all the actors can give the same value to a determined payoff³² (Adrian & Press, 1968, p. 562), and give different importance to the moment when the payoff is received. Based on the rationality of the actors, and the possibility of identifying the preferences for each goal, Bergman³³ (Bergman, 1995, p. 97) designs a model to explain the decision making process. The model is based in the identification of four arenas (government, parliament, elections and intraparty), and a goal linked to each arena (office, policies, votes and internal cohesion).

The common element of the motivational analysis is to understand that *“sometimes goal conflicts occur, trade-offs exist, and hard choices have to be made. When they do, party leader may need to make hard choices between their objectives, and it is such choices that we try to explore”* (Müller & Strom, 1999, p. 280)

When applying the theory into the local arena, we must pay attention to the personalization of the local politics, which is visible in the attitudes, the capabilities (Vallès & Brugué, 2003) and the politicians' potential for leadership (Natera, 2001); (Natera & Vanaclocha, 2005). It is not only the ideology, but also the psychological and personal factors the ones that help to understand the rejection or support given to a certain candidate, as confirmed by an enquiry to Belgian politicians about coalitional behaviour (De Winter, et al., 2002, p. 32).

³¹ Because applying policies can give visibility to the parties in coalition, thinking in the next elections.

³² *“being in a winning coalition is not necessarily in itself an indication of winning Interpersonal valuation of utilities varies ... and individual may be drawn into a coalition that wins a particular office or other payoff, but the payoff may not be the one the individual wants”*. Other costs are, according to the authors: information, responsibility, inter-games, distribution of the payoffs, divergences between the members of the coalition, inertias, pressure and persuasion.

³³ *“...assuming more than one goal in each arena increases model complexity without contributing much new empirical guidance. Moreover, the assumption that parties have multiple goals and multiple arenas already makes this study more complex than most studies, which commonly consider only one or two goals and arenas to be of real importance”*

The personalization can also be studied from another point of view, since there is *political mobility* (Márquez Cruz, 2007, p. 101), and the elected candidates negotiating a coalition may have participated on the opposite list in a previous election, and at the time of the negotiation have moved in terms of ideology, or in terms of being one of them a *faithless elector*. If the first possibility can help in the sense that the candidates know better each other's personality, the second one can represent a factor of divergence between the negotiators.

Finally, we must consider whether the party is a *dominant player* within the coalition negotiation, or a small one, when estimating the relative value of the payoffs to be distributed among the parties (Debus, 2008), since their expectations should be rather different.

3.d) The Horizontal / Vertical dimension

Interparty (horizontal) and intraparty (vertical) relations are also a conditioning factor. *"Regarding termination of coalition governments, interparty tensions have proved to be the most common cause of break-up"* (Hazell & Yong, 2012, p. 23). As an example, the main player in the Catalan elections, CIU, is a Coalition acting as one party since 1978. Intraparty problems use to appear in the headings of the newspapers. Demo-Christians and Liberals have a joint project for Catalonia, but sometimes the internal tensions show that the interparty relations of the coalition (with third parties), and the intra-coalition relations are not easy to handle.

In January 2013, before the formation of the Catalan Government emerged from the elections to the Catalan Parliament in November of 2012, a strong debate took place, in Twitter³⁴, between the leaders of the two parties (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya), triggered by their particular view about the independence of Catalonia, where it was possible to read –between lines- the messages written to be understood in a different way by to their own voters, by the voters of the other party and by the citizenship in general.

When drilling down the intraparty relations, there are two flow directions, *up-down*, so to what extent the party leaders control the behaviour of the subnational leaders, and *bottom-up*, which tells us about the impact of the local actions and problems within the national leaders.

When looking at the horizontal dimensions, we must take into consideration the expected cooperation between parties. In recent years there has been plenty of literature about the governmental coalitions in New Zealand, where they have applied to new relationships, making possible that some candidates can become members of the government while their parties have not signed the coalition agreement. They also tried to apply other imaginative solutions, but anyway under the expectation of applying their policies. That's why we can read, about the coalitions in New Zealand that *"...the unanimity principle and its underlying notion of reciprocity: parties enjoying the benefits of office, and expecting support for their favoured policy positions from their coalitions partners, are obliged to share the responsibilities of office and provide support for their coalition partners in achieving their political objectives"* (Boston & Bullock,

³⁴ While Duran I Lleida, the leader of UDC was in Chile in January 2013, the CDC group of the city of Barcelona issued a message very critic with the attitude of Duran I Lleida about the boundaries of the Independence. @ciuduran, the 22nd of Jan tweeted: *"extreme irresponsibility. I'll wait for the reaction of CDC-head office"*. The reaction, in the media, came from UDC groups explaining that the head office of CDC was in a repossessed building. The 23rd. @ciuduran wrote: *"I apologize. We are alongside CDC defending the presumption of innocence.-Duran"*

2010, p. 366). This shared commitment, which should be expected from the parties, at least, during the first years of a mandate, will help each one of the members of a coalition to make possible the deployment of their policies. Another relationship will be in place, probably, during the last year of the mandate, when each party will like to send clear signals to their voters in order to make clear their specific identities.

In Spain, it is of special interest the relations between the political territorial organizations and the national party structure, because some parties are present in any Province of Spain, having to make compatible decisions or proposals for centralization, so as to satisfy some part of their supporters, with proposals for decentralization to attend the claim of the local organizations. The subnational politics have been used many times as laboratories for national agreements, and quite often are the expression of the internal disagreements³⁵ (Downs, 1998, pp. 11-12), An example in the recent history of Spain, between members of the direction of the same party (PP) was when the Mayor of a city (Madrid/Ruiz Gallardón 2003-2011) was fiercely confronted with the president of the Autonomous Community Government (Madrid/Esperanza Aguirre 2003-2012), and the last one with the President of the Government (Mariano Rajoy 2011-). In fact, two factions of the same party were confronted, the most centric ones against the more devoted to right-conservative ideas, but it was actually performed as a confrontation of different levels of the administration.

It is in the vertical dimension where we can understand the difficulties for certain coalitions at a local level, since some state wide parties have a federal internal structure (PSOE and IU), while others have a regional one (PP), which conditions the way the party has developed its local organizations. Such structure, conditions the way or the freedom for negotiating the coalitions at local level, regardless from regional or national pacts, or directed by the central leaders.

To what extent could we consider that part of the votes received by the candidate for the position of Mayor of a city were due to the votes received by the candidate of the same party for the position of President of the Government?. This event receives the name of *coattails voting* (Vallès & Brugué, 1997), from the central government to the local one. This can also be confirmed when the parties have in their programs matters that cannot be solved from the local government, such as abortion or economy. There are many examples, but paying attention to the electoral programs of the parties for the local elections of 2011, the PP dedicated many chapters to the immigration policies. In fact the local administration can provide integration assistance, and support to the immigrants through the Social Services department, but the immigration policies are fully depending on the Spanish Government and Parliament.

3.e) The internal dimension

It is in the multilevel negotiation when this dimension can be either the problem or the solution. It is relevant to know what type of organization and which internal relations are active between the national and the regional organizations of the parties, to understand the options for negotiations at a local level, and the level of factionalization of a party, since *“a high level of factionalization could affect the efficiency with which parties bargain. Parties that are highly*

³⁵ *“in most multiparty systems with directly elected territorial assemblies, power-sharing alliances at national and subnational levels of government rarely match (...) no theories address the linkages between party alliances in national government and those developing in the linkages between party alliances in national government and those developing in subnational government”*

fractionalized may, for example, have problems acting as unitary actors and in reaching decisions about which partners the party should choose, since the members have highly divergent policy views” (Bäck, 2008, p. 84)

Since we can observe that the parties consist of competing groups³⁶ (Verge & Gómez, 2012, p. 681), the question should be: are the parties unitary actors? The lack of discipline, when voting a candidate for the position of Mayor, different to the one previously proposed by the party, is a source of political instability both for the local entity and for the party, since the need of disciplinary measures can conclude with the dismissal of the candidates contradicting the party decisions. The parties need to be unitary actors, but this characteristic is not easy to maintain in the big national organizations, so as Vallès and Brugué propose: *“assuming that the political parties are not unitary actors, the theory of the nationalization of the politics has open the door to studies about the mechanisms used to solve the possible conflicts between the different organizational and territorial levels of the parties”* (Vallès & Brugué, 1997, p. 14), and on the same page: *“we think that there exist some hierarchized relationships at the time of the elections, but such relations tend to disappear on the daily affairs of the local government”*. Maybe we should also pay attention to the level of amateurism of the local politicians, confronted to the *“professional politicians”*, who occupy the leading roles in the direction of the parties, which means that even speaking the same ideological language, the level of interpretation of the agreements by each one of the players may lead to different conclusions, or to different ways of executing the actions for applying the party’s policies.

In a company, the general management decides the strategies, which are deployed within the organizational chart, and applied by all the employees, the more informed and trained the better. We wonder about the level of internal communication and training being deployed within the political parties with the aim of reaching, informing and training the local politicians in order to obtain a uniform way of doing, that is to say, a unique attitude. The level of centralization/decentralization³⁷ (Maor, 1995, pp. 86-87) of a party can explain the capacity for solving internal issues when negotiating with other parties for achieving a coalition, as well as the longevity of the party itself.

Since 1979, the processes of negotiation for the creation of the local governments in Spain have followed, mainly, a top-down hierarchy, expecting to avoid the lack of coordination between the local leaders. The parties, in their constituent statutes, like PSOE or PP, retain for the national leaders the capacity of determining the coalitional agreements to be signed. Another example could be when it is the head office of the PP the only one to agree or disagree if a local candidate wants to promote a motion against the existing local government.

³⁶ [JJanés], when talking about the role of the Deputy Mayor, which is identified by many politicians as a payment to compensate the result of the negotiation for signing a coalition agreement, explained that it is also used to satisfy the internal party families.

³⁷ *“Despite the growing interest in explaining coalition bargaining and government formation process in parliamentary systems, little attention has been devoted to intra-party determinants. At the outset, there is a considerable general literature on the internal politics of the parties. Much of this material, however, has no direct bearing on coalition bargaining”*

3.f) The socio-political dimension

It is implemented to put some emphasis on the political culture, the preferences of the electors and the relations party-social bases, and also the coalitional culture and preferences of the party.

It is important to pay attention to the changes in the requests of the electors, to foresee how this will influence the elections, and how the parties will create the dynamics for new proposals and attitudes when negotiating for a coalition.

The “coalitional culture”³⁸ (Capo Giol, 2000, p. 244) must be analysed, but there is a lack of historical information, which must be improved by series of public surveys.

In the government of Spain there is no one single experience of governmental coalitions within the periods without majorities, and have always been carried out with parliamentary *ad-hoc* support. Since 1980-1983, when the Autonomous Communities were institutionalized, the coalitional culture has been extended of the new electoral arena, producing a variety of agreements to be studied. Another factor, studied by Ridao, is the relevant impact of the leadership as a main factor in order to understand the level of party agreements in different arenas in Catalonia, thanks to the complicity of the leaders beyond their ideology (Ridao, 2007, p. 33)

3.g) The external dimension

It is linked to the external factors and the uncertainty. An example can be the situation created after breaking a coalition as one of the effects of a multilevel negotiation for the parliament / regional government, but also the information broadcasted by the media, a strike or a war. When it produces a high impact in the behaviour of the party, which forces the introduction of changes in the organization, structure or political goals, it receives the name of *shock* (Harmel & Handa, 1994, pp. 276-277).

At the same time it has had a certain development the concept of the “*events approach*”, which is linked to the study of the stability and the longevity of the coalition governments. Such events can be international crisis, illness or death of the president, all of them driving to the dissolution of the government, without any possibility for adopting any solution, and being absolutely unpredictable.

We must also be aware about the citizen’s reactions to the political scandals, as well as the voters’ trust, based on the accomplishment of the electoral manifestos, both linked to the uncertainty, but having a direct relation with the behaviour of the parties, which are not measuring properly the impact of their daily activity, since they have not setup enough internal controls to avoid corruption, or they have infra-valued the impact of certain coalitional concessions.

³⁸“It refers to the representations, opinions and preferences of the electors about the formation of single party governments, minority or coalitional governments; its concept about the pact as a political procedure; its visualization of a strong or weak government; and its image about the relationship between the executive and legislative powers”

If we agree with the Dancey's and Hetherington's statements in the sense that "*the analyses of individuals' reactions to ... scandals indicate that citizens' impressions of politicians' integrity carry political consequences*³⁹." (Dancey, 2012, p. 421), and that "*political trust is a general evaluation of the entire government*" (Hetherington, 2005), we should expect the parties to take care of both specificities. In fact, if the political scandals are daily in the news in Spain, the accomplishment of the electoral manifestos is quite high. On the one side, there are not many differences between the periods of absolute majority or under minority governments, when the accomplishment rate, by the governing parties, of the economic pledges of the electoral manifestos are above 70% (Artés, 2011, p. 156). The author confirms that the parties on the opposition tend to fulfil more pledges under minority governments than the ones under single party majority governments, "*In the particular case of Spain we find that the opposition parties attain fulfilment rates around 20 percent greater when the government structure is a minority government*".

We can also take into consideration the remarks from Marquez Cruz, when studying the instability of the local governments, stating that "*the conflict within the local governments is double faced: between the different players participating in the local government, and between the local government and the social players*" (Marquez Cruz, 1994, p. 304). When talking about the social players we must pay attention to the Facebook and Twitter movements, meaning that some years ago, a "movement" needed a basic structure in order to organize themselves and to maximize their impact, while nowadays, the free to use social networks are facilitating the direct action, with a low level of organization and theoretical structure. Just do it should be not only a commercial lemma, but also the best definition of some social movements.

³⁹ The discussion is open about the difference between the political analysis of cynical and sceptical electors. Cynics are predisposed to find fault and assume human action is motivated by self-interest, while sceptics possess a more uncertain and questioning world view, Cynicism is thus a more pessimistic and definitive belief about the integrity of others than scepticism.

III- The Political Context

1- Historical Environment

After 40 years of Dictatorship, with the determination of proceeding to a “transition to the democracy”⁴⁰ (Field, 2006, p. 84), which was opposite to a revolutionary breakdown, with the painful impact of the Civil War and the years of repression still in the memory of most of the citizens, under the fear of a possible reaction of the army to any claim for democracy, the 1979’s elections to the municipalities were a challenge in the sense of mixing fear, revenge, wish of peace, need of change..., a lot of controversial feelings motivating each one of the voters. At those times the Mayors were still elected under the rules of the Francoism, meaning that the power was in the hands of people linked to the political structures of the regime.

*“The local elections in 1979 (April the 3rd) are part of the institutional change of the transition to the democracy process and they are, thus, the founding elections of the subsystem of parties in de Municipalities. At the same time it is an example of the **spirit of the transition**, in the sense that facilitates the continuity of the local Francoist authorities within party lists and electoral groups”⁴¹ (Márquez Cruz, 2007, p. 186) .*

Being the right/conservative parties the legacy of the dictatorship, some relevant agreements were signed between left-wing side parties in order to achieve the power in a higher number of municipalities⁴² (Márquez Cruz, 2007), under the need of showing unitary proposals to the voters, in opposition to the divisions previous to the Civil War, thus, limiting the autonomy of the local parties to engage in coalition negotiations (Colomer & Martínez, 1995, p. 58).

It started in 1979, with the *Acuerdo Marco en materia de política municipal (Framework agreement for the local policies)* between PSOE (Socialist party) and PCE (Communist Party). In Catalonia same agreement between PSOE-PSC (Catalan Socialist party) and PSUC (Catalan Communist Party). This was an overall framework for the local politics, coalitions, inter/intraparty supports, and political goals. While “*after four decades of authoritarian rule, most of the parties of the pre-war Republic has disappeared in Spain. In the lates 1970s, parties were restructured or created anew, engaging in electoral mobilization before they had consolidated their grassroots organizations*” (Verge, 2012, p. 47), the communist parties were the only ones being active in clandestinity, allowing them to recuperate the activity once legalized in a very short period of time.

This was the beginning of a continued dynamics between the two parties, with different levels of cohesion and commitment:

⁴⁰ “Two general hypotheses predict the effects of pacted transitions. Pacted transitions offer the most viable path to democracy. However, they may have longer-term negative effects on the type of democracy”

⁴¹ June 26th and October 2nd took place the elections in the Municipalities where it was not possible the 3rd of April because there were no candidates or because of annulment of results.

⁴² Page 186 for 1979. Page 192 for 1983. Page 194 for 1987. Page 200 for 1991. Page 204 for 1995. Page 209 for 1999. Page 223 for 2003 agreements

In 1983, there were some agreements at Autonomous Community level, but not for the whole Spain. None in Catalonia. Only a general rejection to agreements with the conservative party (AP). In 1987, the only agreement was in the sense that the Mayor should be the leader of the most voted list between PSOE and IU, and PSOE-PSC and IC in Catalonia. The level of commitment was reduced in 1991, since only some ad-hoc agreements took place, limited to territories according to the needs of the local responsible of the parties. In 1995 the PSOE lost the majority at local level, position being taken by the conservative party (PP). The PSOE promoted an overall agreement, rejected by IU, so there was no agreement at country level. In Catalonia, PSC and IC committed for mutual support for electing the Mayor from the most voted list. From 1999 until nowadays, no written agreements, only proposals from the PSOE with texts like: "Agreements with other political groups oriented to reach majorities for guaranteeing the stability of the governments in the local institutions", or "agreements under a government program which must include the main PSOE's electoral commitments"

The strategies seem to be independent from any multilevel strategy, as it was explicitly agreed in 1979, probably because of the lack of coalitional experience in the upper levels of the administration (The Congress of Deputies and the Parliament of Catalonia), and the difficulties explained within the multidimensional theories for having a common intraparty approach to the way of applying the political decisions and the specific policies.

In general, the local elections of 1979 produced a very high number of concentration governments, meaning that all the parties getting some representation agreed to form a unitary government, as the best way to move forwards from a dictatorship without democratic political parties, to a political arena where the debate makes the difference between the political options. The first years after the 1979's elections were mainly devoted to *"build-up organizations capable to increase and improve the services offered to the citizenry"* (Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2012, p. 140).

In the coming pages we will follow the evolution of the political parties from this anomalous situation to a competitive democracy. Since 1979 until the current days, some relevant facts took place in the history of Spain. These events are quite interesting for understanding the initial difficulties for giving birth to a real democracy, which would setup the social conditions of the 90's, when a real sense of democracy was put in practice.

The 23rd of February of 1981, a group of 200 members of the Guardia Civil and soldiers entered the Congress of Deputies in a failed coup, retaining the Deputies as hostages for more than 20 hours, only six years after the death of the dictator. We can realize which the amount of pressure was over the politicians debating the Constitution of 1978, as well as the willingness of the army to recover the political power held during the dictatorship.

Actually, the democracy was continuously in danger, and the power of the army was the sword of Damocles. In 1982, the Minister of Defence of the Socialist Government⁴³, began the modernization of the army, sending to the reserve (retirement) most of the Generals and Commanders linked to the Franco army, and joined the NATO. A Referendum in 1986 confirmed

⁴³ Mayor of Barcelona from 1979 till 1982, Minister of Defence in the first socialist government in Spain from 1981 till 1991 when occupies the position of vice-president of the Spanish Government. Resigned in 1995 when it was known that the Intelligence National Centre (CESID) had been practicing illegal controls over the telephone lines of Spanish personalities.

the membership in the NATO, which was the sign to a tricky path to a more professional renewed structure within the army.


Few years later, the military mandatory service was abolished the 31st of December 2001, which was a symbolic political decision, since the civil population was not going anymore to be a source for cheap soldiers to the army, which was forced to become professional.

The first of January of 1986 Spain joined the European Union, after years of international isolation. Consequently, becoming a member of full right of the European Union was the recognition of the European countries that the democracy was a fact in Spain, and opened the country to the markets, triggering a long period of economic growth. The Country started to receive public funds for the development, as well as monetary flows from international investors which foresaw a place for opportunities and short term returns on their investments.

Within this period, there was also a time of hyperactivity at an international level, as synthesized by Hans Keman: *“Since the late 1980s dramatic political and economic change has occurred across the OECD, affecting most established democracies. For example, in Europe the single market was introduced in 1986 followed by the foundation of the EU as an explicit transnational organization in 1992... The Cold War ended abruptly in 1989 followed by the emergence of another world order... First Gulf War and military intervention in the former Yugoslavia by NATO. Also, inter alia, due to the rise of the neo-liberalism....Finally the internationalization of domestic economies became a prime policy concern, compelling parties to revisit their policy priorities”* (Keman, 2011, pp. 12-13)

To have an overall view on the historical times that the current research is covering, we created graph number 12, where some facts can be traced, as the unemployment rate and the GNP variation, as well as some main topics that impacted the Spanish society. It seems that when the unemployment rate raises, the conservative party takes over.

Graph 12. Social and economic rates in Spain, alongside a historical timeline




Source: Author's elaboration

Looking at the evolution at subnational level, graph number 13 shows the colour of the government in the Parliament of Catalonia, and it allocates the mandates of four years for the

local elected, which cannot be modified and conditions some coalition agreements, given the fact that the Mayor cannot call for advanced elections.

Graph 13. Parties in Government at national and sub-national level since 1977



Source: Author's elaboration on data from the Ministry of Interior

It is visible that 7 out of 10 mandates at National level resulted in minority governments. Also, 3 out of 10 at Regional level preferred governing in minority. Only two mandates, at regional level, were under the coalitional form.

2- Local elections as part of a multi-level contest

Since 1977 Spain and Catalonia have had governments of different colours, but generally in the form of a Single Party, majority or minority, and there has only been two periods of coalition, under the form of governmental coalitions, which took place in Catalonia 2003-2006 and 2006-2010, with the participation of the PSC, ICV and ERC, naming President of the Catalan Government a member of the PSC, since this party collected the majority of the votes of the coalesced parties. Both coalitions were under the form of Minimum Winning Coalitions. Although CIU obtained the majority of the votes, the party had to remain in the opposition during these years.

The stable coalition between *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* (*Convergència i Unió*), will be treated as a party⁴⁴ (Matas, 2010), taking into consideration how they create the marketing impact, and the longevity of the coalition. In fact, we could state, for CIU, the same as when referring to the Liberal and National parties in Australia, that *“the best evidence that this is not a single party are the attempts to blend into a single political entity”*⁴⁵ (Costar, 2011, p. 42). However, we can understand that when analysing the coalitions at an Autonomous Community level, in the case of Catalonia, when studying the 9 governments of the *Generalitat* since 1980 until 2014 hold by CIU, this is treated as a bipartite. We must bear in mind that there is an agreement between both parties, made public, on how to distribute portfolios between them, and it is possible to make a follow-up of the coalitional agreements (Matas & Ridao, 2014, p. 208), but disclosing both parties for the purpose of this study would be a nightmare, since most of the electoral coalitions use to specify the party of each candidate but CIU almost never does. Image number 12 shows two electoral lists, one from PSC detailing the party of each one of the members of the list, and one from CIU without such a reference.

Image 11. Electoral lists with different level of details

<p>3. GENT PER AIGUAFREDA – PARTIT DELS SOCIALISTES DE CATALUNYA – PROGRÉS MUNICIPAL (GperA-PSC-PM) (105)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. En Josep Sellas Benvingut (PSC-PM) 2. N' Antoni Blanch Matas (GperA) 3. En Joan Antoni De Arriba Cejudo IND 4. N' Esperanza Martínez Navarro (PSC-PM) 5. En Ramon Puig Pedrosa (PSC-PM) 6. Na Lourdes Amaya Caballero (GperA) 7. En Rafael Roura Oliván (GperA) 8. Na Cristina Sellas Alonso IND 9. En Juan Durán Gómez IND 10. En Pere Matas Blanch (GperA) 11. N' Encarnación Martínez Navarro (GperA) <p>Suplents</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. En Lluís Sallés Farrás (GperA) 2. Na Rosa María González Sánchez IND 3. En Francesc Xavier Raulet Coll IND 	<p>4. FEDERACIÓ CONVERGENCIA I UNIÓ (CIU) (139)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sr. Joan Vila Matabacas 2. Sra. Teresa de Blas Barrabés 3. Sr. Fermin Colomer Dosrius 4. Sr. Ramon Molera Bruguera 5. Sr. Enrique Cruells Carrio 6. Sr. Enric Lopez Vila 7. Sr. David Garriga Campasol 8. Sra. Rosa Maria Rodriguez Martinez 9. Sr. Lluís Marmi Fuentes 10. Sr. Angel Abdon Olives Fernandez 11. Sr. Jaime Colomer Estrada <p>Suplents</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sr. Pere Molera Vila 2. Sr. Enric Alexandre Puig 3. Sr. Lazaro Martinez Herrera
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Source: BOP Barcelona, 1st of May 2007

⁴⁴ “A coalition Government is the one consisting of different political formations.../. Some consider that CIU is an electoral coalition with a single program.../. they are negotiating the distribution of ministries and will continue negotiating the distribution of more plots of political power and the day-to-day implementation of many sectorial policies throughout the legislature. This is the essence of Government coalitions” (Matas, 2010) (article in El País)

⁴⁵ “No clearer evidence exists that the Liberal and National parties are not “a single party” than the attempts that have been made to blend them into a single political entity. The idea of merging the parties is almost as old as the National Party, and despite the fact that such proposals often create tension within and between them,...” (Costar, 2011, p. 42)

The local elections have been celebrated in the months of March-June of 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, so a total of 9 electoral contests covering exact periods of 4 years each.

It is time to know which has been the impact in the local arena, if any, of the variety of combinations of the parties in power both in Madrid (The Congress of Deputies) and Barcelona (The Parliament of Catalonia), as part of a multilevel system

In fact, in two occasions, the governments in Madrid, both in minority, were able to go ahead with their policies thanks to the support of the Catalan nationalists (CIU). It was the period 93-96, during the last government of Felipe Gonzalez (PSOE), and the period 96-2000, the first one of José Maria Aznar (PP), but CIU never got office⁴⁶ – in fact, CIU never accepted it - in the Spanish Government. Having studied the strategies of the two main parties, PSOE and PP, Reniu states that *“the main reason for the inexistence of coalitional governments in Spain is the strategic calculation made by both parties, since they have estimated that the utility of sharing power with a small party was lower than having an overall agreement for the length of the mandate”* (Reniu & Bergman, 2003, p. 73)

The national and/or ideological distance from CIU to the two main Spanish parties was an issue when having to explain to their own voters why participating in a Spanish government, while at the same time it was very easy to make publicity of the rewards obtained by supporting the Spanish Government. When Matas studied the reasons which could explain the absence of a governmental coalition in 1996, he describes several factors which are worth to summarize (Matas Dalmasas, 1998, pp. 7-10):

- The level of implication. Participating in the government means being responsible of the whole governmental action, which was a conflict for CIU, being a necessary partner but certainly in minority, and with a very limited decision capacity
- The political ambience. From 1993 until 1996 the political information was basically concentrated in corruption affairs, parliamentary disagreement, and strong campaigns to remove the socialists from the government, so it was a difficult ambience for participating in a coalition
- The interparty and intraparty relationships. Relating the horizontal forces, we must bear in mind that since 1995, CIU was governing in Catalonia with the support of the PP, which was rejected by the more nationalist sector of CIU. Joining the central government, CIU would stamp an overall agreement between the parties which could have a negative impact within some of the CIU's voters. Having said that, the vertical relationships are also explained, and CIU needed to maintain a certain distance to the PP to avoid a high level of internal criticism.
- The history. From 1993 until 1996, CIU was supporting at parliamentary level, the government in minority of the PSOE. The PNV had very positive experiences governing with the PSOE in their region. All this become an unusual precedent for a coalition between CIU and the PP-

⁴⁶ The conditions for a governmental coalition in 1996 between the PP and CIU were optimal, since the 156 seats obtained by the PP required the 16 of CIU for a solid majority, and adding 5 more from the PNV (conservative vasc nationalists) or 4 from CC (conservative canarian nationalists) for attaining the absolute majority.

- The political culture and the public opinion. In the previous years, the PP was campaigning very hard against the support of CIU and PNV to the socialist government, arguing that the nationalist parties were buying their support against advantages for their regions, so having a governmental agreement with the PP would give easy arguments to the mass media against such an agreement.

Coalitional agreements can frustrate the voters' expectations if they are not properly explained, and consequently can be too expensive for the party (agent and principal) (Keman, 2011). That's why the parties have the need of making public the agreements, in order to "*advertise points of policy congruence to party supporters*" (Eichorst, 2014, p. 98)

However, when considering the benefits that CIU obtained from supporting the two Spanish governments, we must pay attention to the Artés and Bustos conclusions, in the sense that: "*...fulfilment [of the electoral programme] results show several facts. First, collaboration with the governing parties was beneficial for a relatively small nationalist party like CIU in terms of programme fulfilment. Second, collaboration with PP was more profitable than with PSOE. Third, during the socialist minority government, fulfilment on territorial issues was small, while it was high in economic questions. Finally, during the PP minority government period, CIU attained an important percentage of fulfilment of the promises that claimed greater decentralization and maintained a high fulfilment of the rest of its economic programme*" (Artés & Bustos, 2008, p. 329).

Finally, after referring about the rejection of CIU to coalesce with the PSOE in 1993, we can't forget that the PSOE avoided a coalition with its natural partner, IU (Renui, 2001, p. 137), since "*there was a strong confrontation between IU and PSOE during the campaign and the opposition of IU to the European Treaty made it impossible for both parties to reach an agreement*" (Artés, 2011, p. 147)

The only [creative] experience of accepting portfolios whilst remaining outside government, took place in New Zealand -2005-, but it was difficult to explain and still more difficult to understand by the electors: "*As far as members of the wider public were concerned, there appeared to be little credibility to the often-repeated claim that New Zealand First had positioned itself outside rather than inside the government*"⁴⁷ (Miller & Curtin, 2011, pp. 117-118)

In this study, two main effects will certainly be confirmed:

- 1- The PP as the preferred partner for CIU in the City Councils when the PP is in power in Madrid, even being two parties that absolutely disagree in anything having to do with the way of understanding Catalonia in terms of language, infrastructures, and above all decentralization of government. In fact, such a behaviour could be expected, as it is explained in detail by Verge and Falcó that summarize: "*We expected that in a situation*

⁴⁷ "*In one of the most creative solutions struck since the advent of multi-party government, New Zealand First and United Future reached an agreement with Labour that gave them ministerial positions, but outside cabinet, and ostensibly outside government. Winston Peters became Minister of Foreign Affairs. United Future's Peter Dunne was made Minister of Revenue. On matters relating directly to their portfolios, the two parties in question were required to support government policy. On policies unrelated to their portfolios, they were free to either support or oppose the government, although their agreement did include a commitment to support the government on confidence and supply. The seeming contradiction between Peters' pre-election pledge not to accept the 'baubles of office' and his later decision to accept the most prestigious portfolio after those of Prime Minister and Minister of Finance was widely condemned, as evidenced by the slump in support for New Zealand First in late 2005 and 2006*"

of minority in the central government, the State Wide Parties would have strategies for reaching agreements in the regional parliaments, in order to guarantee the support of the regional parties...and it has been confirmed, only when the regional parties have a relevant weight in their regions” (Verge & Falcó-Gimeno, 2013, p. 121)

The CIU’s voters were very disappointed when their party was supporting the PP in the Spanish Parliament, which strategy was explained by the president of the Generalitat of Catalonia for 23 years, and leader of CIU, Mr. Jordi Pujol: *“Don’t you think that it has been better for Catalonia to negotiate with the leader of the government in Madrid, than with the leader of the opposition?”*⁴⁸

The attempts for approaching Spain in terms of didacticism and searching for agreements to find a common project for Catalonia and Spain, had been taking place for 23 years, under Pujol’s rule. Unfortunately such agreement and mutual understanding was never reached, but this is not an issue of the current democratic period, since Vicens Vives wrote: *“Honesty and freedom are the roots of Catalan preference for **pact negotiation** ... this mind-set in the deepest of our social structure and politics, became a way of being, into a conception of the world that has been unchanged through the historical vicissitudes of the last two centuries”* (Vicens Vives, 1954).

This has been the main attitude that can explain the relationship between the Catalan and the Spanish governments during the mandate of the President Pujol

- 2- Increase of the PSC-ICV-ERC coalitions in the municipalities during the joint government of the three parties in the Generalitat of Catalonia, but almost un-existing when they lost the power in 2010, confirming Bäck’s conclusion *“that there is pressure from the superior level to install such coalitions in the regions that reflect the partisan composition of government and opposition at national level”* (Bäck, et al., 2013, p. 382) , also to reflect the thesis of Irina Stefuriuc in the sense that *“It is generally assumed that in multi-level political systems political actors desire to form regional coalitions that match the party composition of the coalition governing at the central level, and that where this matching attempt does not occur it is because a possible new coalition formula for the central level is being tested at the regional one”* (Stefuriuc, 2009, p. 93), and also the *Coalitional Congruence* (Stefuriuc, 2009, p. 94), which is the situation in which the party composition of a sub-national government coincides with that of the national government.

The PSC-ICV coalitions have been common and stable along the years, because of their ideological and national affinities, while the distance between PSC and ERC is high enough to make quite difficult a stable agreement for government. While PSC and ICV are very close within the ideological and within the national axis, for ERC joining this

⁴⁸ Conference in La Garriga., in a session organized by Òmnium Cultural and the Fundació Universitària Martí L’Humà, the 1st of December 2011

coalition is a clear disclaimer concerning its national identity, which was quite difficult to explain to their voters, who were mostly claiming for a coalition with CIU.

It is considered that part of the votes that ERC received in 2003 came from CIU voters who left, disappointed with the complicity of their party with the PP in Madrid. When those voters, most of them Catalan nationalist, noticed that their support to a more radical nationalist party (ERC) was used to create a coalition with parties having a profile biased towards Spain, they resigned to keep on supporting this party.

The price that the party had to pay can be seen in the evolution of the number of votes received in the consecutive elections to the Parliament of Catalonia

Table 18. Votes to ERC for the Parliament of Catalonia

Year	Votes
1999	271.173
2003	541.324
2006	416.355
2010	219.173

Source: Generalitat of Catalonia /elections

The mentioned variations are extremely relevant, since it implied the loss of 50% of the total number of votes, and moving very fast from the best records ever, in 2003, to the worst ones in only two elections, in 2011.

3- Geographical and Demographical data

Catalonia occupies a triangle of land, having the Pyrenees and France in the North border, the Mediterranean Sea in the East and South East, the community of Aragón in the West and València in the South.

The modern administrative division, below the level of Autonomous Community, used also for this research has two main structures:

- The Province (la Província)
- The County (la Comarca)

There are four provinces, the main administrative division, each one holding a Diputació Provincial, the administration supporting and complementing the activities of the small towns.



Image 12. The Provinces

Spain was divided in Provinces in 1836, according to the mandate of the Constitution approved in 1812.

The main activities of the Diputació, at that time, were in the domain of the Public Works, Secondary Education, Charity, and they were also designed to become a link between the local governments and the State.

Image 13. The Counties



The income⁴⁹ of the Diputacions can be splitted in participation in taxes, direct transfers from the central administration and the income directly related to the services provided to citizens and to the local administration.

Below the Provinces there are 41 Counties⁵⁰.

The origin of this division is in 1936 under the Generalitat of Catalonia before the Civil War, superseded during the dictatorship and restored in 1987. In 1990 three more Counties were added in a new division.

⁴⁹ See the budget of the Diputació de Barcelona as example: <http://media.diba.cat/diba/fitxers/ladiputacio/pressupost2012.pdf>, disclosed per income and expenditure concepts

⁵⁰ Art. 92 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006: "the County is a local entity with juridical personality, formed by municipalities for the management of local competencies and services"

The administration related to the County is the Consell Comarcal.

The members of the Diputació (the Deputies) and the members of the Consells Comarcals (the Councillors) are a direct result of the elections to the Municipalities, following different rules⁵¹, creating some confusion to the voters⁵², which can hardly understand the result of their votes is reflected in the composition of the above two administrations (Rey, 2002, pp. 262, 263)

This means that any citizen lies under several hierarchical structures:

- Two administrations creating rules, the Spanish Parliament and the Catalan one.
- The Diputacions, offering services to the cities
- The Consell Comarcal, linked to the County (Comarca), whose main activity is to support the cooperation between municipalities in order to achieve synergies when buying common services such as waste collection and public cleaning services among others

Some demographical facts are displayed in table 19, with information corresponding to the year 2011.

Table 19. Population and population density per Province in Catalonia

2011	Population k inhabitants	# Towns	Sq. km	average inh. per town (thousands)	average inh. per sq. km
Barcelona	5.529	311	7.726	18	716
Girona	757	221	5.905	3	128
Lleida	442	231	12.168	2	36
Tarragona	811	184	6.308	4	129

Source: Author's elaboration on IDESCAT figures

In a (very) general classification, Barcelona concentrates the industry and the services, Lleida leads the agricultural activity, whereas Girona and Tarragona have based their development on the tourist sector. Three Provinces are rural according to OECD (1994) definition, of less than 150 inhabitants per square kilometre. As it happens all around the world, the population tends to concentrate in the big cities, as it is visible in the disproportion between the population of the Barcelona province compared to the other, and the average number of inhabitants per town, telling us about the size of the municipalities.

At economic level, table 20 shows some values, also per province. The bigger enterprises are located in the Barcelona Province, while Girona has much more touristic facilities than any other.

⁵¹ [JRomeu] explained us the way the parties can make alliances for adding-up votes for getting seats within the Diputació and the Consell Comarcal. It consist in adapting the name of the party or the name of the list to a wider alliance, so the list can be recognized as so. It means that the votes are not added-up because of post-electoral coalitions, but because the name of the list already includes the reference to the alliance. (a list named abc-Green, will add-up votes to the Green alliance)

⁵² Since 1997, when the PSC consulted the Central Electoral Administration about the possibility of merging votes of different parties with different names, if such an option was previously declared to the corresponding Regional Electoral Administration, the only certainty is that the party must include the name of the coalition, or that the coalition must be declared previously to the elections. In any other case the votes will not be added-up

In the coming pages we will try to identify whether the above differences per Province are reflected, somehow, in the distributions of votes per parties.

Table 20. Facts and figures about some socio-economic variables, per Province

	Sq. km harvesting/farming 2009	Rooms in Camping/hotels 2011	enterprises (thousands) 2009	employees (thousands) 2009	employees per enterprise 2009
Barcelona	1.889	178.389	179	2.382	13
Girona	762	222.745	29	295	10
Lleida	1.311	46.892	17	176	10
Tarragona	456	138.704	26	293	11

Source: Author's elaboration on IDESCAT figures

This study takes into consideration the cities of more than 10.000 inhabitants and the County Capitals even if smaller, 131 in total.

Keeping aside the towns with less than 250 inhabitants, with direct election of the government by the voters, but representing a 28% of the municipalities in Lleida, the division per Province is the one visible in table 21

Table 21. The number of municipalities under study compared with the total

	Total # Municipalities	less than 250 inh.	more than 250 inh.	# Muncip. in study	% on more than 250 inh.
Barcelona	311	39	272	80	29,4%
Girona	221	51	170	20	11,8%
Lleida	231	65	166	11	6,6%
Tarragona	184	32	152	20	13,2%
TOTAL	947	187	760	131	17,2%

Sources: Author's elaboration on figures from the Provincial Diputations


131 municipalities compared to the total of 947 in the whole of Catalonia represents only a 13,8% of the municipalities, but it is also a 81,9% of the population, according to INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) 2001 and a 81,2% of the electors, according to Gencat data, also 2011. With such figures, we will consider that the analysis is based in a sample representing properly the Region in terms of population and number of electors.

Anyway, we cannot forget that the Municipalities with less than 250 inhabitants follow other electoral rules, thus, the percentage is a little bit higher when comparing the sample with the 760 Municipalities of more than 250 inhabitants. This is a study mainly quantitative. We consider that the cities and towns with populations below 10.000 inhabitants, where the relationship between the candidates and the voters is much closer, must be studied also under a qualitative view to be able to understand the behaviour of the actors, but it is beyond our reach.

There is a concentration of studied municipalities around the capital, Barcelona, where the services and industry have been developed during the last Century, and has been receiving internal immigration from the more rural Counties, most of them with a very limited capacity for offering job opportunities for its inhabitants, and when the opportunities exist they are always linked to activities related to farming and harvesting, making impossible professional careers in any other branch of activity, thus limiting the options to the youth or to any other individuals willing to enhance his/her professional capacities.

The other 3 province capitals are a kind of standalone islands in the territory, without a geographical continuity of big cities around them. The County capitals are provided with more services than regular towns, but in some cases their size makes it necessary to depend on the Province capitals. The territorial distribution of the towns/cities under study can be seen in Graph number 14, where the geographical area occupied by the municipality has been filled in in red colour, it means that it is not the geographical position of the city, but the administrative area, which makes possible to identify geographical connection or isolation.

Graph 14. List of Municipalities under study and geographical distribution



Source: Author's elaboration

Few Counties are composed by a relevant number of towns with more than 10.000 inhabitants, most of them in the area around Barcelona city. Only the Municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants are coloured in red in graph number 14, which are dispersed within the Catalan territory. There is only a certain level of concentration in the coast line included in the oval around Barcelona city, so any analysis related to County will be limited to the ones detailed in Graph number 15

Graph 15 Counties with the higher density of Municipalities under study

County	Municipality	County	Municipality	County	Municipality
Baix Llobregat	Abdera	Maresme	Arenys de Mar	Vallès Oriental	Caldes de Montbui
	Castelldefels		Argentona		Canovelles
	Corbera de Llobregat		Calella		Cardedeu
	Cornellà de Llobregat		Canet de Mar		Granollers
	El Prat de Llobregat		El Masnou		La Garriga
	Esparreguera		Malgrat de Mar		La Llagosta
	Esplugues de Llobregat		Mataró		La Roca del Vallès
	Gavà		Montgat		Les Franqueses del Vallès
	Martorell		Pineda de Mar		Lliçà d'Amunt
	Molins de Rei		Premià de Mar		Mollet del Vallès
	Olesa de Montserrat	Sant Andreu de Llavaneres	Montornès del Vallès		
	Pallejà	Tordera	Parets del Vallès		
	Sant Andreu de la Barca	Vilassar de Mar	Sant Celoni		
	Sant Boi de Llobregat	Vallès Occidental	Badia del Vallès		
	Sant Feliu de Llobregat		Barberà del Vallès		
	Sant Joan Despí		Castellar del Vallès		
	Sant Just Desvern		Castellbisbal		
	Sant Vicenç dels Horts		Cerdanyola del Vallès		
	Vallirana		Montcada i Reixac		
	Viladecans		Palau-Solità i Plegamans		
Barcelonès	Badalona		Ripollet		
	Barcelona		Rubí		
	L'Hospitalet de Llobregat		Sabadell		
	Santa Coloma de Gramenet	Sant Cugat del Vallès			
	Sant Adrià del Besòs	Sant Quirze del Vallès			
	Santa Perpètua de Mogoda				
	Terrassa				



Source: Author's elaboration

Only 5 Counties are quantitatively represented by a number of Municipalities, making the information valuable, whereas in many other Counties it is very common that the only city with more than 10.000 inhabitants is the County capital, or in the rural ones, where even the capital has a smaller population.

4- The Municipalities, the City Council.

In this chapter we would like to explain the legal framework applying to the local administration, as well as the roles of each one of the institutions involved in the management of such an administration, from the political side.

4.a) Legal Framework

The Spanish Constitution was approved in 1978, but at the same time the Municipalities still had Mayors designated during the dictatorship, keeping in power until the local elections of 1979.

The Law 27/2013, published the 30th of December 2013, is currently the main reference relating the relationships between the Municipality and the citizens and within the Municipality itself. Prior to this one, the framework was regulated by the Law 7/1985. Until then, the regulation related to the local government was issued in the 50's⁵³, and the Law 7/1985⁵⁴ had the aim of creating a new legal framework under the Constitutional mandate⁵⁵. It was only in the “*second generation*” Statutes of Autonomy that some competencies were assigned to the municipalities, to be executed with full independence of the upper administrations. (Marquez Cruz, 2010, p. 39)

Among other regulations, this Law, 27/2013, describes the responsibilities and rights of a number of actors which are relevant to explain in order to understand its role in the study. In fact, the new Law makes some changes to the previous one, the 7/1985, as it can be noticed when reading the Law, which consists in a number of amendments to the 7/1985. In other words, you cannot read the Law 27/2013 without reading the Law 7/1985, since only the amended chapters are written.

During the period covered by the current research, the norms affecting the local governments are, grouped according to the legal hierarchy:

Organic Law 5/1985, referring to the electoral system

Law 7/1985, regulating the basics of the local administration, replaced by the Law 27/2013⁵⁶

Law 5/2002, about the rules relating the Official Gazette of the Province

Law 57/2003, with measures for the modernization of the local government

⁵³ Reglamento de Población y Demarcación Territorial de las Entidades Locales, 17/5/1952
Reglamento de Organización, Funcionamiento y Régimen Jurídico de las Corporaciones Locales, 17/5/1952
Reglamento de Funcionarios de Administración Local, 30/5/1952
Reglamento de Contratación de las Corporaciones Locales, 9/1/1953
Reglamento de Bienes de las Entidades Locales, 27/5/1955
Reglamento de Servicios de las Corporaciones Locales, 17/6/1955

⁵⁴ Approved the 2nd of April 1985, published the 3rd of April 1985

⁵⁵ The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, approved in December 1979, had no one single mention to the Municipalities. The Statute approved in 2006, in the articles 86 until 89, makes reference to the municipal autonomy.

⁵⁶ Law 27/2013 “for the rationalization and sustainability of the local administration”, issued the 27th of December 2013, published in the Official Gazette the 30th of December, and validity from the 31st of December

Royal Legislative Decree 781/1986, collecting the existing norms relating the local administration at the time of the Decree

Royal Decree 1690/1986 about the population and the territorial administration

Royal Decree 2586/1986, about the organization, and juridical regime of the City Council

For the translation of the roles and responsibilities we have used the lexicon of the English version of the Barcelona City Website⁵⁷

Prior to the Law 7/1985, we must pay attention to the Law 5/1985⁵⁸, which covered the electoral process, and among other regulations it defines the number of councillors that will take part of a City Council, related to the number of inhabitants at the moment of the elections, as displayed in the table number 22. We must bear in mind that a Councillor participating in the government is not a mere representative of the votes, but someone who will probably exercise executive tasks, and the bigger the town/city the bigger the number of portfolios to be assigned in order to have a proper level of management capacity over the matters and people in the hierarchy of the different department/s.

Table 22. Number of elected Councillors related to inhabitants

# of inhabitants	Councillors
0-100	3
101-250	5
251-1.000	7
1.001-2.000	9
2.001-5.000	11
5.001-10.000	13
10.001-20.000	17
20.001-50.000	21
50.001-100.000	25
more than 100.001, one Councillor each 100.000 or fraction, adding one more when the result is pair	

Source: Author's elaboration based on Law 5/1985

Obviously this is one of the parameters to take into consideration when talking about coalitions, since it can limit the number of parties involved, because the smaller the Council is, the less Councillors are going to become members of the City Council, thus, the less options for negotiation.

In the study, because of the characteristics of the 131 Municipalities, we will only have City Councils with more than 17 Councillors, and only few ones with 13, due to the demographical evolution of the towns.

⁵⁷<http://ves.cat/j7N1>

⁵⁸ Approved the 19th of June 1985

We will investigate whether the number of members in the City Council has any connection with the coalitional behaviour, or if there is any other related variable, such as the number of parties participating in the electoral contest.

The Part X of the Law refers to the big cities (more than 250.000 inhabitants), which in Catalonia – 2011 - means the city of Barcelona and l’Hospitalet de Llobregat, both sharing some streets in a continuous conurbation, and also the Province Capitals with more than 75.000 inhabitants, so Girona, Lleida and Tarragona

The population of the bigger cities in 2011 is the one displayed in table 23:

Table 23. Bigger cities and Cities included in Part X of the Law 7/1985

Municipality	# of inhabitants		Cities under Part X
Barcelona	1.619.337	Province Capital	Yes
L'Hospitalet de Llobregat	258.642	in Barcelona Province	Yes
Badalona	218.886	in Barcelona Province	No
Terrassa	212.724	in Barcelona Province	No
Sabadell	207.338	in Barcelona Province	No
Tarragona	140.184	Province Capital	Yes
Lleida	137.387	Province Capital	Yes
Mataró	122.905	in Barcelona Province	No
Santa Coloma de Gramenet	120.060	in Barcelona Province	No
Reus	106.622	in Tarragona Province	No
Girona	96.236	Province Capital	Yes


Source: Author’s elaboration on IDESCAT’s data

The Law 7/1985 describes the persons in charge and structure, based in the number of inhabitants, which is summarized in the following matrix, graph number 16, where in the green squares, it is displayed the size of the municipality, In the blue ones it is written the name of the position within the City Council or the name of the organism.

In grey colour there is information about the conditions for the municipalities below the required number of inhabitants, willing to constitute an organism foreseen for bigger entities.

The commissions, in orange colour, are for consultation and follow-up of the local government.

Graph 16. Political Responsibilities and organisms in a Municipality



Source: Author’s elaboration on Law 7/1985

As in any other organization, there must be a balance between the need of a structure properly dimensioned, to cover the needs and to be able to coordinate the organization itself and the services offered to the citizens, but we should pay attention to the enormous complexity and the costs of such a bureaucratic structure, which has to do, mainly, with the cost and management of the human resources being involved, as indicated in table 24.

Table 24. Percentage of salaries out of the total budget

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
26,4%	26,5%	28,4%	29,0%	32,2%

Source: Author’s elaboration on IDESCAT data

Table 24 shows the evolutions of the so called Chapter I, the personnel costs, of the budgets of the Catalan municipalities, which are a part of the total budget, which cannot be invested or applied to any policy on behalf of the citizens, since it is related to the salaries of the civil servants and some politicians. The cost of the salaries has to do with the level of bureaucratization of the administration, “which is higher in the cities of mayor-council power structure” (Lapuente, 2010, p. 753), similar to the ones in Spain, where the council-manager structure is almost unknown.

There is a relevant issue with the above figures, due to the high impact of the Barcelona city values. We must bear in mind that the Barcelona city budget in 2011 was the 25,75% of the total of the Catalan municipalities. This means that when we say that the cost for personnel represents the 32,2%, we must be aware that the one of the Barcelona city was the 15,70% in the same year.

The consequence is that we shouldn't be surprised when looking at the Budgets for 2013, and notice that the costs related to personnel in the city of Granollers (59.700 inhabitants) was the 39,3%, and the one of La Garriga (15.600 inhabitants) was the 36,9%, which means that the amounts left for applying politics are highly conditioned by the municipalities' structure of personnel.

Taking the example of La Garriga in 2013, if we put aside the personnel costs, the interests and the repayment of the debt, only the 53,7% was available for other purposes. When drilling down per chapter and per cost line, we wonder whether there is any option or not for deciding when or how the streets must be cleaned, or what is the cost of the public lighting. If we consider that these are fix and mandatory costs, it is to say, without freedom for the local politicians to be able to decide, they can only apply strong policies in the investments chapter (Chapter VI). In this sense, it is possible for them to decide which streets are going to be renewed, or similar actions. In La Garriga 2013 this represented the 13,86% of the total budget, and in 2014 only the 8,2%.

Does it makes any sense for a local politician to be part of a heavy structure that only releases an average of a 10% of the whole budget for executing their policies?

We must bear in mind that the investments chapter is only satisfying the expectations of the Councillors responsible for Public Housing and Street Maintenance. Any other Councillor must follow the trend of the previous years or be able to produce a radical change, only acceptable if it was a main topic of the party's electoral manifesto.

4.b) The Mayor

The Mayor has the main level of power and representativeness. The Mayor is elected by the Councillors, in towns with more than 250 inhabitants⁵⁹, requiring an absolute majority. If this is not reached, the candidate number one of the list having collected the higher number of votes in the elections becomes automatically the Mayor. If two lists have the same number of votes, the Mayor is decided by draw⁶⁰. Such a system has direct consequences in the way that the politicians compete for being elected, and the way the citizens see the elections for the local administration, which is perfectly described as "*local elections in Spain are widely regarded as contests between competing candidates for the position of Mayor*" (Sweeting, 2012, p. 242), or in the same sense, "*frequently elections are like choices between people who aspire to be mayor, rather than choices between parties and their corresponding lists or candidates for councillors*" (Vallès & Brugué, 2001, p. 281). The legislation creates the Strong Mayor figure (Mouritzen & Svava, 2002, p. 52), and consequently the system is geared towards securing mayoral priorities, rather than the contribution of other actors. The fact that the Mayor has a strong role, explains the need of written coalition agreements in the local politics, according to the conclusions of the Indridason and Kristinsson's study about the coalition agreements, arguing that "*a strong core executive alleviates the need to write extensive coalition agreements to constrain ministers ... [while] ... are more likely to be made in contexts where Prime Ministers are strong*" (Indridason & Kristinsson, 2013, p. 840). Unfortunately it is beyond our reach to analyse the coalition

⁵⁹ Special regulation for towns below 100 inhabitants, and for towns with 101 till 250 inhabitants. Direct election of the Mayor by the voters

⁶⁰ Law 5/1985 Art 196

agreements of the governments under study, in order to confirm such a thesis, taking into consideration if there is a difference between the coalition agreements signed when the coalition governments are unbalanced, meaning a main party leading the government, or when there is a balance between the political forces.

Since we had the opportunity of interviewing a number of Mayors, we can define them as people able to exercise a negotiated leadership, aiming to satisfy the needs of their neighbours, regardless they are their voters or not. We could, certainly consider that “*the mayors build their political capital – understood as potential influence – by investing their weak formal power⁶¹ in a prudent manner*” (Kjaer, 2013, p. 268), highlighting the word prudent which is perfect for qualifying all of them, which must be considered “*political and managerial leaders*” (Fenwick & Elcock, 2014, p. 597).

The peculiarity of the election of the Mayor, which does not give any chance for delays or absence of power, has to do with the special lifespan of the local mandate, where the elections are held every four years, with no possibility of advanced elections, so forcing the local politicians to maintain a culture of negotiation different to any other level of the administration⁶², where the lack of consensus can be solved by calling the electors to new elections, which means that there are other arguments to put in the negotiation table.

The process after the elections is explained in graph 17⁶³. Such a process is valid for any Municipality, no matters the size of it. When there is no an absolute majority and there is a need for negotiating to create a government coalition or any other option for electing the Mayor, the parties have only 20 days for reaching a government agreement.


Since there is no a majority option, the parties will try to reach a consensus in order to avoid the election of the Mayor of the most voted list, which guarantees having a Mayor, but not the governability of the City Council.

⁶¹ The paper refers to the local politics in Denmark, where the each local council elects its mayor from among its own members. This means that committees are responsible for the preparation and implementation of the council decisions and for the administration of local authority functions. In addition they can make decisions on behalf of the council. The mayor is the chairman of the representative body, as well as the chief executive of the local government. The council passes the annual budget, imposes local taxes, issues by-laws, etc

⁶² [JSole] explained us the details of the 2007 negotiation, when he became Mayor for the first time. His party, ERC, got 3 Councillors in the previous elections and had to remain in the opposition. In 2007 reached 5 Councillors, CIU also 5 Councillors, the PSC 4, 2 more where for ICV and 1 for the PP, which makes a total of 17, leaving the coalitional negotiation very open. ERC rejected to negotiate with the party of the previous Mayor, the PSC, since they lost a high number of votes due to the way of managing the City Council, and such a coalition would not be accepted by their voters. When talking with CIU they considered that their exigencies where excessive. They participated in the Plenary session for electing the new Mayor, ignoring if there was any agreement between CIU and PSC. There was not previous or post agreement, so he became the Mayor since the day of the elections his party got 17 more votes than CIU. Some months later they signed a government agreement with CIU, but from a stronger negotiating position.

⁶³ We must state that the n days between the City Council Constitution and the Delegations assignment have been the main issue for the research of information to fulfil the database, since all electoral dates are exact dates, by law, but there is no limit in time for the assignment of responsibilities when configuring a new City Council. This means that the search has to take place exploring within an unlimited number of days after the elections.

Graph 17. Timing for the creation of a City Council after the local elections



Source: Author's elaboration on Royal Decree 2586/1986

In any case, after the formal Constitution of the City Council, which means that all the Councillors are entitled as such, and the Mayor is elected, there are two options.

- The first one consists in a detailed government agreement which includes the government program, how the portfolios are going to be distributed and, finally, how are the relations between the parties going to be organized.
- The second one takes place when a government agreement has been signed, but the details have been left as a separate agreement for future negotiations.

For the naming of the Deputy Mayors and the assignment of the responsibilities and portfolios there is no time limit after the City Council's Constitution.

It means that, if the agreement was a basic one, the negotiations can continue over the time without a legal limit. The assignment of some positions, specially the First Deputy Mayor, is of great relevance for recognizing the partnership between parties and the distribution of power. The distribution of the Departments/Portfolios is also very relevant, because is the way that each party will have the opportunity of deploying their policies and being visible for the citizens, bearing in mind the need of having a clear political profile, which is different from any other in coalition.

Usually on the very same day, or even some days later, the City Council will have to vote about the third agreement after the elections, which is the retributions one. This agreement is about deciding which members of the City Council will invest their time, in full dedication basis, or part-time dedication, in order to assign their salaries. At the same time, they will have to decide about the payments related to any other activity under remuneration.

4.c) The Deputy Mayor

The role of the Deputy Mayor, named “Tinent d’alcalde” as described in the Law is:

“... to replace the Mayor in cases of vacancy, absence or illness, and can be freely appointed and removed by the Mayor among the members of the Local Government Committee or among the Councillors when the Committee does not exist⁶⁴”

So a direct translation should be: Mayor’s Substitute. When looking at the article 46 of the Royal Decree 2568/1986, there is a reference to the number of Deputy Mayors. We know, as it has been stated by the regulation, that the number of members of the Local Government Committee cannot exceed one third of the number of members of the Plenary. In the article 46 can we read that the number of Deputy Mayors cannot exceed the number of members of the Local Government Committee. It clearly states that cannot be exceeded, which must be understood as the upper limit, but not as an obligation to equal its number⁶⁵, as it seems to be the rule in some municipalities.

From this definitions we can’t expect other differences between a Councillor and a Deputy Mayor than the temporary representativeness and power, but the practice has converted the Deputy Mayor in the responsible of Areas of government in a few big cities, but in general there is no major difference than a higher salary compared to a regular Councillor as well as higher remuneration for attendance to the commissions. In general, a Deputy Mayor receives delegation from the Mayor as Councillor in a specific department.

We wonder whether this position, which represents the highest level of representativeness after the Mayor, is used as a bargaining argument within the negotiation process for a governmental coalition, and we will also try to answer to these issues by paying attention to the evidences out of the database.

4.d) The Councillors

There is a direct election by the citizens, out of the lists of the parties. The members of the lists, and the internal ranking are decided by the direction of the parties, creating a meritocracy because the voters are not able to give their vote to a single candidate, but to a list, which will cover the positions in the municipality following, usually, the order of the list, but we must bear in mind that *“elected members therefore tend to see themselves as representatives of a political party, and the party program is of considerable importance”* (Sweeting, 2012, p. 241) , which has an impact in the level of commitment of the elected Councillors in relation to the voters, but also in the opposite direction, because the constituents do not have a particular Councillor to turn as “their” representative.

The Councillors taking part of the government can have direct responsibility over a Department, in the sense of leading the Department in terms of applying the politics of his/her party, and, to a certain extent, deciding about the human resources assigned.

⁶⁴ Law 7/1985 Art 23.3, unchanged by 27/2013

⁶⁵ Three of the local politicians interviewed considered that the number of Deputy Mayors had to be equal to the number of members of the Local Government Committee, because “it was said” by the Secretary of the City Council.

Any Councillor is member of the Plenary, and participates in the different Commissions and Committees.

4.e) The Plenary

All the elected Councillors participate in the Plenary, under the rule of one Councillor one vote

The main task of the Plenary is the “Control and audit of the Local Government”⁶⁶

4.f) The Local Government Committee

It is composed by the Mayor and a number of Councillors no higher to one third of the total. It is the Mayor who has the capacity to appoint and remove its members.

The role is to assist and advise the Mayor⁶⁷

4.g) Competencies

The Municipality must exercise competencies in⁶⁸:

- Security in Public Areas
- Traffic
- Urban Planning
- Public Heritage
- Defence of the Consumers
- Basic Health protection
- Waste collection and treatment
- Cultural activities and installations
- Leisure
- Tourism
- Maintenance of the educational facilities, participating in the management of the centres
- Surveillance of the accomplishment of the mandatory scholarship ages

But also there is a list of services to be provided, displayed in graph 18, depending on the number of inhabitants⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Law 7/1985 Art 22, unchanged in 27/2013

⁶⁷ Law 7/1985 Art 23, unchanged in 27/2013

⁶⁸ Law 7/1985 Art 25. The Law 27/2013 replaced completely the Article 25 with a new redaction, but there are some main differences, of which Defence of the Consumers and Basic Health protection are disappeared, while three new competencies are added, being Evaluation, Information and attention to the citizens with social needs or under exclusion risk, Cemetery, and the promotion of the participation of the citizenry in the “efficient and sustainable” use of the information and communication technologies. The points 3, 4 and 5 of the article number 25 explain that the competencies will be determined by Law, accompanied by a financial study detailing the economic resources to be used for providing the services, and clarifying that in any case the provision of the services can justify an increase of the overall public expenditure.

⁶⁹ Law 7/1985 Art 26. This article is also fully re-written. The Food and beverage control disappears, and the Public market for the municipalities with more than 5.000 inhabitants, or any other. The point 2, 3 and 4 of the Law 7/1985, which opened the door to the cooperation with the upper administrations, are completely replaced by the new points 2 and 3, which are mandatory. The point number 2 details the services to be provided by the Province administration to the towns and cities with less than 20.000 inhabitants, and the system to distribute the cost of providing such services. The new text reinforces the role of the Province Administration, and reduces the one of the Autonomous Communities, which in the former redaction could also participate or coordinate the provision of services, and the new text limits to informing about a certain need of support when requested by a municipality.

Graph 18. Services to be provided by the Municipalities, based on number of inhabitants



Source: Author's elaboration based on Law 7/1985

As it has already been said, the municipalities are taking in charge responsibilities, and the related costs, to be able to satisfy the needs of the citizens, without the provision of extra income.

There is no regulation about the way that the above competencies must be executed, directly by employees of the municipality, in cooperation with other municipalities or outsourcing it. When thinking in the period started in 1979, the more common way that the municipalities, as well as the private companies, used to provide goods and services it was by means of their own human, technical and financial resources.

It was at the end of the XXth Century when the private companies opted for concentrating their efforts in their core businesses, and to outsource any other activity not adding value. The administration in general, and the local one also, maintained the old systems, probably because most of their human resources were public servants, so the local leaders were not able to resize the number of employees, conditioning the capacity and the economic sense of outsourcing. Currently, there is an example of success, when the municipalities outsource the maintenance of the public lighting by means of ESCO's⁷⁰, which means "energy saving companies", private companies specialized in energy efficiency, linked to the municipality under a win-win agreement. Such an evolution is explained by Wollmann by saying that "*in Spain's municipalities, public services are predominantly handled by local public companies, some of them 100 per cent municipal companies, other mixed companies with municipal and private shareholders*" (Wollmann, 2012, p. 61), but also refers to the evolution in some of the analysed countries, when describing the new status, "*the position and role of traditional local government has been*

⁷⁰ <http://www.esco-europe.com>

questioned by the emergence and expansion of actors and institutions that, outsourcing and privatizing local government functions to external actors and organizations, constitute local governance networks essentially operating outside the immediate realm of local governance” (Wollmann, 2012, p. 65), being local government understood as the traditional structure, and the local governance as networks of actors and organizations operating outside the realm of government.

Retrieving the former example, in order to explain the structure of the agreement, we must say that the contract, for a period up to 10 or 12 years, is based in the investments of the ESCO in certain assets for reaching some energy savings and achieving the reduction of the electricity bill. The saving is shared in a 50/50 basis between the ESCO and the municipality, which will always have a lower cost than executed by themselves.

The conclusions of the study “the non-mandatory costs in the Spanish municipalities. 2004-2007⁷¹” (Mas, et al., 2011, pp. 49-51), show to what extent this attitude can explain the high level of debt accumulated during the last years.

Some real facts and figures out of the study are the following:

- The non-mandatory costs equals the 25,8% of the total
- The functions/services participating in these expenses are: security, civil protection, culture, social promotion, community and social services.
 - o A list of services foreseen for cities of more than 20.000 inhabitants
- It is mainly for salaries (41%)
- The Municipalities with a higher non-mandatory cost per inhabitant are the small ones (less than 5.000 inh.), and the ones having the lowest cost are the medium size ones (5.001 to 20.000 inh.)

Looking at our database, almost all the Municipalities for which there is information, having less than 20.000 inhabitants, are providing Social Services, as it is shown in table 25, which is only mandatory for cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants:

Table 25. Towns and Cities below 20.000 inh. providing Social Services

Year	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Range									
< 10.000 inh	3	3	4	2	5	9	12	11	11
% on total in DB	100,0%	100,0%	50,0%	50,0%	62,5%	90,0%	100,0%	91,7%	91,7%
> 10.000 < 20.000 inh	14	16	32	31	40	50	53	53	54
% on total in DB	34,1%	39,0%	68,1%	64,6%	80,0%	94,3%	94,6%	94,6%	96,4%

Source: Author’s elaboration on Own Database

⁷¹ The study shows and comments in the conclusions, that the cities in the province of Madrid are the ones with the higher percentage of non-mandatory costs, mainly salaries.

In this table, the top line figures are referred to Municipalities below 10.000 inhabitants, and the bottom one to the Municipalities between 10.000 and 20.000 inhabitants.

In both cases, certainly, since 1999, the vast majority of the Municipalities do have a Department directly dealing with Social Services.

Looking at the 2011 aggregated figures⁷², the last ones available at the Catalan Statistics Institute, the Social Services department has an average cost equivalent to the 6,95% of the total budget of the municipalities, which means that any municipality with less than 20.000 inhabitants having such a service, is supporting an extra cost for which there is no income or compensation foreseen.

⁷² <http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=677>

IV- Research Results

In the following pages, different characteristics will be reviewed:

- Morphology
 - Number of parties in coalition. Firstly, we will calculate and display the trend in terms of the number of parties forming coalitions, in order to investigate if there are any historical reasons explaining certain coalition dimensions, and also if certain reasons in terms of the voter's preferences can explain the number of parties forming a relevant number of coalitions for a specific period.
 - The role of the independent parties or lists. The IND/OTH parties, which are eventually the ones not present within the main five, are having a different level of voter's acceptance along the period under study. Nevertheless we are going to drill down in order to explore if they are really independent parties or, as we have seen in the last elections, new political options in the local arena. A group of citizens can make a list for participating in the local elections as an "electors' list", but the name of the list will have a relevant impact when adding up the votes to other lists for having seats in the upper regional administrations, as the County Council and the Diputació, at province level. We will differentiate the OTH parties, meaning the new political options which are also interested in other electoral arenas, but different from the main historical five, from the IND parties or lists, referring to the ones which are only involved in the local politics.
 - Coalition types. We will describe the coalition types according to the academic standards, as well as display the trend and correlations in the analysed Catalan municipalities, in order to understand which are the preferred ones for the Catalan parties.
 - Connection between parties in coalition. We will start by positioning each party according to the ideological and the national axis, so as to know which kind of connection exists between each group of parties forming coalition, and to visualize the distance within the axes, in order to validate if the connection is also a driver that can explain a number of coalitions, or if the coalition logics is a matter of mathematics out of the connection between parties. We will also study which is the axis producing more coalitions, if any, or if it is a balanced factor.
 - The behaviour of the main and the pivotal parties. Does the big fish always eat the small one? We will verify, according to the historical records, if there is an expected result in the next elections after a coalition government, or the other way around, how a coalition can impact in each one of the members in the next elections, paying only attention to their relative size within the coalition.

- Cooperation patterns. We will check if when parties go into coalition they respond to certain patterns in terms of getting certain portfolios, which have to do with the parties in coalition, and/or which is the party of the Mayor, understanding that the party of the Mayor is the majoritarian within the coalition, or the former party. We will investigate if the parties, when going into coalition, tend to obtain the portfolios that better respond to their electoral manifestos.
 - Busy Mayors and longevity. We will present the results of the database in terms of what a Mayor declared to hold as direct responsibilities, and which are the trends, as well as the evolution of certain Counties and parties in terms of stability.
 - Power and Representativeness in the local administration. We have the need of defining both concepts, the Power related to the Portfolios managed by the Councillors, and the Representativeness, related to the position acquired by a Councillor, since we consider that both parameters are needed for understanding the paybacks of the coalition negotiation.
- Who gets what
- The many faces of the Deputy Mayor. The study will analyse at what extent the Deputy Mayor is fulfilling the mandate of the Law, or whether this position is used as a coalitional pay-back, by checking how do the parties distribute the First Deputy Mayor, as well as the second and third, so the main ones.
 - Gender. The parity Law from was issued in 2003, and the study will use our database to verify at what extent the women maintain their positions once getting portfolio. Do the parties respect the positions in the electoral lists occupied by women when distributing portfolio?

The expectation is to know and to understand the many variables influencing the coalition governments

1- Morphology

1.a) Number of parties in coalition

The number of parties taking part in a coalition government can tell us about the fragility of the government, since the more parties in government the more difficulties for reaching agreements. In fact, the coalitions of two and three parties are the most usual ones. We can also notice that the coalitions of 4, 5 and 6 parties were exceptionally relevant in 1979, as a consequence of the high number of concentration governments. It was Komorita who proposed that due to logistical problems relating internal communication of the coalitional offers that the big ones are much more difficult to manage than the small ones. We can also highlight that the higher the number of parties, the wider the possibilities for having *faithless electors*. The coalition with a lot of parties are more difficult to create and also to maintain (Komorita, 1974) and, finally, as the result of his quantitative study, Kline stated: “ [we should] examine the extent to which norms, institutions and history conspire to nearly inevitably reduce the effective number of parties as we consider each subsequent stage of the electoral and governance process” (Kline, 2009, p. 268)

The main difference between the total number of a Single Party government and the Coalitions of two parties can be found in the number of governments with such forms in 1987 and in 1991.

In Table number 26, the number of parties in coalition is displayed, and we can notice that the 40,6% of the local governments within the analysed period have had the form of single party government, in majority or minority, far from the 71,7% of the municipalities in Galicia (Marquez Cruz, 2010, p. 52). It is important to say that the percentage is always in the range of the 40%, regardless the dimension of the towns/cities under scope.

Table 26. Number of parties in coalition per year


Year of the election	Number of parties in coalition						TOTAL
	Single Party	2	3	4	5	6	
1979	22	27	27	16	3	1	96
1983	39	33	16	7	1		96
1987	65	26	12	7	2		112
1991	70	22	10	5	2		109
1995	58	37	21	2	2		120
1999	53	46	25	1	1		126
2003	38	51	40	2	0		131
2007	30	54	39	7	1		131
2011	52	51	21	5	2		131
TOTAL	427	347	211	52	14	1	1052

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

If we look at the total number of votes received by each party, we will be able to understand this high level of Single Party Governments in the mentioned elections. With this purpose, in graph number 19 it is displayed the absolute number of votes received by each one of the options. Even though we must be aware that in 1979 the lists under the name of *independent electors' lists* received 312.274 votes, something never repeated again. The independent electors' lists are only a part of the IND/OTH lists, including UCD and other disappeared parties,

which in total received almost 800.000 votes. To pay attention to the reduction in the number of votes of the two main parties in 2007 and 2011⁷³.

Graph 19. Number of votes per party and per year




Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

At a first glance we can observe that in the years previously mentioned, 1987 and 1991, the two main parties had a very high number of votes, which made them to become the two best periods in history for the PSC, and 1987 the best one for CIU, if not in absolute terms, certainly in percentage when comparing to the votes obtained by the other parties and the overall level of participation, as it is displayed in graph number 19.

Since the Law regulating the number of Councillors for each City Council, related to the number of inhabitants of the cities/towns, was issued in 1985, and the population has been continuously growing, in Graph number 20 we can appreciate the growth of the total number of elected Councillors, from 8.260 in 1979 until 9.132 in 2011, which means an increase of the 10,5%, while within the same period the number of electors increased in a 21,1% and the population in a 25,8%.

Graph 20. Catalonia, Total number of Councillors




Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

⁷³ [JRomeu] commented that the loss of votes of the two main parties in 2007 and 2011, facilitated the coalition agreements with the participation of smaller players than ever before

With such a relevant change in the number of Councillors, we must start paying attention to the evolution of each party, also in absolute figures. What we can notice in Graph number 21 is that the increase of Councillors has been capitalized by the two main parties, CIU and the PSC, and at a lower extent by ERC, Apparently, the IND/OTH parties used to benefit from the lack of the voter's maturity. The IND/OTH parties in 2011, including new political proposals, reached their bottom level in terms of Councillors.


Graph 21. Number of Councillors per party



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

Taking the records behind the Graphs 19 and 21, we can construct Graph number 22, in order to look at the average number of votes needed for having a Councillor. When looking at the Graph number 22, we must bear in mind that the Graph is only showing averages, but not weighted averages, which means that the average number of votes needed for having a Councillor in Barcelona, it is put aside with the number of votes needed for having a Councillor in a town with 10 inhabitants. It simply displays the number of Councillors in a certain year for a certain party, divided by the number of votes received.

Graph 22. Number of votes needed to have a Councillor




Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

The performance of the votes, in terms of Councillors reached per every vote received, is also different per party, and has an evolution along the years. It has to do with the strategy of the parties when deciding in which cities and towns to invest in supporting their local leaders. The party with the best performance, ever, is CIU, having presence in all type of Municipalities, despite of its size, in all the geography of Catalonia, reaching an average of one Councillor for every 200 votes received. Only ERC in 2007 and 2011, and the independent lists are so successful in terms of transforming votes into Councillors. We must be aware that the number of Councillor is relevant not only at local level, but also in the government of the Counties and the Provinces, which political structure is directly elected out of the results of the local elections. The PSC and ICV show an evolution which should be understood as positive, if this would be the result of a strategy, but the truth is that since both parties have lost votes and Councillors in the big cities in 2011, on behalf of CIU, their ratio has improved. The less votes in the big cities, the best ratio. Certainly, improving the performance in that sense is not the goal of the parties, and the example to follow is the one of CIU, receiving votes in towns and cities of all sizes. For the two parties having less impact in the rural areas, ICV and PP, a Councillor has always a higher cost in votes.

In the next graph, number 23, it is displayed the percentages of votes compared to the total, and it is evident that in 1987 and 1991, both parties together, obtained their best results, which allowed them to constitute the highest number of Single Party Governments ever.

Graph 23. Percentage of votes and Councillors per party and per year. All Catalonia



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

Due to the cost of each Councillor, in votes, and the spectacular implementations of CIU in the rural areas in each small town, the conversion from votes to Councillors shows the CIU's advantage in the following graph, also displaying percentages, which confirms the results in 1987 and 1991 already explained.

On the previous table 26 it is also visible the impact of the government of three parties, PSC, ICV and ERC, in the Generalitat of Catalonia. After the local elections of 2003 and 2007, the number

of coalitions of three parties almost doubled the average of such number of parties in coalition. This effect may be due to the convergence of two factors, being the first one the voters' behaviour, and the second one the parties' coalition decisions.

Shall we conclude that the voters decide in a similar way, regardless of the type of election, for a limited, historical, period of time? Does Noels' statement also apply to the Catalan electors, when he said *"Presidential election can be forecast with incredible accuracy well before the campaign really begins. In fact, if all you know is the state of the economy, you know pretty well how the incumbent party will do"*? (Noel, 2010, p. 2)

The correlation between the number of votes received by the parties, when comparing the results of the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia with the next local elections, or when comparing the elections to the Parliament with nearest (in time) local elections, regardless if the local elections were before or after the ones to the Parliament of Catalonia, is always 0,86. This figure shows that the electors, when voting are conditioned by historical or economic reasons, rather than political loyalties, or *"...the regime type seems to play the most dominant role [for explaining the local vote]. Specifically, parliamentarism appears to restrict the local vote, whereas presidentialism appears to accommodate all levels of local voting"* (Morgenstern & M. Swindle, 2005, p. 164). This behaviour opens a limited number of options for the parties when deciding on how to coalesce, but the easiest option for the local politicians is to adopt the same scheme than the one in the upper administration.

When looking at the figures in Catalonia, we must also bear in mind what is displayed in table 27, in the sense that two parties are the main ones when considering number of councillors participating in coalition governments, thus, that at statistical level, these two parties are offering the best information for any kind of analysis. The table is showing the number of Councillors in Coalition Governments. Bearing in mind that the coalitions between the PSC and CIU represent less than the 8% of the total within the research period, the high values of both parties must be compared with the 31,6% of the other parties altogether, since they are the beneficiaries of participating in coalitions accompanying the two main ones. In that sense we could understand the coalition dynamics in Catalonia as a game of three.

Table 27. Councillors per party in Coalition governments.

Party	PSC	CIU	ICV	ERC	IND	PP
Year						
1979	165	128	88	11	93	
1983	202	89	48	8	43	18
1987	144	120	55	16	48	23
1991	144	89	53	13	11	20
1995	200	191	61	34	34	20
1999	326	169	70	83	44	25
2003	470	157	129	126	41	17
2007	570	197	99	136	55	21
2011	252	299	71	73	62	60
Total	2473	1439	674	500	431	204
%	43,2%	25,2%	11,8%	8,7%	7,5%	3,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Using Graphs from number 24 until 29, we will try to make visible other characteristics of the distribution of votes and Councillors within the parties, using the records covering all the towns and cities of Catalonia. It will be in Graphs from 32 until 39 where we will analyse the same variables for the specific municipalities under study.

In Graph number 24 we can easily visualize that CIU reaches a very high percentage of Councillors, which is always higher than the percentage of votes, with the only exception of the 1979's elections. Actually, this fact can be explained because the Coalition was born in 1978. When looking at the graphs displaying the performance of the other lists, we will notice that CIU always gets the best ratio of Councillors per votes, which is explained by the presence of the party in any town and city of Catalonia.

Graph 24. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. CIU




Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

In 2011 CIU was not obtaining their best results, neither in votes, nor in Councillors. However, thanks to the PSC's bad results, the party succeeded in gaining the position of Mayor in many cities which were in the hands of the PSC or any other left wing party since 1979. CIU never reached the 40% of the votes, but usually the 40/50% of the Councillors, thus, dominating most of the County Councils out of the Barcelona Province.

The rates of the PSC are shown in Graph number 25. The votes used to be in the range of the 40% but it started to reduce the percentage in 2003, being lower in 2007 and below the 30% in 2011.

Graph 25. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. PSC




Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

The conversion ratio for a party like the PSC, having its success and main number of electors in the urban areas, is very bad compared to the one of CIU. Anyway, the PSC has always kept the Province administration, the so called Diputació, of the Barcelona Province, the one related to 73% of the population. Holding power in the Barcelona Diputació means administrating important economic resources to be spread within the territory. This administration was lost after the elections of 2011. When distributing the resources within the different towns and cities, the party leading the Diputació has the possibility of benefiting the ones under the rule of Mayors belonging to their party, converting the Diputació in an important political tool.

The two first graphs of this group, 24 and 25, are graded from the 0% until the 60%, but the next three ones, from 26 until 28, have a maximum of a 30%, because when using the 60% the curves are almost invisible. The last graph recovers the 60% as maximum, in behalf of the visibility.

Graph number 26 shows the ERC's evolution, using dark blue instead of yellow for facilitating the visibility of the curves. This is the party that gained all the elections in Catalonia from 1931 until 1939, but has played a discrete role from 1979 on the local elections, improving the performance of the votes received only in 2007 and 2011, after stopping the continuous internal problems and changes of leaders. This party declared the Catalan Republic in 1931 and the Catalan State in 1934.

Graph 26. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. ERC



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

It is important to know that ERC's decision making process is based on assemblies, which sometimes is a too slow system, and that sometimes results in confusion, since the assembly can contradict the choice of the leader. Sometimes the relevant issues of the present require a fast response. In such a situation the party leaders are under pressure for a fast reaction, not having the time for consulting their assembly. The best example of a contradictory process was when the party participated in the writing of the Statute of Autonomy of 2006, and the leaders asked their voters to support it, but before the referendum of the 18th of June 2006, the assembly approved to reject it, and to campaign against it, promoting a negative vote.

Graph number 27, which is about the performance of ICV, shows always a low percentage of Councillors in relation to the percentage of votes. This is due to the concentration of voters in the more urban and industrialized areas. In 1979 they seem to have good results, but this was due to the fact that for the purposes of this study, any communist or filo-communist, or green party, have been aggregated under the ICV name. The PSUC, Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, in other words, the Catalan Communist Party, was very rooted and popular in Catalonia, since it was very active during the dictatorship, thanks to their cellular structure which made them possible to survive to the pressure of the francoist police. The cooperation between the PSUC and the communist trade union (Commissions Obreres), which was created by members of the communist parties, but also by catholic grass-root organizations, which made the PSUC a popular option for the workers of the industrial areas, as well as some intellectuals positioned against the dictatorship. As stated by Encarnación, *"While still operating underground, left parties, particularly the PCE –the Communist Spanish Party- used their organizational resources and political expertise to organize society against authoritarian order, literally creating much of Spanish civil society, which was very weak when Spain embraced democratization"* (Encarnación , 2003, p. 47). Out of the first elections, they have always been reaching an average of the 10% of the votes and the 5% of the Councillors.

Graph 27. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. ICV



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

It is in Graph number 28 where the rates of the PP are displayed. In 1979 the party, AP (Alianza Popular) at that time, was not presenting lists to the local elections in Catalonia, but afterwards the party has had an average performance of receiving 10% of the votes and reaching 5% of the Councillors, improving both in 2011, which allowed the party to place a Mayor in Badalona, one of the main Catalan cities in number of inhabitants, traditionally occupied by the PSC.


Graph 28. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. PP



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

The last one of this series, the number 29, recovers the level of the 60% and it refers to the IND/OTH, meaning anyone different to the previous ones. This group, together with CIU, are the only ones which have succeeded in having a percentage of Councillors higher than the percentage of votes, which is telling us about their presence in many towns/cities mainly of small size, and also in a high number of them. The main percentage was reached in 1979, the first elections, but this was due to a high number of the so called *electors lists*, hiding many times political options whose leaders were afraid to declare.


Graph 29. Rates of Votes and Councillors. All Catalonia. OTH



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

Graph number 30, and the following ones, reproduce the same structure than the previous ones, but limited to the 131 municipalities participating of this study. This means that some differences will be explained by the different presence of the parties in small towns or big cities, since the first ones are excluded from this part.

Graph 30. Percentage of votes and Councillors per party and per year. Studied municipalities




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We notice that the relationship between the percentage of votes and the percentage of Councillors for any party and any year is more equilibrated than in the previous analysis.

When comparing Graph number 30, with the previous Graph number 23, displaying both the average number of votes needed for having a Councillor, the differences are, again, due to the wider presence of a certain party within the territory, because when looking at Graph number 31, limited to the municipalities under study, most of them of more than 10.000 inhabitants, the rate is more balanced. When paying attention to the overall rates, the performance of the best

one (200 votes per Councillor), compared to the one of the worst (1.200) has a factor of 6. When taking only into consideration the cities under study, the factor is usually around 3.


Graph 31. Number of votes needed to have a Councillor. Municipalities under study



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Starting with CIU in Graph number 32, it is also the party receiving a higher percentage of Councillors than the percentage of votes, certainly at a lower extent than when looking at the overall records, but still unique. The best rates were obtained in 1987, 1991 and 1995, but the ones of its competitor, the PSC were still better in terms of percentage of votes and Councillors.


Graph 32. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. CIU



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The PSC, in Graph number 33, has been clearly leading the local elections in the cities with more than 10.000 inhabitants until their defeat in 2011. In Graph number 25 we could see that the percentage of votes was always near to the 40%, and in Graph number 32 the rates are approximately the same, meaning that having good results in the big cities you can expect a good overall result, since the population is very concentrated at a geographical level.

Graph 33. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. PSC




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

What we can also see in Graph number 33 is that the performance in terms of councillors per votes is much better when looking at the cities with more than 10.000 inhabitants

In Graph number 34 we can see the results of ERC, also in dark blue instead of yellow, but as in the previous series, modifying the scale from a maximum of a 60% to a maximum of a 30% in order to have a visible distribution. The party is almost irrelevant, in percentage of votes as well as in percentage of Councillors. This figures convert ERC in a pivotal party, with a very limited number of exceptions.


Graph 34. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. ERC



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The next graph, number 35, shows the evolution of ICV, and the heritage of the communist party in 1979, in the surroundings of Barcelona city, but collecting only a stable percentage of votes of around the 10%.


Graph 35. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. ICV



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The PP, in graph number 36, shows the worst conversion rate. We must pay attention that in 1979 there were no lists from this political option, and that the best results were reached in 2011, but also in 1995, when the PSOE lost all the credibility in the Spanish Government, and the PP was to win the elections to the Spanish Parliament in 1996. The same happened in 1999 and 2003, while the PP hold the power in the central government. In that sense, the voting behaviour of the elector does not makes difference between the different arenas, at least in the main cities.


Graph 36. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. PP



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When looking at Graph number 37, we can notice that there is a difference between the results in 1979 and the ones of any other electoral contest. In 1979 there was a huge percentage of votes and Councillors accounted by this option in the whole Catalonia, but it was less relevant in the cities with more than 10.000 inhabitants. It was in the smaller cities and towns were more “elector lists” were voted in 1979. For any other electoral year, the percentage of votes to the IND/OTH, represented by new political parties, is also concentrated in the main cities.

Graph 37. Rates of Votes and Councillors. Municipalities under study. IND/OTH



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

If we go back to the previous table, number 26, we can state that, in general, the coalitions of two parties and the coalitions of three parties, altogether, have been more common than the single party system. The governments consisting in a coalition of 4, 5 or 6 parties are the most frequent after the elections of 1979 and 1983, in connection to the high number of concentration governments taking place during these years. Therefore, we can consider that coalition is the norm, comparable to the three-fourths of the European governments formed in the post war era (Gallagher, et al., 2005), and we can also expect that some voters cast their ballot bearing in mind the possible future coalition rather than their preferred party option “We have estimated that for nearly one voter out of ten, coalition preferences were a decisive consideration, that is, that they induced the voter to support a party other than their most preferred one” (Blais, et al., 2006, p. 702).

When paying attention only to the Oversized coalitions, in table 28, there is a balance between the ones of two members and the ones of three members.

What does it mean an Oversized coalition of two parties? This is actually the situation in which a party has enough Councillors to rule as a Single Party, but it prefers to look for a minor one for forming a coalition.

The Oversized coalitions of four and five parties are actually quite rare. The governments of three parties in 1999, 2003 and 2007 are directly linked to the tripartite PSC+ICV+ERC, and the 6 City Councils with 4 different parties in 2007 are due to a variety of options where all the parties participate in different coalitions despite not having any kind of relationship.

Table 28 Number of Oversized parties in coalition per year

Year of the election	Number of parties in Oversized coalition				
	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
1979	3	6	2		11
1983	14	5			19
1987	13	4	1		18
1991	5	4	2	1	12
1995	5	4	1		10
1999	14	13	1		28
2003	11	19	2	2	34
2007	8	16	6	1	31
2011	6	5	3	2	16
TOTAL	79	76	18	6	179

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Drilling down the Oversized Coalitions composed by two parties, we can analyse the records displayed in table number 29. It is evident that the PSC and ICV are the most favourable for governing together, regardless their possibility of governing alone. With the exception of the elections of 1979, we cannot consider that the above coalitions are based on the *“perceived need of political unity”*, but to the *“utility of government is greater for political parties than the utility of being in the opposition”* (Jungar, 2002, p. 59). Both parties have shared coalitions from the beginning of the recent democracy in Spain, and their cooperation is accepted by most of their voters.

We also notice that the coalitional agreements between the two main parties (PSC and CIU) are certainly low, compared to the one between the two leftist parties mentioned before.

Table 29. Detail of the two parties' Oversized Coalitions

Main party	Oversizer	Governments	
PSC	ICV	37	46,8%
ICV	PSC	4	5,1%
PSC	CIU	6	7,6%
CIU	PSC	2	2,5%
CIU	ERC	8	10,1%
OTH/IND	any other	11	13,9%
Miscellaneous		11	13,9%
TOTAL		79	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Table number 30 will be used for the same purpose, but relating to the Coalitions between three parties. The main group is the one including the PSC and ICV, and also ERC, which is usually playing the role of the oversizer. The combination of the three parties was common within the years when the same parties hold the government of the Generalitat of Catalonia. We must pay attention that within the *miscellaneous* group there are also combinations in which the PSC and ICV are participating.

Table 30. Detail of the three parties' Oversized Coalitions

Main party	Second	Third	Governments	
PSC	ICV	ERC	13	17,1%
PSC	ERC	ICV	8	10,5%
ICV	PSC	ERC	1	1,3%
PSC	CIU	ERC	4	5,3%
PSC	ERC	CIU	1	1,3%
ERC	CIU	PSC	1	1,3%
CIU	ERC	PSC	2	2,6%
CIU	PSC	ERC	2	2,6%
OTH/IND	any other		20	26,3%
Miscellaneous			24	31,6%

TOTAL 76


Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Within the second group, displaying different combinations of the PSC, CIU and ERC coalitions, no one has special relevance, neither the whole group of combinations. Any other, individually, is still less relevant, despite the fact that when considered altogether the percentage is quite high, reaching a 31,6%, but considering the individual combinations no one is relevant. It is beyond our reach, but it would be interesting to consider how can a party “participate in government in order to influence policy or attain government office” (Jungar, 2002, p. 60), when they get only one seat within an Oversized Coalition Government.

When using percentages, it is noticeable that only in 1987 and 1991 the single party was the prevalent option, as it is displayed in graph number 38.

If we leave aside the results of the 1979's elections, the single party government together to the two parties' coalition have always been the governments in more than 60% of the municipalities, and more than 70% with the only exception of the two electoral periods when the tripartite had its main successful results, in 2003 and 2007

Graph 38. Number of parties in coalition



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

To what extent could we consider that a high number of parties in coalition is a characteristic of a municipality? We wonder if there are conditions, as it could be a high number of parties

participating in the elections, a tradition of cooperating in the government, or any other external factor, but only related to certain municipalities. The truth is that a number of municipalities score always high relating the number of parties in coalition.

In table number 31, the size of the Municipality is compared with the average number of parties participating in the government, and the number of parties presented to the elections, also as an average of the whole period (1979-2011).

The bigger is the city, the more parties or lists participate in the elections, from an average of 4,1 lists for the towns with less than 5.000 inhabitants, to 7,41 in the cities with more than 20.000 inhabitants. If the number of parties participating in the elections seems to be correlated with the size of the municipality, the number of parties participating in the government is quite stable and closed to an average of two parties.

Table 31: number of inhabitants and parties

# of inhabitants	average parties in government	average parties in contest
less than 5.000	1,85	4,10
from 5.001 until 10.000	1,99	4,85
from 10.001 until 20.000	2,03	5,66
more than 20.001	1,88	7,41

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Table number 32 shows the list of the 17 municipalities whose average of parties in government is higher than 2,5. It is to be noticed that 6 out of the 17 show standard deviations smaller than 1, meaning that the average is made out of similar figures.

We will analyse two of them, one with a Standard deviation smaller than 1, and another one higher than 1, out of the top 5, in order to understand if there is any pattern of behaviour.

Table 32. Municipalities with frequent large coalitions

Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	average	Std dv
Cambrils	4	4	5	3	2	3	3	3	3	3,33	0,87
Sant Just Desvern	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3,00	0,50
Castelló d'Empúries						2	2	4	4	3,00	1,15
Tremp	3	3	4	4	5	3	2	1	2	3,00	1,22
Mont-roig del Camp			1	1	4	3	3	4	5	3,00	1,53
Malgrat de Mar	4	3	2	5	2	2	3	3	2	2,89	1,05
Alcanar				4		5	2	1	2	2,80	1,64
Salou					2	3	3	3	3	2,80	0,45
Premià de Mar	5	3	4	2	3	3	2	2	1	2,78	1,20
Cervera			1	1	5	2	3	5	2	2,71	1,70
Canet de Mar	3	2	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	2,67	0,71
Figueres	6	2	4		3	1	1	3	1	2,63	1,77
Gandesa			1			4	3	3	2	2,60	1,14
Les Borges Blanques			3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2,57	0,53
Arenys de Mar	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	3	3	2,56	0,73
Sitges	4	3	1	1	3	3	2	2	4	2,56	1,13
Palafrugell	4	4	1		1	2	3	3	2	2,50	1,20

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We have selected Cambrils and Mont-roig del Camp because of the completeness of the information available, not only in terms of number of years, but also considering the variety of records, from the electoral lists to newspapers and other related documents.

Cambrils, in table 33. Seven independent parties, present in most of the governments. This is a high number of parties, which can condition the spread of votes, so, increasing the difficulty for negotiating stable majority governments.

Table 33. Cambrils. Detail of the parties and number of Councillors

	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Total # of Councillors	17	17	17	17	17	17	21	21	21
A.E.IZ	3								
A.P.			1						
ACI				2					
ACI-FIC						1			
AP-PDP-UL		2							
CC-UCD	3								
CIC	8		3						
CIU	2		6		6	5			6
ERC		2	1						
ERC-AM							2		
ESQUERRA-AM								2	
ICV-EPM							2		
ICV-EUIA-EPM								1	
LA PLIC-FIC									2
PP				2		3			4
PSC (PSC-PSOE)					4				
PSC-PM							8	9	
PSC-PSOE		6	5	5					
PSUC		1							
Total in Government	16	11	16	9	10	9	12	12	12

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The lists A.E.IZ, ACI, ACI-FIC, CIC, LA PLIC-FIC, which run out of the traditional parties, have been participating in different governments, alone or in different pre-electoral coalitions, as ACI in 91, ACI-FIC in 99, and LA PLI-FIC in 2011.

The IND lists are usually composed by some leaders, who strongly believe in their projects, and a number of friends and relatives occupying the positions in the list that will never succeed to be elected, because of the need of covering the legal number of candidates and substitutes.

We are going to trace some of the lists of Cambrils from 1999 until 2011, in order to have an example of the fragility of such political structures, creating table number 34, where the name of the candidate can be traced for each year, each list in which has been participating, and the position occupied within the list. The light blue colour indicates that the candidate has received a seat in the local government.

Table 34. Cambrils' candidates in OTH lists

Year	1999		2003		2007	2011
List name	ACI-FIC	UPC	ACI-FIC	PLIC	PLIC-FIC	PLIC-FIC
Francesc Garriga	1					
Eduard Madico	6		1			
Sandra Sala	7					
Manuel Díaz	8		7			
Jordi Piñas	10		17			
Teresa Balaña	12		4			
Joan Mulet	13		14			
Sadurní Martí	15		15			
Josep Pedrell	17		21			
José Mellau		1		5		
Javier Martí				1	1	1
Laura Mellau				2		2
Salvador Franch				3	3	
Josep Llobera				6	5	
Francisco Bordera				11	11	9
Domingo Capafons				12	6	4
Núria Fàbregas				13		8
Alexis Domenech				14	7	
Maria José Molino				15	9	

Source: Author's elaboration on electoral lists

What can be deduced from the previous table is the volatility of the candidates in joining and leaving the politics within the IND lists. When we pay attention to the traditional parties, the lists are more stable along the years, and you can recognize the evolution of the top five candidates on any list.

In 1999, the candidate number one of the ACI-FIC list, became Second Deputy Mayor, who was responsible for Housing and Public Works, a very relevant position, but in 2003 left the list, with the next four candidates. This means that until the sixth candidate of the list we don't retrieve a candidate repeating in the next elections. The candidate number six of the ACI-FIC list in 1999, was the number one in the ACI-FIC list in 2003.

With such an intensity of changes, this type of lists open the door to any citizen interested in participating in the local politics to have an opportunity for obtaining a seat in the front line.

Mont-Roig del Camp. The justification could be the same, linked to the wide offer of political options. It could be highlighted that while in Cambrils, the City Council has been composed of 17 and 21 Councillors during the last two mandates, while in Mont-Roig del Camp it was composed by 11 in 1987, 13 from 1991 until 2007, and 17 only in 2011.

Table 35. Mont Roig del Camp. Detail of the parties and number of Councillors

	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Total # of Councillors	11	13	13	13	13	13	17
ADMC						1	
AME-AM							3
CIU	9	9	7		3		2
ESQUERRA-AM						2	
FIC							2
MPI			1				
MPI-FIC				2			
PP			1	1		1	2
PSC (PSC-PSOE)			2				
UMM-ERC-AM				5			
UMRM-ERC-AM					3		
UPM-MPI-PSC-iii						4	
VIM					2		
VX+							2
Total in Government	9	9	11	8	8	8	11

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The average number of IND parties in the elections, from 1979 until 2011 for the 131 municipalities under study is 2,85, and the Standard Deviation 1,99. The number of 10 IND parties in Mont-Roig del Camp could be a good explanation for a tradition of having many parties in government.

To test to what extent the number of political options in the elections, so the number of choices for the electors, drives to a high number of parties with elected candidates, thus creating governments with a high number of parties, we have built a file with three fields, table number 36 :

- (1) For each Municipality, for each year, the number of candidates to be elected, which is a legal constraint linked to the number of inhabitants, divided by the number of political parties in contest. This would show the range of probabilities to have Councillors in a City Council.
- (2) For each Municipality, for each year, counted the number of parties getting at least one Councillor to participate in the City Council.
- (3) For each Municipality, for each year, counted the number of parties being part of the government.

Table 36. Correlation linked to the number of parties in coalition

Filter / Comments	Correlation 1 - 2	Correlation 1 - 3	Correlation 2 - 3
None	0,15	-0,39	0,35
Any Kind of Coalition	0,11	-0,42	0,25
Oversized Coalition	0,31	-0,36	0,56

Majority Coalition (Balanced or Unbalanced)	-0,14	-0,31	0,35
Minority Coalition (Balanced or Unbalanced)	-0,44	-0,31	0,29
Balanced Coalition (Majority or Minority)	-0,34	-0,45	0,48
Unbalanced Coalition (Majority or Minority)	-0,09	-0,27	0,23
(1)< 2	-0,17	-0,01	0,50
(1)> 3	-0,07	-0,39	0,26
The 17 Municipalities in the above list	-0,22	-0,47	0,40

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The main correlation of the whole table can be observed between the number of parties getting at least a Councillor and the number of parties participating in the governmental coalition when we limit the focus to the oversized coalitions. In other words, when there is a proportion between the number of parties in the City Council and the number of parties in government, the more probabilities that we are in front of an oversized coalition

The R^2 of a multivariate regression where (3) is explained by (1) and (2) is 0,118, so not applicable

1.b) The role of the small (OTH/IND) parties or lists

We are going to use the acronyms OTH and IND within the study, when referring to any option different to the main five players in the Catalan politics since the restorations of the democracy, so in general small parties with a limited number of elected Councillors when compared to the main ones. When considering only the parties with a traditional party structure, aiming to be present in other arenas than the local one, we will specifically use the OTH acronym. The IND one will be used for the local lists or parties being created with the aim of influencing only at local level. They have different goals, as single issue parties for the independence of Catalonia, or for the independence of a neighbourhood in front of a certain Municipality, or to protect the interests of the farmers, or simply a group of citizens aiming to participate in the local administration out of the rules of the main traditional parties. We agree that the *“small parties are relevant because they address the policy deficiencies of main parties and open up political debate beyond the archaic left-right spectrum”* (Sloan, 2014, p. 626), and also that *“small parties in local politics provide new channels of citizen engagement, political activism, participation, and new avenues for political accountability”* (Clark, et al., 2008, p. 254), so, definitively, they are necessary players for approaching the democracy and the political participation to citizens not engaged to the traditional parties.

This means that the origin of a local list, or even a party, may have to do with the goals of a certain interest group⁷⁴ (H Allern & Bale, 2012, p. 8). When an IND/OTH list, which was created out of an interest group becomes a single issue party, the lifespan is directly related to the existence of the issue which was in the origin of the party. We must also consider, when talking about interest groups that *“it has never before been easier to organize around and issue and to*

⁷⁴ Political parties, also, are considered as coalitions of interests (Grossmann & Dominguez, 2009, p. 767)

keep people informed” (Lavin, 2000, p. 60), when considering the role of the social networks in facilitating the diffusion of ideas. When the voters support one of these lists, they know exactly how the party is going to operate when the discussion will have to do with the issue which originated the interest group, but cannot expect a certain attitude when the discussion is around different matters⁷⁵. Anyway, the goal of a list is to be voted for being elected, as it was clearly stated by Lemieux, when writing “*Winning the election is the goal here, not increasing membership or even educating the public about your cause. It doesn’t matter why people vote for your measure, only that they do vote for it*” (Lemieux, 2005, p. 41)

The Independent lists have been excluded when talking about connection⁷⁶, both, ideological or national, basically because of their specificity, which is usually running aside from both axes, but certainly the number of lists is so high that, at least, we should pay attention to the numeric evolution.

Leaving aside the number of independent parties getting a seat in 1979, the average number from 1983 until 2011 is 24, in quite stable figures, while if we look at the total number of independent list in the democratic contest, there is a high number during the first years, when the democracy was being built, but also a very high number in 2007 and 2011

Table 37. Percentage of OTH parties in government in relation to the total number of OTH

	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
IND Lists in contest	332	194	200	214	125	160	190	302	393
IND list being elected	67	25	30	15	23	20	21	27	32
	20,2%	12,9%	15,0%	7,0%	18,4%	12,5%	11,1%	8,9%	8,1%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In the forthcoming pages we are going to analyse the IND/OTH lists presented in 2007 and 2011, even though we should acknowledge whether this is a change due to the political activity among the most populated Provinces, or whether this is a general trend in the local politics.

Analysing per Province, in table 38, in Catalonia, comparing at a first glance, urban (Barcelona) to rural (Lleida), touristic (Girona) to industrial (Barcelona and Tarragona), thus, we are going to look closely to the distribution per Province.

⁷⁵ Ciutadans (C’s) is a party which main focus is the defence of the Spanish language and identity in Catalonia, in the schools and in the administration. When the debate about the changes in the abortion Law took place in the first weeks of 2014, the position of C’s was unexpected for their voters, which supported the party exclusively by their public messages, always around the identity factor.

⁷⁶ [JSalom] explained the power of the single issue parties, which at local level are usually under the form single issue lists, since they have a part of the population from their side, not having to make public their policies about the regular affairs, such as economy or social services. An issue can be the discussion about the installation of a biomass plant, or the public/private management of a service provided by the municipality.

Table 38. Total number of OTH parties/lists per province and Year


Province	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Barcelona	216	131	135	146	71	96	119	192	262
Girona	33	23	25	27	20	29	22	34	46
Lleida	25	16	8	13	13	9	11	17	23
Tarragona	58	24	32	28	21	26	38	59	62
Total	332	194	200	214	125	160	190	302	393

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In order to make it more evident, we are going to calculate the percentage per Province and per year, of the number of IND/OTH lists in reference to the total number of lists presented in every electoral contest.

In reference to the total, all provinces show the same evolution of the relative number of independent lists, which is also displayed in Graph 39.

Graph 39. Evolution of the number of IND/OTH parties/lists per province



Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Checking the list of parties classified as independent in the database, in the sense of being different to the big 5, we notice that the 6 top ones, making the quantitative difference, are new options, non-existent in previous contests, which quantitative presence is visualized in table number 39. These lists are not local options, but parties replicating the organizational structure of the conventional ones, but exploring new political options. This group of parties will receive the OTH indicator, leaving the IND for any other option focused only in the local politics.

If we remove these observations from the total, then, the number and percentage of IND lists in 2007 and 2011 remains in the same levels than in the immediately previous years.

Excluding UPyD and Eb-CenB, the other ones are regional⁷⁷ (Brancati , 2008, p. 139) parties, deploying their activities only in Catalonia, but also expecting to have representation in the

⁷⁷ “Political decentralization encourages politicians to form regional parties, and voter to vote for them, because decentralized systems of government have regional legislatures in which regional parties have a greater opportunity to govern”

Congress of Deputies⁷⁸ (Brice, 2011, p. 354), two of them allocated in the extreme right positions (PxC, C's)⁷⁹ and one in the extreme left (CUP)

Table 39. The new participants in 2007 and 2011

	2007				Total 2007	2011				Total 2011
	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona		Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	
PxC	9	1	3	5	18	49	5	5	8	67
C'S	49	3	1	10	63	40	2	1	5	48
CUP-PA						15	4		5	24
SI						12	2		1	15
Eb-CenB						6	1	1	1	9
UPyD						2	3	1	2	8

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Following table, number 40, shows the results of some of them in the elections for the Congress of the Deputies in Madrid in 2011, relating to the votes obtained in Catalonia.

Table 40. Results of the elections to the Congress of Deputies 2011 in Catalonia

Candidatura	Votos	% válidos	Diputados
CIU - CONVERGÈNCIA I UNIÓ	1.015.691	29,35%	16
PSC-PSOE - PARTIT DELS SOCIALISTES DE CATALUNYA	922.547	26,66%	14
PP - PARTIDO POPULAR	716.371	20,7%	11
ICV-EUIA - INICIATIVA PER CATALUNYA VERDS-ESQUERRA UNIDA I ALTERNATIVA: L'ESQUERRA PLURAL	280.152	8,09%	3
ERC - RI.cat / ESQUERRA - ESQUERRA REPUBLICANA DE CATALUNYA-CATALUNYA SÍ	244.854	7,07%	3
PxC - PLATAFORMA PER CATALUNYA	59.949	1,73%	0
Eb - ESCONS EN BLANC	50.879	1,47%	0

Source: www.infoelectoral.mir.es

Since they are already receiving a relevant number of votes, let's analyse their characteristics, which will be expanded in the chapter 1.d):

- PxC (Plataforma per Catalunya), C's (Ciudadanos) and UPyD (Unión Progreso y Democracia), there are all in conservative or extreme right positions
- CUP-PA (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) and SI (Solidaritat per la Independència) cover the space of the Catalan independentism,
- and Eb-CenB (Escons en Blanc), is a new proposal for the unsatisfied voters with the current democratic institutions. The Councillors will never occupy their seat.

⁷⁸"A further hypothesis on the benefits that can accrue to regional parties who challenge national parties at elections to national legislatures, and thereby appear to voters as defenders of regional interests, also seems supported....UV has historically presented itself as the defender of the region's interests in Rome so that any new regional party is compelled to adopt a similar discourse to be credible..."

⁷⁹ There is an increase of the Populist Right Radical Parties (PRRP's) in Western Europe, but "it is clear that they have not been a major fact in party system change in Europe. While their rise has changed the identity of some of the political parties of some of the party systems in Western Europe ... [they] have hardly changed the systemic interactions between the relevant political parties within most countries" (Mudde, 2014, p. 223)

The ANNEX IV contains the complete list of IND parties participating in government, per town/city and year.

Table 41 contains the detailed information of the total number of lists and candidates of the IND lists, compared to the total.

Table 41. Detail of the IND lists and candidates

	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Total number of lists participating in the elections	697	668	674	741	741	817	800	944	995
Lists reaching a seat in the City Council	252	190	190	171	213	230	271	289	278
Number of Municipalities	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131
Average of lists per Municipality	5,3	5,1	5,1	5,7	5,7	6,2	6,1	7,2	7,6
Average of lists reaching a seat in the City Council	1,9	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,6	1,8	2,1	2,2	2,1
OTH/IND lists participating	124	108	96	103	88	92	98	117	121
OTH/IND lists reaching a seat in the City Council	67	25	30	15	23	20	21	27	32
Number of Municipalities	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131	131
Average of OTH/IND lists per Municipality	0,9	0,8	0,7	0,8	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,9	0,9
Average of OTH/IND lists reaching a seat in the City Council	0,5	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Percentage of OTH/IND lists per Municipality	17,8%	16,2%	14,2%	13,9%	11,9%	11,3%	12,3%	12,4%	12,2%
Percentage of OTH/IND lists reaching a seat per Municipality	26,6%	13,2%	15,8%	8,8%	10,8%	8,7%	7,7%	9,3%	11,5%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can see that the average of the lists participating in the local elections is increasing, probably due to the new political options, and there is also an increase of the number of parties in the City Councils. If we pay attention to the IND lists, excluding the new parties mentioned before, the figures are quite stable in terms of lists participating in the electoral contests, and also the ones succeeding in positioning some of their Councillors in some City Councils.

Table 42 shows the percentage of Councillors of the IND lists per Province.

Table 42. Percentage of IND Councillors in local government

Governing	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Barcelona	25,1%	12,8%	14,9%	9,2%	6,6%	5,6%	4,7%	4,7%	11,8%
Girona	24,2%	8,0%	14,3%	0,0%	28,6%	10,3%	7,9%	13,5%	8,6%
Lleida	35,7%	27,3%	11,1%	7,1%	8,7%	0,0%	4,8%	14,3%	29,4%
Tarragona	42,9%	15,4%	23,3%	13,6%	18,8%	23,1%	20,5%	20,5%	13,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Logically, the percentages of the Barcelona Province are conditioning the weighted average. The only common trend are the high percentages in 1979, and also to notice the high percentages that are usually shown in the Province of Tarragona, some of them already analysed in previous chapters.

1.c) Coalition types

For each government of the 131 municipalities under study, it has been analysed the Majority/Minority status and the type of government proclaimed after each one of the electoral processes since 1979, according to the following descriptions:

- Concentration Government

This happens when all the represented parties or all of them except one, when this one has only one or two elected Councillors, get a seat in the new government. It means that an overall negotiation has been prioritized, rather than a bilateral bargaining. In this sense, the unity overrules the policy, which is an understandable attitude taking into consideration the overall political situation in the first years of the Spanish democracy.

- Oversized Coalition

Not enough parties to be considered a concentration government, but more parties than needed for reaching a MWC⁸⁰ (Reniu, 2001, p. 28).

- Balanced (Majority or Minority) Coalition

The balance of Councillors between the leading party and the other members of the coalition is in the range of 60/40 (maximum). This is a situation of unclear leadership, since the equilibrium can be broken by any change in the relationship between parties.

- Unbalanced (Majority or Minority) Coalition

The leading party has a number of Councillors much higher than any other of the participants. There is a clear leader, which is the former party, and usually initiates the negotiation for reaching the coalition agreement. Any forecast about the resulting government will have to pay attention to the connection between parties, and sometimes, to the affinities between their leaders.

- Single Party (Majority or Minority)

On the one hand, the Single Party government in Majority is the most wanted option for any leader as well as for any supporter, since it allows the party to deploy the totality of their policies and capture most of the visibility in front of their voters. On the other hand, the Single Party in Minority can only survive when the parties in the opposition are very fractionalized, and there is a lack of connection between them. This form can be also the result of any Mayor's designation which ended without any agreement between parties, so the leader of the most voted list becomes automatically elected.

⁸⁰ MWC, Minimum Winning Coalition: The minimum number of parties in order to guarantee a stable majority. (to minimize the size in order to maximize the utility). Oversized Coalition is MWC+1 party or more. This can have the origin in the payback of a multilevel agreement, of the need of guaranteeing enough votes when the internal party discipline is low. [JRomeu] explained his experience in having a party in an oversized coalition, because they considered that having the party in the government was better than having them in the opposition, since there was a conflict which could be capitalized in votes if the other party was free to oppose. For [JJanes] the party discipline is so high that an oversized coalition can never be explained by the risk related to the lack of discipline.

From the database we can extract the figures in table number 43, where we can appreciate that the coalitions in majority are the main government type.

Table 43. Summary of the Coalition Types


	Coalition	Single Party	TOTAL
Majority	584	289	873
minority	43	136	179
TOTAL	627	425	1052

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When paying attention to the evolution since 1979, as in graph number 40, we can appreciate, in light blue colour, the evolution of any kind of single party government, which tells us about majorities of one of the two main parties, as CIU in 2011, or a combination of both in 1987 and 1991, which made the small ones unnecessary for governing.

It is also relevant the number of Oversized coalitions, compared to any other one, since this is a very special coalition type, out of the logic of the Minimal Winning Coalition, thus maximizing the payoffs. When the coalition is oversized we must look to other payoffs beyond the mere distribution of portfolios within the current mandate.

Graph 40. Number of Government types per electoral year



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

A more detailed view is in table 44, where each type is disclosed. In the administrations originated in the 1979 and 1983 elections, the choice of a high number of municipalities was the concentration government, which means that all the parties having elected Councillors took part of the government. This *fenomena* could be understood as the least competitive, and at the same time the least democratic, but as said before the rationale for government formation is not always based in the pure deployment of the political program.

In fact, this result has to do with the historical momentum and it seems to be a logical path from the dictatorship to a smooth transition to the democracy.

Table 44. Number of governments per government type

Government type	# of Observations	% on total
1- Concentration Government	89	8,5%
2- Oversized Coalition	181	17,2%
3- Balanced Majority in Coalition	76	7,2%
4- Unbalanced Majority Coalition	240	22,8%
5- Balanced Minority Coalition	9	0,9%
6- Unbalanced Minority Coalition	34	3,2%
7- Majority Single Party Government	287	27,3%
8- Minority Single Party Government	136	12,9%
Total # of observations	1052	

Source; Author's elaboration on own database

The government resulting from a negotiation has to do not only with the expectations and constraints of the involved parties, but also with the economic environment, and the social development, *"including the desire to hold office"*⁸¹ (Evans, 2011, p. 46)

In the following pages we are going to analyse some tables taking into consideration who is who when leading different government types, and also to what extent a certain coalition type has to do with the overall trend every year, calculating the correlation factor between the percentage of municipalities with a given government type, and the average of government per government type and year.

As the starting point, what we can define as normal must be the average proportion Mayors belonging to each party, in order to validate to what extent the tables show a behaviour that can be considered as exceptional. Looking at table number 45, we can consider PSC as the *dominant player* (Bazalel, 1981, pp. 12-13), since is included in more winning coalitions than any other party.

Table 45. Mayors per party, 1979-2011

Mayor's Party	Number of Observations	%
PSC	488	46,4%
CIU	361	34,3%
ICV	83	7,9%
IND	60	5,7%
ERC	52	4,9%
PP	8	4,9%
	1052	

Source: Author's elaboration based on own database

Anyway, the records will also be compared with the percentage for each party in the same year, in order to get the correlation value, which will be used for understanding to what extent the parties behave equal to their averages, independently from the government type, or exceptionally, depending on historical facts or on multilevel constraints.

⁸¹ *"Theoretical accounts of coalition government formation include analysis of a wide range of underlying factors, including the desire to hold office, a way of advancing specific policy initiatives; and a sense of patriotic duty during periods of crisis"*

We think that it is relevant, getting profit of the database created for this research, to drill down each one of the Government types, per year and per party, in order to have a clear view on how do the parties like to coalesce in terms of leadership. We must bear in mind that the parties always have the opportunity of rejecting their participation in a certain coalition, so when they accept it is because they expect a payback higher than the one of remaining in the opposition.

Table 46. Concentration Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 1		Mayor's	Year									TOTAL	Specific	General
Government type	Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011				
Concentration Government	PSC	17	10	1	3	2	1	1			35	39,3%	46,4%	
	CIU	12	9	3	1	2					27	30,3%	34,3%	
	ICV	4	4	2	1						11	12,4%	7,9%	
	IND	7	5	1			1				14	15,7%	5,7%	
	ERC	2									2	2,2%	4,9%	
	PP										0	0,0%	0,8%	
TOTAL		42	28	7	5	4	2	1	0	0	89			

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 1. Table 46. This is a very specific government type, limited to the first democratic electoral contests, keeping specific percentages relatively close to the general ones, and a correlation of 0,63 when putting side by side the percentages of governments of this type per party and the overall percentages per year. We should interpret that when it is a historical and decisive time for Concentration Governments, all the parties follow the trend according to their proportional capacity for exercising some power. The fact that the percentage of Concentration Governments under ICV's rule, which in 1979 and 1983 was the Communist Party, is higher than the overall average, can be connected with the fear of governing alone after the death of the dictator. The independent lists (IND/OTH) also have a very high percentage, but this has to do with a higher number of electoral lists presented, apart from the main parties, to the first electoral contests, under the form of *electors' lists*.

Table 47. Oversized Coalitions per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 2		Mayor's	Year									TOTAL	Specific	General
Government type	Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011				
Oversized Coalition	PSC	5	13	9	6	1	17	25	20	5	101	55,8%	46,4%	
	CIU	1	3	7	5	5	2	3	6	9	41	22,7%	34,3%	
	ICV	4	2		1	3	3	1			14	7,7%	7,9%	
	IND	1	1	3		1	3	3	2		14	7,7%	5,7%	
	ERC	1					3	2	3	2	11	6,1%	4,9%	
	PP										0	0,0%	0,8%	
TOTAL		12	19	19	12	10	28	34	31	16	181			

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 2. Table 47. There is a huge difference when looking at the oversized coalitions, compared to the general distribution of seats. The Correlation coefficient is 0,85, so quite high, meaning that the oversized coalitions behave very closely to the average coalition type.

Three remarks should be made about table number 40:

- The PSC and ICV have been linked by different pre and post electoral government agreements, thus, explaining the positive difference of 10 points when the Mayor's party is the PSC. In some chapters we will identify ICV as the usual partner in such kind of agreements.
- The years of maximum effervescence of the above coalitions are coincident with the period of joint government in Catalonia of PSC and ICV (Generalitat), from 2003 until 2010. The numbers, of 25 and 20 Municipalities evidence such an evolution. It is also relevant the drastic reduction to only 5 in 2011, since the tripartite government was over. This fact explains the impact of the multilevel agreements in the local arena, and the difficulties for the local politicians to make agreements opposite to the ones of the upper administrations. Certainly, when the voters stop trusting a political party, the trust is lost for any level of the political arena, and the number of votes drops consequently, so less options for the same parties to maintain some coalitions, since they simply lose the possibility of negotiating for participating in government.
- CIU's percentage is 12 points below the average. In the following tables we will see CIU as a party of Majorities, but also in the chapter about the connections between parties, we can find some evidence that CIU, although it is a party of government, has a relevant ideological and national distance to any other party, making very difficult the agreement for an Oversized government.

When talking about oversized coalitions, and paying attention to the above comments, we should bear in mind the three explanations for creating an oversized coalitions, which are the uncertainty about coalition partners' reliability, the party motives, in terms of office, policy or votes, and last, related to normative motives, reflecting a norm of consensual politics (Serritzlew, et al., 2008, p. 423), and also that *"a party, acting rationally in its own self-interest, could accept sharing oversized majority coalitions in some parliament with numerically superfluous partners. The condition of this acceptance would be receiving the side-payment of being accepted in some majority coalition in another parliament into which the party would not have been accepted by parties actin in their local self-interest"* (Colomer & Martínez, 1995, p. 41), thus, the multilevel agreements not conditioning, but benefiting, the parties accepting others to participate in an oversized coalition.

Table 48. Balanced Majority Coalition Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 3		Year											Specific	General
Government type	Mayor's Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL			
Balanced Majority Coalition	PSC	9		3		3	4	4	7	1	31	40,8%	46,4%	
	CIU	2	1		2	2	1	5	3	5	21	27,6%	34,3%	
	ICV	4			1		1			1	7	9,2%	7,9%	
	IND	1		2	1		1				5	6,6%	5,7%	
	ERC					1	2	3	4	2	12	15,8%	4,9%	
	PP										0	0,0%	0,8%	
TOTAL		16	1	5	4	6	9	12	14	9	76			

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 3. Table 48. When two or more parties coalesce within a balanced number of seats. This is the least extended of the options to form a majority government, and displays a very low Correlation coefficient of 0,53. Only ERC shows a higher percentage in relation to the standard.

We should investigate under which conditions was ERC leading this kind of governments, in terms of preferred partners, or connection between parties.

The 12 observations correspond to the coalitions displayed in table 49.

Table 49. Combination of parties in Balanced Coalition Governments per year

other parties	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
+CIU+IND			1		
+CIU+ICV				1	
+CIU		2		1	
+PSC+IND	1			1	
+PSC+ICV			1		
+PSC			1	1	2

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Apparently there is no trend or “best partner” and simply corresponds to the needs of a small party willing to participate in power, since we can’t identify a majoritarian preference.

Table 50. Unbalanced Majority Coalition Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 4

Government type	Mayor's Party	Year										TOTAL	Specific	General
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011				
Unbalanced Majority Coalition	PSC	3	4	5	8	14	14	16	30	15	109	45,4%	46,4%	
	CIU	2	2	6	5	18	14	13	7	20	87	36,3%	34,3%	
	ICV		1	3	2		1	4	2	4	17	7,1%	7,9%	
	IND			1	1	1	1	1	2		7	2,9%	5,7%	
	ERC				1	1		5	6	2	15	6,3%	4,9%	
	PP			1	1	2		1			5	2,1%	0,8%	
TOTAL		5	7	16	18	36	30	40	47	41	240			

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Type 4. Table 50. A leading majority partner is accompanied by others, which are needed to compose an absolute majority, but with a big difference in the number of Councillors of each participant: the former was probably very close to reach the votes for constituting a single party majority government. The percentages are in line with the overall results. The Correlation coefficient for this type is 0,94, very close to the 100% of correlation, which would mean identical to the average.

Table 51. Balanced Minority Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 5

Government type	Mayor's Party	Year										TOTAL	Specific	General
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011				
Balanced Minority Coalition	PSC	1				1				2	4	44,4%	46,4%	
	CIU							1	1	1	3	33,3%	34,3%	
	ICV										0	0,0%	7,9%	
	IND										0	0,0%	5,7%	
	ERC		1				1				2	22,2%	4,9%	
	PP										0	0,0%	0,8%	
TOTAL		1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	9			

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Type 5. Table 51. This type is, by far, the least common of the types. In the table number 40, it can be appreciated that this is certainly an exceptional government type, which has nothing to do with any party, so it is only understandable when knowing the affinities or difficulties for creating a more stable City Council. The negative and very small Correlation coefficient of -0,58 is, in fact an irrelevant figure, since the number of observations is very low.

Table 52. Cities with Balanced Minority Government, per year. Number of Councillors

Municipality	Mayor's Party	Party	Number of Councillors in the Government						
			Year						
			1979	1983	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Argentona	CIU	CIU							4
		ERC							1
		ICV							1
		PSC							2
Calella	ERC	ERC				4			
		PSC				3			
Calonge	CIU	CIU					3	1	
		IND					3	4	
		PSC							3
Corbera de Llobregat	PSC	IND			3				
		PSC			2				
Martorell	PSC	ICV	3						
		PSC	6						
Molins de Rei	PSC	CIU							5
		PSC							5
Palamós	ERC	ERC		2					
		PSC		2					
Vilanova del Camí	PSC	IND							4
		PSC							4

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Surprisingly, there was only one observation per electoral period, as it is visible in table number 52, but it was after the elections of 2011 when three cities had this government type. Checking the status in May 2014, Argentona remained as it was at the beginning of the mandate. The government consisted in 8 Councillors of four different parties, while in the opposition there were 9 Councillors of five parties. Molins de Rei also maintained a stable government in minority, with 10 Councillors of two parties, while in the opposition there were 11 Councillors of four parties. The situation in Vilanova del Camí, in May 2014 was quite extreme. The four Councillors of the PSC remained, and kept on holding the position of Mayor. The OTH group joining them in the government was decomposed. One Councillor, out of the OTH party, stayed in government, while the other three were in the opposition, so the situation in May 2014 was of 5 Councillors forming government, four of them in the PSC's list and an independent Councillor out of any list, what is called as he *faithless elector*. The opposition was occupied by 12 Councillors, which belonged to seven different parties.

Table 53. Unbalanced Minority Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 6														
Government type	Mayor's Party	Year										Specific	General	
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL			
Unbalanced Minority Coalition	PSC		2			3		4	4	2	15	166,7%	46,4%	
	CIU	1		1		2	3	2	2	6	17	188,9%	34,3%	
	ICV										0	0,0%	7,9%	
	IND										0	0,0%	5,7%	
	ERC									1	1	11,1%	4,9%	
	PP									1	1	11,1%	0,8%	
TOTAL		1	2	1	0	5	3	6	6	10	34			

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 6. Table 53. Again, we have to face situations in which the parties have not been able to form a MWC, and the former had to accept that the benefits offered to the other participants were not enough, or not accurate enough to their expectations in order to convince for a MWC formation. We would probably have to understand personal differences rather than political ones. The Correlation coefficient is also a very low 0,55.

Table 54. Majority Single Party Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 7														
Government type	Mayor's Party	Year										Specific	General	
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL			
Majority Single Party Government	PSC		14	26	28	16	22	9	10	7	132	46,0%	46,4%	
	CIU	5	7	21	23	11	13	11	8	15	114	39,7%	34,3%	
	ICV	3	5	3	5	4	1			1	22	7,7%	7,9%	
	IND		1	4	2	2	2	1			12	4,2%	5,7%	
	ERC							2	2	2	6	2,1%	4,9%	
	PP				1						1	0,3%	0,8%	
TOTAL		8	27	54	59	33	38	23	20	25	287			

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 7. Table 54. This is the type accumulating most of the governments, 12,9% of the total, and also one of the highest correlation, a 0,90.

After two years of concentration governments, in 1979 and in 1983, the single party majority has, probably, served to stabilize the democracy (1987 and 1991) before a last period (from 1995 on), when a variety of options have proven to be possible and performing well for a country ready for the democratic contest.

Table 55. Minority Single Party Governments per year, sorted per Mayor's party

Type 8		Year										Specific	General
Government type	Mayor's Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL		
Minority Single Party Government	PSC	1	7	4	5	12	7	9	6	10	61	21,3%	46,4%
	CIU	3	2	4	5	8	6	4	5	14	51	17,8%	34,3%
	ICV	5	1	2		1	2			1	12	4,2%	7,9%
	IND	2	1		1	4					8	2,8%	5,7%
	ERC							1	1	1	3	1,0%	4,9%
	PP									1	1	0,3%	0,8%
TOTAL		11	11	10	11	25	15	14	12	27	136		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Type 8. Table 55. Better alone than in bad company should be the description. The existence of this kind of governments can explain the difficulties for the negotiation to reach a coalition agreement.

When drilling down, in order to look for the theoretical options of each one of the above governments, what we get is that they always had the opportunity of bargaining with connected parties, but for unknown reasons they never reached a final agreement. The Correlation coefficient is a 0,87

The summary is shown in table number 56, which displays the Government type, the number of observations, and the correlation coefficient between the percentage of each party within a given government type and the average. It should answer the following question: is the coalition type a choice of the parties, or it is simply a result of the number of votes received?. The higher the correlation coefficient is, the more similarity between the number of votes received and the behaviour of the parties when coalescing.

Table 56. Government types. Correlations

Government type	# of Observations	Correlation	rank
4- Unbalanced Majority Coalition	240	0,94	1
7- Majority Single Party Government	287	0,90	2
8- Minority Single Party Government	136	0,87	3
2- Oversized Coalition	181	0,85	4
1- Concentration Government	89	0,63	5
5- Balanced Minority Coalition	9	-0,58	6
6- Unbalanced Minority Coalition	34	0,55	7
3- Balanced Majority in Coalition	76	0,53	8
Total # of Observations	1052		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

With the exception of the oversized coalitions, it seems that most of the parties prefer, by far, leading the government, alone or in coalition with a pivot party, but always with a party playing the role of the leader or, using Bäck's words, "Parties seem to aim at majority status, which would not necessarily be an important goal if parties were pure policy-seekers, since government participation is not a necessary condition for policy payoffs. This result supports the idea that parties are interested in satisfying an office-seeking goal (another interpretation of this result is

that parties aim at majority status since this type of government is an efficient means to influencing policy)" (Bäck, 2003, p. 463).

From 1987 on, the main structures are the Single Party Majority and the Unbalanced Majority Coalition, in the sense that a party capturing a big part of the votes needs one or more parties to configure a majority, being the weights radically different.

Focusing on the Single Party Governments, the power distribution remains the same, in the sense that the parties receiving most of the votes are the ones leading the two government types, following the general ranking, and showing a clear change in 2011 within the two more voted parties, as it can be seen in table number 57.

Table 57. Distribution of Single Party Governments in Majority per year and Mayor's party

Majority Single Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL
PSC		14	26	28	16	22	9	10	7	132
CIU	5	7	21	23	11	13	11	8	15	114
ICV	3	5	3	5	4	1			1	22
IND		1	4	2	2	2	1			12
ERC							2	2	2	6
PP				1						1
TOTAL	8	27	54	59	33	38	23	20	25	287

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When looking in detail at the Mayor's party, of the number of City Councils which ran under the form of Single Party Government we can state, one more time, that within 2003 and 2011, the PSC resigned from this government type in behalf of the Oversized Governments, and that the victory of CIU in the 2011 local elections is also evidenced when drilling down in any one of the possible variables.

Table 58. Distribution of Single Party Governments in Minority per year and Mayor's party

Minority Single Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL
PSC	1	7	4	5	12	7	9	6	10	61
CIU	3	2	4	5	8	6	4	5	14	51
ICV	5	1	2		1	2			1	12
IND	2	1		1	4					8
ERC							1	1	1	3
PP									1	1
TOTAL	11	11	10	11	25	15	14	12	27	136

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In the above table, number 58, the number of City Councils in Single Party Minority, which is a very uncomfortable type of government but, it keeps the profile of the previous one, in terms of relative leadership of each party.

Starting in 1999, there is a clear increase of another structure, the Oversized Coalition, which drives us to investigate about multilevel agreements that can explain and justify the excess of parties in government. Table 59 shows the combination of parties within such kind of coalition.

Table 59. Parties participating in Oversized Coalitions. 1999-2007

Leading Party	Minory Party					
	CIU	ERC	ICV	IND	PP	PSC
CIU		6		2	2	
ERC	1			1	2	2
ICV	2	2				1
IND		2		1	4	
PSC	7	16	36	2	4	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The main number of Oversized governments during this period of 12 years, is basically repeating the structure of the government in the Generalitat of Catalonia, PSC+ICV+ERC, as the result of a general agreement, or simply because for a local politician it is much easier to explain to the party leaders that they are doing the same, is to say that they are negotiating with exactly the same parties as they do in the upper level of the administration. This fact should avoid the need of explaining coalitions based on local needs, where the political profile is not that relevant.

In 2011, for the first time, there were more governments type Minority Single Party than Majority Single Party, and in general, there is a rise of the minority governments, which could be in line with the recent experience in some Westminster democracies⁸² (Curtin & Miller, 2011, p. 8).


This affirmation can be seen in the next graph, number 41, where there is a visible trend relating to the increase of governments, of any type, in minority, but certainly keeping a huge distance to the number of Majority governments.

A final conclusion should be that the parties prefer any option where a party can hold the power, alone or in coalition, in which case other ones play the role of pivot, in order to have the majority of the votes.

Paying attention to the governments in minority resulting from the 1995 and the 2011 elections, some differences can be appreciated.

⁸² "The pattern that seems to emerge post-coalition is a preference for minority government formation – which may in part be a result of strategic decisions taken by small parties looking to survive and major parties looking to adapt"

Graph 41. Number of Governments in Majority or Minority



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The overall percentage of the last column in the next table is not equal to 100%, since there are other parties forming governments, but not in minority.

In 1995, the IND/OTH groups and the PSC had a higher percentage of Minority governments, mainly Single Party governments, comparing to their overall results, as visible in the table 60, where the main parties, the ones leading the government formation because of having the majority of the Councillors, are sorted according to the government type that they created, always un minority.

Table 60. Minority Governments in 1995 per party

1995						
Former party	5- Balanced Minority Coalition	6- Unbalanced Minority Coalition	8- Minority Single Party	Total general	%	overall %
CIU		2	8	10	32,3%	40,0%
ICV			1	1	3,2%	6,7%
IND			4	4	12,9%	6,7%
PSC	1	3	12	16	51,6%	45,0%
	1	5	25	31	100,0%	98,4%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We wonder if there is any reason for this increase of such an option, like the lack of connected parties getting Councillors, however, in the next table it is visible that in any one of the 12 towns/cities where the PSC had the opportunity of going into coalition with parties very close to their political options, especially with ICV.

We will look at the morphology and composition of the above 12 City Councils of each one of the towns/cities in 1991, in table number 61, in order to try to understand the rejection of the main party to establish any kind of coalition government, preferring to remain in a weak political position rather than going into coalition.

Table 61. PSC's Minority Single Party Governments, 1995

Town/City	Party	Councillors	Town/City	Party	Councillors
Badalona	PSC	10	Montornès del Vallès	PSC	6
	CIU	6		CIU	3
	ICV	7		ICV	5
	PP	4		IND	1
				PP	2
Barberà del Vallès	PSC	10	Reus	PSC	10
	CIU	2		CIU	7
	ICV	6		ERC	2
PP	3	ICV		2	
Esparreguera	PSC	8	Ripollet	PP	4
	CIU	4		PSC	9
	ERC	1		CIU	4
	ICV	1		ICV	3
	IND	1	IND	2	
Lleida	PP	2	Sant Adrià de Besòs	PP	3
	PSC	13		PSC	9
	CIU	7		CIU	5
	ERC	1		ICV	2
ICV	1	IND		2	
Lloret de Mar	PP	5	Sant Feliu de Guíxols	PP	3
	PSC	8		PSC	8
	CIU	5		CIU	6
	ERC	1		ERC	1
Mollet del Vallès	ICV	1	Terrassa	ICV	1
	PP	2		PP	1
	PSC	10		PSC	13
	CIU	5		CIU	6
			ERC	1	
			ICV	3	
			PP	4	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The previous governments, in 1991, had the following morphologies:

Minority Single Party. Badalona. Same structure and similar percentages in previous mandates. Same Mayor in 1991 and 1995

Oversized Coalition. Esparreguera. PSC (11) + CIU (3) + ICV (2). Same Mayor in both governments

Unbalanced Majority Coalition. Montornés del Vallès. ICV (7) + CIU (3). 6 Councillors of PSC remained in the opposition, and Sant Adrià del Besòs. PSC (19) + PP (1). 2 Councillors of ICV remained in the opposition

Majority Single Party. The other eight cities, always PSC's Mayors.

Taking into account this information there might not be a unique possible explanation to the 1995's Single Party governments led by the PSC, at least out of the figures in the tables.

When looking at the 2011 Single Party Governments, table 62, the evidence is that the percentages correspond to the overall ones, which means that the parties tend to behave according to their proportional level of power.

Table 62. Minority Governments in 2011 per party

2011						
Former party	5- Balanced Minority Coalition	6- Unbalanced Minority Coalition	8- Minority Single Party	Total general	%	overall %
CIU	1	6	14	21	52,5%	51,1%
ERC		1	1	2	5,0%	6,9%
ICV			1	1	2,5%	5,3%
PP		1	1	2	5,0%	1,5%
PSC	2	2	10	14	35,0%	34,4%
	3	10	27	40	100,0%	99,2%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The only remark is that in 4 out of the 6 governments in an Unbalanced Minority Coalition, led by CIU, it was accompanied by ERC, and in the other 2 by the PP.

In May 2014, we looked at the websites of the Municipalities, in order to check the stability of the Minority Coalitions established after the elections of 2011.

Table 63. The evolution of the 2011's minority coalitions

Municipality	Mayor's Party	2011	May 2014
Arenys de Mar	CIU	CIU + PP + IND	PSC joined. Balanced Majority
Argentona	CIU	CIU + PSC + ERC + IND	Remains. Parties in the opposition are PP, CUP and 2 IND groups
Castelldefels	PP	PP + IND	CIU joined. Unbalanced Majority
La Roca del Vallès	CIU	CIU + PP	Remains. Parties in the opposition are PSC, ERC (1) and ICV (1)
Lloret de Mar	CIU	CIU + ERC	Remains. Parties in the opposition are PSC, ICV, PP and 2 IND
Malgrat de Mar	PSC	PSC + PP	Remains. Parties in the opposition are CIU, ICV and ERC
Manlleu	ERC	ERC + ICV	Remains. Parties in the opposition are CIU, PxC and IND. Parties reject to coalesce with PxC
Molins de Rei	PSC	PSC + CIU	Remains. Mayor from CIU. In the opposition CUP, PP and 2 IND
Montgat	CIU	CIU + ERC	Remains. In the opposition PSC, ICV, PP and IND
Sant Joan de Vilatorrada	CIU	CIU + ERC	Remains. In the opposition PSC, ICV, PP and IND
Sant Pere de Ribes	PSC	PSC + ICV	No information. Very poor website, all matters sorted in alphabetic order without internal coherence
Vic	CIU	CIU + ERC	Remains. Parties in the opposition are PxC, CUP, PSC, SI, ICV
Vilanova del Camí	PSC	PSC + IND	IND left. PSC single party in minority. In the opposition CIU (2), PP (1), ERC (1), PxC (1), ICV (1) and 2 IND (3+3)

Source: Author's elaboration on the municipalities' websites


The results are shown and commented in table 63, where we can verify that most of the governments remain in minority, thanks to the composition of the opposition in terms of parties unable to produce a joint agreement to create an alternative Government coalition.

1.d) Connection between parties in coalition

It is of high importance when willing to understand the coalitional behaviour of the parties, to know to what extent there is proximity between them. In that sense, there is connection between two parties when there is no another political option in between so, from a voter's point of view there is no possibility of an intermediate third option. According to Lawler and Youngs, the ideological similarity is an explicative variable for understanding the coalition formation, sometimes it is more important than the payoffs expected by the parties (Lawler & Youngs, 1975).

The following graph, number 42, allocates each one of the five main parties in a two axis graph, according to the CEO (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió) issued in November 2006, and used by Reniu, whose methodology will be used in this chapter (Reniu, 2007).

Graph 42. Ideological and National allocation of the main parties, 2006



Source: Author's elaboration on CEO report 367 November 2006

When looking at the connection between parties, and studying a territory where the political speech is centred not only in ideology, but also in the national aspect, in the sense of supporting a model of State centralized or de-centralized (with positions moving from a certain level of symbolic autonomy, to the autonomy of the German Länder, or to the independence) we actually have to pay attention to both dimensions

"[in Catalonia] the ideological variable is not the only key to be able to explain which is the actual distribution of the citizens and the political parties within the political space. It is needed to add a second axis, for a second variable which is important: the national identity" (Reniu, 2007, p. 13)

Obviously there is a different strategy carried out by the state-wide parties (SWP) with regard to the centre-periphery issues in regional elections. *"... the regionalist parties are primarily concerned with strengthening the region... the more successful these regionalist parties, the more SWPs will have to take their issues into consideration during the elections"* (Libbrecht, et al., 2011, p. 625), and attending to the Position-Saliency-Ownership theory (Meguid, 2005, p. 347), defining the *niche parties*, different from the mainstream catch-all parties. A mainstream party can be expected to choose strategies depending on the success of the regional party. In other words, if the *niche party* is not seen as a threat, the SWP should adopt a dismissive strategy concerning the issue which is the priority for the niche party, but if the proposal of the niche party tends to be seen as a successful one, the SWP can opt between getting an accommodative position or an adversarial one. The accommodative strategy will be selected when there is competition between both parties in the left-right axis, and adversarial will take place when the parties are ideological opponents.

Not only the Position-Saliency-Ownership theory can explain the different strategies of the state-wide parties in Catalonia, but we need to know some historical reasons that explain the different position in the national axis of the three parties with relevancy both in the regional and the nation-wide elections (Verge & Gómez, 2012, pp. 672-678), being their view about the centralization/de-centralization of the politics a direct consequence of their internal behaviour:

- **PSOE. Centralized factionalism.** *At the time [of the Felipe Gonzalez's governments], the PSOE combined tolerant rules towards factionalism with low levels of regional autonomy. Although informal factions had always existed, factional activity was only formally admitted in 1984. Factions could not have their own symbols, organizational structure and vote discipline, although the latter two aspects could easily be achieved through informal arrangements. They should restrict their activity to fostering debate and providing input on platforms and policy within the party. Access to party documents and communication means was limited../.. So, the party organization very quickly matched the state structure. Regional branches were allocated low influence and autonomy. The federal bodies monitored, controlled and could veto the decisions adopted by regional branches regarding candidate selection, manifestos, finances, platforms and alliance choice. Coordination of public policy across territories was assigned to the federal level. Besides, the presence of regional leaders within the highest executive boards was insignificant during the 1980s*

- **PP. Inter-layered factionalism.** *The organizational penetration of the PP began with the sub-regional level, the provinces, which are the electoral constituencies in national and regional elections. The regional organization was only fully set up in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the party structure was designed in an extremely centralized and hierarchical fashion (the president of the party accumulating numerous functions), and factionalism was forbidden and sanctioned with expulsion../.. Since 1989, regions have been unable to request the celebration of an extraordinary conference. They can establish their rules, but candidate lists for all elections require federal approval. Severe incompatibilities between territorial and parliamentary representation were introduced too, limiting regional influence on the party in public office at the federal level.*

- **IU (ICV). Multi-layered factionalism.** *Since its creation in 1986, IU has gone through two significant episodes of factionalism. The first occurred in the period 1991 and the second from 2000 to 2008. On both occasions, factions developed at the two levels of the party organization and mounted opposition to the dominant faction through a multi-layered strategy fostered by policy and strategy differences../.. However, the multi-level setting allowed the dominant coalition to turn the regional arena to its advantage and use the party meso-level to circumvent factionalism../.. The dominant faction used this decline to orchestrate a coalition of support at this layer which came along with an empowering of regional leaders in the national leadership selection process – regional leaders were enfranchised as members of the electorate. Regional party branches also obtained an increased autonomy in subnational issues, including the capacity to unilaterally decide whether to enter an electoral or a government coalition.*


Since the five main parties participating in the local elections are also present in the Catalan Parliament, the CEO's report is including all of them in its reports about the elector's political perception.

Looking at the June 2011 survey of the CEO, in Graph number 43, positions in both axes remain the same as in 2006, but ERC and ICV get closer in the ideological axis.

Compared to the 2006 report used by Reniu, almost no changes can be noticed in the national axis, while the changes in the ideological one, based on a 10 points axis, are the following:

ICV: 0,2 points to the left; CIU: 0,6 points to the right; PPC: 0,5 points to the right. Certainly we can perceive some minor changes, despite having left some free space in the centre, which is claimed to be occupied by all of them, since it is in the political centre where most of the voters allocate themselves. No changes are noticeable in the national axis.

Graph 43. Ideological and National allocation of the main parties, 2011



Source: Author's elaboration on CEO's report 652 June 2011

We will also show to what extent it is the distance between parties relevant, in the sense that CIU and PP are quite close at an ideological level, but very distant at a national level, which might represent a blocking gap for a CWC (Connected Winning Coalition)⁸³ (Larkin, 2011, p. 67)

Based on the above distribution in both axes for knowing which parties are connected and how, the summary is visible in table 64. We can conclude that, for the whole period under research, the ideological connection is the main one for building coalitions, while the national connection has less importance. Drilling one level down, we notice that the government coalitions ideologically connected but not at national level are the main ones, with a percentage of 35,9%, including the coalitions between ERC+ICV+PSC, the ones between CIU+PSC and the CIU+PP ones.

Table 64. Distribution of the Ideological and national connections

		Nationally Connected				Nationally Connected	
		yes	no			yes	no
Ideologically Connected	yes	126	151	Ideologically Connected	yes	29,9%	35,9%
	no	73	71		no	17,3%	16,9%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database


We also explored the coalitions not connected at all, since it represented a 16,9%. A 67,6% of this group corresponds to the PSC+ERC and ERC+PSC coalitions, the majority, the 72,9% within the period 1999-2007, in municipalities where ICV had no Councillors the year of the coalition.

⁸³ "First, all other things being equal, parties will choose office rather than opposition. Further, in order to ensure a position of greatest relative strength within the coalition, they will seek a MWC. Second, if parties are distributed along a simple left/right axis, parties will seek coalition with those adjacent to them on the axis: they will seek a Connected Winning Coalition. 'Connected' may be too straight forward, however, and the lack of intermediate parties will count for little if the ideological gap between potential partners is too wide. Last, electoral geography is important and parties will prefer coalition partners who are not their nearest competitors in too many seats"

The next graph, number 44, excludes the concentration coalitions, understanding that their rationale for government formation is out of the ideological/national domain.

For each electoral year we can see the proportion of each one of the connected coalitions, in relation to the total of connected coalitions.

Graph 44. Type of connection per years



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The first years of the new democracy, the negotiations ended in the highest number of “full commitment” coalitions, where both axes were taken into consideration when searching for support to make government, while since 1995, the ideological axis is leading in spite of the national one. In 1995 there was a high number of CIU+PP, and CIU+PSC coalitions, both only connected at an ideological level. In 1995, CIU was supporting the government of the PSOE, in minority in Madrid, and 1996 CIU started to support the government of the PP, also in minority in Madrid.

In 1999, 2003 and 2007, the “none of both” option is relevant because of the high number of governments with the participation of PSC and ERC, not connected at all, against the Axelrod (1970) premise “...requiring government coalitions to be minimal connected winning in unidimensional policy space”, among other⁸⁴ (Strom, et al., 1994, p. 328).

So, repeating the above tables, but only covering the 1983 and 1987 periods, when the leading structure was PSC+ICV, there is an increase of the coalitions both axes connected, as it is displayed in table 65, reaching a 47,1% of the total. Also the coalition between ICV+PSC and CIU is included, but this is a very rare one, due to the ideological distance between ICV and CIU.

⁸⁴ The Axelrod concept goes together to Riker’s (1962) size principle, the proposition that coalitions should be *minimal winning*, and the Laver&Shofield’s (1990) prediction that coalitions should include the *core party* –able to govern alone-

Table 65. Ideological/National connection

1983-1987				2003-2007			
		Nationally Connected				Nationally Connected	
		yes	no			yes	no
Ideologically Connected	yes	47,1%	31,4%	Ideologically Connected	yes	22,2%	36,1%
	no	9,8%	11,8%		no	19,0%	22,8%


Source: Author's elaboration on own database

For the period 2003 and 2007, the main coalition type was PSC-ICV-ERC, where the national connection was lost, since CIU is missing in the ideological continuum. This fact explains the increase up to the 36,1% of the governments whose connection is only at an ideological level, or in other words, that this is the most common coalition.

It might be interesting to drill down, to the level of which parties were participating in the different coalitions, as is has been detailed in the former paragraphs, in order to know whether there is a limited number of realistic options, out of the mathematically possible options.

As a first step we can consider the government coalitions where there is, at least, one connection, which are represented in the Graph number 45, and their relative percentages as it is displayed in the box place at the left side of the graph as well as in top of the party icons. For the only national connection, it existed coalitions ERC+CIU and ICV+CIU, while for the only ideological we must take into consideration the ERC+ICV+PSC, the PSC+CIU and the CIU+PP ones. Without the division in two axes, a coalition between ERC and CIU would be absolutely *antinatural*, due to the high ideological distance between the two parties, but it still represents the 14,3%, of the total connected coalitions.

Graph 45. Main Connected Coalitions



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Finally, considering the government coalitions between parties connected at ideological and national level, we can pay attention to the upper box. The most usual one is the composed by two traditional partners, the PSC and ICV, being one third of the total. Any other connection can be easily explained to the voters, under the ideological point of view, the common one in any country or territory. Anyway, adding up per type, the 44% are only ideologically linked.

The second step should be to pay attention to the name and number of parties getting a seat, where we can also notice a clear evolution of the way that the parties prefer to associate, including or excluding some partners, having to do with overall trends. The table number 66 shows, per electoral year, the most popular connected coalitions.

Only 12 combinations are enough to explain the 80% of the coalitions all along the period under study, not all of them can be explained by the level of connection⁸⁵ (Field, 2009, p. 431).

Table 66. Main Coalitions and participating parties

Coalition	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	Total	Cumul. %
ICV+PSC	19	11	11	6	6	14	12	15	10	104	19,3%
ERC+ICV+PSC		3	1	2	8	10	19	11	2	56	29,7%
CIU+PSC		3	2	1	8	5	7	10	9	45	38,1%
CIU+ERC	1	1	3	1	4	9	8	8	9	44	46,3%
ERC+PSC		1	3	1	2	9	9	11	4	40	53,7%
CIU+PP		1	5	3	7	5	5	1	8	35	60,2%
CIU+OTH	3	4	2	5	3	4	4	1	5	31	66,0%
OTH+PSC		2	4	2	3	2	3	2	2	20	69,7%
CIU+OTH+PP			3		2	4	2	2	7	20	73,4%
CIU+ERC+PSC			1	1		3	5	5		15	76,2%
CIU+ICV+PSC	1	1		1	2	2	2		3	12	78,4%
CIU+ICV		1		3	2		2	1	1	10	80,3%
Other	9	2	6	8	11	5	15	31	19	106	100,0%
Total	33	30	41	34	58	72	93	98	79	538	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database


⁸⁵“The analysis here also strongly suggests that alliances cannot be easily explained by the parties’ relative policy instance. Therefore the ability to build alliances is not exclusively a function of policy positioning. This analysis makes a novel contribution by demonstrating that alliance building possibilities can also be improved by intergovernmental dynamics that create mutual dependence between the party in the national minority government and regional parties (of various political colours) that are either in a vulnerable position due to their own minority government status or are in an executive coalition with the national governing party at the regional level”

If we concentrate in the two main coalition combinations, almost a 30% is reached. Both are made with the participation of ICV and PSC, and ERC, which mainly joined from 1999 until 2007. Adding up the ERC+PSC coalitions, also in a relevant number in the same years, we reach a total share of 37% of the total of the existing coalitions. The table number 58 shows, again, that in 2011 any combination of the parties losing the power in Generalitat of Catalonia in 2010, drops to the minimum. We can notice that ERC+ICV+PSC, move from 19 and 11 coalition government during the years sharing the power in the Generalitat to only 2⁸⁶.

And also other reductions that took place for the same parties with other combinations: ICV-PSC from 12 and 15 to 10, and ERC+PSC from 9 and 11 to 4⁸⁷

In the analysis performed in 2006 (Renui & Magre, 2006, p. 49), the conclusion was that no vertical integration was taking place, considering the autonomous evolution of the local government, compared to the results and distribution of power of any other administration. After the elections of 2011, this could be slightly reconsidered. Within the compared two periods, 2003-2006, and 2011-2012, the citizens have given the majority of votes to the same parties for the three levels of the administration. We can also notice that there are some recurrent majorities, in the sense that the Socialist party usually receives the majority of the votes for the elections to the Congress of Deputies in Spain and in the Municipalities, while *Convergència I Unió* is the preferred party for the Parliament of Catalonia.

Graph 46. More voted lists to the elections in three arenas



Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es and www.gencat.cat

The exception comes up when there is a break in the trend, as it happened in 2003 when CIU lost, for the first time, the majority in the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, but still more

⁸⁶In Sant Just Desvern, one of them, in the Baix Llobregat County, the historical domain of the left wing parties, the combination ERC+ICV+PSC has been stable since 1979, with the only exception in 2007 when ERC was missing in the coalition.

Government Type	Majority Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Oversized Coalition	ERC	✓								
	PSC		✓							
Unbalanced Majority Coalition	PSC			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

⁸⁷ [JJanes] considered that when the coalition of the three parties in the Generalitat of Catalonia ended, the three party leaders were personally confronted, making very difficult to restore trust, between leaders and between parties, in some years.

noticeable when it happened in two different arenas at the same time, such as in 2011, when CIU got the majority of the votes in any election in the Catalan territory. Graph 46 displays, per year, the governments in each one of the arenas, as well as the colour of the most voted lists.

We must pay attention to the evolution of the percentages, and notice that the majorities reached in 2011 and 2012 are based on the lowest percentages since the elections held in 1982, in anyone of the arenas, which means that the loyalties cannot be maintained forever. Such a change resulted in a new scenario where the votes are distributed over the different political options, and the differences between a majority and a minority are narrower. An influencing factor can be the appraisal of new political options.

As a result of the different combinations concerning the connection, we can drill down into the Majority/Minority relation, linked to anyone of the connection options, in table 67.

Table 67. Relation homogeneity / Minority, Majority, Oversized

Homogeneity	Type			TOTAL
	Minority	Majority	Oversized	
Ideological and National	6	61	59	126
Ideological	8	108	35	151
National	12	46	15	73
None	5	39	27	71
TOTAL	31	254	136	421

Homogeneity	Type			TOTAL
	Minority	Majority	Oversized	
Ideological and National	1,4%	14,5%	14,0%	29,9%
Ideological	1,9%	25,7%	8,3%	35,9%
National	2,9%	10,9%	3,6%	17,3%
None	1,2%	9,3%	6,4%	16,9%
TOTAL	7,4%	60,3%	32,3%	100,0%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In the above table it's visible a high concentration of governments in Majority, only ideologically connected. The detailed composition of the 108 governments under such conditions had the following combinations, represented in table number 68.

Table 68. Governments in Majority, Ideologically Connected

Majority Party	Minority Party	Number of Observations
CIU	IND	2
	PP	36
	PSC	17
ERC	ICV	2
PSC	CIU	17
	ERC	20
	ICV	9
	IND	1
PP		4
TOTAL		108

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

This is a first view on the coalitional preferences for each one of the main parties, being the PP the more common option for CIU while ERC is the preferred partner for PSC. Anyway this is a

partial view, because only the main party and the minor one are displayed, in the sense that in a coalition ideologically connected between PSC and ERC (20 in total), ICV is a required participant. This fact means that the combinations in which PSC and ICV participate together are 20+9. By the same set of rules, any connected coalition between PSC and PP must have CIU in between, so as to have a complete ideological continuum.

The same records, displayed per electoral year are shown in the following table, number 69.

Table 69. Governments in Majority, Ideologically Connected, per electoral year

Majority Party	Minority Party	Year								
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
CIU	IND	1						1		
	PP		1	5	3	7	5	5	1	9
	PSC				1	5	4	1	3	3
ERC	ICV							2		
PSC	CIU		1			3	1	2	6	4
	ERC			1	2	4	3	4	4	2
	ICV					2	2	2	3	
	IND							1		
	PP					1			3	
TOTAL		1	2	6	6	22	15	18	20	18

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can see CIU combining repeatedly with PP, increasing and stabilizing the partnership when AP, the clear successors of the Francoism decide to move forward in 1989 to an European Conservative style party (PP), or *“from a conservative party with its roots in Franquismo to a much more heterogeneous catch-all party”* (Gunther, et al., 2004, p. 234), which reached its peak in 2011 when CIU wanted to reach majorities at any price⁸⁸ (Falcó-Gimeno, 2012, p. 409), the year of the PSC's defeat. In fact, the years when the relationship between CIU and PP was at its highest point, belonged to the period 1995-2003, when the PSOE was in minority in Madrid (93-96), and the transition to the eight years of the PP holding the Spanish Government (1996-2004) started. The 2011's figures could explain the high number of First Deputy Mayors from the PP occupying such a position after the mentioned elections.

The only difference is displayed in the group of cities from 50 to 100.000 inhabitants, is shown in table number 70, where the Ideological connection loses weight on behalf of the coalitions constituted by parties connected by both axis.

⁸⁸ *“This article has claimed that, despite the empirical strength of the relationship between parties' and portfolios, there are reasons to take other variables into consideration to improve our understanding of how coalition partners distribute ministerial posts. This work has argued that one of these variables might be how long parties have had to wait for the opportunity to leave the opposition benches and participate in a new government...the longer the period that parties have spent without enjoying the spoils of office, the more impatient they get...”*

Table 70. Relation homogeneity / Government type in the bigger cities.

Homogeneity	Type			TOTAL
	Minority	Majority	Oversized	
Ideological and National	0,0%	34,6%	19,2%	53,8%
Ideological	0,0%	19,2%	13,5%	32,7%
National	0,0%	5,8%	0,0%	5,8%
None	1,9%	3,8%	1,9%	7,7%
TOTAL	1,9%	63,5%	34,6%	100,0%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The 34,6% of coalitions ideologically and nationally connected has to do with 18 City Councils which are displayed in the next table, number 71, all of them with the same combination of parties, mainly in the area of Barcelona city where, traditionally, the voters prefer the parties in the left wing, allowing PSC and ICV to exercise their usual cooperation when structuring coalitions.

Table 71. Majority Governments Connected at Ideological and National level

Municipality	Year	Mayor's Party	Pivot Party
Castelldefels	1995	PSC	ICV
	1999	PSC	ICV
	2007	PSC	ICV
Cerdanyola del Vallès	1979	PSC	ICV
El Prat de Llobregat	1979	ICV	PSC
	1987	ICV	PSC
	2003	ICV	PSC
	2007	ICV	PSC
	2011	ICV	PSC
Granollers	1979	PSC	ICV
Mollet del Vallès	1987	PSC	ICV
Sant Boi de Llobregat	1979	PSC	ICV
	2003	PSC	ICV
	2011	PSC	ICV
Viladecans	1979	ICV	PSC
	2003	PSC	ICV
	2011	PSC	ICV
Vilanova i la Geltrú	1979	PSC	ICV

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When considering only the oversized coalitions, we have the opportunity to look at the payoffs in terms of representativeness.

On the one hand we pay attention to the main party, and on the other hand to the oversizer, which means the party not critical to have a MWC, but it was asked to join the coalition. The consideration whether a party is the oversizer or not, has to do with the number of Councillors, in the sense that at a mathematical level the coalition was already a MWC without its participation, and is the one adding-up the lowest number of Councillors. Table number 72 displays the leader party in the left columns, and the number of governments for each one of the small parties with the lowest number of Councillors, so the one playing the oversizer's role.

Table 72. Number of governments per main and oversizer party.

Parties in coalition	Oversizer						TOTAL
	Leader	CIU	ERC	ICV	IND	PP	
CIU		16		12	6	3	37
ERC	2			1	3	3	9
ICV	8	3		1		3	15
IND	1	2	1	4	4	2	14
PSC	13	24	55	9	5		106
TOTAL	24	45	56	27	18	11	181

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can observe two different behaviours. We don't pay attention to the IND/OTH figures, since we can't allocate this type of lists within the ideological or national axes.

Looking at the two parties receiving most of the votes, they usually take as oversizer a party with a certain level of connection. In that sense, CIU calls ERC and the PP, and the PSC calls CIU, ERC and ICV.

But if we look at the two small parties, ERC and ICV, it seems that the need of reaching power for gaining visibility drives them to some unnatural coalitions, for example, ICV with CIU and ERC with PP.

On the other hand we can look at the party getting the position of First Deputy Mayor. In the next table, number 73, we have a total of 148 observations instead of 181, because of 33 observations in which we don't have any information about the positions occupied by the Councillors, so we cannot link the position to a certain party.

Table 73. Number of governments per main and FDM's party.

Parties in coalition	Party of the FDM						TOTAL	
	Leader	CIU	ERC	ICV	IND	PP		PSC
CIU		21	4		2	3	2	32
ERC	2		4		1		1	8
ICV				8			2	10
IND					7	2	1	10
PSC	3	8	2	4			71	88
TOTAL	26	16	10	14	5	77	148	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can notice that the party exceeding the needs of the coalition for being a majority, it never gets other payoffs than participating in government. The party in majority usually keeps the position of the First Deputy Mayor, as it can be validated, since the highest figures of each combination appear in the cells forming the diagonal of the table.

It seems that if there is an overall agreement, it will be fulfilled by taking the oversizer on board, but without any power payments, entitling their Councillors as First Deputy Mayors.

In the next tables, from 71 until 80, it is visible the variety of both national and ideological values, assigned by the voters to each one of the parties, so that it is possible to identify the positions

for which each party is competing with their policies and marketing to get the confidence of the voters.

Four times a year it is passed the general enquiry about political behaviour, when 2500 citizens are asked about their political thoughts. The enquiry number 652 was made in June 2011, so a very close date to the one of the local elections taking place in May 2011.

We can see, coloured in red, the cells with a percentage higher than the 10%, which means the predominant positions in which a party is seen by the voters, thus the sociological universe where a party will collect most of its votes. Coloured in orange, we can appreciate the percentages covering from the 5% until the 10%, and finally, in yellow colour the cells with percentages from the 1 until the 5%.

By using the colours code, the representation of the political space becomes more evident, and it is very easy to view the common areas for which voters the parties are competing.

From this survey, which was obtained in a data base, two answers have been used⁸⁹, for each one of the political parties taking part of the study, that is to say, the ones having representation in the Catalan Parliament at the time of the enquiry

It is important to appreciate the area occupied by the coloured cells, since this is informing us about how focused are the policies and the public image of the parties, or the contrary, how wide it is.

1.d.1) The Conservative Parties

Graph 47. Two axes allocation for CIU

CIU	LEFT			CENTER			RIGHT
CAT	0,3%	1,8%	2,4%	10,6%	13,4%	14,4%	0,4%
CAT>ESP		1,5%	1,6%	9,1%	16,0%	9,7%	0,5%
CAT=ESP		0,5%	0,6%	2,9%	5,2%	5,6%	0,3%
CAT<ESP		0,1%	0,1%	0,2%	0,3%	0,9%	
ESP		0,3%		0,2%	0,2%	0,5%	0,1%

Source: Author's elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

Convergència I Unió, CIU, has about 55% of the perception concentrated as a conservative and Catalan oriented party. Graph 47 shows a quite surprising result, since it shows the 9,2% of allocation on the left of the centre, while the social and economic policies of CIU have always been publically conservative, on behalf of the markets and the private initiative. CIU is a coalition of Liberal Democrats and Demo-Christians, so knowing the participants in the coalition it is still more difficult to believe that they can run as a party in the left wing. It should be mentioned that

89

1) How do you think the political party..... can be better identified:

- a. Only Spanish
- b. More Spanish than Catalan
- c. Equal Spanish to Catalan
- d. More Catalan Than Spanish
- e. Only Catalan

2) How do you think the political party..... can be better classified:

- a. Extreme Left
- b. Left
- c. Centre Left
- d. Centre
- e. Centre Right
- f. Right
- g. Extreme Right

they have been holding the power in Catalonia for 23 years without any interruption, always with the same leader, Mr. Jordi Pujol, who occupied the position of President of Catalonia, meaning that their party visibility has been the maximum possible one.

Graph 48. Two axes allocation for PPC

PPC	LEFT		CENTER		RIGHT		
CAT		0,2%		0,2%	0,2%	1,1%	0,1%
CAT>ESP		0,1%		0,1%		0,8%	0,1%
CAT=ESP		0,3%	0,1%	0,9%	2,6%	6,4%	0,8%
CAT<ESP	0,1%	0,6%		0,7%	3,3%	18,3%	5,2%
ESP	0,4%	0,6%	0,1%	1,0%	3,3%	31,3%	20,9%

Source: Author's elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

A higher perception of the Partido Popular de Catalunya, PPC, tends to be better placed in right /extreme right positions, with a very high level of concentration in few cells, since almost 70% are in only three cells. This party is clearly positioned in the right wing, with Spanish centralism devotion. When a 0,2% of the citizens answering the enquiry allocates the PPC as a party of the left wing, with proposals only Catalan minded, it tells us about the minimum level of people not responding honestly of living absolutely out of the politics, as displayed in Graph number 48, in the bottom left corner.

So, in the conservative side the main positions are clearly distinguished by the national approach. The only voters in conflict are the ones having a Spanish identity as well as the Catalan one.

1.d.2) The Leftists

Graph 49. Two axes allocation for ERC

ERC	LEFT		CENTER		RIGHT		
CAT	13,6%	46,3%	8,7%	2,9%	0,8%	2,2%	0,7%
CAT>ESP	3,3%	13,3%	2,2%	0,9%	0,3%	0,6%	0,3%
CAT=ESP	0,3%	1,3%	0,3%	0,2%		0,1%	0,1%
CAT<ESP	0,1%	0,3%		0,1%		0,1%	
ESP	0,2%	0,4%	0,1%	0,1%			0,1%

Source: Author's elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

In the left side the competition increases because of the range of common voters is higher, as well as in the ideological or the national axes.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC, concentrates 73% of the recognition in only three cells. Only one cell is in orange colour, so no middle term, and few ones in yellow. So there are no major doubts for the electors about the ideological and national allocation. Graph number 49 shows that some voters, the ones positioning the party in the Spanish centric and conservative ideology rows, have never read or listened to the political proposals of the parties, or that the surveys are answered randomly.

Graph 50. Two axes allocation for ICV

ICV	LEFT			CENTER			RIGHT	
CAT	2,4%	22,5%	2,9%	2,2%	0,1%	1,1%	0,1%	
CAT>ESP	2,2%	24,1%	4,1%	1,8%	0,3%	0,8%	0,1%	
CAT=ESP	1,8%	19,6%	2,5%	1,2%	0,3%	0,1%	0,1%	
CAT<ESP	0,4%	3,6%	0,6%	0,3%		0,1%		
ESP	0,4%	2,9%	0,3%	0,3%		0,2%	0,1%	

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

As it was the case for ERC, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds, ICV in Graph 50, concentrates in only three cells most of their recognition, 63%. There is no middle term at all, and a 27,6% is spread around the three central positions.

Graph 51. Two axes allocation for PSC

PSC	LEFT			CENTER			RIGHT	
CAT	0,3%	3,1%	1,0%	0,6%	0,2%	0,8%		
CAT>ESP	0,2%	4,8%	4,2%	1,2%	0,2%	0,2%		
CAT=ESP	0,3%	17,0%	14,3%	7,0%	1,5%	1,6%	0,1%	
CAT<ESP	0,2%	9,3%	7,3%	3,6%	1,9%	1,3%	0,2%	
ESP	0,4%	7,9%	3,3%	2,9%	0,8%	2,0%	0,2%	

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

The PSC is the one having the broader spectrum. The internal discussion between the Catalanist sector (pure PSC oriented, CAT>ESP)⁹⁰ and the Spanish centred one (PSOE oriented, ESP>CAT) is visible in Graph 51, mainly because the percentages of the voters feelings are relevant in both directions. Also, to be noticed the electoral space shared with the PPC at the right side of the table, taking into consideration that we are talking about a Socialist party.


There is a huge group of voters, from leftist positions to extreme left, and from feeling only Catalans to undergoing a mixed feeling of Catalan and Spanish identities at the same time, which can be satisfied with the proposals of the three main parties.

1.d.3) The Other parties or lists

Two of these options, Ciutadans (C’s) and Solidaritat per la Independència (SI), have representation in the Parliament of Catalonia, so they are also included in the Political Behaviour surveys, allowing us to allocate both in a matrix, displayed in Graph number 52 in squared forms.

⁹⁰ For the first time in their joint history (31 years), the 26th of February of 2013, the 14 Deputies of the PSC voted different from the ones of the PSOE in the Congress of the Deputies in Madrid, when voting a proposal in behalf of the “right to decide” for the Catalan citizens. The 27th, the PSOE announced a penalty of 600 euros to each one of the 14 Deputies for breaking the “vote discipline”.

Graph 52. Ideological and National allocation of Si and C's 2011



Source: Author's elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

The two parties are positioned in the graph according to the results of the survey, however in the next tables we will notice that their positions are not really centric in one single point of the graph, as the result of a mathematical exercise which needs some further explanations. To pay attention to the fact that within the main five parties, the PSC has the broader level of cells where someone identified the politics of the party.

For C's, only one cell is left empty, and for SI all the cells are used in the table.

Within the main five, any orange cell is near to another orange cell or to a red one, without yellow or white cells in between, so they appear to be in a continuous degradation of colour, meaning intensity of recognition, whereas, for the two new parties this is not the case.

This specific characteristic could be explained by the novelty of the parties, as well as the lack of public exhibition of their policies, which is an image only based in their own publicity and the diffusion made by the media.

Graph 53. Two axes allocation for C's

C's	LEFT		CENTER				RIGHT	
CAT	0,4%	4,0%	0,7%	1,7%	1,0%	2,7%	0,9%	
CAT>ESP	0,1%	2,3%	0,7%	1,5%	0,6%	1,9%	0,4%	
CAT=ESP		2,1%	1,4%	5,6%	2,8%	5,3%	0,6%	
CAT<ESP	0,2%	1,0%	0,7%	1,7%	3,8%	12,4%	4,0%	
ESP	0,2%	1,4%	0,9%	1,5%	2,7%	19,0%	13,8%	

Source: Author's elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

Ciudadanos (C's), represented in Graph number 53, is a party deploying its main political activities only in Catalonia, and it is recognized in the survey as a party located in the right/extreme-right wing, and defending positions on behalf of the Spanish centralism. In fact, most of their public proclaims have to do with the language used at the schools and in the Administration in Catalonia, rejecting the priority given to the Catalan language, and consequently asking for a legal framework which would avoid the positive discrimination on

behalf of the weakest language, the Catalan. In fact, it could be classified as a *personal party*, since its leader, Albert Ribera, is leading all the public communication on behalf of the party, on the radio, television and newspapers He also occupies the widest section of the party’s website.

The last one, Graph 54, corresponds to Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència. SI, is recognized in the other extreme of the diagonal, as a party which stands for full sovereignty, and in the left wing. A 14,9% think that this is a party on the right wing, and a 4,3% on the extreme right, which means it actually covers all range of attitudes relating the Catalan or the Spanish preferences.

Graph 54. Two axes allocation for SI

SI	LEFT			CENTER			RIGHT
CAT	10,7%	29,8%	7,0%	9,1%	4,9%	9,2%	2,6%
CAT>ESP	1,8%	7,7%	1,8%	1,5%	1,4%	2,2%	0,7%
CAT=ESP	0,3%	1,6%	0,2%	1,0%	0,2%	1,4%	0,3%
CAT<ESP	0,1%	0,6%	0,1%	0,2%	0,2%	1,2%	0,4%
ESP	0,1%	0,7%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,9%	0,3%

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

In the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia in 2010, SI got four seats, and C’s three. In 2012, SI reached only 42.821 votes, not giving then the right to any seat in the Parliament, while C’s, with 274.925 votes, reached nine seats.

1.d.4) The electors

The elector allocate themselves as displayed in Graph number 55.

Graph 55. Two axes allocation of the electors in percentages

	LEFT		CENTER			RIGHT	
CAT	1,0%	11,5%	5,4%	4,3%	1,7%	1,1%	0,0%
CAT>ESP	0,6%	9,5%	6,9%	7,4%	3,1%	1,2%	0,2%
CAT=ESP	0,1%	13,3%	6,2%	9,5%	6,0%	3,5%	0,2%
CAT<ESP	0,0%	0,5%	0,4%	0,7%	0,6%	0,5%	0,0%
ESP	0,0%	1,2%	0,5%	1,3%	0,5%	0,8%	0,1%

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

In the local elections of May 2011, from a total of 5.307.677 electors, the voters were only 2.919.872 meaning that the abstention was the 44,99%.

Applying these percentages to the total number of voters, in each row of Graph number 56, there is a figure, in thousands, which means the number of voters that could be allocated for each option.

Graph 56. Two axes allocation of the electors in thousands

	LEFT		CENTER			RIGHT	
CAT	30,2	334,5	157,6	126,1	50,7	31,5	1,4
CAT>ESP	16,4	278,3	202,9	215,2	90,5	35,6	5,5
CAT=ESP	4,1	387,9	182,3	276,9	174,1	102,8	6,9
CAT<ESP	0,0	15,1	11,0	20,6	16,4	15,1	1,4
ESP	1,4	34,3	15,1	37,0	13,7	24,7	2,7

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

We can realize that voting is not a mathematic experience, and understanding that the calculated figures can only be useful at the level of analysing certain trends and big numbers; however, the results can only be certified after the counting of the votes.

Graph 57. Vote attribution per parties

	LEFT			CENTER			RIGHT	
CAT	30,2	334,5	157,6	126,1	50,7	31,5	1,4	
CAT>ESP	16,4	278,3	202,9	215,2	90,5	35,6	5,5	
CAT=ESP	4,1	387,9	182,3	276,9	174,1	102,8	6,9	
CAT<ESP	0,0	15,1	11,0	20,6	16,4	15,1	1,4	
ESP	1,4	34,3	15,1	37,0	13,7	24,7	2,7	

Source: Author’s elaboration on data from CEO survey 652

Anyway, if we make the exercise of assigning full cell values according to the main allocation cells of each part, it will result Graph number 57, where the colours are the ones representing the parties

1.e) The behaviour of the main and the small parties

Do pivotal parties fight for policy-seeking, or for participating in the next government?

“macro-political and socio-economic development seem to be related to shifting loyalties within electorates and are conducive to a change in vote-seeking behaviour of the established parties as well in the policy-seeking behaviour of the “pivot” parties”. (Keman, 2011, pp. 10-28)

The Mayors’ distribution, in order to see the difference between Main parties and small parties, positions CIU and PSC as the main parties succeeding in leading the City Councils is visible in table number 74. Any other party is left far away from the leadership; consequently they are forced to play the role of accompanying the main party or staying in the opposition, but we must bear in mind that *“if voters did not conceive of their favourite party as a party that would participate in the coalition they would like to see formed after the election, they deflected and mostly voted for one of the major parties, as these were seen as taking part in their favourite coalition”* (Bäck & Rosema, 2008, p. 17), which means that for a small party, participating or not in a coalition is always a risk.

Table 74. Number of Mayors per Party and electoral Year

Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	TOTAL	
CIU	26	24	42	41	48	39	39	32	70	361	34,3%
ERC	3	1	0	1	2	6	13	16	10	52	4,9%
ICV	20	13	10	10	8	8	5	2	7	83	7,9%
IND	11	8	11	5	8	8	5	4	0	60	5,7%
PP	0	0	1	2	2	0	1	0	2	8	0,8%
PSC	36	50	48	50	52	65	68	77	42	488	46,4%
TOTAL	96	96	112	109	120	126	131	131	131	1052	

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Table number 75 shows that the structure remains when splitting the number of Mayors per Province, but Barcelona, which is a more industrial Province, and having a long tradition of a less

conservative vote election than the other three provinces, but in any case, confirming that two parties have most of the votes.

Table 75. Number and percentage of Mayors per Party and Province

Party	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona
CIU	192 26,8%	61 46,9%	45 59,2%	63 48,5%
ERC	19 2,7%	14 10,8%	6 7,9%	13 10,0%
ICV	81 11,3%	2 1,5%	0,0%	0,0%
IND	33 4,6%	7 5,4%	3 3,9%	17 13,1%
PP	6 0,8%	1 0,8%	0,0%	1 0,8%
PSC	385 53,8%	45 34,6%	22 28,9%	36 27,7%
TOTAL	716	130	76	130

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In the structure of a MWC there is, at least, a *formateur* and a minority party. The *formateur* is considered to keep the position of Mayor.

The following table, number 76, displays what has happened to both parties in the forthcoming elections. As an example, we can see how the MWC existing after the elections of 1979, in 8 of the observations, the former improved his position, creating a Single Party government, while the Minority Party was out of the government. Such an evolution took place in 52 of the observations, meaning a 17,71% of the total.

Table 76. MWC. The “next elections” impact for the former and for the pivot party


MWC		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	TOTAL
Mayor’s Party	Minority Party									
IMPROVES	OUT	8	3	8	1	12	6	4	10	52
OUT	IMPROVES			1		2	1	3	1	8
	OUT	1	3	2	7	7	12	15	29	76
STAYS	STAYS	1	2	2	5	1	8	8	7	34
	OUT	3		2	2	10	3	9	6	35
WORST	STAYS	8	2	5	4	15	13	16	11	74
	IMPROVES	2			1			2	1	6
	OUT		1	1		1		2	2	7
	STAYS							1	1	1
TOTAL		23	11	21	20	48	43	59	68	293

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

The summary of the above table, but using percentages is shown in Graph number 58, which makes clear that the former party, in 40,3% of the occurrences goes out of government.

In a 17,7% of the observations its position has improved, being able to constitute a City Council in Single Party majority, while in 37,2% kept as former and Mayor’s party. Only in 4,8% of the observations it loses the leading position and becomes the minority party of the coalition. Anyway, it means that the main party succeeds to participate in the next government in a 62,8% of the observations.

Graph 58. Type and percentage of change in the next elections for the members of a MWC



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

For the Minority Party the main probability is to be rejected from the next coalition, in a 57,7% of the observations. The chance of improving its position only takes place in a 4,5% of the observations.

With these results in front of us, is there any incentive for a party to become part of the minority in a government coalition?

Reading Boston, there is still another argument in behalf of the small party supporting explicitly the government, but not participating in a governmental coalition: *“This political altruism is inevitably tempered by a desire to avoid the perceived costs of cabinet membership. These include the risk of being overshadowed by the major coalition partner, the need to compromise on key policy commitments, and the problem of being directly associated with (and blamed for) unpopular government policies.”* (Boston, 2011, p. 86). Anyway, the answer is yes, because remaining in the opposition ⁹¹is still worse.

Taking into account the number of lists presented since 1979 to the 131 Municipalities under study, and per party, we can notice that the percentage of success, in terms of comparing the total of occasions in which a list has been presented to a city/town, and the number of times that the list has participated in government, is quite different if we look at the results of the two main parties or of we look at the results of the other ones. Table number 77 shows, per party, the number of observations in which it participated in government or remained in opposition.

⁹¹ A member of the list *Acció Independentista per La Garriga*, in government since the elections of 2011, in coalition with CIU as former party, explains that when you are in the government, the technicians and civil servants in general count on you and inform about organizational issues, that being in the opposition you would ignore.

There is a huge difference between the results obtained by the two main parties and the ones obtained by the small ones in terms of success in getting a seat in government.

Table 77. Success in participating in government

Party	Times in Opposition	Times in Government	% of success
PSC	483	627	56,5%
CIU	645	512	44,3%
ICV	629	304	32,6%
ERC	608	233	27,7%
PP	805	121	13,1%
IND	1850	260	12,3%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It is when we know the evolution per years, as shown in the next table, number 78, that we can figure out some explanations.

Table 78. Success in participating in government per years

Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
PSC	57,4%	58,6%	51,7%	46,5%	53,5%	59,7%	64,6%	72,5%	43,5%
CIU	46,2%	37,0%	39,5%	40,0%	42,0%	40,8%	45,4%	43,1%	64,1%
ICV	66,3%	37,0%	25,9%	25,6%	26,1%	21,4%	43,0%	34,7%	22,7%
ERC	23,2%	15,5%	22,6%	12,0%	17,4%	29,2%	45,8%	41,5%	24,3%
PP		12,0%	16,8%	12,9%	12,9%	10,7%	9,2%	11,5%	19,5%
IND	20,2%	12,9%	15,0%	7,0%	18,4%	12,5%	11,1%	8,9%	8,1%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

For PSC and CIU no other explanation can be found rather than their capacity and ability to present lists in the majority of the towns and cities for CIU, and in all the big cities for the PSC, and their capacity for collecting the majority of the votes, which means being able to participate in most of the local governments.

Table number 79 contains a number of correlations between pairs of parties, attending to the percentage of success, from which we can observe the following facts:

There is a negative correlation between PSC and CIU, which is quite reasonable, since the government of one of them usually excludes the other.

The main correlation is between PSC and ERC, which is double than between PSC and ICV. The only reason is the lack of presence of ICV in the smaller cities.

The PP is much more in line with CIU's behaviour, showing a very high level of correlation.

Table 79. Correlation between parties' success in being in government

Correlation coefficient	
PSC-CIU	-0,385
PSC-ICV	0,368
PSC-ERC	0,733
CIU- ERC	0,170
CIU-PP	0,624

Source: Author's elaboration on data from www.infoelectoral.mir.es

As a summary, we can state that the main connections are between PSC and ERC and between CIU and PP, confirming once again the rule on preferences in coalition formation.

Do voters have any impact in the coalition negotiations, or this phenomenon is just a “party affair”?

In the insight of the negotiation appears the “dual and often conflicting role, being both agent and principal”⁹² (Keman, 2011, p. 11), so the main question is to what extent the wish or the mandate of the voters are executed by the parties or, at least, taken into consideration.

In order to try to understand it, we are going to analyse the 35 observations in which the main party remains in the same position whereas the small one is excluded in for the next government.

Table 80. The “next elections” impact for the main and for the Oversizer party

Mayor's Party	Minority Party	1979	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	TOTAL
CIU	ERC						2	1	3
	ICV	1			1				2
	IND	1			1			1	3
	PP			1	1	2			4
	PSC				3				3
ERC	ICV						1		1
ICV	IND		1						1
PSC	CIU				1				1
	ERC			1	1		4	2	8
	ICV	1			2			1	4
	IND		1				2	1	4
	PP						1		1

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Apparently, there is no clear trend or pattern to be applied to the above table, so we will look for the information in order to know which was the number of votes received by the Minority party, and which was its relative position in the new City Council, so as to verify if the party was out because of the reduction of votes, or because of some negotiation issues.

⁹² The duality has to see with the “delegated powers” of a multi-party government in the sense that the citizens are the principals and the parties the agents, but as far as the party has to “command and control” as a principal the policy-making actions of its self-appointed agent: party government.

Table 81. The voters or the parties modifying the structure of an oversized coalition

The voters changed the equilibrium in the number of Councillors		16
Of which:	The former became single party	1
	The pivot moved from 6 to 1 or from 6 to 2 Councillors	2
	The pivot party had no one single Councillor in the new City Council	13
By number of Councillors it was possible to repeat a MWC with the same pivot party, but the former's choice was another		19

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The result, displayed in table number 81, is that 16 times out of 35, the voters broke the equilibrium of the previous elections, which means sending the pivot party out of the City Council, whereas 19 occasions, which can be translated in 54% of the observations, it actually was the leading party's choice to reject repeating the same governmental coalition.

So it seems that for the minority party it is better to have a good relation with the former than with their voters⁹³ (Lupia & Strom, 2006, pp. 9-10). Should we explore the balance between trust and effective control?⁹⁴ (Keman, 2011, p. 11)

It can also be noticed that 13 times, so in a 37% of the elections after a coalition government, the pivot party was out of the City Council by reduction of the number of votes.

From the previous table we can see that in 19 out of 35 observations, a 54%, the same party made a different choice, when it was possible to repeat the coalition, but there is still another option for checking the value of the *strategic voting*: looking at the number of minority single party governments created when pivot connected parties were available, but rejected.

To what extent the voters of a small party vote thinking about a possible coalition? This is the *strategic voting*.⁹⁵ (Bäck & Rosema, 2008, p. 16).

⁹³ "Parties that fail to cultivate voter support are replaced in parliament by parties that succeed, while parties that fail to maintain coalition agreements are replaced in cabinets by parties that can"

⁹⁴ "Organizational theory tells us that there are minimally two conditions required to make a principal-agent relationship work: (1) trust, and (2) effective control. Note, however, that 'trust' can imply trust in a person (politicians) or in the institutions and their performance. Hence the formation of representative government in parliamentary democracies implies that the population (i.e. the electorate) trusts its agents, i.e. the political parties, and must have confidence in these parties not only to follow the mandate received through elections (e.g. the policy programme or electoral manifesto), but also to form a government that is more or less representative and effectively conducting its business according to the 'rules' (institutions) of the game"

⁹⁵ "Scholars have long assumed that an electoral system that combines three characteristics – proportional electoral formula, large district magnitude, and no electoral threshold – provides no incentive for strategic voting. Indeed, the traditional 'wasted vote argument', which entails that voters will not vote for their favourite candidate or party if it has no chance of winning a seat, does not apply in such a system. Consequently, one might expect that in such systems strategic voting is virtually absent. However, recent studies suggest that in multi-party systems that adopt proportional representation strategic considerations of another nature, namely those related to coalition formation, also provide incentives for voters to deflect from their favourite party and thus vote strategically"

Table 82. Connected parties rejected for avoiding minority

Former Party	Year	Rejected Connected Pivot Party					
		CIU	PSC	ERC	ICV	PP	
CIU	1979				1		
	1983		2		1	2	
	1987		4		4	1	
	1991		5	3	5	3	
	1995		8	7	5	8	
	1999		6	5	2	6	
	2003		4	3	3	3	
	2007		5	4	1	4	
	2011		14	8	10	13	
Total			48	30	32	40	
PSC	1979	1			1		
	1983	7			5	4	
	1987	4			3	1	
	1991	5			3	4	
	1995	12			12	12	
	1999	7			4	6	
	2003	9			5	8	
	2007	6			3	4	
	2011	10			9	9	
Total		61			45	48	
ERC	2003	1			1		
	2007	1			1		
	2011	1			1		
Total		3			3		
ICV	1979	4	5	2			
	1983	1	1				
	1987	2	2				
	1995	1	1	1			
	1999	2	2	2			
	2011	1	1	1			
Total		11	12	6			
PP	2011	1	1				
TOTAL			76	61	36	80	88

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The records in Table 82 show a total of 341 observations in Single Party minority, having always the option of negotiating with a party in the ideological or national continuum for creating a Minimum Winning Connected Coalition. In spite of that, any kind of party preferred the weakness of the minority.

There were some years when the parties were more active in that sense. For CIU the year with a highest concentration of rejecting connected parties was 2011, and for the PSC it was 1995. For the other parties there are no relevant figures, and it seems that they don't like taking the risk of governing in minority.

The next two tables show that in fact, CIU in 2011 and PSC in 1995 had multiple choices for going into coalition, within the parties connected ideologically, at national level, or both of them.

In the next tables, 83 and 84, the list of cities under CIU's Single Party government in 2011, and the number of Councillors reached by any other party somehow connected with CIU, which implies making mathematically and politically possible a MWC.

Table 83. Municipalities with single party government of CIU

Town/city	PSC	ERC	ICV	PP
Balaguer	6	2	1	1
Barcelona	11		5	8
Calella	5	2		2
Cardedeu	4	1	1	2
Girona	7		2	3
La Seu d'Urgell	6	1	1	1
Manresa	4	3		3
Mataró	8		2	5
Olot	6	2		1
Premià de Mar	4		2	3
Salt	6			1
Torelló	4	3	1	
Vilafranca del Penedès	6	1	1	2
Vilanova i la Geltrú	8		2	3

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It would be interesting to investigate at a qualitative level, why such decisions took place.

The same information is available in the next table, but for the cities under the PSC's rule in 1995, also in Single Party government. There is a considerable number of Councillors of ICV available, which is the usual partner when forming coalitions, even though they were rejected.

Actually, there is no information available about the possible *Parliamentary* coalitions, in the local arena, offering support to the governing party based on *ad-hoc* agreements, depending on the matters to be decided by the government, thus, making impossible to validate whether there was no formal Governmental Coalition but a continuous support to the government political proposals.

Table 84. Municipalities with single party government of PSC

Town/city	CIU	ICV	PP
Badalona	6	7	4
Barberà del Vallès	2	6	3
Esparreguera	4	1	2
Lleida	7	1	5
Lloret de Mar	5	1	2
Mollet del Vallès	5	4	2
Montornès del Vallès	3	5	2
Reus	7	2	4
Ripollet	4	3	3
Sant Adrià de Besòs	5	2	3
Sant Feliu de Guíxols	6	1	1
Terrassa	6	3	4

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Paying attention to the MWC when the Mayors party is PSC or CIU, the situation encountered was the one shown in table number 85, for each one of the different positions of the small party, for each one of the electoral years.

Table 85. Next election for the minority party when the majority is CIU or PSC

MWC		Mayor's party is PSC or CIU									
Mayor's Party	Minority Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	TOTAL	
IMPROVES	OUT	7	3	6	1	12	5	4	8	46	19,8%
OUT	IMPROVES					1	1	2	1	5	2,2%
	OUT		1	2	3	6	11	10	25	58	25,0%
STAYS	STAYS	1	2		3		5	6	5	22	9,5%
	OUT	3		1	2	10	3	8	6	33	14,2%
WORST	STAYS	7	2	5	4	14	11	15	8	66	28,4%
	IMPROVES									0	0,0%
	OUT		1						1	2	0,9%
	STAYS									0	0,0%
TOTAL		18	9	14	13	43	36	45	54	232	100,0%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The Mayor's party goes out of the next government in 36,64% of the elections, and the Minority party is excluded in 59,9% of the occasions. It can be understood from this point of view that large-party supporters should prefer Single Party governments; however this is not the main option in the previously studied cases⁹⁶ (Vowles, 2011, pp. 128-129)

This is the case when the Mayor's party is one of the two main parties, by number of votes, and the Minority party is one of the pivotal ones, so that each one is occupying their normal position in a government.

As a matter of fact, it can be said that the big one has more probabilities to stay or improve its position of power, while the small one has a high probability of moving to a worst position of power.

The next table, number 86, covers the MWC governments where the Mayor's party does not belong to the two main parties.

Certainly, this situation occurs in much less occasions, but we must bear in mind that it is logical that a coalition where the Mayor comes from a pivotal list is an exception to the average government structure.

Table 86. Next election for the minority party when the majority is not CIU or PSC

MWC		Mayor's party is NOT PSC or CIU									
Mayor's Party	Minority Party	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	TOTAL	
IMPROVES	OUT	1		2				1	2	6	9,8%
OUT	IMPROVES			1		1		1		3	4,9%
	OUT	1	2		4	1	1	5	4	18	29,5%
STAYS	STAYS			2	2	1	3	2	2	12	19,7%
	OUT			1				1		2	3,3%
WORST	STAYS	1				1	2	1	3	8	13,1%
	IMPROVES	2			1			2	1	6	9,8%
	OUT			1		1		2	1	5	8,2%
	STAYS								1	1	1,6%
TOTAL		5	2	7	7	5	7	14	14	61	100,0%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

⁹⁶ "Sincere small-party supporters should want their party to have a role in government and thus support the idea of coalition government as the only means of giving it that opportunity. Sincere large-party supporters should prefer single-party government: However, preferences of large-party supporters could also be shaped by expectations"

The Mayor’s party is excluded from the next government in 54,1% of the observations, and the Minority one in a 50,8%, but this one improves much more than in the former scenario (from 2,2% improvement of the pivot parties to 14,7% when the minority is for PSC or CIU)

The same analysis structure will be applied to the oversized coalitions, in order to check whether the behaviour of the main and small parties is equivalent, or not, compared to the main and the oversizer party. Table number 87 shows such an evolution.

Table 87. Next election for the Oversizer party

Oversized Coalition		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	TOTAL
Mayor's Party	Oversizer Party									
IMPROVES	OUT	1	7	5	5	2	3	6	6	35
OUT	IMPROVES	1		1	1					3
	OUT	2	3	2	1	1	4	3	12	28
STAYS	STAYS			1		2	2	2	2	9
	OUT	2	4	3	2	2	7	4	3	27
	STAYS		4	3	2	2	12	18	8	49
WORST	IMPROVES	1								1
	OUT					1				1
	STAYS									
TOTAL		7	18	15	11	10	28	33	31	153


Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

The conclusions are better explained in next graph, number 59, which applies percentages to the figures in the above table.

For the party of the Mayor the situation in the next elections is the same or better in a 72,6% of the observations, while the Oversizer will go out of the government in 59,4% of the occasions, so the Oversizer will keep the same situation, or improve it, in 40,6% of the cases.

So comparing the result, it is more convenient for both parties to take part of an oversized coalition than a MWC, according to the average historical results, if no other factor would be taken into consideration, such as the satisfaction of the citizens and the campaign activities, since *“if campaigns make individual’s party identifications more accessible, then campaigning can serve the goal of party maintenance”* (Tobin Grant, et al., 2010, p. 817)

Graph 59. Type and percentage of change in the next elections. Oversized Coalition



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The reason could be that the relationship between the former and the oversizer is more natural, since the participation of the last one is not mandatory for having a majority, and the result is a kind of positive symbiosis for both parts.

It shouldn't be forgotten that one of the reasons for creating an Oversized Coalition is the lack of trust of the former party in the internal cohesion, having the need of guaranteeing a number of votes in behalf of its policies. Such a supportive attitude may project a positive image of the oversizer which is going to be rewarded in the next elections.

Finally, the above analysis confirms Font's assessment "There is a clear rule concerning the coalition governments: the big fish always eats the small one" (Font, 1999, p. 169)


1.f) Cooperation patterns

The following graph, number 60, is the result of analysing only the Coalition Governments excluding the Concentration ones, which only exist when the political or social conditions are exceptional. It is when the coalitions are created under a democratic environment that the parties have to show to their voters their own personality and profile, out of the coalition agreements, in order to maintain their fidelity and trust. Martin and Vanberg analysed the behaviour of the parties in coalition when debating in parliament, and concluded "that government parties engage in more extensive debate on issues that separate them from their partners and that they do so increasingly as elections approach" (Martin & Vanberg, 2008, p. 513), because they are forced to show and prove that their political proposals are unique and different from the one of their partners.

It is by using the previous colour code that we can appreciate the overall party preferences since 1979, in terms of Departments. For some parties a certain colour is used twice. It means that the percentages are exactly the same for two Departments.

Graph number 60 represents the ranking of the Departments hold by Councillors of a party, without considering whether the party is the main actor, or the pivotal one. The only condition is to participate in government.

Graph 60. Overall party preferences in terms of importance of the departments



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We could expect all the parties to fight for occupying the most important departments, but since the power is unbalanced each one will be rewarded differently, depending on the number of votes and the coalitional needs of the former party. At this point we must remember some of the main theories for explaining the payoffs distribution, starting with Turner, who listed the three main costs for participating in a coalition. The first one are the concessions made in order to be accepted, the second one is about accepting to renounce to take decisions on their own, and the third one is the debt acquired by some parties in front of the ones receiving lower payoffs (Turner, 1991). We must also pay attention to some views such as Gamson's, by which the actors will expect to maximize their benefits, bearing in mind that the benefits will be distributed based on equity (Gamson, 1961), but also according to Komorita and Chertkoff, who explained that the strongest actor will expect to be paid according to equity, while the weakest ones will expect that the distribution of payoffs will be based on equality (Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973).

As a matter of fact, we can split the preferences within the regular ones, which means the top five Departments, which are the most wished by any party, while the exceptional ones are the ones out of the top five. The Departments ranked from the position 6 until the position 21 can be occupied because the former party reserves for its Councillors the top five, and the consequence of that is that the pivotal party has to accept any other Department, either because such a Department is needed by the pivotal party for deploying its policies, so it is a must for the

party when negotiating the coalition agreement, since the subject of the Department reflects the party’s character in front of their voters.

It seems that all the parties are undergoing a struggle to achieve one of the first five more important departments. Only ERC shows interest for Culture, ICV for Education and Environment and the PP for Security.

In fact it makes sense, as far as the two main parties, CIU and PSC, are concentrated in the important Departments, and the smaller ones must show that they are no simple followers. While Environment tends to be the green party’s, ICV, main goal, Security is the main objective for the conservative party, PP.

Generally speaking, the small parties make use of less relevant departments, and they also have the need of deploying some specific policies in order to become visible for the voters.

The previous graph has been created using absolute figures, as a direct output of the database, without any kind of adjustment, which would be useful for making the comparisons more objective.

Standardization is necessary since the PSC has 18 times more Councillors than the PP, and at the same time there are 2,8 times more positions available for the Social Services Department than for the Department of Education.

Graph 61 shows a weighted preferences matrix, which means that it is calculated with the assumption that all the parties have the same number of elected Councillors, and all the Departments exist in the same number of Municipalities.

Graph 61. Standardized party preferences in terms of importance of the portfolio

Department	CIU	ERC	ICV	IND	PP	PSC
01-Economy	Green					
02-Urban Planning				Green		
03-Social Services			Green			
04-Economic Promotion	Orange			Red		
05-Public Works and Maintenance					Yellow	
06-Governance	Yellow			Orange	Green	
07-Education	Green		Yellow			
08-Territory Services				Green		Green
09-Security					Red	
10-Communication						
11-Participation		Green	Green			
12-Urban Housing		Red	Red			
13-Culture		Yellow				
14-Environment			Orange			
15-Sports	Yellow					
16-Organization						Yellow
17-Society of Knowledge					Orange	Green
18-Comerce	Red	Orange			Orange	
19-Equality		Green				Red
20-Youth			Green	Yellow		
21-Mobility					Green	Orange


Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In such a theoretical case, CIU would show the preference for Commerce and Economic Promotion, ERC for Urban Housing and also Commerce, ICV for Urban Housing and Environment, the PP for Security, Commerce and Society of Knowledge, and the PSC for Equality and Mobility.

The department of Communication is not one of the most occupied departments, so any other is, with more or less intensity, assigned to the different political options.

On top of this standardization we can also check what the distribution is, according to the party of the Mayor, for any other of the parties participating in a coalition as it can be seen in Graph 62.

Graph 62. Party preferences based on Mayor's party



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We shall comment one by one, in two groups: Firstly when the Mayor is member of one of the two main parties, and secondly when is member of one of the parties usually playing the role of pivot.

Starting with the Mayors which are members of the two main parties, when the Mayor belongs to CIU, the competitor in the ideological axis, the PP, can always get the Department of Security, which is one of its preferred areas, but is not allowed to take positions in the 4 top Departments.

For ERC, their competitor in the national axis, when going into coalition with CIU, and bearing in mind the need of having an independent personality from the leader of the coalition, their policies must be shown in the Departments of Equality, Commerce, and Participation, but none of the top 10.

Only ICV is allowed to hold the Departments of Environment, Participation, Social Services and Education, so they can make policies in their preferred areas, thus, for CIU this is not a relevant competitor because of the lack of connection.

In fact, CIU tend to keep for its own Councillors the top 5 Departments. The first red colour is seen in position 12, when the Department of Urban Housing is kept by the OTH lists. The first orange colour can be seen in the position 9, when the PP has the Department of Security.

CIU is a governmental party which always likes to reserve for its Councillors the most important Departments, and never allows the other parties in coalition to have the Department of Economy, the Urban Planning or the Economic Promotion Departments.

When the Mayor belongs to the PSC, ICV, which is the preferred and historical partner, can execute its policies in Environment, Urban Housing, Education, Social Services and Participation, as their most wanted areas for deploying their policies, which are mainly based in the social areas.

ERC's Departments are not in the top ten of the list, so they tend to keep the residual ones. The PSC, being one of the dominant parties, it never allows other to have Economy, Urban Planning or Governance.

We will also look at the cooperation patterns when the Mayor belongs to one of the minor, usually small party, starting by ERC.

The price to be paid by a pivotal party when willing to lead a government is made in terms of the importance of the Departments given to the other parties in coalition. This fact can be understood since in some cases ERC has given to the other parties in coalition the Department of Economy and Urban Planning, which is something that has never happened to the two main parties.

It is also evident that the red and the orange cells are in a higher position in the graph than the ones of the main parties.

The main Department which never allows others to have is the one in position number 12, Urban Housing.

When the Mayor belongs to ICV, as it happens when the mayor belongs to ERC, the most important Departments are sometimes given to the other parties in coalition and the red and orange cells are within the ten first positions.

It should be noticed that, the more anti-natural is the coalition, the higher is the price to be paid. ERC and ICV are the only parties allowing the PP to have the Department of Economy. Actually, the PP is in the opposite side of anyone of the ideological or national axis.

ICV never allows another party to rule over the Department of Participation or the one of Environment.


The CIU and ERC relationship seems to be of concurrence, while the relationship between the PSC and ICV seems to be complementary, according to the way that they distribute the Departments. ICV's preferred department, regardless of the Mayor's party is Environment. As a consequence of this fact, it could be studied whether ICV is acting as a single issue party, or not

When CIU has had a Mayor with the support of ERC, represented in the yellow cells of Graph 63, which has been 65 times, it has been repeated only 9 times, which means a 13,8%, as it can be counted when two yellow cells are continued.

After participating in a government with CIU, ERC has got the Mayor in the next elections, represented with the brown cells, actually only in one occasion, visualized as a brown cell at the right side of a yellow cell, equivalent to 1,5% to the observations.

We must bear in mind that both parties are the most connected ones at national level, in the political corner of the parties beating for the independence of Catalonia so, at a certain extent competing for the same voters, being the difference between them related to the ideology, being CIU in the conservative side of the axis, while ERC is clearly located in the left wing side.

Graph 63. CIU and ERC, competition pattern




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

By reproducing the previous analysis, focussing our attention to the PSC and ICV coalitions, we can say that in 170 governments the Mayor has been from the PSC in coalition with ICV, as it is represented in the green cells of graph 64, which has been repeated 72 times, so a 42,4%, which are the times that a green cell is at the right side of another one.

After governing with the PSC as main party, green cells, ICV got the position of Mayor 3 times, represented by the cells in blue colour positioned at the right side of a green one, which is equivalent to 1,8% of the observations, thus, showing the limited pre-eminence of the small parties.

Graph 64. PSC and ICV Cooperation pattern



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can assess that the different patterns for distributing portfolios within the coalesced parties produce opposite results for the pivotal party in terms of options for improving its position within the next elections.

The PP is a very unusual partner in Catalonia, and the only combination which has a certain number of observations is in coalition with CIU. It is only in such a case, that the PP has de Departments of Security and the one of Governance.

We are going to verify the accomplishment of the conclusions of the Bäck, Debus and Dumont study⁹⁷ in the sense that “... our results give strong support to the idea that parties prefer, and aim to gain control over, ministries with a policy area of competence which was stressed in the respective parties’ election manifestos.” (Bäck, et al., 2008, p. 26), or in other words, “campaigns have a useful purpose for political parties beyond capturing a particular office” (Tobin Grant, et al., 2010, p. 817)

⁹⁷ “...in addition...we find that party family variable based on the work by Budge and Keman (1990) is a good predictor of portfolio allocation”

To do so, we will use the election manifestos of the five main parties for the 2011 local elections, in two different levels: the general one, issued by any party, as a reference document covering the overall policies for the whole Catalonia, and the one specific for the city of Barcelona.

The analysis will cover different approaches:

- The 10 words most used⁹⁸, both for the generic and the specific document
- Chapters, taking into consideration order and content
- The analysis of the introduction chapter.

From this analysis we will be able to compare similarities and differences among the five parties, and to visualize the preferred policies, in order to check whether the responsibilities acquired in coalition correspond to their policies or not.

In table number 88, the 10 most used words within the electoral manifestos have been placed in a table, being ordered from top to bottom, according to the most used words.

We can notice some differences between the parties. The word “Catalonia” has been extensively used by CIU, as well as the name of the party (“CIU”) and the substantive “Country”. “Equipment’s” is another word usually employed by this party, as well as “District”

The words used by the PSC are common to any other, with the only exception of “Coexistence”.

Looking at the ERC’s preferences, the scheme is very similar to the PSC’s one, with only two significant specificities, given by the use of the word “neighbourhood” like CIU, and the word “youth” like ICV.

ICV is the only one using the word “Participation”, and we will have to analyse if this exception is visible also when looking at the received portfolios.

The last one, the PP, is the most singular one. Some words are only preferred by this party, like “Family”, “Administration”, “Promote”, “Initiative”, “Private”, “Recover” and “Better”. This brings to us a clear picture of the party politics, in terms of making the families the centre of their social policies, being also a defenders of the private initiative, and willing to prevent from changing the past.

⁹⁸ The selected on-line tool has been www.wordle.net, because being a free web application, it is able to split articles, and other common used words, as well as excluding numbers, from the ones giving meaning and content to the text, and displaying a ranking only with the ones creating the message.

Table 88. Most used words in the electoral manifestos

CIU		PSC		ERC		ICV		PP	
generic	bcn city	generic	bcn city	generic	bcn city	generic	bcn city	generic	bcn city
Catalonia	Barcelona	Municipalities	City	Municipalities	City	Services	City	Services	Barcelona
CIU	City	Services	Barcelona	People	Barcelona	Policies	Barcelona	City Council	Promote
Country	Neighbourhood	Policies	Services	Citizens	People	Social	People	Municipalities	Initiative
People	People	Social	Quality	Social	Districts	People	Social	Citizens	Services
Social	Services	Citizens	Social	Policies	Services	Participation	Policies	Family	Private
Society	Equipments	Cities	Citizens	Services	Neighbourhood	Local	Public	Catalans	People
Politics	District	People	People	Youth	Social	Municipalities	Services	Administration	Recover
Municipalities	Social	Local	Coexistence	Local	Public	Citizens	Youth	Popular	Better

Source: Author's elaboration on electoral manifestos

We can also understand the different solutions that each party has for the main topics that are on the citizen's minds. The best examples are two of the main citizen's concerns during the last years, unemployment and immigration, displayed in table 89, showing the different proposals from the parties depending on their position within the ideological axis.

When reading the electoral manifestos, it is not only that the parties have different proposals, but also that the approach is radically opposed when facing the common challenges. When talking about immigration, and reading the chapters' text in which the word is used, we can understand that the proposals move from the support to the people involved in such a situation, mainly with economical support, but also with training and provision of extra services, or by a politically directed action of the police, in order to avoid the illegal immigration.

If the concern is unemployment, which reached the level of the 26% in Spain at the time of this study, the left parties advocate for public policies, which are expected to help the private initiative to create jobs, while in the conservative and right wing side, the only expectation lays in the private entrepreneurship, the free market and the minimization of the Administration's role in such domains, simplifying the processes for creating new enterprises.

Table 89. Political solutions to the main social issues

	LEFT Wing	Conservative	RIGHT Wing
	ERC-ICV-PSC	CIU	PP
ISSUE			
Immigration	Social Services	Integration	Security
Unemployment	Public policies	Private Initiative	

Source: Author's elaboration on electoral manifestos


The way that each party wants to respond to the main challenges, tells us, in correspondence with the previous analysis of the most used words, their way of understanding life, thus, making understandable the use of the word "coexistence" by the PSC

1.g) Busy Mayors and Party longevity

The last two periods, 2007 and 2011, a number of Mayors have declared in the “delegations edict” or “delegations announcement”, to keep other responsibilities apart from the main role of being Mayor, which would mean being involved personally in areas that until then were often, about 80% of the observations, assigned to Deputy Mayors, or to Councillors.

For visualizing such an evolution, we created the Graph number 65, where the blue bars represent the percentage of Mayors that have not declared to be involved in the daily management of specific portfolios, and the green ones, the percentage of Mayor that have declared to reserve for their own, the direct responsibility over a certain portfolio, which has not been delegated to any other Councillor.

Graph 65. Tasks performed by the Mayors



Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

These figures are based on what it is actually declared in the Delegations document, which can slightly differ from the reality, since a Mayor keeps on his/her own responsibility any delegation which is not publicized in behalf of a certain Councillor. In other words, all the responsibilities belong directly to the Mayor. Some of them are usually assigned to other Councillors with the so called Delegations edict. Nevertheless, the Mayor is usually quite busy with different political duties as well as having some public presence. We consider that the Major exercises executive responsibility over a certain area when this is explicitly announced.

The behaviour is different through the years when comparing different towns and cities by number of inhabitants, showing that the smaller the city is, the more responsibilities to be accumulated by the Mayor, or the other way around, the smaller the city, the less delegations for the Councillors and the more concentration of power.


By testing the results according to the dimension of the towns/cities, there is a clear difference taking 50.000 inhabitants as the border line, visible in Graphs 65 and 66, which is telling us about the complexity of managing a city with a larger number of inhabitants, and the need of

distributing the responsibilities in order to have a reasonable approach to the citizens' needs. Whether the organization responds, or not, in terms of agility and performance, has to do with the civil servants level of professionalism, as well as the optimization of the different processes. Such a complexity may explain the appearance of the figure of the General Manager of a City Council, who tends to be a professional, not belonging to the world of politics, and he/she is basically responsible for the organization and the performance of the administrative processes.

In the smaller cities where there has been an increase in 2007 and 2011. It can also be identified in anyone of the Provinces, not in absolute figures, but as a common trend.


In 2011, the education level of the Councillors and Mayors was higher than the preceding years, as a general trend of the society, but also increased the number of people whose activity was Retired (from 6,6% in 2007 to 9% in 2011), unemployed (from 4,9 to 6,4%) and housewife (from 3,6% to 6%) (Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces, 2011).

Graph 66. Mayors' responsibilities, less than 50.000 inh



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Graph 67. Mayors' responsibilities, more than 50.000 inh



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The Departments taken under the Mayors' management are in line with the ranking of importance of the departments, and it validates the enquiry's results, since the Mayor, who is in the highest level of power and representativeness, has the most important responsibilities and the most visible ones for the citizens, but also that *"the leaders of local government are, in the vast majority, and on average, more highly qualified than the citizens that they represent"* (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008, p. 195), so they qualify better for the more important and difficult responsibilities, as detailed in table number 90.

Table 90. Departments under the rule of the Mayors

Department	# of Mayors
01-Economy	74
02-Urban Planning	39
04-Economic Promotion	26
03-Social Services	19
06-Governance	16
07-Education	7
09-Security	7
08-Territory Services	6
16-Organization	5
05-Public Works and Maintenance	5
15-Sports	4
11-Participation	4
10-Communication	3
14-Environment	3
13-Culture	3
17-Society of Knowledge	2
21-Mobility	1
Total	224

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

The Department of Public Works and Maintenance is not in the position number 5 as it should be expected, but in the position number 10, and it could be due to the need of having some specific knowledge for running this department, but it is beyond our reach to prove it.


At a first glance, looking at Graph 68 in the previous page, there are Counties with more party stability than others. For instance, the so called “red belt” of Barcelona, composed by the Counties of Baix Llobregat (South), Barcelona and Vallès Oriental (North), shows to be quite stable in keeping the red colour, which stands for the socialist party (PSC), and green, for the ecosocialists (ICV).

The Maresme is more conservative than the indicated above, with a relevant number of CIU Mayors (Orange), as well as having the highest concentration of Independent lists (Dark blue)

What we can see in the Vallès Oriental County is the equilibrium between the Socialists (Red) and the ecosocialists (Green).

Considering the time a party is lasting in power, analysed at County level, we can notice some specificities when looking at the party of the Mayor:

Graph 68. Mayor's Parties per cities and years



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

To sum up, out of 66 cities and towns shown in the tables, the most common situation is to keep in power. In 63,6% of the total, the same party has remained in power more than 50% of the elected City Councils since 1979.

Table 91. Party longevity in power

Times Party of the Mayor	# of Observations	% on total
9	12	18,2%
8	12	18,2%
7	9	13,6%
6	9	13,6%
TOTAL	42	63,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database


The number of cities and mandates is displayed on the table number 91, where we can notice that in 12 cities or towns, the Mayor has always been from the same party, and 12 more where only in one of the elections the Mayor has been of a different party, so in a total of 24 cities/towns of the mentioned counties, the power has almost always been in the hands of the same parties.

1.h) Power and Representativeness in the local administration

There are two concepts that we must define in order to be able to assign an absolute value to the results of the coalition negotiations, which are the level of power and the level of representativeness acquired by a Councillor once the government is created. The power was already defined by Panebianco as *“a relationship type, asymmetric but reciprocal, which is the result of an unbalanced negotiation, producing an uneven interchange in which a player wins more than any other”* (Panebianco, 1990, p. 64)

When talking about power, something that we do for comparison between elected candidates and lists, we will be assigning a value to the portfolio assigned to a Councillor, so as to transform into a quantitative valuation (see graph number 7), being the Mayor and/or holding the portfolio of Economy will be represented by the level of power 1, the six main portfolios stand for power level number 2, and any other for level number 3, as it is displayed in image number 15.


Image 14. Ranking of Power



Source: Author's elaboration on own proposal

When talking about representativeness the level 1 stands for the Mayor, which is the main level of power and representativeness. The level 2 is for the First, Second and Third Deputy Mayors, because this is a position existing in almost any Municipality, and it is proved that these three DM's are the ones getting the main portfolios. The level 3 is for any other Deputy Mayor, which according to the evidence of the records and the comments collected from the Councillors, they don't have a relevant role. The level 4 is given to any other Councillor with an assigned responsibility in an area of government, and finally the value zero is for any other, which has no role in the government, or it belongs to the opposition, as displayed in the image number 16.

Image 15. Ranking of Representativeness



Source: Author's elaboration on own proposal

In the next chapters, when studying the questions of gender and the role of the Deputy Mayor, the above values will be used to classify and to recognize to what extent there are rewards or penalties when distributing the portfolios as a result of the negotiation, intra and inter party, for forming government.

Table 92 shows the overall comparison, without any filter, and we can appreciate that the Portfolio of Economy is assigned in direct relation to the level of representativeness, as it also occurs with the 6 Main Portfolios, while the assignment of any other portfolio follows the inverse relation. This fact means that the Councillors, representing the lower level of representativeness, tend to have the lower level of power.

Table 92. Quantitative relation between power and representativeness

	Mayor	1/2/3 DM	Other DM	Councillor
Mayor or Economy Portfolio	33,9%	6,8%	5,4%	2,6%
6 Main Portfolios		9,1%	8,8%	8,6%
Other Portfolios		6,0%	7,9%	10,9%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The theoretical debate about the distributions of the portfolios was started by Gamson by saying *“Any participant [in the government] will expect from the other members of a coalition a proportional reward, in direct relation to their contribution [in terms of number of seats]”* (Gamson, 1961, p. 376). It was continued by Browne and Franklin’s proposal of measuring the payoffs based on the number of portfolios received, compared to the number of seats, and considering a normal distribution the one where the number of portfolios represents the same percentage than the number of seats of the parties in coalition (Browne & Franklin, 1973). The work of Warwick and Druckman, including the weight or the importance of the portfolio to the analysis of the distribution within the members of a coalition, appeared in different articles published in 2001. Their work started by sorting the portfolios per country (Warwick & Druckman, 2001), through a survey to some experts (Warwick, 2005), and concluding that the proportionality rule was also correct when assigning a certain weight to each portfolio (Warwick & Druckman, 2006).

In Catalonia, it has been studied by Matas and Reniu, who classified the importance based on the budget managed by each department for the intra-coalitional agreements of the CIU governments (CiU is a stable coalition formed by *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*) (Matas & Reniu, 2003).

For this purpose we will use the result of our survey and the classification of the image number 15, since the high number of observations makes almost impossible, and it is simply out of our reach, to consider the individual budgets. We also consider that the opinion of the elected Councillors is a valuable point of view for classifying the importance of the portfolios since it brings a new opportunity for validating Gamson’s Law.

In table number 93 we start the analysis of the distributions of the portfolios when the coalition is balanced in terms of Councillors. As we can see at the bottom, the average corresponds to a 52,3% of Councillors of the main party, and a 47,7% for the other parties in coalition.

The main party, being the party of the Mayor, which keeps the majority of the Economy portfolios, while it tends to be more generous with the distribution of any other level of power, with a very high payoff level when considering the level 2.

Table 93. Power distribution in Balanced Coalitions

Balanced Coalition		
Power	Mayor's party	Any other in coalition
1	82,8%	17,2%
2	42,8%	57,2%
3	45,1%	54,9%
Councillors	52,3%	47,7%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When the coalition is unbalanced, which is displayed in table number 94, and the average of Councillors are in the range of 73,6% for the former party, the distribution of portfolios shows an equivalent profile, since the party of the Mayor retains the power level 1 in a higher proportion than the number of Councillors, up to a 92,1%, so 20 points on top of the percentage of Councillors. For power levels 2 and 3, the scheme is opposite to the one of the balanced coalition governments, keeping for the party of the Mayor a high percentage of level 2, as it could be expected taking into consideration the relation of power between the parties, in direct relation to the percentage of Councillors.

Table 94. Power distribution in Unbalanced Coalitions

Unbalanced Coalition		
Power	Mayor's party	Any other in coalition
1	92,1%	7,9%
2	69,9%	30,1%
3	64,7%	35,3%
Councillors	73,6%	26,4%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

If we pay attention to the level of power number 2, in table 97. the difference between the average (47,7%) and the portfolios of level 2 received by any other party in coalition (57,2%), it is about 10 points, whereas, when we look at the Unbalanced Coalitions, table number 99, the difference is less than 4 points, which means that the former has more negotiation power than in a Balanced Coalition.

Finally, when looking at the Oversized Coalitions in Table number 95, we notice that the distribution of Power lies between the two previous coalition types, which tends to look like a subtype of the unbalanced coalitions, with the former party being overpaid at level 1.

Table 95. Power distribution in Oversized Coalitions

Oversized Coalition		
Power	Mayor's party	Any other in coalition
1	87,4%	12,6%
2	67,6%	32,4%
3	66,5%	33,5%
Councillors	70,4%	29,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

If we do the same analysis, not taking into consideration the Mayor's position, which means paying attention only to the assignment of portfolios, as it can be seen in table number 96, which confirms that the portfolio of Economy is the reward of the main party in any type of coalition, always in a percentage higher than the one corresponding to the number of seats.

Table 96. Power level 1 per Coalition type

Power level 1		
	Mayor's party	Any other in coalition
Balanced Coalition	63,9%	36,1%
Unbalanced Coalition	84,6%	15,4%
Oversized Coalition	77,0%	23,0%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In any case, the main party keeps the portfolio of Economy in percentages which are from 10 to 20 points higher than any other level of power, which are more generously attributed to the other parties in coalition, confirming the *formateur bonus* (Druckman & Roberts, 2005, p. 537), defined as "...the formateur is over-compensated relative to the proportionality standard, and thus we should not expect payoffs to be proportional to each party's seat contribution to the coalition"

2- Who gets what

Our main aim in this chapter is to describe how the portfolios are distributed, which are the constraints and the behavioural trends, paying attention to the power and representativeness assignment from different point of view, since we are able to perform a deep and detailed analysis, thanks to the extensive database created for the purpose of this study.


2.a) The many faces of the Deputy Mayor.

We would like to investigate the figure of the Deputy Mayor, “Tinent d’Alcalde” in Catalan, in order to be able to understand his/her role and privileges, if any, of the politicians who are more relevant after the Mayor. They also use to have the responsibility of certain portfolios, thanks to the delegations made by the Mayor, to some of trusted partners.

2.a.1) The Representativeness

In the following “patchwork” matrix, Graph number 69, it is displayed the colour of the Mayor’s Party and the one of the First Deputy Mayor (FDM). Only few Municipalities are shown, in alphabetic order, but the purpose is to evidence the diversity of results after the negotiation process for the settlement of a City Council, and the high number of differences between the parties of the two main representatives of the Municipality, having to do with the high number of coalition governments.

Graph 69. Party of the Mayor vs party of the FDM



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can see light blue colours, meaning the conservative PP, as FDM of a City Council where the Mayor belongs to the Socialist Party, or any other combination.

Any empty row means that the information is not available in the database for such a city and year. In fact, it is much easy to have some information about the Mayor's party than for any

other member of the City Council. The information only about the Mayors can be retrieved in the files produced by Muncat as well as the ones from the ICPS.

For the same Municipalities, the next table shows which was the position within the electoral list occupied by the candidate becoming the Mayor, normally number one in a list, and on the right side the position occupied by the candidate becoming the FDM.

On the right hand side table, number 97, when the colour of the cell is red, it means that two number ones are occupying the position of Mayor and FDM of a City Council, which means that they belong to different lists.

On the right hand side table we can also see a lot of numbers two, because this is the usual position for the second of the majority list when there is a situation of Single Party government.

We can interpret that with the position of FDM and the Deputy Mayors in general, the parties are compensating the allowances accepted by the minority lists for joining the coalition.

Table 97. Order within the list of the Mayor and the FDM

Municipality	Order within the list. Mayor										Order within the list. FDM									
	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Abrera	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Alcanar					1		1	1	1					1		1	1	2	1	
Amposta			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		6	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Arenys de Mar			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	
Argentona			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		2	1		1	1				1	
Badalona							1	3	1								2	1	2	
Badia del Vallès					1	1	1	3	1					1	1		2	2	3	
Balaguer			1	1	1	1	1	1	1				3	2	2	2	2	3	4	
Banyoles	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1		2	1	2	1	2		
Barberà del Vallès	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	2	2	2	2	5		2	2	2		
Barcelona	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2		
Berga			1				2	1	1				1			1	2	2	2	
Blanes	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	3	2	7	1	1	2	2	2		
Calafell			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		2	2	3	3		1	1	3		
Caldes de Montbui	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	3	3	2	1	3		
Calella			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		2	2	2		1	1	1	2		
Calonge					1	1	1	1	1					2	2		1	1	1	
Cambrils	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1		
Canet de Mar	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In general, if we look at the number of occasions when a party selects a member of another party for the position of Mayor/FDM, paying attention to the behaviour of the two main parties, we can notice what is represented in table number 98.

Table 98. Party of the FDM in relation to the party of the Mayor, per years

Mayor's Party	Deputy Mayor's Party	Year									Total
		1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
CIU	CIU	3	1	6	6	13	8	11	8	16	72
	ERC				1	2	4	6	3	6	22
	ICV					1		1			2
	IND			1	2	2	2	1	2	5	15
	PP			7	3	1	5	1		6	23
	PSC					4	2	2	4	5	17
TOTAL		3	1	14	12	23	21	22	17	38	151
PSC	CIU						1	3	7	3	14
	ERC		1		1	2	8	6	10		28
	ICV	1		1		2		3	5		12
	IND						1		8	1	10
	PP			1			1	1	3	2	8
	PSC		3	8	13	12	18	21	38	34	22
TOTAL		4	9	15	13	22	32	51	67	28	241

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

While CIU's preferred partners are both ERC and PP, with different intensities, depending on the historical moment, but also having a high number of agreements with PSC and also with any type of OTH list, for the PSC their preferences are linked to ERC rather than ICV.

The link between PSC and ERC, together to ICV has the main strength at the same time that there is a coalition of the same parties in the Parliament of Catalonia (2003-2007 / 2007- 2010). In 2011, one year after the coalition was moved out of the Generalitat, no one single coalition in the municipalities resulted in assigning the position of FDM to a candidate of the above parties.

In the following table, number 99, excluding the concentration governments, we can notice that most of the FDM belong to the party of the Mayor, in a 59,2% of the occasions, and it is directly related to the Oversized Coalitions and the Unbalanced Majorities, when the former is usually keeping for himself the position of Mayor and also the position of FDM, so that, the other parties receive less rewarding roles.

Table 99. Party of the Mayor and party of the FDM per morphology

Mayor's Party	FDM's Party	Any Coalition		Oversized Coalition		Unbalanced Majority	
CIU	CIU	72	47,7%	21	65,6%	37	46,3%
CIU	Any other	79	52,3%	11	34,4%	43	53,8%
ERC	ERC	11	37,9%	4	50,0%	6	50,0%
ERC	Any other	18	62,1%	4	50,0%	6	50,0%
ICV	ICV	15	50,0%	8	80,0%	5	33,3%
ICV	Any other	15	50,0%	2	20,0%	10	66,7%
IND	IND	12	57,1%	7	70,0%	3	60,0%
IND	Any other	9	42,9%	3	30,0%	2	40,0%
PP	PP	2	66,7%			1	50,0%
PP	Any other	1	33,3%			1	50,0%
PSC	PSC	169	70,1%	71	80,7%	82	74,5%
PSC	Any other	72	29,9%	17	19,3%	28	25,5%
Party	same party	281	59,2%	111	75,0%	134	59,8%
Party	Any other	194	40,8%	37	25,0%	90	40,2%
FDM belongs to any other party		40,8%		25,0%		40,2%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The above table shows that when the Coalition is an Oversized one, the Oversizer is not receiving the FDM, since it only happens in a 25% of the observations.

Any other morphology, different to Oversized and Unbalanced Majority represents only a 21,6% of the total, and it is usually assigning the FDM to the minority party of the coalition.

We created table number 100, in order to make visible the different level of rewarding to the coalesced parties, paying attention to the coalition type

Table 100. Distribution of FDM between Main and other parties

Morphology	Mayor's Party	Mayor	FDM	% FDM
1- Concentration Government	No		26	32,9%
	Yes	79	53	67,1%
2- Oversized Coalition	No		37	25,0%
	Yes	148	111	75,0%
3- Balanced Majority in Coalition	No		53	85,5%
	Yes	62	9	14,5%
4- Unbalanced Majority Coalition	No		90	40,2%
	Yes	224	134	59,8%
5- Balanced Minority Coalition	No		6	85,7%
	Yes	7	1	14,3%
6- Unbalanced Minority Coalition	No		13	40,6%
	Yes	32	19	59,4%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The more balanced the coalition is, the best rewarding percentage for the coalesced parties, in the range of 85% of FDM's for the accompanying parties, while when the coalitions are unbalanced, in the sense that the main party holds the majority of the seats, the percentages of assignment of the FDM position for the coalesced parties are less than half of the previous coalition type.

2.a.2) The Power. The Delegate Responsibilities

What kind of compensation represents holding the position of DM?

Legally, a Deputy Mayor in Spain is merely a substitute of the Mayor, when the Mayor is not available because of illness, holidays...

The role is described as *“to replace the Mayor in cases of vacancy, absence or illness, and can be freely appointed and removed by the Mayor among the members of the Local Government Committee or among the Councillors when the Committee does not exist”*⁹⁹

No further legal attributions are meant.

In the second Edict after the elections, the one which is concerned about delegations, few Municipalities assign the so called Generic Delegations, in the sense of making the DM responsible for an Area of Government which covers several Departments. However, when this happens, there is a section where the Specific Delegations are distributed, to any Councillor.

In this particular case, a DM, who is responsible for a certain Area, will also be entitled as Councillor for one or more Departments.

Image number 17 shows the example of a Councillor getting both responsibilities, an Area and more than one portfolios.

Image 16. Delegations as Area coordinator and Department responsible

B. ÀREA DE SERVEIS D'ATENCIÓ AL CIUTADA
 Coordinador de l'àrea: Sra. Carme Mansilla Cabré
 Ensenyament: Sra. Carme Mansilla Cabré
 Serveis Socials: Sr. Martí Barberà Montserrat
 La delegació d'atribucions inclou la concessió i/o denegació de targetes d'aparcament, i la concessió i/o denegació de subvencions per servei d'ajuts a domicili
 Cultura i Joventut: Sr. Jordi Rius Jové
 Esports: Sra. Carme Mansilla cabré
 Sanitat: Sr. Roman Galimany Solé

Source: BOP Tarragona

As an example, in Valls, for the year 2003, the Second Deputy Mayor, Carme Mansilla became Coordinator (Generic Delegation) of the Area called “Attention to the citizen”, and at the same

⁹⁹ Law 7/1985 Art 23.3

time Councillor (Specific Delegation), in the sense of direct responsible for the Departments (Portfolios) of Education and Sports.

Is the DM really exercising an executive role as responsible of an Area, or is it just a mere title?

Certainly, we do not have the possibility of performing a detailed qualitative research in order to validate the above statement. Paying attention to the answers given by the Councillors to the enquiry that we previously sent, which will be explained later on, it seems that the actual task is the one of working on the assigned department, while the responsibility over a whole Area is a mere title without any specific attributions, and in any case, being out of any legal framework.

In the next tables we are going to explore which Departments are the ones assigned to the different levels of Deputy Mayors, in order to understand whether this is a position of especial relevancy compared to the Councillors which don't have such a degree of representativeness¹⁰⁰.

As long as we cannot validate whether the different DM's have responsibilities over Areas of government, we are going to verify if they receive the most important Portfolios according to our survey, and if there is any difference between the importance of the Departments assigned to the Deputy Mayors, and the Departments distributed among the Councillors.

If there is no evidence of any differences, we are going to apply the ranking of importance to transform the variables into quantitative values. In case the tables show some clear trends, in the sense that the order of the Departments is clearly different from the Councillors in comparison to the one of the Deputy Mayors, in that case the conclusions will be extracted from the evidence.

Assessing the information pictured in table number 101, which covers any kind of government, listing the departments assigned to the First, Second and Third Deputy Mayors, it is obvious that they receive the most important departments according to the enquiry, and more or less in the same order.

Table 101. Number of Deputy Mayors holding a certain Department

	FDM	2DM	3DM
01-Economy	170	131	138
02-Urban Planning	178	132	116
03-Social Services	102	94	124
04-Economic Promotion	73	106	89
07-Education	42	65	63
05-Public Works and Maintenance	46	71	50
06-Governance	55	39	36

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Seven departments out of the seven more important ones are assigned to the FDM, 2DM and 3DM's, leaving the other ones to other DMO's, but mainly to ordinary Councillors.

¹⁰⁰ [JJanes] added the concept of *internal payment*, in the sense that the DM is not only used to compensate the coalescent parties, but also the internal political *families* of the party.

The distribution is the same when considering only the coalition governments, shown in table number 102.

Table 102. Number of DM's and Portfolio. Coalition Governments

	FDM	2DM	3DM
02-Urban Planning	99	70	65
01-Economy	81	67	74
03-Social Services	55	44	67
04-Economic Promotion	45	64	53
05-Public Works and Maintenance	24	43	24
07-Education	18	34	32
06-Governance	24	16	21

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It is only at the level of Economy and Urban Planning that there is a swap in the ranking, while any other Department remains in the same order. Such evidence is giving us an approximation to the special treatment given to the Deputy Mayors.

In the following table, number 103, it is displayed how the Departments are distributed when paying attention to the Councillors having only responsibility over departments.

Table 103. Number of Councillors holding a certain Department

Councillor	Overall	Councillor	Coalition
03-Social Services	805	03-Social Services	477
04-Economic Promotion	467	04-Economic Promotion	258
05-Public Works and Maintenance	356	05-Public Works and Maintenance	195
15-Sports	298	15-Sports	148
07-Education	241	07-Education	135
13-Culture	223	01-Economy	119
01-Economy	222	13-Culture	117

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

There is no doubt about the relevant difference when comparing the distribution of Departments of the Deputy Mayors and the one of the Councillors, since in the second one only five out of the seven more important ones are assigned, and the order of the ranking is quite different to the ranking of importance.

We can conclude that representativeness goes hand in hand with importance.

In order to determine whether the power, in terms of importance of the departments, is distributed within the different Deputy Mayors, we are going to use table number 104.

Table 104. Portfolio distribution within Deputy Mayors

	FDM	2DM	3DM	4DM	5DM	6DM	7DM	8DM	9DM	TOTAL
01-Economy	170	131	138	89	52	19	8	1	1	609
02-Urban Planning	178	132	116	82	46	12	10	4		580
03-Social Services	102	94	124	123	81	36	16	5	4	585
04-Economic Promotion	73	106	89	89	45	20	11	4	2	439
05-Public Works and Maintenance	46	71	50	63	38	16	11	3		298
06-Governance	55	39	36	26	10	11	2	1		180
07-Education	42	65	63	33	28	14	5	6	1	257
Correlation Coefficient	0,92	0,90	0,90	0,77	0,66	0,34	0,51	-0,28	0,19	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

What we can visualize is that from the third DM on, the correlation coefficient, between the number of Councillors per Department and the ranking of the importance of the Departments, it is experiencing a continued reduction. In this sense we can attribute to the FDM, 2DM and 3DM an equivalent level of Power. The results are very similar when taking into consideration the Coalition Governments only.

The preferences are only slightly specific per Province. Table number 105 reproduces the structure of the previous one, per province.

Table 105. Departments assigned to the DM's per Province

	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	TOTAL
01-Economy	400	91	44	74	609
02-Urban Planning	376	88	42	74	580
03-Social Services	414	67	41	63	585
04-Economic Promotion	233	76	44	86	439
05-Public Works and Maintenance	192	37	20	49	298
06-Governance	109	28	13	30	180
07-Education	174	41	18	24	257

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

While in Barcelona, the Social Services is the leading department, followed by Economy, in Girona province they are more concerned about the Economy of the Municipalities, the Urban Planning and the Economic promotion, just like in Lleida, and only in Tarragona the Economic Promotion takes the first position.

In fact, the relevancy of the Social Services in Barcelona has to do with the average size of the cities. If we only look to the cities of more than 50.000 inhabitants, in table number 106, we can notice that the Department of Organization, considered to be the 16th in the ranking, has more relevance in the bigger cities, which is absolutely logical.

Table 106. Portfolio per DM's per Province. Cities with more than 50k inh.

	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	TOTAL
01-Economy	109	6	4	8	127
02-Urban Planning	95	7	4	7	113
03-Social Services	126	4	5	8	143
04-Economic Promotion	69	5	4	6	84
05-Public Works and Maintenance	50	3	2	3	58
07-Education	43	7	1	4	55
16-Organization	36	3		8	47

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

But the question is, what does "Social Services" mean?

The names of the departments and/or responsibilities grouped under the umbrella term of Social Services, can be:

The Elderly, Assistance to the Disabled, Public Health, Women Promotion, Gender Equality, Family support, Immigration Services, Solidarity, Addictions, among others.

It is in Barcelona, the more urban province, where the population has more need of such services, and focusing more specifically at the level of County within the Barcelona Province, the scheme is repeated in the Counties with the highest population density.

Table 107. Portfolio and DM's per County. Cities with more than 50k inh. Barcelona

	Bages	Baix Llobregat	Barcelonès	Garraf	Maresme	Vallès Occidental	Vallès Oriental	TOTAL
01-Economy	9	34	24	3	2	19	18	109
02-Urban Planning	10	28	19	2	5	18	13	95
03-Social Services	11	30	33	5	1	27	19	126
04-Economic Promotion	3	23	18	1	3	11	10	69
05-Public Works and Maintenance	6	10	11	1	5	6	11	50
07-Education	3	13	13		3	4	7	43
16-Organization	2	10	12	1	2	8	1	36

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

2.a.3) Remuneration

From the list of the Municipalities that used to have seven or more DM's. From the Edict about salaries published in 2011, we can realize that some meaningful differences can be acknowledged:

Table 108. Payments for different responsibilities in some Municipalities. 2011

	Badalona	Barberà del Vallès	El Prat	Granollers	Pineda de Mar	Sant Adrià del Besòs	Sant Pere de Ribes	Sta Coloma de Gramenet	Sitges	Terrassa	Vilafranca
Gross Yearly Salary											
Mayor	76.391	71.099	70.300	58.339	52.200	55.000	50.006	58.484	53.427	89.474	58.800
Deputy Mayor	61.891	62.113	55.400	46.672	54.560	45.200	42.615	51.042	47.727	68.306	37.800
Councillor + LGC + Presidency of a Commission		69.794									
Councillor + Local Government Comitee		62.113	52.500							61.292	
Councillor + Delegation	55.867	57.895	32.800	46.672	44.000	32.000	42.615	37.194	40.205	52.444	37.800
Councillor	21.318	57.895		46.672							
President of Municipal Group	61.891	3.000						27.320		32.340	
Attending a session of:											
Plenary	1.343	200	500		100			125	402	1.533	700
Local Government Comitee	728				55				268		700
Information Commission	672				100			83	67		700
Other Comitees	560								67		

Source: Author's elaboration on retributions edicts

From the legal point of view there are two levels of salary: Full Time, which means exclusive dedication, or Part Time. A Councillor can also work under a volunteer basis, so no salary will apply.

Calculating the averages and considering full time dedication, what we can learn is the following:

The Salary of the Mayors is a 21% higher than the Salary of a Deputy Mayor (no other attributions included). By default, all Deputy Mayors hold Delegations

The Salary of a Deputy Mayor is a 20% higher than the one of a Councillor with delegations.

In the table there is also a mention to the retributions for attending a session of the Plenary or any other commission, only for the municipalities that have informed in the remunerations Edict, where huge differences are visible between municipalities¹⁰¹.

In Catalonia there are two associations of Municipalities:

- The ACM¹⁰² (Associació Catalana de Municipis)
- The FMC¹⁰³ (Federació de Municipis de Catalunya)

The ACM issued a report with recommendations about salaries¹⁰⁴ in June 2011.

Based on a Full Time dedication, the proposals are indicated below:

- Deputy Mayor without Specific Delegations -> at least 65% of the Mayor's salary
- Deputy Mayor with Specific Delegations -> at least 85% of the Mayor's salary
- Councillors with Specific Delegations -> from a 30% to a 60% of the Mayor's salary

Paying attention to the percentages, it is noticeable that the recommendations are quite close to the actual 2011 figures already commented.

The FMC also distributed a document¹⁰⁵, created in 2003. The last update is from May 2011.

Also based on a Full Time dedication:

- Deputy Mayor or Councillors with Specific Delegations -> Mayor's salary reduced by 10/25%

As a matter of fact, it is evident that the parties and the organizations dealing with the local politics are concerned about the salaries of the elected candidates, since this is an issue which has a very high impact in the mass media, because there is no legal framework about the limits, both maximum and minimum for the members of a City Council.

2.a.4) The Number of Deputy Mayors

Taking into consideration only the legal description of the Deputy Mayor's role, in the sense of replacing the Mayor in any kind of absence, it is logical to have at least two Councillors playing this role, the so called First and Second Deputy Mayors, whose title is giving us some information about the ranking and relevancy for each one.

When a Mayor decides to entitle from a third Deputy Mayor to a ninth Deputy Mayor in some Municipalities, we have to reconsider the role of such Councillors, who are recognized with a title not possible to justify with the only legal responsibility of substituting the Mayor. Nevertheless we must bear in mind that according to Mershon, parties can reduce the office costs of creating oversized coalitions by increasing the number of portfolios (Mershon, 2002),

¹⁰¹ [JSole] explained that in Caldes de Montbui, the DM's and the Councillors have the same remuneration, since there is no "difference in their level of responsibility"

¹⁰² www.acm.cat

¹⁰³ www.fmc.cat

¹⁰⁴ Associació Catalana de Municipis, Serveis Jurídics. Recomanació: Escala de Retribucions dels Electes Locals. June 2011

¹⁰⁵ Federació de Municipis de Catalunya. Orientacions de retribucions de L'FMC per a càrrecs electes locals. May 2011

therefore, they can also increase the number of payoffs by increasing to the maximum the number of Deputy Mayors. Since a Deputy Mayor has no special duties, there is no need of creating an administrative structure in order to support her activities, opposite to the option of increasing the cabinet size, so the number of ministries, in order to satisfy the requirements of the parties in terms of payoffs after a coalition negotiation at national level for the central Government, explained by using the following terms: “...the size of the cabinet depends on intra- and inter-party politics. Inter-party politics influence the size of the cabinet because of the need of coalition parties to come to an agreement about the division of ministerial portfolios and increasing the size of the cabinet can at times smooth that process. Intra-politics matter because seats in the cabinet are an important tool for maintaining party discipline.” (Indridason & Bowler, 2014, p. 395)

In the next tables we are going to pay attention to the evolution of this title, in order to have a historical view, as well as looking for the driver that can explain the number of DM’s in some Municipalities. Based on our own database, it is possible to create the following table, number 109, where we can count the number of Councillors, each legislature occupying a certain position as DM or as Mayor.

In the bottom line it appears the number of Mayors. For each Mayor we have one observation. So this informs about the number of municipalities involved in the calculation.

Table 109. Number of Deputy Mayors per year

	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
1DM	45	51	96	90	98	118	120	130	131
2DM	44	51	94	89	97	117	121	126	129
3DM	37	46	90	87	90	114	114	127	126
4DM	32	37	72	76	75	95	94	114	106
5DM	17	24	35	47	42	59	65	91	77
6DM	12	18	17	15	17	23	33	42	28
7DM	4	9	11	10	9	13	27	24	17
8DM	3	9	2	1	2	6	9	7	3
9DM				1		3	4	4	1
Mayor	47	53	96	91	99	118	120	131	131

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

To make it more understandable, and with the aim of making visible the evolution, it is turned into percentages per columns

Table 110. Percentage of Deputy Mayors per year

	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
1DM	95,7%	96,2%	100,0%	98,9%	99,0%	100,0%	100,0%	99,2%	100,0%
2DM	93,6%	96,2%	97,9%	97,8%	98,0%	99,2%	100,8%	96,2%	98,5%
3DM	78,7%	86,8%	93,8%	95,6%	90,9%	96,6%	95,0%	96,9%	96,2%
4DM	68,1%	69,8%	75,0%	83,5%	75,8%	80,5%	78,3%	87,0%	80,9%
5DM	36,2%	45,3%	36,5%	51,6%	42,4%	50,0%	54,2%	69,5%	58,8%
6DM	25,5%	34,0%	17,7%	16,5%	17,2%	19,5%	27,5%	32,1%	21,4%
7DM	8,5%	17,0%	11,5%	11,0%	9,1%	11,0%	22,5%	18,3%	13,0%
8DM	6,4%	17,0%	2,1%	1,1%	2,0%	5,1%	7,5%	5,3%	2,3%
9DM				1,1%		2,5%	3,3%	3,1%	0,8%
Mayor	47	53	96	91	99	118	120	131	131

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

What we have as conclusions is:

- A stable number municipalities (almost 100%) having 1DM and 2DM.
- Also a stable number of municipalities, in the range of 95%, with 3DM.
This can be connected to the evidence of the table 99, in the sense that the three first DM's receive the main Departments.
- Relating to 4DM till 9DM, it has been continuously increasing, with a change of trend in 2011.

This can drive us to certain conclusions, since from the First until the Third DM, the percentage of Municipalities having such a position is stable and majoritarian. Therefore we can assess that these are the DM's having the most important departments, while for any position from the Fourth onwards, in a situation of the economy downturn the number of DM's per City Council tends to be reduced, and at the same time, we know that the Departments assigned to such a Deputy Mayor are of less importance. At the same time, as seen before, a number of Mayors have retained some of the delegations, resulting both actions in a reduction of the cost of the remunerations at Municipality level.

Paying attention to the above tables, a new question arises: Is there a relation between the government type in the sense of single party/coalition, and the number of DM's?

All the multivariate regressions show very low levels of confidence with such variables.

There is only one combination allowing us to appreciate a certain level of relation is the one taking into consideration the number of elected Councillors and the number of parties in Coalition.

Dependent variable: number of DM's+Councillors with responsibility over a Department

Explicative Variables: (1) Total number of elected Councillors and (2) Total number of parties in Coalition

The regression is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Number of seats} = & + 0,4344784 \\
 & +0,41125252 \text{ Total number of elected Councillors} \\
 & +0,93243838 \text{ Number of Parties in Coalition}
 \end{aligned}$$

The adjusted R² is 0,47364221, and the Correlation Coefficient 0,68907743

All the values are statistically significant. What the regression is explaining is that the number of seats gained by a party are a result of the number of parties participating in the coalition, and the total number of elected Councillors

2.a.5) A controversial role

As a matter of fact, we can perceive the challenge when describing properly the role of the Deputy Mayors, because of the three mentioned elements:

- A position wished by the parties in coalition, since the three first Deputy Mayors used to become the leaders of the more important departments.
- A position without special legal attributions for the daily duties
- A position with a higher salary than a Councillor with Specific Delegations

In order to know how this position is understood by the active politicians, an enquiry was sent to 813 active Mayors and Councillors, in March of 2012. Together to the enquiry they received a report with the conclusions of the enquiry about the importance of the Departments and how the importance was perceived in relation to the gender. 61 Councillors answered the new enquiry about the role of the Deputy Mayor, consisting in only two questions.

The first question, about the sense of a seventh, eighth or further Deputy Mayors, was limited to three possible answers. The results were the following:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------|
| ▪ Coalitional compromises | 42,62% |
| ▪ Emotional Remuneration | 27,87% |
| ▪ Other | 29,51% |

When the answer was “Other”, they were asked to specify and/or to talk about the role of the DM. Here we simply translated some of the answers given by the Councillors.

- *The municipal organization sometimes is organized into major areas that can bring together two, three or more Departments. In the case of the city of Olot, the organization is made of 4 areas led by four Deputy Mayors. In my case, for example, as First Deputy Mayor I am responsible for coordination in the area of Social Care which includes social welfare, culture, education, health, youth, sports, neighbourhoods,... but actually I'm just a Councillor of Social Welfare and Culture.*
- *Society has evolved quite a lot since the Law 7/1985 was issued. This Law gave too much representativeness and powers to the Mayor. In reality, in large municipalities it has been proven that it is much more efficient that representation, authority and competencies are assumed by the Deputy Mayors. These, at the same time, coordinate areas where other Councillors can be found.*
- *A Deputy Mayor is a symbolic role. I think he/she should never be paid, but on the other hand he/she is institutionally representative, which implies a reinforcement of the image of the Corporation*

It has already been commented about a *complicated and redundant* legislation, and the consequences are continuously visible, as in this case. *“The creation of the Ministry of Social Affairs at the end of the 80's was an exercise to try to coordinate the cooperation between administrations, concerning the elder, drugs, equality of opportunities and youth, but it never succeeded to become a system of universal services to the citizens granting their rights, but remained as discretionary as it was the Charity”* (Moreno Fuentes & Bruquetas Callejo, 2011, p. 64)

The 61 answers came from 25 women and 36 men, so 40,98% of women, and representing 23 out of the 41 Counties.


From the second question included in the enquiry we can summarize the following statements:

- 39 out of 61, so the 63,9%, considered that the Deputy Mayor has had an evolution in the sense of having attributions beyond the ones determined by law, in terms of coping with different Departmental responsibilities.
- From their comments, it can also be appreciated that certainly the Deputy Mayors are responsible of certain areas of government
- They also mentioned that some areas are led in terms of policies by Deputy Mayors, and in terms of organization by civil servants.

2.b) Gender

“We are at the beginning of a new world, and the woman will join it with a considerable potential of energy. The problem is how she is going to join it” (Capmany, 1966)¹⁰⁶

Graph 70. Active population in percentage by gender. Catalonia



Source: www.ine.es

The evolution of women as a work force shows a linear trend from 1976 until 2004-2008, when it started to drop because of the economic downturn, as it also happened to men. Graph number 70.


The enquiry on *active population* refers to the citizens having the working age, whether they are in the unemployment lists or not, so it means that the percentage of employment is lower than the one reported by the governmental employment agencies.

The evolution, from the 30% to the 50%, so 20 points of difference in 28 years can be compared for a similar period with the incorporation of women to the local politics, as displayed in Graph

¹⁰⁶ M. Aurèlia **Capmany**, born in Barcelona in 1918, roman and theatre writer, wrote this essay in 1966. In the page 8 stated: “a liberal is willing to admit that the intelligence of a determined woman may be equal to that of a determined man, that the woman is absolutely responsible for its acts and would never prevent any woman the free exercise of his will, while a conservative is willing to defend women’s happiness, based on motherhood and marital dependence”

number 71, in the sense of women getting a portfolio or a certain governmental position, and consequently raising from the 10% to the 40%.

Graph 71. Evolution of the percentage of women in local government. Catalonia



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Since the approval of the Equality Act¹⁰⁷, which forced the electoral lists to be structured with a minimum of 40% of the less represented gender, and when out of each 5 positions of a list must be covered in a relation of 2/3 of both genders, and taking into consideration that the voter cast their ballot in behalf of a list, not for a candidate, the output must result in a minimum of 40% of the less represented gender. When the above conditions are not fulfilled, the list can be rejected.

Image 17. Electoral List of ERC/Cambrils 2011 displaying the mandate of the Equality Act



Source: Tarragona Official Gazette 26/04/2011

The image number 18 shows a list which is a good example for understanding some deviations of the expected percentages. The women of the list are highlighted in yellow colour. When only

¹⁰⁷ Ley Orgánica 3/2007, 22nd of March, for the effective equality of women and men


the three first candidates would be elected, a 100% of men would be in the City Council. If the 12 first candidates would be elected, a 58% of women would participate in the City Council.

Two Councillors of this Party were elected in 2007, and none in 2011. Since 1979 this Party has never obtained more than 2 Councillors. We could imagine that having a fourth Councillor was beyond their reach, so it seems that there is a lack of fair play in gender affairs¹⁰⁸, or should we agree with the fact that fulfilling the mandate of the Law is not guaranteeing equality, but simulating it.

We can use Graph 72 to visualize the evolution of the percentage of female, occupying each one of the first ten positions of the electoral lists.

There is an evident evolution, but there is still some room for improvement. We must pay attention to the percentage of the number one in 2007, which was below the 20%. In 2007 the 40% was only reached for the positions higher than the second, with the exception of the sixth. This negative situation was repeated in 2011, in terms of accomplishing the Law for each group of five candidates, but positioning always men in the first possible position, as it happened in 2007 with the sixth and the seventh positions.

Graph 72. Percentage of female within the 10 first positions of a list



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Uribe already warned in 2013 about the limited impact of the Parity Law when focusing in the first positions of the lists (Uribe, 2013, p. 191), and Delgado observing that *“the less political power the easier to find women occupying the first positions within the electoral lists”* (Delgado, 2010, p. 160)


According to graph number 73, a clear evolution has taken place since 1979, but what matters is wondering about whether this growth has been homogeneous within the different levels of power and representativeness, in order to validate that *“gender quotas certainly contribute to feminising the party bodies (formal level) if effectively enforced”* (Verge & de la Fuente, 2014, p. 76).The graph shows the variation of the percentages from the previous elections to the indicated in the time line.

¹⁰⁸ [AMaymo] explained the difficulty for maintaining women in their lists (CUP) since they are composed out of candidates younger than any other lists, when most women decide to have children, abandoning the politics. In that sense we must recognize that not all the gender exclusion can be attributed to unfair attitudes of the party leaders.

In 1979, the percentage of women taking part in the City governments was below the 10%¹⁰⁹, which was reached in 1983. Since then, every year the increase in the percentage of women has been rapidly growing, until 2007 when it reached its maximum, near to the 40%. Not to forget that we are only talking about women taking part of a government, but not forming part of the opposition.

After the 2011 elections, for the first time since 1979, the percentage of women in power suffered some reduction. If looking at the studies about the impact of the equality act, an overall 40% has always been reached. The percentage is a direct consequence of the electoral system, but not because of the change in the attitudes of the parties relating gender equality of opportunities. It is only when focussing on the distribution of representativeness that we will be in position to understand if the local politics are still a male affair.

Graph 73. Variation of the percentages of women in government




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The trend was broken in 2011, because of a relevant change having direct impact in the number of women in power. It was CIU getting more elected Councillors than PSC, having both parties different attitudes relating the gender equality¹¹⁰ (D.P. Brady, 2012, p. 50), as it will be shown later on.

¹⁰⁹ [JMayoral] In Granollers, until 1979 only two women had occupied the position of Councillor. In 1979, after the first democratic elections, three women were in the Plenary, all of them with responsibility over a portfolio, Culture, Sports and Social Assistance.

¹¹⁰ "International experience suggests that it is only where parties take positive steps to increase the number of women candidates that the number of women representatives increases perceptibly."

Graph 74. Variation of the percentages of women in government per representativeness



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

As we can appreciate in Graph number 74, the percentages of women getting the position of Mayor seems to have an erratic behaviour, certainly not reaching even the 20% in 2011, but it has to do with the low number of women getting this position, so any possible change, in the number of women holding the position of Mayor has a very high impact in the percentages displayed in the graph. Its historical evolution cannot be compared to any other of the positions, not even paying attention to the changes but or to the maximum percentages attained.

When looking at the position of First, Second and Third Deputy Mayor, the evolution is much better in terms of equality, but not reaching the 40% that could be expected from a distribution of power in direct relation to the ranking occupied in the electoral lists.

Any representativeness position in which women do not reach the 40% in 2007 and 2011 is underrepresented, which means that some men received some titles which are not in accordance with their ranking in the electoral list. As a result, this male positioning is awarded in detriment of the female allocated in the highest positions of the list. Should this mean that the parties have internal agreements for creating the lists according to the requirements of the parity Law, but distributing representativeness and power by means of some other criteria?

In table number 111, it can be clearly appreciated that the more relevant is the position, the less women are in charge.

We could say that the main impact of the Equality Act is the one at the level of FDM, 2nd and 3rd DM's, since occupying such positions implies having the responsibility over the most important departments, thus, merging representativeness and power.

Table 111. Percentage of women in each level of representativeness

Percentage of women		
	1979-2003	2007 and 2011
Mayor	7,0%	19,8%
FDM	14,0%	27,2%
2DM	15,1%	37,3%
3DM	17,3%	37,9%
4DM	17,3%	38,2%
5DM	23,6%	40,5%
6DM	21,5%	44,3%
7DM	15,7%	36,6%
8DM	25,0%	60,0%
9DM	62,5%	40,0%
Councillor	20,3%	45,6%


Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It is thanks to the results at the level of third Deputy Mayor or higher, and Councillor, that the aggregated figures show a result closer to the expected 40%.

The two following graphs, number 75 and number 76, are identical to the last two ones, but taking into consideration only the coalition governments.

Putting the graphs aside it is obvious that there are no relevant differences or trends, so we could conclude that it is not the morphology of the government, but the party in government which helps to explain the number of women holding power.


Graph 75. Variation of the percentages of women in government. Coalition governments



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When looking in detail, in graph 76, we can notice that for the position of Mayor or FDM/2DM the percentages are similar when comparing the overall figures with the ones limited to the Coalition Governments, while for any other position the results are worse for the women participating in coalitions than the overall figures. The percentages are certainly bad and actually it worsens in 2011 compared to 2007.

Graph 76. Variation of the percentages of women in government. Coalition governments



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In order to confirm the above sentence, some more graphs must be added.

First of all, and following the same structure of the above graphs, the results for the City Councils where CIU has the position of Mayor, independent of any other variable, so for any kind of government. This is represented in Graph number 77.


This specific view will allow us to compare the parties' behaviour in terms of the internal approach to the gender equality. Two points are to be investigated. First of all the evolution along the years, in order to understand how the party approaches the women's role in politics, from 1979 until 2003, when there was no regulation, so that the parties could freely decide on how to organize their electoral lists. The second issue is what happened in 2007 and 2011, when they had a mandate for the organization of the lists in terms of gender, and to be able to validate whether this mandatory ranking was respected when distributing responsibilities among the elected Councillors, or not.

When the Mayor belonged to the CIU list, the evolution from 1979 until 2003 was always positive, with the only exception of the variation from 1979 to 1983. The maximum percentage was reached in 2003, and it was very close to the 23%, more than 5 points below the average in Catalonia.

The women, when the Mayor is from the CIU list, just reached a little bit more than the 35% in 2007, but the year of the main success of the list 2011, even lost a small part of their best percentage.

Anyway, the maximum percentage ever reached by the women of this list was close to the 35%, also 5 points below the average. We can state, from the above comments that about a 5% of the women in the CIU lists, so being elected, do not receive responsibility over any department.

Graph 77. Variation of the percentages of women in government. Mayor from CIU




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When looking at the evolution, according to the level of power acquired by the women, there are two meaningful changes: On the one hand there is an improvement of the percentage of FDM, 2DM and 3DM. On the other hand there is a reduction of the 4/9DM percentage. Both are mathematically compensated, but obviously the level of representativeness quality of the female is much better, as it can be appreciated in Graph number 78.

There is a huge growth for the positions of FDM and 2DM in 2011, the higher growth since 1979, but also a huge reduction in 2011 for the other DM positions, ending both in a range around the 35%.

Graph 78. Variation of the percentages of women in government. Mayor of CIU



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In the following graph, number 79, it is visible the evolution of the Single Party governments, majority or minority, the unbalanced majority coalition, and the Oversized Coalitions, so the government types where only one acts as the leader, and there is no need of big concessions to any other party. Therefore, the FDM and 2DM used to remain with the main party.

With those types of government, women tend to be a little bit better represented than in the average, and additionally this is the only case when there is a certain approximation to the targeted percentage of 40%.

The effect in the participation of the women in the government is linked not only to the level of power in the hands of the party, but also to the social evolution. The changes in 1987 and in 1991, which broke the growing trend comparable to the one of the labour market, have to do with the governmental choices made by the party.


Graph 79. Percentage of women per government type. Mayor from CIU



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When the party of the Mayor is the PSC, the situation is radically different. There is a steady and continuous growth in women participation. Graph number 80 should be compared with Graph number 77, showing the different percentages of the two main parties.


Graph 80. Variation of the percentages of women in government. PSC's Mayor



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In the next graph, number 81, we can confirm that even when the defeat of the party, in 2011, the level of women with the main responsibilities is higher than the 40% required by law.


Graph 81. Variation of the percentages of women in government. PSC's Mayor



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Leaving aside the percentage for 1979 relating the Unbalanced Majority Coalition only, which is exceptional as a percentage, but in connection to a very low number of Councillors, three women and three men, the rest of the curves show a clear positive trend, which is unrelated to the government types and years. When comparing Graph number 82 with Graph number 79, we can notice that the PSC always shows higher percentages.

Graph 82. Percentage of women per government type. Mayor from PSC



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Anyway, to have a certain level of power, the first step is to be in a list in a relevant position, let's say within the three first positions in order to have options to become Mayor, FDM or 2DM. Taking into consideration that the Law has gender requirements at the level of each 5 positions

in the list, in the sense that the Law could be perfectly fulfilled with only one woman in the second position, so one of three, the 33%.

The following table, number 112, shows the percentage of women within the 3 top positions of the electoral lists per party

Table 112. Percentage of women within the three first positions in a list


	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
CIU	2,5%	4,5%	7,7%	10,5%	8,4%	13,3%	22,6%	26,6%	33,2%
ERC					12,1%	10,8%	13,9%	28,7%	18,6%
ICV	14,3%	13,9%	16,2%	26,2%	14,9%	31,5%	33,3%	36,7%	38,6%
IND	1,5%	4,5%	2,1%	5,9%	7,5%	13,2%	14,3%	17,5%	22,4%
PP			4,3%	4,5%	5,0%	4,5%	25,0%	15,0%	30,2%
PSC	11,5%	7,3%	8,6%	12,1%	20,6%	23,7%	27,3%	37,7%	41,1%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Any percentage below the 33% in 2007 and 2011 is telling us about parties which, in more than 50% of their lists have not accomplished the mandate of the equality act, in terms of structuring the list in relation to gender distribution.

The same percentages represented in Graph number 83, in order to highlight the differences

Graph 83. Percentage of women within the three first positions in a list



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Only the PSC and ICV are above the 33%, which means that there are lists with two women in the top three positions, while CIU is only reaching the level of the 33% in 2011.

The percentages of any other list may not be significant enough, simply because the low number of Councillors reached after each election.

2.b.1) Quotas

If we compare real facts, with the aim of the Law, we shouldn't highlight the fact that the Law has been implemented, when the successful percentages are the ones based on a calculation based on the averages, but concealing the certainty that gender power is not equally distributed. Therefore, it's difficult to understand the need of studies as the ones with the title: "Local Elections 2007. Impact of the Organic Law 3/2007, from the 22nd of March, for the effective parity between women and men" and "Local Elections 2011....."¹¹¹, both available at the special elections website of the Ministry of Interior, demonstrating that at least 40% of the elected Councillor are women, per province, per city,

Was it really needed the Equality Act?

"In the Convention of the Political Rights of Women (UN) of 1952, the article II provides that women should be eligible under conditions of equality with men [...] the terms in equal conditions must be noted because this naming does not impose equal treatment, but creating truly egalitarian conditions, which implies the adoption of positive actions in this regard" (Freixes San Juan, 2008)

"The debate about gender quotas is spread all over the world, being in use in almost half of the countries" (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2008, p. 2).

The main conclusion of the report "Electoral Gender Quota Systems and Their Implementation in Europe" is *"that in order to be effective, a quota system must be compatible with the electoral system in place and that quota rules must be supplemented with rules concerning rank order as well as effective legal sanctions"* (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2008, p. 2)

It is also remarkable the sentence *"the political parties are the gatekeepers to gender balance in political decision making because they control "the secret garden of nominations""*, placing us in front of the difficulties created by the meritocracy of the current political parties¹¹² (Field, 2006, p. 95), or as said, in the same sense by Lilliefeldt, *"Individual political parties are the main architects of parliamentary representation. By selecting the candidates for election, they are able to exert a considerable influence over gender balance in parliament"* (Lilliefeldt, 2010, p. 194)

Looking at the proportion of women being elected and getting a position in government, it is obvious that the PSC has gone for *voluntary* Party quotas (started in 1982, reaching 40% in 2000), which is one of the drivers; the wish of facilitating the parity¹¹³ (Alnevall, 2008, p. 98).

¹¹¹ Local Elections 2007 (2011). Impact of the Organic Law 3/2007, from the 22nd of March, for the effective parity between women and men. 135 and 80 pages respectively in www.infoelectoral.mir.es

¹¹² *"Without formal institutional guarantees, Spain suggests that an alternative means of making a pact credible is through party organizations that encourage compliance of the rank and file with the leadership who negotiates the pacts. In other words, pacting elites need to count on party executive committees, governmental appointees, and parliamentary groups that support (or cannot oppose) their strategies. Along these lines, Capó argued that the form of reaching agreements in Spain, pacted by the party leadership, strengthened party discipline. In Spain there are several mechanisms that encourage party discipline. First, the electoral laws stipulate the use of closed party lists. Second, the party financing and campaign laws are party-centric. Third, parliamentary procedures extremely limit the actions of individual legislators"*

¹¹³ *"The Spanish women's movement, the PSOE women's secretariat and initially also the Women's Institute were the crucial actor in the process of getting quotes for women approved....Nevertheless, the percentage of female political representatives in Spain is higher than that in many other European countries"*

In fact, since the PSOE's Federal Congress held in 1988, the feminist members of the party succeeded in passing a 25% quota for party positions and electoral lists. In 1997 they approved a 40% party quota and, above all, they were continuously trying to put it in the political agenda in the Spanish Parliament.

Until 2004 the discussion was out of the Parliament because of the rejection of the conservative party (PP), being in power¹¹⁴ (Roig i Berenguer, 2008, p. 27), to legislate about gender quotas, and only in 2007 Spain had the first Act regulating quotas in a 40:60 equilibrium of both sexes. Because of such a focused political hyperactivity, the 2004-2008 period has been qualified as the Second Transition¹¹⁵ (Calvo & Martín, 2009, p. 499). It is in table number 113, where it can be appreciated which parties have the so called Voluntary Party Quotas, the details, and the provisions provided by each party agreement.

Table 113. Parties with regulated party quotas

Voluntary Political Party Quotas*

Party	Acronym	Official Name	Details, Quota provisions
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Since 1997, PSOE has a 40 percent quota for either sex (party statutes, 2009, article 7k). The party first introduced a quota rule, at 25 percent, in 1988.
United Left	IU	Izquierda Unida	Since 1997, IU has a 40 percent quota for either sex (party statutes 2008, article 7). The quota was first introduced in 1989, at 25 percent.
Socialist Party of Catalonia	PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	PSC has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2000). The quota was first introduced in 1982 (12 percent) and enlarged in 1987 (15 percent), 1990 (25 percent) and 1996 (30 percent).
Initiative for Catalonia-Green	ICV	Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds	ICV has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2002). The quota was first introduced in 1991 (30 percent).
Republican Left of Catalonia	ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	ERC has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2004).
Nationalist Galician Block	BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego	Quotas were approved by BNG in 2002 (40 percent quota for either sex).
Canarian Coalition	CC	Coalición Canaria	A 40 percent quota for either sex was approved by CC in 2000. (Party statutes, 2008, article 4:18.)


Source: www.quotaproject.org

If we don't take into consideration the values relating 1979, because of the novelty in democracy, nor the ones for 2007 and 2011, since the Equality Act was issued, the linear regression shows an evolution which results is an estimation for 2011 which equals the reality.

¹¹⁴ "The political game is determined by the majority political force that can defend or reject the measures of positive discrimination. If this political party of increased electoral support is postulated in favour of promoting women's incorporation into the parliamentary elite, the renewal of the members are usually higher"

¹¹⁵ "The concern about women's full citizenship is still on Zapatero's mind. The victory in the 2008 general elections resulted in the recuperation of old plans to reform abortion legislation in Spain. If the announced bill successfully goes through the parliamentary process, Spanish women will be given abortion rights in line with those granted in most Central and Northern European countries. Zapatero maintained the politics of presence by appointing in 2008 female ministers for the defence and economy portfolios. A (female) minister of equality was also appointed". In 2014, the Partido Popular, holding an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament, tried to modify the Abortion Law, erasing any advancement in terms of decision capacity of the Spanish Women in anything relating to the abortion. Finally, the Law remained unchanged and the Ministry of Justice, Mr. Ruiz-Gallardón has to resign.

Graph 84. Trend of the number of women getting a portfolio



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

With such estimation, displayed in Graph number 84, we could consider that the social evolution has driven the parties to the same achievement in terms of *effective equality* than the result of accomplishing with the mandate of the Law.

We define *effective equality* when it is something that can be measured in terms of distribution of power and representativeness. When paying attention to the gender of the elected candidates, it is actually the result of a mathematical calculation without any qualitative evaluation.

This could mean that in terms of gender, the parties apply two different rules, one to accomplish with the percentages and list structure as described in the Law, and another one for the distribution of responsibilities among their candidates, where the women suffer some discrimination.

To conclude, if the parties can play with different rules depending on their needs, and on the stakeholders' requests, this means, at the same time listening to the society, accomplishing the mandate of the Law and also attending the candidates' demands, it seems that there is a need of some more regulation in order to align all the interests, as well as reaching an effective gender equality.

We will compare the Spanish Act regulation with the recommendations of the study "Gender Equality in Elected Office: A Six-Step Action Plan" (Norris & Krook, 2011),", baseline for the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook on Measures to Promote Women's Participation in Political Parties, which concludes that the following steps are necessary for a proper practice of the gender equality:

- Constitutional reform
 - The Spanish Constitution of 1978 proclaims, in article 14, that "the Spaniards are equal in front of the Law, regardless race, ethnicity, gender, religion..."
 - In 2013 only France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Serbia had Constitutional quota rules, while any other Country, including Spain, has the quota in the electoral law. Only Ireland has a penalty in the public funding of the parties if the quotas are not met.

- Electoral, campaign finance, and party laws to regulate the nomination, campaigning and election process.
 - Only some parties are running under voluntary party quotas.
- Legal gender quotas
 - This is the main domain of the Equality Act, in anything related to the politics
- Party selection rules and nomination procedures
 - There is no regulation about the selection and nomination procedures, which are constrained by the Equality Act
- Capacity development (as mentoring)¹¹⁶
 - There is no legal framework for the capacitation of women, which would promote more interest in the participation in politics, as it could be performed in the primary and secondary school within the area of knowledge dedicated to improve the citizenry skills.
- And at last, if the above is insufficient to get more women candidates into office, there should be some actions to encourage gender-sensitive rules and procedures in elected bodies
 - Currently, there is no social activity relating this type of actions, since the parties and the activists are only paying attention to the elected candidates, but not to the office acquired by the candidates.

If the above steps are required for practicing the gender equality, we must pay attention to the informal practices sustaining women's subordination, listed and described by Verge and de la Fuente, which are the actual practices blocking the effective equality (Verge & de la Fuente, 2014, p. 72):

- Gendered rituals performed by men in party meetings, as
 - Participating regardless of not having substantive points to make
 - Referencing previous contributions of male participants
- Women carry the "burden of doubt"
 - Women are frequently qualified as tokens, whereas men's competency is not challenged
- Gendered informal sanctions are often imposed upon women who show political ambitions or assertiveness
 - Women who access high-level positions are also sometimes dishonoured with rumours about sexual favours to their male selector
- Women's agency is hindered by a myriad of informal networks, that circumvent formal decision-making bodies
 - Party structures are very masculine in the sense that decision-making very frequently takes place outside the formal channels –in bars, restaurants...-
- Time a scarce resource for women
 - Supply side factors limit women's time availability due, specially, to the unequal distribution of housework


¹¹⁶ Good examples can be seen in www.iknowpolitics.org (International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics)

- Late-hour meetings and the time when informal networking usually takes place are considered to sustain male power

In next graph, number 85, it is visible a positive evolution of the number of women getting a seat, with a change in the trend in 2011

In fact, this change has to do with the change in the parties getting most of the votes, because the PSC, the former winner, had always more women in their lists and power positions than CIU

Graph 85. Percentage of Women/Men in local governments




Source: Author's elaboration on own database

This is explained in the following graph, number 86, where the percentage of women is splitted per party, and the historical difference between PSC and CIU becomes an evidence.

To notice the low percentages in the PP, but also in the IND/OTH parties or lists, which certainly must accomplish the Law, but the truth is that reaching a low percentage of votes, so few Councillors, the ones getting a seat in the government are the ones in the first positions of the electoral lists, mainly men. In other words, the evidences and trends are only valid for PSC and CIU, the ones having enough number of Councillors to make the results statistically valuable.

Graph 86. Percentage of women in government. Only Mayors and Deputy Mayors.



Source: Author's elaboration on own database


Nevertheless, we can observe that there is a general trend, increasing the number of women occupying the higher political positions in the City Councils, and that the leftist parties are the ones with higher rates, as stated by Lilliefeldt: *“Leftism had a profound impact on West European parties becoming gender balanced¹¹⁷ in the late 1980s. The analysis shows that when the social structures did not provide sufficient support, small –or medium- sized leftist parties with localized candidate selection were, with the help of the closed party lists, themselves able to reach more balanced proportions of men and women in parliament”* (Lilliefeldt, 2010, p. 206)

The difference between PSC and CIU structure is also reproduced in the Congress of the Deputies, between PSOE and CIU (Valiente, et al., 2003, p. 186)

But if we just pay attention only to the candidates covering the position of Mayor or anyone of the Deputy Mayors, the percentages are rather lower for women, not reaching the 40%, but continuously growing, in a clear trend that seems to be independent from the legislation. Graph number 87 shows the evolution of the male (M) and female (F) candidates for such positions in government.

The maximum percentage is, certainly, 20 points below the target. When the Deputy Mayors are included in the records, the 34% is reached within the two last electoral periods.

Graph 87. Percentage of women in government. Only Mayors and three first DM's



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In the next pages some graphs will make visible that there is a direct connection between gender and party colour, which is stronger than any other variable such as the Province, the size of the municipality or the morphology of the government.

Starting the analysis of Graphs number 1 until 12 of the next page, the profile of the curves in the first columns is similar to one province to another, and only the Province of Barcelona, graph number 1, has a faster growing trend than the others.

¹¹⁷ Considering that the proportion is balanced when the women reach the 33%

It is also the only one in the level of the 40% in 2007 and 2011, which can be explained by the level of votes to the left parties, mainly to the PSC in the cities within the Counties in the Barcelona city area. The less presence of the PSC, as in the Girona province, the less percentage of women with portfolio in the local governments.

It is in the second and third columns where, for each province, that it is visible the different behaviour of the two main parties, in the sense that in any province the PSC has a higher percentage of women in power than CIU, confirming the previous assumptions.

While CIU never reaches the 40%, in any of the Provinces, the PSC does in all of them, even in Lleida, graph number 11, which is the most rural of the Catalan Provinces. Each one of the graphs from number 5 to number 8 shows a lower percentage of women than the equivalent in the graphs from number 9 to 12, where each province can be compared, based on the elected candidates' party.

The difference between parties certifies their attitudes concerning the gender parity in government. Both parties have to present electoral lists according to specific legal requirements, which means a minimum of a 40% of the less represented gender, but once the portfolios are distributed, we notice that the percentages suffer a variation which is always negative for the women in the CIU's lists, but positive for the women in the PSC's lists. We must acknowledge that there is an overall different attitude, which is linked to the internal behaviour and traditions of the parties related to gender issues. The PSC has had official internal quotes from the year 2000, which means that the women in the lists will also be exigent when distributing portfolios, in terms of maintaining the ranking of the list in a direct relation to the importance of the portfolio and the representativeness of the charge, whereas for CIU is not a matter of discussion. Consequently, we could understand by looking at the graphs, that the CIU's women agree, or have to accept, the fact of losing power and representativeness when the positions and portfolios are being assigned.

We should remember that the records which are displayed in the graphs are giving us information not about the overall candidates, but only about the ones getting a portfolio or a responsibility, at political level, in the municipality.

In the next page, a similar group of graphs can be seen, from number 13 until number 20, but per number of inhabitants and number of parties in government. The main comment is related to the bottom left graph, the number 15, since the cities of more than 50.000 inhabitants are, generally, under government of the PSC and, again, the percentage of women is higher than in any other.


Nevertheless, all the graphs display a very high percentage of women in government, increasing as it increases the size of the town/city, showing that the PSC has a better support in the bigger cities. This means, that the Barcelona area is the only metropolitan area with the sociological and socio-economical profile to be compared with such areas in any other European County.

We can also notice that there is a huge difference before 2003, when the parity Act was created. Looking at the 1999 percentages, we move from a 10% in cities below the 10.000 inhabitants,


to a 20% in the cities from 10, to 20.000 inhabitants, almost a 25% for the towns between 20 and 50.000 inhabitants, and about a 30% for the bigger cities of more than 50.000 inhabitants.

When the mentioned Act dominated the creation of the electoral lists, in 2007, there is a clear increase, mainly in the smaller cities/towns. This is visible when comparing the graphs from the number 13 to the number 16, and the values in 1999 and 2007. For the towns/cities with less than 10,000 inhabitants, and the ones up to 20.000 inhabitants, we can notice an improvement of the percentual points for the women, which is smaller for the cities of more than 20.000 inhabitants.


When looking at the second column, to graphs from the number 17 to 20, the only comment can be relating graph number 20, since the coalitions with more than four parties are very rare, thus, the percentage of women in government very erratic.




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
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
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
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
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
19



16



20



The link between the number of women in government, as a second step of women in politics, and the party, or to be accurate, to the behaviour of the party about gender questions, probably following the pressure of the feminine party lobby, is also an outcome of the McElroy and Marsch¹¹⁸ (McElroy & Marsch, 2010, p. 831) work, in the sense that any other variable are not as relevant.

Testing a multivariate regression where the dependent variable is the percentage of women in government, and the independent ones are Municipality size, and gender of the Mayor, no valid relationship can be justified, so we can't confirm the Matland and Brown (Matland & Brown, 1992, p. 92) relation of the percentage of women and the district magnitude. The results are shown in table number 114.

Table 114. Multivariate regression to estimate the percentage of women in government

Independent variable	Correlation	R ²	Statistical significance
Mayor's Gender	0,00145485	-0,00095026	none
Municipality size	0,11816471	0,0139629	none

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

2.b.2) Gender and Representativeness

In the following electoral list, we can notice that within the first six candidates being on the list, there are three women, in positions 2, 4 and 6. In the column in the right side we have the responsibilities assigned to each one when the City Council was formed. The evidence is that two out of the three had a lower level of representativeness than the expected one attending to the ranking within the list.

Image 18. Single Party. Switching positions when distributing Representativeness

Municipi de Torelló

*25. PARTIT DELS SOCIALISTES DE CATALUNYA-
PROGRÉS MUNICIPAL*

1 MIQUEL FRANCH FERRÉS	MAYOR	
2 FLORA VILALTA SOSPEDRA	FDM	
3 PERE GALOBARDES MOLERA - Indep	2DM	
4 MARIA ÀNGELS CASALS FONT - Indep	Councillor	↓ ↑
5 JOSEP MARIA SOLER TABERNER - Indep	3DM	
6 MARIA DOLORS BARDOLET CASAS - Indep	Councillor	↓ ↑
7 ENRIC MIQUEL ZAMORA EXPÓSITO	4DM	
8 MARC FONTSERÉ CANDELL	Councillor	
9 FRANCESC XAVIER RIVERA GARCIA - Indep	Councillor	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database and BOP Barcelona Province. Electoral List of Torelló 2003

In the next tables, all them with number 115, we will see the comparison between the following parameters:

- Rank in the list of the forming party

¹¹⁸"It may be the case that increasing women's political representation will depend on whether political parties have a strategic incentive to promote women. Studies of candidates themselves suggest that women are far less likely to seek public office than men, they are less likely to think they are qualified to run, and they are less likely to be recruited"

- Rank in the list of any other party in coalition
- The level of representativeness according to the image number 16.

In the top line tables, the absolute figures are displayed, while on the bottom three tables the percentages are shown. The table on the bottom-left is showing the total percentages, without gender division, so this is the one to be used as reference, in order to notice the exceptionality of the others, with the main options inside a square.

We are going to comment the tables containing the percentages, which are giving a clear view on the trends when distributing representativeness after the elections, starting by the results obtained by the former party, and then by the other parties in coalition.

Number one of the former party, either man or woman, usually becomes the Mayor. This is represented by the overall 96,7%, which is confirmed by the 97,3% when filtering per gender and observing only the female results, and the 96,6% for men. It means that regardless the gender of the number one of a list, his/her aim is to become Mayor, and there is no further negotiation after the elections.

The person in the number two of a list, usually obtains the position of FDM, 2DM or 3DM in a percentage of 80,6%, When the number two is a man, in a 82,6% of the occasions receives the position of FDM, 2DM or 3DM, but when number two is a woman, the percentage tends to drop to the 73,5% of the observations. This is a relevant difference, since we can notice a certain level of bargaining after the elections. In fact, *strictu sensu*, any elected Councillor of the leading party, who occupied the second position in the list, should expect one of the three first DM's, depending only on the number of parties forming part of the government. Almost ten points of difference between women and men, in the race for the second most relevant position in a local government, which is not a minor difference, which is telling us about the level of gender inequality when distributing the representativeness.

The other options are more or less balanced, even though there is a special mention for the fifth of a list, since when is a woman, she will remain as Councillor in a 71,8% of the cases, versus a 47,2% when the fifth is a man. This difference, of more than 20 points, is also to be taken into account, since corresponds to men in the fifth position of a list, getting positions as DM in a much higher percentage than women in the same rank of the list.

However, if we focus on any other party in coalition, the gender differences are smaller, but still quite remarkable.

A lot of values can be seen as a positive percentage variation for women when comparing with the ones of men, but we actually must pay attention to the third of a list, which will have 58,3% of options to remain as Councillor, and to the fifth of the list, which implies having an 82,6% of possibilities to remain also as Councillor when the candidate is a woman.

In conclusion, there are still some negative differences according to the gender of the elected Councillor, always leaving women in less relevant positions that it could be expected, and trying to sum up, we can say that only the women in the first and second position in the electoral lists, succeed to be rewarded according to their rank, regardless of being member of the former or any other party in government.

Table 115. Relation between the ranking in the electoral list and the representativeness

TOTAL					Female					Male							
	Number in list	level of representativeness					Number in list	level of representativeness					Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4			1	2	3	4			1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	525	9	5	4	Leading Party	1	71	2			Leading Party	1	454	7	5	4
	2	8	428	40	55		2	3	86	14	14		2	5	342	26	41
	3	5	271	100	133		3		70	30	41		3	5	201	70	92
	4	2	134	142	216		4	1	24	50	83		4	1	110	92	133
	5		54	133	240		5		8	36	112		5		46	97	128
Other in coalition	1	1	537	135	127	Other in coalition	1	1	85	22	9	Other in coalition	1		452	113	118
	2		81	136	283		2		20	23	60		2		61	113	223
	3		18	48	211		3		3	13	76		3		15	35	135
	4		7	20	103		4		1	8	23		4		6	12	80
	5		2	17	58		5			4	19		5		2	13	39

TOTAL					Female					Male							
	Number in list	level of representativeness					Number in list	level of representativeness					Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4			1	2	3	4			1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	96,7%	1,7%	0,9%	0,7%	Leading Party	1	97,3%	2,7%	0,0%	0,0%	Leading Party	1	96,6%	1,5%	1,1%	0,9%
	2	1,5%	80,6%	7,5%	10,4%		2	2,6%	73,5%	12,0%	12,0%		2	1,2%	82,6%	6,3%	9,9%
	3	1,0%	53,2%	19,6%	26,1%		3	0,0%	49,6%	21,3%	29,1%		3	1,4%	54,6%	19,0%	25,0%
	4	0,4%	27,1%	28,7%	43,7%		4	0,6%	15,2%	31,6%	52,5%		4	0,3%	32,7%	27,4%	39,6%
	5	0,0%	12,6%	31,1%	56,2%		5	0,0%	5,1%	23,1%	71,8%		5	0,0%	17,0%	35,8%	47,2%
Other in coalition	1	0,1%	67,1%	16,9%	15,9%	Other in coalition	1	0,9%	72,6%	18,8%	7,7%	Other in coalition	1	0,0%	66,2%	16,5%	17,3%
	2	0,0%	16,2%	27,2%	56,6%		2	0,0%	19,4%	22,3%	58,3%		2	0,0%	15,4%	28,5%	56,2%
	3	0,0%	6,5%	17,3%	76,2%		3	0,0%	3,3%	14,1%	82,6%		3	0,0%	8,1%	18,9%	73,0%
	4	0,0%	5,4%	15,4%	79,2%		4	0,0%	3,1%	25,0%	71,9%		4	0,0%	6,1%	12,2%	81,6%
	5	0,0%	2,6%	22,1%	75,3%		5	0,0%	0,0%	17,4%	82,6%		5	0,0%	3,7%	24,1%	72,2%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It seems that the women are more resisting to be removed from positions when being members of the other parties of the coalitions, but also with worst results than men in equal conditions.

Is there any evolution since the publication of the Act for Equality? This will be answered thanks to the records displayed in table number 116. The table shows the same values but covering only the governments created after the elections of 2007 and the ones of 2011, only for women in government.

Table 116. Ranking within the electoral list and level of representativeness. 2007/2011

Female

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	35			
	2	1	50	11	5
	3		36	16	21
	4		12	29	43
	5		6	20	65
Other in coalition	1		45	3	5
	2		14	10	31
	3		2	7	45
	4		1	4	15
	5			3	11

Female

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	2	1,5%	74,6%	16,4%	7,5%
	3	0,0%	49,3%	21,9%	28,8%
	4	0,0%	14,3%	34,5%	51,2%
	5	0,0%	6,6%	22,0%	71,4%
Other in coalition	1	0,0%	84,9%	5,7%	9,4%
	2	0,0%	25,5%	18,2%	56,4%
	3	0,0%	3,7%	13,0%	83,3%
	4	0,0%	5,0%	20,0%	75,0%
	5	0,0%	0,0%	21,4%	78,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can remark some evidences, which are classified according to the relative position of each party within the coalition.

- Candidates of the main party:
 - Number one in the list. 100% kept the position of Mayor.
 - Number two. A minor improvement when receiving the level number 2, higher when receiving number 3, which means any other DM number.
 - Number three. All the figures are quite stable.
 - Number four. A minor improvement as Other DM, but compensated by a very small loss when the level 2 of representativeness is distributed.
 - Number five. No changes to be commented.

So, in general, we could say that the impact of the Equality Act, in terms of representativeness, was non relevant, and that the social trends are the ones defining the gender profiles of the City Councils.


- Candidates of the other parties in coalition:
 - Number one. 12 points of improvement when becoming 1DM, 2DM or 3DM
 - Number two. 6 points of improvement, also when becoming 1DM, 2DM or 3DM

- Number three. No relevant changes
- Number four. 5 points lost, swapping from becoming the correspondent level as DM to becoming Councillor
- Number five. Improvement, getting less Councillors

It means that the women in the coalition parties, but the forming one, have slightly improved their positions since 2007, mainly due to the best results when occupying number one and two of a list.

In the next graph, number 88, it is represented the percentage of women occupying each one of the levels of representativeness, which makes evident that the higher is the level, the lower is the percentage of women in such a position.


Graph 88. Percentage of women in each level of representativeness



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

As said before, the weighted average reaches the 40% in 2007 thanks to the evolution of the women occupying the position of Councillor reaching almost the 50%, with responsibility over a Department, while in 2011 all the values are quite close to the average. However, this is a general overview, which must be analysed separately, for single party government and for coalitional governments. The first one is displayed in Graph number 89.


Graph 89. Single Party. Percentage of women in each level of representativeness



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When there is no coalitional negotiation, the parties follow more strictly the ranking of the lists, and 2007/2011 showed the fact that, except for the Mayors, all the positions kept closer to the 40%, and the female gained the position of FDM, 2DM and 3DM, and as a consequence, they reached their better score in comparison to any other government type.

Graph 90. Coalition Government. Percentage of women in each level of representativeness



Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When there is a negotiation between different actors for sharing power, the women lose pre-eminence in relation to the position occupied in the list

We should investigate, more in detail, the impact on distribution of power in the situation of single party, from 1979 until 2011 compared to the years 2007 and 2011 after the Equality Act was signed.

We can notice the following evolution, displayed in the next page's tables number 117.

The position 1 in the list becomes, generally, the Mayor

Numbers 2, 3 and 4 to become FDM, 2DM and 3DM

Number 5 becomes also DM or Councillor, at it should be expected.

When comparing the overall results to the ones of 2007 and 2011, we can notice that there has taken place a relevant movement backwards of the percentages, in any position, for any party, when the government has been under the form of single party government.

The Women in the PSC are always having lower percentages as Councillor, representativeness level 4, than the ones in CIU, so we can say that the women in PSC use to get positions more in line with their rank in the list or, the other way around, that the positions in the list are more in line with the political capacities and expectations.

We can conclude that there hasn't been any relevant improvement of the female gender empowerment after the signature of the Equality Act in 2007, and in the special case of the single party governments the trend has gone in the opposite direction. Bäck already verified the lack of effective equality in the Swedish *Riksdag*, when comparing the time and issues of the speeches of the female MPs, where more than 50% of the members are women, but she remarks that *"our findings show gender matters in parliamentary debates: surprisingly, women speak less often than men, which contradicts the "Scandinavian effect" of high representation of woman in the political process. In addition, there is evidence that female MPs give fewer speeches in "harder" policy areas than male MPs"* (Bäck, et al., 2014, p. 514)

Table 117. Representativeness per ranking in the list and party

FEMALE Single Party Government

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	91,3%	4,3%	0,0%	4,3%
	2	0,0%	88,9%	4,2%	6,9%
	3	1,1%	78,3%	6,5%	14,1%
	4	0,0%	68,5%	9,0%	22,5%
	5	0,0%	18,6%	45,4%	36,1%

FEMALE Single Party Government 2007 and 2011

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	91,7%	8,3%	0,0%	0,0%
	2	0,0%	84,6%	7,7%	7,7%
	3	2,3%	69,8%	9,3%	18,6%
	4	0,0%	68,4%	10,5%	21,1%
	5	0,0%	17,4%	52,2%	30,4%

FEMALE PSC Single Party Government

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	2	0,0%	84,4%	4,4%	11,1%
	3	2,9%	82,9%	8,6%	5,7%
	4	0,0%	71,7%	10,9%	17,4%
	5	0,0%	23,9%	43,5%	32,6%

FEMALE PSC Single Party Government 2007 and 2011

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	2	0,0%	69,2%	15,4%	15,4%
	3	7,7%	69,2%	15,4%	7,7%
	4	0,0%	82,4%	5,9%	11,8%
	5	0,0%	31,3%	56,3%	12,5%

FEMALE CIU Single Party Government

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	71,4%	14,3%	0,0%	14,3%
	2	0,0%	95,7%	4,3%	0,0%
	3	0,0%	74,0%	4,0%	22,0%
	4	0,0%	64,3%	3,6%	32,1%
	5	0,0%	14,3%	54,8%	31,0%

FEMALE CIU Single Party Government 2007 and 2011

	Number in list	level of representativeness			
		1	2	3	4
Leading Party	1	80,0%	20,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	2	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	3	0,0%	69,2%	3,8%	26,9%
	4	0,0%	64,3%	7,1%	28,6%
	5	0,0%	11,1%	55,6%	33,3%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

We can explore some more tables in the same sense, aiming to clarify and confirm the previous conclusions. For such a purpose, we start with table number 118, analysing the percentage of women and men occupying the second, third and fourth position within their electoral lists, and how are they rewarded in terms of representativeness.

The bias between male and female is confirmed at the level of the third in a list, and the positions occupied compared to the gender of the candidate, 8 points difference when getting the position of FDM/3DM

Table 118. Gender and representativeness

	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	58,6%	26,6%	44,8%	39,4%	30,1%	60,6%
Men	60,2%	25,8%	52,8%	31,6%	37,7%	42,8%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

If the third in the list is a woman, she gets the position of FDM or 3DM in 44,8% of the observations, while of the third is a man, the same reward is reached in a 52,8% of the observations, thus the 8 points above commented, in such a relevant position.

When considering the candidate in rank four of a list, there is a difference of more than 18 points in behalf of the women when getting the lower level of representativeness, from a 42,8% of the men to a 60,6% of women, meaning that the overall distribution of the DM's has been biased in favour of male candidates.

In the following tables we can see some more graphs with the same design, classified according to the different Parties, Provinces and per government type.

The two first ones have to do with the parties' internal behaviour, in the sense that the figures are not comparing one party to the average, but within their own candidates. That is to say that the PSC is definitively the party with a higher percentage of women in their lists, and the direct consequence is that it is also the party with more women getting a portfolio, but what is the level of respect of the positions in the list when assigning representativeness of the two main parties?

Table 119. CIU. Gender and representativeness

CIU

	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	72,1%	11,8%	55,5%	31,8%	38,1%	54,6%
Men	71,4%	18,1%	58,5%	25,3%	39,4%	42,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Starting with the CIU lists, in table number 119, we can notice that the three analysed cases are in balance when considering the percentages according to the candidate's gender. The second in a list, regardless his/her gender, receives one of the three first DM titles, in a similar

percentage of 71/72%. The third in a list is also receiving one of the three first DM charges in a similar percentage in the range of 55/58%. Finally, the fourth will become 4DM or higher also in a very equilibrated relation of 38/39%. We can conclude that the CIU leaders show a high level of respect for the positions occupied by women in the electoral lists when assigning representativeness.

Table 120. PSC: Gender and representativeness

	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	70,7%	18,6%	52,2%	27,6%	28,7%	59,6%
Men	79,9%	11,7%	59,6%	24,0%	39,9%	39,5%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In table 120 we can observe the same parameters for the PSC. In each one of the positions analysed there is a huge difference between the level of representativeness of the men and the one of the women. For the second of a list there is a difference of 9 percentage points against the women, 7 points for the third in a list, and 11 for the fourth in a list.

What we can notice when comparing the results in tables 119 and 120, is that CIU, which has less women in their lists, keeps better the ranking when distributing representativeness than the PSC. This means that the lack of balance in the overall gender distribution of the representativeness is made out of two main components. One of them is the low percentage of women in the CIU’s lists, and the other is the lack of commitment of the PSC leaders with the women in their lists. Should we think about the possibility that the quotas, of any kind, force the parties to enrol in their lists women that don’t want to obtain office?

Candidate selection has been recognized as the door for women having the option to gain office. However, once they have been able to participate, there are some other constraints for women, as the institutionalism, in the sense that the characteristics of the institutions becomes one of the main factors influencing the parties when selecting the candidates (Krook, 2010, p. 717).

Table 121. Single Party Government. Gender and representativeness

	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	89,2%	6,8%	78,3%	14,1%	45,4%	36,1%
Men	93,5%	3,8%	87,1%	7,3%	44,5%	28,9%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

In table 121, we pay attention to the gender relation within the Single party governments, regardless the parties, and we can also see the higher percentages compared to any other table. Certainly, there is a bias in behalf of the male candidates, Nevertheless, we could assess that in situation of single party government is when the possibilities of obtaining the representativeness level is more in line with the position in the electoral lists.

Table 122. Coalition Government. Gender and representativeness

	Any Coalition					
	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	48,4%	33,2%	31,9%	49,2%	22,0%	73,6%
Men	49,8%	32,7%	38,7%	41,6%	33,3%	52,1%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The above comments can be confirmed when looking at table number 122, related to any kind of coalition government, where there is a clear step backwards for any position and gender.

When the coalition is oversized, table number 123, which means that at least three parties are in the government, the thirds and fourths of the list pay the price of distributing representativeness in a balanced way between the members of the coalition, but it seems that this political price is much more expensive for the women, since the gender difference for the thirds in the lists is of 20 points, the more scandalous of the analysed tables.

Table 123. Oversized Coalition. Gender and representativeness

	Oversized Coalition					
	Second in a list becoming		Third in a list becoming		Fourth in a list becoming	
	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	1DM or 3DM	Councilor	4DM or higher	Councilor
Women	42,5%	38,8%	23,8%	54,0%	25,0%	69,2%
Men	50,5%	38,8%	43,5%	41,5%	32,3%	49,5%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It is obvious that in a coalition of three parties, the number one of the main party will become the Mayor, the number one of another party will become FDM, and so on, so the second of each one of the coalesced lists will have several difficulties for having a representativeness level within the main ones.

In the next table, number 124, the evidence is also in the same sense: for a second in a list, in a coalition, which expected position would be FDM, 2DM or 3DM, this use to happen for men, but in a lower extent to women.

Table 124. Gender and Representativeness for the second within a list

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year								TOTAL	
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007		2011
Female	2	1						2		1		3
		2	1	2	9	10	14	27	21	46	41	171
		3		1	1	2	2	4	7	16	7	40
		4	1	1	2	4	7	8	18	18	20	79
Male	2	1	1					1	1	2		5
		2	36	41	78	73	76	84	96	81	80	645
		3	16	14	16	13	4	14	19	30	20	146
		4	31	20	18	14	38	29	47	36	41	274
TOTAL			86	79	124	116	141	169	209	230	209	1363

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

It is when looking at the percentages of assignment for the expected level of power (1 or 2), table 125, that the differences and the yearly distribution seems to be too erratic, so it is worth to split per members of the Mayor’s party or the others parties in coalition, and also splitting Single party from any kind of coalition government

Table 125. Gender and Representativeness. Percentages

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2	50,0%	50,0%	75,0%	62,5%	60,9%	70,7%	45,7%	58,0%	60,3%	59,4%
		3 and 4	50,0%	50,0%	25,0%	37,5%	39,1%	29,3%	54,3%	42,0%	39,7%	40,6%
Male	2	1 and 2	44,0%	54,7%	69,6%	73,0%	64,4%	66,4%	59,5%	55,7%	56,7%	60,7%
		3 and 4	56,0%	45,3%	30,4%	27,0%	35,6%	33,6%	40,5%	44,3%	43,3%	39,3%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

The totals are quite balanced, so, as we already have said, there is need of drilling down, in order to understand how, in terms of gender, the representativeness is distributed.

We are going to start by isolating the records when the candidate belongs to the party of the Mayor, regardless any other filter. In table number 126 we can appreciate that there are 6,5 points of difference, which means that more men than women succeed in gaining the representativeness according to their position in the electoral list, which is a number two.

Table 126. Gender and Representativeness. Mayor’s party

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2		100,0%	81,8%	83,3%	92,9%	86,2%	75,0%	72,3%	84,8%	81,0%
		3 and 4		0,0%	18,2%	16,7%	7,1%	13,8%	25,0%	27,7%	15,2%	19,0%
Male	2	1 and 2	71,1%	81,6%	88,0%	88,8%	86,9%	89,7%	96,6%	91,1%	82,1%	87,5%
		3 and 4	28,9%	18,4%	12,0%	11,3%	13,1%	10,3%	3,4%	8,9%	17,9%	12,5%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

Table number 127 shows the percentages when the candidate belongs to any other list different to the Mayor’s one. The percentages between male and female are quite similar, displaying worst figures when comparing with the candidates of the previous table.

Table 127. Gender and Representativeness. Non Mayor’s party

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2	33,3%	50,0%	100,0%	25,0%	33,3%	50,0%	33,3%	58,3%	18,2%	41,1%
		3 and 4	66,7%	50,0%	0,0%	75,0%	66,7%	50,0%	66,7%	41,7%	81,8%	58,9%
Male	2	1 and 2	46,9%	39,3%	43,3%	45,5%	18,9%	39,0%	38,7%	52,1%	47,4%	42,2%
		3 and 4	53,1%	60,7%	56,7%	54,5%	81,1%	61,0%	61,3%	47,9%	52,6%	57,8%

Source: Author’s elaboration on own database

The next table, number 128, isolates the Single Party Governments. While the male candidates succeed in a 93,4% of the observations to keep the correspondent representativeness, for the

female there is still a lot to be done, and there are two main topics to be tackled. The first one the loss of representativeness when taking into consideration the position occupied in the electoral list. It is not a legal requirement that the second in a list should receive a certain level of power and/or representativeness, but it is a proposal from the parties to the voters, in the sense that the second within a list, is not a mere name, this is to say that it should be a known person, attracting votes. As far as this value proposal is forgotten when the DM's are distributed, we should consider that the parties are not keeping their promises. The second topic is the low number of women occupying the second position in a list, which can be derived from the erratic evolution of the percentages.

Table 128. Gender and Representativeness. Single Party Government

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2	100,0%	66,7%	87,5%	100,0%	100,0%	81,8%	66,7%	100,0%	10,0%	72,0%
		3 and 4	0,0%	33,3%	12,5%	0,0%	0,0%	18,2%	33,3%	0,0%	90,0%	
Male	2	1 and 2	100,0%	85,7%	93,8%	94,0%	91,2%	94,3%	100,0%	100,0%	88,9%	93,4%
		3 and 4	0,0%	14,3%	6,3%	6,0%	8,8%	5,7%	0,0%	0,0%	11,1%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Knowing the percentages when the government corresponds to a single party, we must analyse the coalitional results. Table number 129 covers the results in case of any kind of coalition government. Once again, the percentages are quite balanced for both genders.

Table 129. Gender and Representativeness. Coalition Government

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2	50,0%	0,0%	77,8%	37,5%	35,7%	57,1%	34,3%	56,5%	49,1%	49,5%
		3 and 4	50,0%	100,0%	22,2%	62,5%	64,3%	42,9%	65,7%	43,5%	50,9%	
Male	2	1 and 2	43,4%	47,5%	51,6%	52,0%	53,6%	55,9%	52,9%	49,6%	45,7%	50,3%
		3 and 4	56,6%	52,5%	48,4%	48,0%	46,4%	44,1%	47,1%	50,4%	54,3%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When just looking to the candidates of the Mayor's party in a coalition government, there is a bias on behalf of the male, which tend to receive more often than female the position of Mayor, FDM, 2DM or 3DM, as displayed in table number 130.

Table 130. Gender and Representativeness. Coalition Government. Mayor's Party

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2			87,5%	75,0%	80,0%	75,0%	70,6%	75,0%	77,4%	76,1%
		3 and 4			12,5%	25,0%	20,0%	25,0%	29,4%	25,0%	22,6%	
Male	2	1 and 2	70,3%	80,0%	80,0%	80,0%	84,0%	86,5%	95,5%	88,5%	77,1%	83,8%
		3 and 4	29,7%	20,0%	20,0%	20,0%	16,0%	13,5%	4,5%	11,5%	22,9%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

The last one of this set of tables, number 131, refers to the candidates not belonging to the party of the Mayor, in a Coalition Government. This is the only situation in which female advance male in the total figures, which has to do with the low number of women occupying such a position.

Table 131. Gender and Representativeness. Coalition Government. Non Mayor's Party

Gender	Position in List	Level of Represent.	Year									TOTAL
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Female	2	1 and 2	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	11,1%	33,3%	0,0%	36,4%	9,1%	19,4%
		3 and 4	50,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	88,9%	66,7%	100,0%	63,6%	90,9%	80,6%
Male	2	1 and 2	21,7%	3,8%	17,2%	10,0%	8,8%	17,1%	14,9%	15,7%	19,3%	15,4%
		3 and 4	78,3%	96,2%	82,8%	90,0%	91,2%	82,9%	85,1%	84,3%	80,7%	84,6%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Having a look again to table 92, in order to have its, we will compare it to the gender distribution of the same parameters.

	Mayor	1/2/3 DM	Other DM	Councillor
Mayor or Economy Portfolio	33,9%	6,8%	5,4%	2,6%
6 Main Portfolios		9,1%	8,8%	8,6%
Other Portfolios		6,0%	7,9%	10,9%

We will start with table 132, which refers to the distribution when the elected candidate is a woman. Under such condition, the position of Mayor is clearly retained, in a 50,7% of the occasions, as well as the portfolio of Economy, but any other level of power is kept at a lower extent.

Table 132. Quantitative relation between power and representativeness - Female

Female				
	Mayor	1/2/3 DM	Other DM	Councillor
Mayor or Economy Portfolio	50,7%	6,2%	3,8%	2,7%
6 Main Portfolios		6,8%	6,7%	6,0%
Other Portfolios		3,8%	5,5%	7,7%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When the candidate is a man, as it can be seen in table 133, the figures are much more balanced, since the number of men tends to be higher than the number of women, in such a way that the figures are in line with the totals.

Table 133. Quantitative relation between power and representativeness - Male

Male				
	Mayor	1/2/3 DM	Other DM	Councillor
Mayor or Economy Portfolio	30,2%	6,7%	5,8%	2,7%
6 Main Portfolios		9,7%	9,1%	9,2%
Other Portfolios		6,5%	8,5%	11,7%

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Putting emphasis on whether the female Councillor belongs to the same party than the Mayor, or to any other party in coalition, the reward seems to be better when forming part of the Mayor's list. The representativeness acquired is always higher, and it can be specially seen at the level of the number 2 and 3 within a list, in the table number 134.

On the left hand side, there is a table showing the number of women, being members of the Mayor's party. In the second column we can read the position occupied in the electoral list. Only the first five positions have been taken into consideration for this analysis. The third column contains level of Representativeness acquired in the government, as Mayor, Deputy Mayor or Councillor without representativeness. Finally, in each row it has been displayed the number of women occupying such a position per year.

For any position within the list, there is a very high number of women becoming Councillors. When the position in the list is the number two, we should expect the candidate to become FDM of any single party government formed, or 2DM if there is a coalition of two parties, and so on. Even though it is beyond our understanding that a Councillor without representation is the reward for a candidate being in the second position in an electoral list. It is still worse for the women in the third position within the list, but it is definitively non acceptable for the women in the fourth and fifth position that mostly become Councillors.

When looking at table number 134, on the right hand side, the same structure is repeated, for the women in a list different to the one of the Mayor, which gives for confirmed that this only happens when a coalition exists. With the exception of the women occupying the first position in the list, becoming FDM or 2DM, as it should be expected in a coalition of two or three parties, many become 3DM or higher, but still some become Councillors. For the rest of the cases, becoming Councillor seems to be the rule.

When a woman is the second of a list, the majority of them become Councillors. Being the second of a list, despite the party or the level of the administration, means a level of commitment that makes difficult for us to understand the lack of rewards in terms of representativeness. We cannot forget that the lists are blocked, and the electors vote to a list. Certainly, not all the candidates will be known by the majority of the electors, but we reject to believe that only the first one, that is to say, the candidate to become the Mayor, is known by the electors. Thus, the women occupying the second position in a list are part of the value proposal made by the party to their voters. How can they immediately remove any representativeness to such a candidate?

Table number 135 seems to be much more logical. We talk about men in politics. When comparing both tables, looking only at the percentage of elected candidates receiving a Representativeness with level four, it means remaining as a regular Councillor, what we can notice is that for candidates of the Mayor's party, when a woman occupied the position 2, 3 and 4 of the list, she became Councillor in a higher percentage than the men in the same positions, in percentages 3 points higher for position 2, 5 points higher for position number 3, 10 points higher when occupying position 4, and 20 points higher when the position in the list was the fifth.

Table 134. Distribution of representativeness for female candidates

Councillors belonging to the Mayor's Party

Gender	Position in List	Represent.	Year										TOTAL	%
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015		
Female	1	1	5	4	1	3	5	11	17	21	25	92	95,8%	
		2		1		1						3	3,1%	
		4							1			1	1,0%	
	2	1						2		1		3	1,6%	
		2		2	9	10	13	23	21	33	39	150	79,4%	
		3				1		2	1	8	5	17	9,0%	
	3	1			2	1	1	2	6	5	2	19	10,1%	
		2			4	9	11	15	18	19	26	40	142	60,9%
		3	2					6	8	11	9	36	15,5%	
	4	1									1	1	0,4%	
		2		1								1	0,4%	
		3	1	2	6	9	7	11	11	14	24	85	34,4%	
	5	1				2	1	6	15	19	14	58	23,5%	
		2	3	4	3	4	12	12	14	25	26	103	41,7%	
		3		1		4	3	2	2	5	9	26	10,3%	
4	1		1	1	3	5	6	5	15	25	19	80	31,6%	
	2			5	6	6	15	19	17	40	39	147	58,1%	
	3													

Councillors NOT belonging to the Mayor's Party

Gender	Position in List	Represent.	Year										TOTAL	%	
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015			
Female	1	1									1			1	0,9%
		2	1	2		2	5	6	6	18	22	23	85	72,6%	
		3		1	1		1	5	11	1	2	22	18,8%		
	2	1			1	1	1				2	3	9	7,7%	
		2	1				1	4		13	2	21	20,2%		
		3		1	1	1	2	2	6	8	2	23	22,1%		
	3	1	1	1		3	6	6	12	13	18	60	57,7%		
		2	1							2		3	3,3%		
		3						1	5	1	6	13	14,1%		
	4	1	5		1	3	5	3	14	25	20	76	82,6%		
		2								1		1	3,1%		
		3	1			1		1	1	2	2	8	25,0%		
	5	1	3					1	4	12	3	23	71,9%		
		2								1	3	4	17,4%		
		3			1	1	2	1	3	6	5	19	82,6%		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Table 135. Distribution of representativeness for male candidates

Councillors belonging to the Mayor's Party

Gender	Position in List	Represent.	Year										TOTAL	%
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011			
Male	1	1	39	47	93	88	94	104	99	97	106	767	97,6%	
		2	1					1	1	4		7	0,9%	
		3	2		1			1		1		5	0,6%	
		4	1		1		2	1		1	1	7	0,9%	
	2	1	1					1	1	2		5	0,7%	
		2	26	40	73	71	73	77	85	70	69	584	86,8%	
		3	3	4	8	5		5	1	3	4	33	4,9%	
		4	8	5	2	4	11	4	2	4	11	51	7,6%	
	3	1			2					1	3	6	1,0%	
		2	18	31	50	52	57	63	50	38	42	401	67,1%	
		3	3	4	12	4	10	9	14	12	14	82	13,7%	
		4	10	8	12	14	11	13	14	14	13	109	18,2%	
	4	1									1	1	0,2%	
		2	9	23	48	33	39	42	33	24	27	278	48,9%	
		3	5	5	7	14	17	15	14	17	16	110	19,3%	
		4	18	13	23	17	22	25	24	18	20	180	31,6%	
5	2	6	7	20	16	5	13	18	9	10	104	21,4%		
	3	6	14	24	28	33	31	24	15	18	193	39,6%		
	4	11	15	22	16	24	33	30	15	24	190	39,0%		

Councillors NOT belonging to the Mayor's Party


Gender	Position in List	Represent.	Year										TOTAL	%
			1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011			
Male	1	2	40	19	36	32	49	61	73	80	63	453	66,2%	
		3	11	29	10	5	7	14	14	13	10	113	16,5%	
		4	24	11	19	8	14	9	8	14	11	118	17,3%	
	2	2	10	1	5	2	3	7	11	11	11	61	15,4%	
		3	13	10	8	8	4	9	18	27	16	113	28,5%	
		4	23	15	16	10	27	25	45	32	30	223	56,2%	
	3	2	3	2	1	2	3		1	3		15	8,1%	
		3	7	6		3	1	5	5	4	4	35	18,9%	
		4	20	11	14	7	10	15	19	22	17	135	73,0%	
	4	2	1				1	2		1	1	6	6,1%	
		3	2		2	1	3		1	2	1	12	12,2%	
		4	17	10	8	4	6	4	11	8	12	80	81,6%	
	5	2				1				1		2	3,7%	
		3	1	5	1		1	2		2	1	13	24,1%	
		4	12	2	5	2	1	3	5	5	4	39	72,2%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

2.b.3) Gender and Power

When exploring the records registered with the answers given to the enquiry about the importance of the departments, but putting an emphasis to the gender of the respondents, we can elaborate the following graph, to detect whether there are any gender related preferences, or not.

Graph 91. Male/female preferences in terms of importance of the departments




Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

Some differences can be seen on how the preferences are sorted out, based on the Councillor's gender.

In that sense, Economy, Urban planning, Governance and Education, from the list of the top seven, show a different perception, the two first become much more important for men, whereas the other two are much more important for women.

Graph 92. Relative importance of the Departments per gender of the Councillor



Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

We propose the above graph, since we think that it is much easier to understand. We must bear in mind that the women answering the enquiry were a 39,5% of the total, so any responsibility were the women represent less than 39,5% is unbalanced, in the sense that the women are under-represented, or over-represented when the blue columns show values higher than the 60,5%.

As a matter of fact, in Urban Planning, Economic Promotion, Territory Services, Communication and Security¹¹⁹, the women are under-represented.

To be noticed that no one single woman has Sports or Culture as a choice.

No one single man took Society of Knowledge, Organization or Urban Housing as the main preference.


As a direct consequence, the ranking has some differences directly linked to the gender of the Councillor responding to the enquiry.

For the men, the importance starts with Economy, followed by Urban Planning, Economic Promotion, Social Services, Public Works and Maintenance, and the next ones in a lower range,

While for the women the order is Economy, Social Services, Governance, Education, Public Works and Maintenance, Economic Promotion and so on.

It means that Economy is a clear principal preference, and Social Services, Economy Promotion, Public Works and Maintenance are also important, but with different levels of intensity.

Graph 93. Male and Female ranking of importance of the Departments



Source: Author's elaboration on own survey

Once the preferences are known, we can check how do the reality looks like.

Since 1983, women occupy more than the 30% of the positions, displayed in orange colour in the next table, in Education and Social Services, in the last years also Communication and

¹¹⁹ [JJanes] explained the difficulties in managing the Local Police, until the portfolio of security was hold by a woman, which changed the management style. For him this was a gender related style.

Economic Promotion, so 4 areas out of the 10 top relevant, and getting the majority in two of them; Social Services and Education, in red colour in the table.

Table 136. Male/Female distribution of the Departments

	1979		1983		1987		1991		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
01-Economy	2	51	2	57	6	70	4	76	4	94	13	95	27	104	36	108	36	120
02-Urban Planning	2	48	3	49		80	1	69	3	82	16	83	17	104	27	103	28	100
03-Social Services	5	54	14	55	29	72	41	58	64	73	91	89	127	115	179	83	177	83
04-Economic Promotion	2	37	4	38	4	64	7	60	19	68	29	118	46	108	52	105	58	113
05-Public Works and Maintenance		53		40	1	52	1	60	6	73	5	84	17	74	24	83	16	70
06-Governance	3	32	2	32	3	35	1	25	4	27	5	35	7	26	10	29	12	22
07-Education	9	25	11	25	19	35	25	20	18	35	35	39	36	31	51	22	38	31
08-Territory Services		8	1	8	1	14	2	9	4	7	6	21	6	23	8	23	6	23
09-Security		1		6		12		14	1	16	3	19	3	30	10	27	4	25
10-Communication		2		5	1	3	3	11	1	11	11	9	10	11	13	10	8	9
TOTAL	23	311	37	315	64	437	85	402	124	486	214	592	296	626	410	593	383	596
% of Women	6,9%		10,5%		12,8%		17,5%		20,3%		26,6%		32,1%		40,9%		39,1%	

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

When looking at the figures from 2003 until 2011, in percentages in the next table, we can notice that within the ten more important departments, the percentage of women reaches the target of the 40% as a whole.

In each one of the Departments there is an increase or, at least, there is no one single decrease of women's participation. Women are clearly leading the Social Services and Education Departments, so two out of the four Departments considered to be the most important by women. The other two, Governance and Economy follow different paths.

The Department of Governance has been assigned to an increasing number of women, reaching the 35,3% in 2011, quite near to the target of the 40%.

This is not the case for Economy, which tends to be the preference number one for women and men, and has a stable participation of women in the range between the 20 and the 25%, and it seems to be kidnapped by the male politicians.

Table 137. Male/Female distribution of the Departments in percentages

	2003			2007			2011		
	F	M	%	F	M	%	F	M	%
01-Economy	27	104	20,6%	36	108	25,0%	36	120	23,1%
02-Urban Planning	17	104	14,0%	27	103	20,8%	28	100	21,9%
03-Social Services	127	115	52,5%	179	83	68,3%	177	83	68,1%
04-Economic Promotion	46	108	29,9%	52	105	33,1%	58	113	33,9%
05-Public Works and Maintenance	17	74	18,7%	24	83	22,4%	16	70	18,6%
06-Governance	7	26	21,2%	10	29	25,6%	12	22	35,3%
07-Education	36	31	53,7%	51	22	69,9%	38	31	55,1%
08-Territory Services	6	23	20,7%	8	23	25,8%	6	23	20,7%
09-Security	3	30	9,1%	10	27	27,0%	4	25	13,8%
10-Communication	10	11	47,6%	13	10	56,5%	8	9	47,1%
TOTAL	296	626		410	593		383	596	
% of Women	32,1%			40,9%			39,1%		

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Women are generally leading two departments, the Social Services and the Education, and at the same time they seem to be climbing positions in Economic Promotion, Governance and

Communication. In any other department women are under-represented; therefore there is no positive evolution in terms of gender quality.

There was a definite list of 7 top preferred Departments for women, which belongs to the top common 10, for which we can assess their evolution along the years, as displayed in table number 138, where for each portfolio we can see the current percentage of women occupying such a department, the evolution within the years under study, and some comments about the gender trend for each one of them.

Table 138. Evolution respecting gender of the seven more important departments

Portfolio	Current % of women	Evolution	Comments
Economy	23,1%	Flat	Trend as male Department
Social Services	68,1%	Flat	No issue
Governance	35,3%	Positive trend	No issue
Education	55,1%	Flat	No issue
Public Works and Maintenance	18,6%	Flat	Trend as male Department
Economic Promotion	33,9%	Slow Growth	No issue
Urban Planning	21,9%	Slow Growth	Trend as male Department

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

Certainly, the Departments with the lower percentages of women carrying out the responsibility, are the ones maintaining the bias on behalf of men.

2.c) What is given to whom?

- For becoming Councillor of Economy you should be a man, the second in a list of CIU
- For becoming Councillor of Social Services you should be a woman, the sixth in a list of the PSC.

If we calculate a multivariate regression, with the portfolio as independent variable, and the gender, party and position in the list as dependent variables, according to the following values:

- Portfolio: 1 = Economy, 2= Urban Planning and so on until the 21
- Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2
- Party: From the one with less votes (PP = 1) to the main one (CIU = 5)
- Order: The position of the candidate within the list

In table number 139 we can see the values for the β constants, which give us an idea of the impact of each one of the variables.

Table 139. Multivariate regression to predict the Portfolio

		<i>Coefficients</i>
	β_0	6,271871531
Gender	β_1	0,14970349
Party	β_2	-0,57029023
Order	β_3	0,366347087

Source: Author's elaboration on own database

In that sense, if the goal is having a result as small as possible, because the lower the result is, the better is the portfolio received as reward, we have to understand what is the effect of each one of the constants.

The β_0 is the intercept, the only value which will not apply to a variable. Since this value is 6,27, the only way to approximate to the value of 1 is by having negative values as the result of the other members of the equation.

The β_1 is the factor for Gender. As far as a male gets the value 1, and a female the value 2, it is obvious that for a female is much more difficult to have a small value at the end of the calculations.

The next factor, β_2 is the one to multiply the figure which represents the party, but this is a negative value, meaning that the higher the value of the variable, the smaller the result (PSC = 4, CIU = 5)

And last, the β_3 , will multiply the number which represents the position of the candidate within the list. The higher the number is, the more difficulties for having a small number as the result of the calculation.

We can summarize that the best portfolio will be received by a man of the party receiving most of the votes, and occupying the upper positions within the electoral list, as it could be expected applying common sense. We cannot forget that the creation of a list and the deciding which position is going to be occupied by each one of the candidates, is in the hands of the party leaders.

V- Summary and conclusions

By trying to reach some conclusions, we are going to comment the outputs of the study, and we will give the possible answers to the research hypothesis, as well as commenting what we consider as a lost opportunity in relation to the Law 27/2013, which was expected to reform the local administration after almost 28 years under the rule of the Law 7/1985.

1- Local governments, the art of bargaining.

We should be able not only to determine how things were in the past, and what was the meaning and consequences of certain coalitional decisions, but also to develop some rational in order to help the voters to foresee and to understand how their vote to their preferred political option can result in supporting other options or parties which are ideologically far from their way of understanding life. A political coalition is the result of a volunteer bargaining process. In any negotiation, reaching an agreement requires that each one of the participants accepts to renounce to a part of their goals but, in any case, getting some payoffs which make the agreement better than staying out of the coalition. For the negotiators any negotiation step is known, as well as the constraints, but the voters are usually only informed by the parties about the final agreement, highlighting the level of fulfilment of their electoral manifestos. The voters can think that the rewards were not enough, or that it would be better not to participate in the coalition. By knowing and understanding the negotiation parameters, we expect to facilitate the comprehension of the results.

David Butler said "*Single party government is the British norm*", and it is still true, since the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition remains as the exception to the norm (Butler, 1978, p. 112), but since 2010, when the Coalition Government was created, a lot of research has been performed enriching the debate about the coalitions from many points of view.

When looking at the Spanish Parliament, since the restoration of the democracy after the death of the dictator in 1975, the governments in Madrid has always been under the form of single party government, in majority or minority, but never forming a stable coalition, so there is no experience or literature about it.

At subnational level in Spain, we must consider the Autonomous Communities, with their regional governments, and the Municipalities. When paying attention to the Government of Catalonia, there is a variety of experiences, but basically under two specific formulations. When the government has been ruled by CIU (Convergència i Unió), we must bear in mind that this is an electoral coalition formed by two parties, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*. The coalition was formed in 1978, and governed the *Generalitat de Catalunya* continuously from 1980 until 2003, and from 2010 until the current days.

From 2003 until 2010, there was a Governmental Coalition made out of three parties, the PSC (the Socialist Party of Catalonia), ICV (post-communist and currently eco-socialists) and ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia, supporting the independence of Catalonia).

While the above Parliaments show a very limited range and number of coalitions, the local world has plenty of coalition agreements which make possible not only a qualitative study, but also a quantitative one, being this one the main difference between all of them. In the local politics, within the years and region under study, coalition is the norm.

2- Fieldwork and methodological approach

In order to be able to answer the research hypothesis, we had to create a database containing the required fields, since such an information was not available in digital format. We had to retrieve the records from several primary sources, hosted or managed by different entities, without a common profile or archiving criteria, which made this task of high difficulty and time consuming. The goal was to complete a data base about 131 Catalan municipalities, the ones with more than 10.000 inhabitants in 2008, or County Capitals regardless the number of inhabitants. For each one of the towns and cities, and for each one of the electoral contests for the local administration, so nine in total, the aim was to collect some information about each one of the Councillors getting a portfolio in the local government issued immediately after the elections. The information was, among other details, the full name of the candidate, the name of the party, the ranking of the candidate within the electoral list, gender, name of the town/city, County and Province, number of members of the City Council, number of parties in coalition, if any, and portfolio under her rule.

The universe, composed by 131 municipalities and 9 elections, should have information about 1.179 observations. After a long period of research, when the database already contained more than 180.000 records, the number of observations, meaning town/city and year, was of 1.052, which was a good sample, since it represented the 89,23% of the whole research universe. It contained a wide representation of Counties and towns/cities, allowing the researcher to perform analysis in the time axis or within a certain electoral period.

In the database there was a mix of quantitative and qualitative records, being the best example of the second ones the name of the portfolio hold by a Councillor within a certain period.

In order to be able to assign a value to each one of the portfolios, a survey was sent to a number of active politicians, members of the City Councils of the Municipalities participating in the research, asking them to create a ranking about the importance of the portfolios. With the result of the survey, having proven its statistical validity, we could transform the names into figures, allowing us to use the quantitative view when comparing the rewards obtained by the different parties and candidates when the local government was formed. There is no discussion about the position of the Mayor, which is assigned to the candidate occupying the first position of the most voted list, or the first position of one of the lists participating in a coalition, but the Mayor can delegate some or all of the portfolios in behalf of some Councillors. Knowing the relative value of each portfolio we could use it in the different chapters of the research in order to know the value of the payoffs.

As soon as some results were visible, in terms of morphology, the role of the Deputy Mayor, and gender, we started to interview some local politicians, showing them some of the graphs and tables, in order to receive their input, since we thought that their experience could add value to the figures obtained after an exercise of data-mining out of the records of the data base. We

selected some politicians which were active within the 2011-2015 mandate, but also in previous ones, most of them having played the role of Mayor in cities of a variety of sizes. We tried to add some extra value by selecting some local politicians of a city which showed a different behaviour in relation to the majority within the same County, in terms of sociological scheme of the population, and electoral decisions, but it was only useful to confirm the opposite, it means that the view on the society and their commitment with their citizens has no relation with other parameters than the wish of servicing.

In any case, the comments of the interviewed politicians was of great importance in order to drill down into the details of some decisions for creating a coalition, the relations between the parties, the coalesced ones, as well as the ones in the oppositions, and a number of confidences made about their difficulties for creating electoral lists in which they can trust, while guaranteeing the performance of the elected Councillors when they receive a portfolio in which they have to manage a certain budget, among others.

3- The morphology of local governments in Catalonia

We have been using the content of the database in order to create different pictures of the relations between parties from a variety of views, which should allow us to reach some conclusions if there are clear trends, from the observation of each one of the views or by mixing some of them.

We started creating some tables, in order to be able to visualize trends or exceptional facts concerning the number of parties participating in a coalition. The first evidence was that coalition has been the norm during the period under study. After each one of the electoral contests the number of coalitions of two or three parties has been bigger than the number of governments under the form of Single Party, with the only exceptions of 1987 and 1991, when the two main parties, PSC and CIU reached their best results, allowing them to govern without needing coalitional agreements. Another evidence, relating to the multilevel agreements, written or *de facto*, was that the coalitions of three parties were the most popular after the elections of 2003 and the ones of 2007, when a tripartite was governing the Generalitat of Catalonia, and the agreements between PSC, ICV and ERC were the most usual also at local level. Finally we noticed two different electoral strategies for converting votes into seats of the two main parties. From the one side, CIU's strategy is to be present in almost any one of the Catalan Municipalities, while from the other side the PSC is concentrating the effort in collecting a high number of votes in the main cities. The result is that the PSC receives much more votes than CIU, but thanks to a better conversion ratio of CIU, this is the party having the highest number of Councillors, so it has the highest possibilities of governing the towns and cities.

A second view was on the IND/OTH parties, meaning anyone different to the main five. Such parties or lists are, mainly, driven by local issues. From the tables created for analysing such a characteristic we could conclude that, with the exception of the 1979's elections, there is a stable number of such kind of lists, and that the increase of the last three contests was due to the appraisal of new parties with a political projection beyond the local elections. If we leave the mentioned options aside, we can confirm that the number of local IND/OTH lists is stable, and that there is no difference at Province level in terms of stability, but the Province of Tarragona is showing a permanent higher percentage Councillors of such options participating in the local

government, being 21,3% their average, that must be compared to the 10,6% of Barcelona, the 12,8% of Girona or the 15,4% of Lleida. We couldn't go beyond the quantitative evidence which is not allowing us to understand the reasons for such a relevant specificity.

Some new tables and graphs allowed us to drill down within the different coalition types in terms of majority or in minority, allowing us to conclude that the coalitions collecting the majority of the seats is the norm, and also that the parties prefer any kind of government type, as far as someone is holding a clear leadership, so preferring the unbalanced coalitions, in majority or minority and the oversized ones. Insisting about the multilevel agreements, the highest number of oversized coalitions appeared in 2003 and in 2007, mainly government coalitions led by the PSC, while there was a tripartite government in the Generalitat of Catalonia with the same structure in terms of participating parties.

The next view was on the connections between coalesced parties. We must bear in mind that in Catalonia we must always pay attention to the ideological axis, but also to the national one, which can explain that a conservative party as CIU can be connected to a leftist party as ERC, and a coalition between both is considered as acceptable by most of the voters of both parties, thanks to the connection related to the national axis. We concluded that the most usual coalition both axes connected has been the one between the PSC and ICV, and also that within the years of the tripartite governing in Generalitat of Catalonia the national connection was lost in behalf of the ideological one, since CIU, the conservative catalanist party remained out of most of the governmental coalitions. We have confirmed that not all the mathematically possible coalitions are feasible, since the ideological or national distance is a constraint, and that the connections in one of the axes is usually required, since it is explaining at least the 80% of all the governmental coalitions created within the research period, with the only exception of the ones between ERC and the PSC, and the ones between CIU, ERC and the PSC, accounting all together for a 10%, so still a 70% of the coalitions show any kind of connection.

A new set of tables and graphs supported the sentence saying that the big fish eats the small one. In Catalonia there has been a scenario in which two parties have been playing the role of main parties, present in most of the City Councils and getting most of the Mayors, and some other parties and lists participating in the local governments only when being partners in a coalitional government. Generally speaking, after a Minimum Winning Coalition, or after an Oversized Coalition, the party representing the minority of the seats in the government has more possibilities of remaining out of the government formed after the new elections than the one in majority. The only explanation for the willingness of a party of participating as minority in a coalitional government even though such an evident trend, is the sentence of an interviewed councillor, in the sense that being in the opposition is still worst in terms of executing policies and knowledge of decisions of the majoritarian party.

For understanding the cooperation patterns we had to create a new layout for making the results understandable, *at a glance*, in terms of positive relationship between parties – cooperation-, or negative – competition -, because we discovered that the creation of a coalition is not always a long term agreement that can be expected to survive the mandate. In the previous chapter we learned that in the next elections the small parties supporting a coalition are, most of the times, awarded with some seats in the opposition. With the new graphs we

learned that participating in the next government or staying in the opposition has to do with the coalition relationship between parties, in terms of portfolio distribution. The best example of a cooperative pattern is the one between the PSC as main party and ICV as the small one. The competitive pattern is exemplified with CIU and ERC. When the two first ones are in coalition, ICV, the small one, has usually been receiving the portfolios more relevant for executing their electoral promises, while when the last ones are in coalition, the small one, ERC, don't use to receive his preferred portfolios. The outcome of such a relationship can be measured in terms of receiving portfolios in the government issued after the next elections when the main party maintained the position of Mayor. There is no doubt, after the analysis of the records, that a cooperative relationship is much more rewarding for the small party than a competitive one.

The last one, to finalize the review of the different morphological aspects of the coalitions in the Catalan local governments, we paid attention to the longevity of the parties in each one of the studied municipalities, and we could verify a certain degree of stability, in the sense that in the 63,6% of the observations, the same party has been holding the position of Mayor, at least, in a 66,6% of the mandates. It is interesting to know that in 18,2% of the observations, the Mayor has always been of the same party, and also in a 18,2% of the observations, they only lost one mandate.

We can recap the above evidences, by saying that within the local governments in Catalonia, the coalition has been the norm. When the parties had to go for coalition, they preferred the ones in which a party could exercise a strong leadership, being the connection between parties one of the main drivers for understanding why some parties decide to coalesce, and having in mind that the consequences for the minor party are worse than the ones for the main one in terms of success within the next elections, especially if the portfolio distribution is based in competition rather than cooperation.

Once the previous information was sorted out, we noticed that there was some information missing, in order to perform the analysis about the main items, the Deputy Mayor and the Gender evolution in local politics. Certainly, we needed to be able to assign a value to the portfolios, which was the only attribute that we could consider as a payback after a coalition negotiation, according to the available information, but also we needed this value when comparing the portfolios handled by women and men, in order to be able to analyse if there was a gender bias or not. There are two approaches to the gender equality, in the sense that one of the genders can get the less appreciated portfolios, or in the sense that some of the portfolios are usually assigned to Councillors of the same gender. Typically Social Services mainly assigned to women, but it is equally valued by men and women?

Thanks to the enquiry sent to the active Councillors, the results show that there is a portfolio generally considered and the main one, which is Economy, and six other portfolios with a certain level of relevance, being Urban Planning, Social Services, Economic Promotion, Public Works and Maintenance, Governance and Educations. Any other got a lower level of importance.

The Mayor and the Councillor responsible for Economy received the classification number 1, while the Councillors having the responsibility of one of the six next portfolios received the number 2, and any other Councillor receiving any other of the portfolios received the number 3.

This was all about the ranking of the Power concept, since being the leader of a certain role was allowing you to deploy a certain policy.

The concept Representativeness also needed to be defined, and quantified. Looking at the usual number of Deputy Mayors, and the statistical assignment of Portfolios, so power, we considered four levels. The number 1, the highest level of representativeness of a Municipality, is for the Mayor. The second level is for the three first Deputy Mayors, since they exist in almost any Municipality, and because there is a direct relation between them and the main levels of Power.

The number 3 goes to any other Deputy Mayor, since this is role is a choice of the Mayor, and there is a difference in terms of Power in front of any other Councillor. For the Councillor holding a portfolio, so still with a certain level of representativeness we created the rank number 4.

Once both attributes were defined and valuated, we had the opportunity of understanding the quality of the paybacks from a coalitional negotiation, and the level of equality between genders, not in terms of participating, but in terms of being rewarded for participating.

4- So, who got what?

With all the previous inputs in mind, we started to drill down the different views over the role of the Deputy Mayor, with two main conclusions. On the one hand, this is a role used as part of the payoffs of a coalition agreement, confirmed by the figures, but also by the interviewed politicians, in the sense that the three first deputy mayors receive better portfolios than any other. On the other hand, the higher salary of a Deputy Mayor compared to the one of the regular Councillors, cannot be explained by a higher level of responsibility, or any other objective variable, so it also refers to the payoffs to the coalescing parties and also to the members of the list of the Mayor, expecting to have a relevant role and visibility among the others.

We have verified that in case of coalition, the position of Mayor is always for the main party, while the Deputy Mayors are distributed among all the members of the coalition. The legal role of the Deputy Mayor is to replace the Mayor in any case of absence, and it should be assigned according to the numbering, in the sense that the Second Deputy Mayor would never replace the Mayor if the First one is present. What we have noticed is that the Mayor usually distributes his representation, probably with the aim of satisfying all the enrolled Deputy Mayors, but this is causing some tensions, since the First Deputy Mayor, which is usually the head of the list of the second main party, expects always to have the opportunity of increasing her visibility.

We have also identified the portfolios usually assigned to the Deputy Mayors, and noticed that the Power goes hand in hand with the Representativeness, thus, becoming a certain Deputy Mayor usually guarantees a certain portfolio, among the most important ones.

When the Mayor, the legal holder of any responsibility, distributes the so called delegations, entitling some of the Councillors with the delegate responsibility over one or more portfolios, he/she is usually also delegating the responsibility over certain areas of government, which are grouping a number of portfolios having a certain relation between them. A Deputy Mayor in the United States or in United Kingdom would hold only the responsibility of one area of government, while in Spain they use to get both, the one over an area (generic delegation) and the one over one or more portfolios of the same area (specific delegation). The generic

delegation is used to explain the higher salary of a Deputy Mayor, but knowing the level of work load and time consuming of each one of the portfolios, it is quite impossible to execute, at the same time, the control and management over a whole area of government.

Finally, we have analysed the evolution in terms of quantity of the Deputy Mayors, noticing a continuous inflation, which stopped in 2011.

When asking to the Mayors (a non-professional role) about the number of Deputy Mayors of their Municipalities, the answer was always the same, indicating that the Secretary (a professional civil servant) of the Municipality told them that any member of the Local Government Committee must be a Deputy Mayor, and that the Government Committee must be composed by one third of the elected Councillors. The truth is that one third is the maximum number of members of such a Committee, so the inflation in the number of Deputy Mayors has to do with the increase of the population, which implied an increase of the number of Councillors, driving to Government Committees with more members, and finally more Deputy Mayors, making the life easier for the Mayor when willing to satisfy the requirements of the parties in coalition and the ones of the members of their own list when claiming for payoffs.

For the first time, after the elections of 2011, there was a reduction in the number of Municipalities having fourth and further Deputy Mayors, being stable the number of Municipalities having First, Second and Third Deputy Mayor, almost 100% of the total.

Gender has been the last subject of research, which has shown that there is a relevant difference between accomplishment of the Parity Law (or Equality Act) and the effective equality in terms of power and representativeness, since we had the opportunity of analysing and calculating it, based on the actual portfolios assigned to each elected woman.

The percentage of women participating in the local governments since 1979, has gone in parallel to the percentage of women joining the labour market. Anyway, in March of 2007, two months before the local elections, the Equality Act was passed. The main impact related to the participation of women in politics was the configuration of the electoral lists, in the sense that for each five positions in the list, only three should be occupied by the most represented gender, which only gives two options; two men and three women, or the opposite. When paying attention to the results of the elections, showing the number of elected women, certainly the 40% was reached, but our analysis aimed to go beyond the participation rates, checking if there was equality also in the assignment of Power and Representativeness, thus, we were only working with records referred to the elected women participating in government.

The first evidence was when looking at the four levels of Representativeness, and noticing that women reached a maximum of 20% of the positions of Mayor, a 37% of the three first Deputy Mayors, some 42% of any other Deputy Mayor, and almost a 48% of the Councillors holding a portfolio. The average was about the 40%, but obviously not equally distributed.

When splitting the above figures per each one of the main parties, it was evident that the women being members of the PSC scored always higher than the women of CIU, in any year and for any level of representativeness. We considered that this fact could be explained by the existence of party quotas in the PSC since 1982, while such a concept was never applied by CIU.

Drilling down the concept of Representativeness, we noticed that when distributing it, the ranking of the electoral lists was not always respected when considering the gender of the elected Councillor, resulting that women had less Representativeness than the one that we could expect only paying attention to the ranking within the electoral lists.

With the only exception of the position of Mayor, which corresponds always to the number one of the main party, regardless the gender of the candidate, for any other of the representativeness level, especially for the one referred to the three first Deputy Mayors, women tend to be underrepresented in 10 points in relation to the average.

The same exercise was made at party level, for the two main ones, getting results contradictory with the previous assumptions which only attended the number of women getting a seat, which we considered explained by the party quotas. What we tested were the internal swaps or Representativeness in relation to the ranking within the list, for each one of the two parties, and for each one of the candidates in the second, third and fourth position within an electoral list. The evidence, after such an analysis was that CIU, having less elected women in their lists tend to respect the ranking of the list when assigning Representativeness, much better than the PSC.

We also verified that the relation between Power and Representativeness is weaker when analysing women, than when doing it for the elected men, but there is still a direct relation between both variables.

The last analysis was about the distribution of Power in relation to gender. We noticed that, in general, there are not main gender differences when considering the importance of the portfolios, but certainly there are portfolios usually managed by one of the genders. The best examples are economy, the main one for both genders but dominated by male Councillors, and Social Services, fourth in importance for men and second for women, but almost always in hands of female Councillors.

5- And what about our research hypothesis?

We wanted to know if behavioural patterns existed when the political parties went into coalition, and we focused in the Catalan Municipalities, since it gave us the opportunity of dealing with a high number of observations, and a variety of coalitional agreements between parties covering all the ideological and national spectrum.

The first impact of having some specific hypothesis was to avoid dispersing the focus, which was a continuous temptation due to the abundance of outcomes.

Concerning the patterns, two main issues raised, the first one about the existence of them, and the second one about their profile, in the sense that we wanted to know whether some parties were coalescing for sharing the immediate payoffs and also the future rewards in terms of seats in the next government, or whether some other parties were coalescing for unblocking an issue related to the creation a MWC government, getting the immediate payoffs, but competing for the seats in the next government.

Taking into consideration the mentioned options, we thought that the hypothesis should be written declaring the possible structure of the positive definition, in the sense that any party

expects to be able to receive the main portfolios according to their electoral manifesto, and this will only be possible in coalition when the parties go into the coalition negotiation with the aim of cooperating.

H1: The portfolio distribution between parties in coalition reflects the priorities of the parties, only when it is based in cooperation patterns

We can confirm the hypothesis as it was formulated, since we can summarize that the coalition agreements represent the interests of the coalesced parties in terms of visibility, office-seeking or policy-driven goals within the four years term of the electoral mandate, but this is not modifying the relationship between the parties in the long term scope, meaning that the cooperation or competition strategy of the main party will have a certain impact in the payoffs out of the coalition agreement. We have verified that only in case of a cooperation pattern, the small party receives portfolios which will make possible to deploy important policies included in their electoral manifesto, thus, increasing their visibility and producing positive results in the next elections.

Once the main hypothesis was laid down, two other ones were added, covering unexplored areas of study, as it is the role of the Deputy Mayor and the effect of the parity quotas within the electoral lists of some parties.

H2: The Deputy Mayor is a role used by the leading party as a payback for the coalition concessions made by the small ones

We can confirm the second hypothesis, thanks to the results of the quantitative analysis, but also to the comments of the interviewed politicians and the responses to the survey sent by email. We demonstrated that there is a direct relation between Representativeness and Power. Since the Deputy Mayor is the main position within a City Council, after the one of the Mayor, this is the highest level of Representativeness that a Mayor can use for negotiating the payoffs, taking into consideration that it will correspond to a high level of Power, or vice-versa, among other benefits in terms of visibility and salary. When governing in coalition, the three first Deputy Mayors belong to the first candidates of the coalescing lists.

H3: Gender party quotes don't guarantee equality in portfolio distribution

We proved that party quotas promote the participation of women in the electoral lists, but it is not guaranteed that the parties will distribute Power accordingly to the order how the list was structured. We noticed a gender bias, negative for the female candidates when considering their position in an electoral list and the importance of the assigned portfolios. Only when the female candidate is the number one of the list of the main party, she will become Mayor, but in any other position she will not receive the equivalent portfolio. We performed further analysis confirming that women use to manage a limited number of portfolios, the number three in importance, Social Services, the number seven, Education, and the number ten, Communication. If any other out of the ten most important are usually leaded by men, corresponding to the 70%, and the participation of women in the lists is in the range of the 40% the unbalance is mathematically evident. 40% of the candidates receive the 30% of the portfolios. Is we look at

the six main portfolios, the level of power number two, the evidence is that the 40% of the elected Councillors, female, receive the 16,6% of the main portfolios.

6- Some lessons learned...

Thanks to the work performed for getting quantitative results, but especially to the one for getting the qualitative ones, we can confirm that the local politics is the world of the citizens aiming to serve their neighbours, but they have to deal with two main constraining factors, which are the party politics and their own amateurism.

While the voters will be voting to lists rather than to candidates, the power of the parties or the leader/s of a local list will be a constraint for the candidates. If they are members of a traditional party, any multilevel agreement will affect their freedom to choice according to the specific needs of her town/city, since the party will dominate the constructions of the lists, which could be based in meritocracy instead of the capabilities of the candidates. Some agreements made at local level, as a consequence of a multilevel agreement can't be understood by the local voters, resulting in the indifference of some citizens for anything related to the local politics. The concept of *voting discipline* required by the parties to their members, limits the autonomy of the local candidates when confronted to a decision taken from the upper levels of their political organizations.

The phenomena of the local lists, independent from any other political structure, makes the difference with any other electoral arena. The problem is repeated in the sense of the power of the leader in constructing the list. This kind of lists are usually very volatile, meaning that the leaders tend to create new lists as soon as there are differences between the leading members. We could consider most of them as single issue lists, losing their capacity of action as soon as the issue doesn't exist anymore.

The amateurism of the candidates is a problem as soon as they are elected, because they must rely in the capacity and willingness of collaboration of the civil servants, most of the times placed in their position by previous Mayors. Within the local administration there is a lot of complicity and hidden relations between part of the civil servants and the members of the previous governments, which makes sometimes very difficult to concentrate the politicians in applying their policies. One of the interviewed Mayors had to rely in a Secretary, the city lawyer, which was married to the former Mayor, leader of the opposition at that time. No further comments are needed.

There is a second issue concerning the amateurism. In each one of the Municipalities there is a budgetary controller, the so called *Interventor*, officially entitled by the State, so supposed to be independent from the local power. He/she will continuously inform the politicians holding a portfolio about the economic and legal constraints of certain expenditures, which must be included in the yearly budget of the Municipality. The problem is that huge budgets are placed in hands of amateur politicians not knowing the constraints of the administration, specifically the ones of the local administrations for managing expenditures and investments, which sometimes have resulted in over-expenditures and over-investments bearing only in mind the next elections, and the difficulties of being assertive.

This was all about the people and their tools, but if we consider gender, and we expect to reach an equalitarian society, it is not by creating Laws that we will succeed. Currently, female is the less represented gender within the local government, but we consider that willingness of participating has more impact than any Law. We must consider the steps proposed in the study “Gender Equality in Elected Office: A Six-Step Action Plan” (Norris & Krook, 2011), in order to create the social and legal environment for an effective participation, since we already demonstrated that the Equality Act only resulted in a quantitative equality in participation.

Having learnt about the economic difficulties of the municipalities, which are conditioning the deployment of the policies of the elected governments, having also investigated the lack of clarity in anything related to the distribution of responsibilities within the members of the City Council, with special emphasis in the role of the Deputy Mayor and finally, concluding the lack of effective gender equality, we would support that it is time to debate about some new regulation tending to update the Law 7/1985, which has been ruling for 30 years, while the society has been continuously evolving. Unfortunately, the Law 27/2013 has mainly limited the debate to the budgetary balance.

The 27th of September of 2011, thanks to the fast agreement between the two main parties, PP and PSOE, the Spanish Constitution was reformed, specifically the article 135, in order to guarantee the budgetary stability of the public administration in anyone of its levels. A constitutional modification has impact within the whole legislative body, and the regulation of the local administrations was not excluded. Certainly, the Law 27/2013 is an update of the 7/1985, but only for anything having to do with the budgetary stability and centralization, figuring out that centralization is equivalent to economic savings.

Having in mind the results of this study and the comments made by the politicians, the interviewed ones, and the ones responding to the specific survey, there is plenty of room for improvement in the Law regulating the local administration, in terms of defining responsibilities, clarifying the role of the Deputy Mayors, providing more up-to-date organizations, separating the economy from the politics, in order to avoid the risk of amateurs managing huge budgets, establishing financial and nonfinancial key performance indicators to improve the level of transparency of the local politicians and the local public servants, defining local administration as the single contact point for the citizens when needing to be in contact with any level of the administration, creating the environment for an on-line administration, and managing the change of culture. Instead of all this, only the financial stability was in the scope of the new Law, and that’s why we consider it as a lost opportunity.

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ANNEX

ANNEX I. The parties in contest

The big five in Catalonia + the Other's lists







Table 140. Description of the five main political parties in the local contests

Acronym (and colours used for graphs)	Party	Logotype (2012)	History and Facts	Grouping acronyms	Website
CIU	Convergència i Unió		Coalition born the 19 th of September 1978. Agreement between Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Liberal center-right) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (Christian-democrats). Jordi Pujol President of the Generalitat de Catalunya in 1980-1984, 1984-1988, 1988-1992, 1992-1995, 1995-1999 and 1999-2003	CIU	www.ciu.cat
PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya		Created the 16 th of July 1978, after the merger of three socialists parties, one of them the catalan federation of the PSOE. Pasqual Maragall President of the Generalitat de Catalunya 2003-2006, and José Montilla 2006-2010	PSOE PSC-PSOE PSC PSC-PM PM	www.socialistes.cat
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya		Founded the 17 th of March 1931, merging three nationalist organizations. Presidents of the Generalitat de Catalunya: Francesc Macià, 1931-1933; Lluís Companys, 1934-1940; Josep Irla, 1940-1954; Josep Tarradellas, 1954-1980	ERC ERC-AM AM ACORD	www.esquerra.cat
ICV	Iniciativa per Catalunya - Verds		The 23 rd of February 1987 was presented, created by the merger of the ENE, PCC and PSUC. From 1979 till 2012, from Communist Party via euro-communism, to become eco-socialists	PSUC IC ICV ICV-EPM ENTESA	www.iniciativa.cat
PP	Partido Popular		Alianza Popular, created the 9 th of October 1976 by francoist ministers, in 1989 changed the name to Partido Popular.	AP PP PPC	www.ppcatalunya.com
OTH/IND	Other		Any other out of the big five, including UCD, CC, C's, PxC, CUP, SI, Eb, UPyD		

Source: Author's elaboration based on the websites of the parties


The newcomers

Table 141. Description of the new parties participating in 2007 and 2011

Acronym	Party	Logotype (2012)	History and Facts	Website
PxC	Plataforma per Catalunya		In the group of the Personal Parties, led by Josep Anglada since its foundation in 2001, PxC is basically a racist party with radical proposals about immigration, security and family policies, with an extreme nationalist point of view.	http://www.pxcatalunya.com/
CUP	Candidatures d'Unitat Popular		Independentist and social program covering a wide range of matters, working in local assemblies via direct democracy. The origins are in the 1979's elections, because some social groups were disappointed with the political proposals of the established parties. Reached 3 seats in the Catalan Parliament in the 2012 elections	http://cup.cat/
C's	Ciudadanos – Partido de la Ciudadanía		In 2005 a group of Catalan professionals and intellectuals issued a manifesto against the existing political parties and their distance to the "real problems" of the citizens. A second manifesto was proclaimed in 2006, for freedom and equality, laicism, and a bilingual society (Spanish and Catalan) and pro Constitution.	http://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/
SI	Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència		Born in 2010, with the Independence of Catalonia as its main political goal, as a federation of parties, reached its maximum success in 2010, with 3 deputies in the Parliament of Catalonia, lost in 2012.	http://www.solidaritatcatalana.cat/
Eb	Escons en blanc		Since 2008 this option is available in any election, willing to represent the ones unsatisfied with the existing system of parties. Their goal is to force the modification of the electoral law recognizing the existence of citizens aiming to be represented by empty seats in any Parliament	http://esconsenblanc.org/
UPyD	Unión Progreso y Democracia		Another personal party. Since 2007, when Rosa Díez resigned from the PSOE, she created this option in the Basque Country, expanded later on to all the Spanish regions. 5 Deputies in the Spanish Parliament since 2011, it is active in matters related to unionism, and supporting one language for the whole Spain.	http://www.upyd.es/

Source: Author's elaboration based on the websites of the parties

ANNEX II. The Analysis of the Electoral Manifestos

	Generic Document	
	Barcelona City	

Generic Document

- Document title: Think positively
- Document subtitle: Catalonia: towns and cities with a unique country project
- 124 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- To know that things can always be done better
 - 2- To believe in the country and its opportunities
 - 3- To work hard every single day
 - 4- To trust people
 - 5- To believe that the civil society is the booster for progress, social cohesion and identity
 - 6- To love the land
 - 7- To look at the future positively
 - 8- 10.000 people serving the country
 - 9- To have a strong political force, united, to serve everybody
 - 10- To know that our country will rise with the help of every town and city
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

All along the history of Catalonia, the catalanism has been the propeller of change, evolution and modernity. The defence of the identity of the catalan nation and the self-government while, at the same time, we have reached the highest levels of economic progress as well as social and cultural.

The Municipalities constitute the backbone of our country, empowering our project. The towns and cities must become the engine of the economic recovery of our country.

As far as the world is continuously changing, the catalanism must also change, for assuring a leadership for a strong Catalonia, in order to face the threat of the current situation which is destroying work places, thus, reducing the financial capacities of the municipalities.

Barcelona city document

- Document title: The change in positive
- Document subtitle: None
- 408 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction. The city of the people
 - 2- To listen and to regenerate Barcelona
 - 3- Quality of life
 - 4- Economic and social progress
 - 5- The neighbourhoods (pages 287 till 408)

- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

The current economic downturn is being worst form one day to the other. There is a crisis in the construction sector, a financial one, economic and social, but also in the public administration due to the reductions of the income.

Any action must be deployed under the framework of a new political culture, with imagination, managing priorities, open minds, and a good public service.

Old pattern will not be useful to face the new challenges. We need new attitudes and new priorities, not only on the short but also for the long term.

Barcelona is not only a way of being, but also a way of doing. For such a city there is need of a City Council not only busy with the daily activities, but one facilitating the souls of the city, making her bright, not forgetting their people.

We must recover the trust between the municipal administration and the citizens, usually too distant¹²⁰. There is need of democratic regeneration, with more transparency and dignity in the management of the city

¹²⁰ The Municipality of Barcelona was ruled by the Socialist Party, continuously since 1979

	Generic Document	
	Barcelona City	

Generic Document

- Document title: Commitment with people, commitment with the City Councils
- Document subtitle: The Challenges of a new period.
- 87 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- The challenges of a new milestone.
 - 2- Strong local governments: more competencies and better finances.
 - 3- Values to transform the society.
 - 4- Municipal action for progress in a prosperous, cohesive and sustainable Catalonia.
 - 5- A better government for a more complex society.
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

Within the seven years of our party in the Government of the Generalitat of Catalonia, we have been improving the Municipal services, as well as investing in new infrastructures and public equipment, which means working hand by hand with the Municipalities, in order to face the Country's challenges.

Currently, the Government of Catalonia has no Municipal conscience¹²¹, and within a quite different economic environment, the challenges are quite new and without any kind of precedents.

We consider three main activities for the coming years. The first one will be to offer quality in public services, in order to avoid any social divide, paying special attention to the effects of the economic downturn. The second will be to innovate and to create the right environment to promote economies based on sustainability, based in knowledge, linked to the territory,

¹²¹ At that time the government of the Generalitat of Catalonia was in hands of CIU

avoiding the speculation of the financial capital, while fighting against the unemployment. The third, and last one, to govern with democratic authority, with a powerful leadership, in order to generate trust, credibility and commitment, showing responsibility, proximity, efficiency and transparency in government, far from the populism and demagoguery.

There are three main challenges. The first one is to maintain, in front of the citizens, our condition of the party that can guarantee the transformation of our municipalities, the second one to confirm our decision of being a party focussed on the municipal government, and third to renew the socialist offer, transforming our organization, and winning the battle against disaffection

It is of main importance to protect the welfare and the rights, rather than following the fake debate relating to the relations between Catalonia and Spain, promoted by the right wing Catalan parties.

Since 1979 we have been fighting for the social inclusion and cohesion, promoting policies for the economic development, because we know that changing the environment of the citizens is the best way for transforming the society.

Barcelona city document

- Document title: All for Barcelona
- Document subtitle: Barcelona, a collective project
- 67 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction. Barcelona, a collective project
 - 2- Barcelona, a project of future
 - 3- Barcelona, the economic motor in the South of Europe
 - 4- Barcelona, a city for educations and creativity
 - 5- Barcelona, the city of people, a city with cohesion
 - 6- Coexistence in a secure and tidy public space
 - 7- New centrality and connectivity for the urban transformation of Barcelona
 - 8- Barcelona, commitment and responsibility for the environment
 - 9- The neighbourhoods and the Metropolitan area, the two faces of the same Barcelona
 - 10- Barcelona, European and Mediterranean capital
 - 11- Governance with rigor and equity, the quality and the efficiency
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

Barcelona city as a reference of dynamism and prosperity at an international level, with the participation and complicity of the citizens. That is to say that it has been the result of a constructing and evolving leadership performed by the socialists (The PSC was the party of the Mayor from 1979 until 2011). Barcelona, the greatest value that Catalonia has within the World. It is time for making up our minds and choosing between being a city which stands for everybody's interests, a project of solidarity, or live its future in the hands of those who have

never defended their city, basically because they want to use it with some different interests to those of the citizens.

	Generic Document	
	Barcelona City	

Generic Document

- Document title: Elections 2011
- Document subtitle: Framework program
- 76 pages
- Chapters:

- 1- Introduction
- 2- Local Promotion
- 3- Civic Space
- 4- Social cohesion
- 5- Citizenship
- 6- JERC. The ERC's youth Program
 - a. Introduction
 - b. Work
 - c. Training
 - d. Housing
 - e. Youth's health
 - f. Mobility
 - g. Participation
 - h. Gender policies
 - i. New citizens
 - j. Culture

- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

This document pivots around the local promotion, the social cohesion, the civic space and the citizenship, and it uses the experience and accumulated knowledge of the number of Mayors

and Councillors of the party, to be applied for improving our cities and towns from the national and leftist point of view.

We are having very difficult times for the Municipalities and for the citizens, thus, the electoral campaign must be focussed in two main matters, the economy and the investments in social welfare. The municipalities must make use of the proximity to accompany the neighbours, which are suffering difficulties, and to support their initiatives.

Transparency is a must for our party.



Barcelona city document

- Document title: Barcelona Portabella (name of the candidate)
- Document subtitle: Barcelona, a city of justice and freedom
- 144 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction.
 - 2- A city capital of a State
 - 3- A prosperous city
 - 4- A republican city
 - 5- A city for the youth
 - 6- A city for the neighbourhoods
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

To create 50.000 new jobs in Barcelona city, within the next four years. Barcelona to become the capital of the next State of Europe. Improve infrastructures like the airport, the port and the Mediterranean railroad path, as well as the trains of proximity.

Relating the welfare of the citizens, commitment to work in social cohesion, economic stability, public housing, quality of the health services and surveillance of the quality of the public transport.

Finally, in relation with the public administration, transparency, proximity and participation of the citizens, as the direct election of the District Councillors.

	Generic Document	
	Barcelona City	

Generic Document

- Document title: Recognition amongst the general public
- Document subtitle: Left Wing, Ecology, freedom
- 181 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction. Manifesto
 - 2- Cities and towns for the social rights and cohesion
 - 3- Cities and towns for a new ecologic economy, bringing new jobs
 - 4- Cities and towns for the democratic quality, the diversity and “convivència”
 - 5- Sustainable development, and policies for the small towns and rural areas
 - 6- Youth in cities and towns
 - 7- Gender policies: towns and cities 50/50
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

The City Councils received with a deep intensity the social consequences of a crisis which is strongly affecting the labour workers and the middle classes.

In the name of the austerity policies, for resolving the deficit and the public administrations' debt, the Social Welfare is being reduced, which implies an increasing social unbalance and a major risk for social exclusion for the citizens.

The local governments must be the main protagonists and leaders of a social and ecologically sustainable way out to the crisis. The Municipalities must lead some policies for equality against social exclusion and poverty, and favouring social integration.

The cities must work for a new ecological economy which will be able to create occupation.

Citizens should not be treated as customers, and the Administration cannot become a provider of services, but they must be open to the social participation and dialog which are held my means of efficiency and transparency

Barcelona city document

- Document title: Electoral manifesto
- Document subtitle: none
- 202 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction. Against the crisis, against the disaffection
 - 2- A Barcelona inclusive and solidary
 - 3- A Barcelona ecologic and a place to live
 - 4- Barcelona, an educative and creative city
 - 5- A city for open-minded citizens
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

This document starts with the index and immediately starts de development of the ideas, without an introduction or presentation page(s)

	Generic Document	
	Barcelona City	

Generic Document

- Document title: More society, best government
- Document subtitle: Commitment 2011-2015
- 79 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- Introduction. The Popular manifesto: Committed with our Cities
 - 2- Committed with job creation and tax reduction
 - 3- Committed with the local productive economy
 - 4- Committed with the territory and the infrastructures
 - 5- Committed with the education of your sons
 - 6- Committed with the welfare of your family
 - 7- Committed with coexistence and security
 - 8- Committed with the democratic regeneration: bases for a local pact for the transparency and against the corruption
- Introduction chapter, main specific topics:

In the Parliament of Catalonia we must face an increasing nationalism which is becoming more and more separatist.

To show trust in the civil society we must prevent from the administration duplicating activities already performed by the civil society.

To trust the entrepreneurs by means of supporting the culture of personal effort and risk, rather than the culture of fear and security promoted by the left wing parties.

To trust more in society and less in administration, by means of smaller and more competitive administrations

To trust more in the families, to give them back the control of their lives, which means being able to decide which nursery or any other service, which adapts to their lifestyles

To implement some public policies promoting a free and competitive economy; more work and less administration

There is no freedom without security. We must work hard for preventing our municipalities to become security fairgrounds of insecurity, vandalism, anti-system, noise, prostitution and illegal immigration.

We cannot integrate those who don't want to integrate our own values. We cannot provide assistance to an unlimited number of immigrants.

Barcelona city document

- Document title: Electoral manifesto
- Document subtitle: none
- 3 pages
- Chapters:
 - 1- To recover the leadership and competitiveness of Barcelona
 - 2- To recover the security by the exercise of the democratic authority
 - 3- To improve the welfare if the citizens
 - 4- To recover the education of quality. Trilingual.
 - 5- To control the immigration
 - 6- To recover an open and cosmopolitan Barcelona

To recover the leadership and competitiveness of Barcelona, in order to face the economic downturn, we must promote the entrepreneurship and facilitate the bureaucracy for new business opportunities, we must also reduce taxes to families, the self-employed, trades, SME's, in order to increase the internal consumption and activate the cities' economy, and last, empower the local commerce to position the Barcelona touristic brand of quality, and bet for the economy of knowledge.

To recover the security by the exercise of the democratic authority, increasing the number of police officers in the street and promoting better justice.

To improve the welfare if the citizens, promoting a new housing plan, which would include the selling of 33.000 new apartments.

To recover the education of quality. The parents will be able to choose their son's education language.

To control the immigration, the immigrant to respect the social rules, in order to keep a united society not fragmented by ethnical, cultural or religious causes.

To recover an open and cosmopolitan Barcelona, with freedom as the main rule.... Freedom for using both official languages, Catalan and Spanish in the private and public sphere.

ANNEX III. Number of parties in coalition

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011		
Barcelona	Alt Penedès	Sant Sadurní d'Anoia	3	2	1	1	2	2	3	2	2		
		Vilafranca del Penedès	5	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Anoia	Igualada	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	
		Piera	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	
		Vilanova del Camí	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	
	Bages	Manresa	4	3	1	1	3	3	3	2	1		
	Baix Llobregat	Sant Joan de Vilatorrada	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
		Abrera	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	3	
		Castelldefels	3	1	1	4	2	3	3	3	3	2	
		Corbera de Llobregat	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	4	3	3	
		Cornellà de Llobregat	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	
		El Prat de Llobregat	2	3	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	
		Esparreguera	2	2	2	3	1	3	3	2	4	4	
		Esplugues de Llobregat	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
		Gavà	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
		Martorell	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	
		Molins de Rei	3	3	2	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	
		Olesa de Montserrat	4	2	1	3	1	1	3	3	3	1	
		Pallejà	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	
		Sant Andreu de la Barca	3	2	4	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	
		Sant Boi de Llobregat	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	2	2	
		Sant Feliu de Llobregat	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	2	2	2	
		Sant Joan Despí	1	2	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	
		Sant Just Desvern	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	
		Sant Vicenç dels Horts	2	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	
		Vallirana	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	
	Viladecans	2	4	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2		
	Barcelonès	Badalona	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	1	1	
		Barcelona	4	1	2	2	3	3	3	2	1	1	
		L'Hospitalet de Llobregat	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	
		Santa Coloma de Gramenou	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	
	Berguedà	Sant Adrià del Besòs	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	
		Berga	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	
		Garraf	Cubelles	2	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3
			Sant Pere de Ribes	1	2	2	3	1	1	1	3	2	2
	Maresme	Sitges	4	3	1	1	3	3	2	2	4	4	
		Vilanova i la Geltrú	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	
		Arenys de Mar	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	
		Argentona	2	2	1	4	2	2	2	2	4	4	
		Calella	4	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	
		Canet de Mar	3	2	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	
		El Masnou	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	2	2	2	
		Malgrat de Mar	4	3	2	5	2	2	3	3	2	2	
		Mataró	2	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	1	1	
		Montgat	2	2	1	1	2	3	2	3	2	2	
		Pineda de Mar	4	3	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	1	
		Premià de Mar	5	3	4	2	3	3	2	2	1	1	
		Sant Andreu de Llavanera	3	1	4	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	
		Tordera	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	
		Vilassar de Mar	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	
		Osona	Manlleu	1	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	2
	Torelló		4	2	1	1	4	3	1	2	1	1	
Vic	1		1	1	1	1	2	1	3	2	2		

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011		
	Vallès Occidental	Badia del Vallès					2	2	2	1	1		
		Barberà del Vallès	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2		
		Castellar del Vallès	2	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	
		Castellbisbal	1	2	1	4	1	1	1	1	3	2	
		Cerdanyola del Vallès	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	1	
		Montcada i Reixac	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	2	2	
		Palau-Solità i Plegamans	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	3	3	3	
		Ripollet	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	
		Rubí	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	
		Sabadell	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	1	1	
		Sant Cugat del Vallès	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	
		Sant Quirze del Vallès	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	
		Santa Perpètua de Mogod	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	
		Terrassa	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	2	
		Vallès Oriental	Caldes de Montbui	3	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
			Canovelles	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Cardedeu		1	1	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	1	
	Granollers		2	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	
	La Garriga		3	3	2	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	
	La Llagosta		1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	
	La Roca del Vallès		1	1	3	1	3	1	1	1	2	2	
	Les Franqueses del Vallès		3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	5	
	Lliçà d'Amunt		1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	2	
	Mollet del Vallès		3	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	
	Montornès del Vallès		1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	1	
	Parets del Vallès		3	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	
	Sant Celoni		1	1	3	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	
	Girona		Alt Empordà	Castelló d'Empúries						2	2	4	4
				Figueres	6	2	4		3	1	1	3	1
				L'Escala								2	2
		Baix Empordà	Roses			3	2	2	2	1	1	4	2
			Calonge					2	1	3	4	2	2
Castell-Platja d'Aro						2			2	3	2	2	
La Bisbal d'Empordà						3	2	1	1	2	1	1	
Palafrugell			4	4	1		1	2	3	3	2	2	
Palamós			4	2	2	1	2	2	3	2	2	2	
Sant Feliu de Guíxols					1	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	
Torroella de Montgrí			3	2	1		1	2	2	3	3	3	
Cerdanya			Puigcerdà			2				2	2	1	1
			Olot	3	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1
Gironès		Girona	4	4	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	
		Salt							2	1	2	1	
Pla de l'Estany		Banyoles	3	4	2		2	2	1	2	2	2	
		Ripoll	2	2	2	2		1	3	2	1	1	
Selva		Blanes	4	3	1	2	2	2	2	3	1	1	
		Lloret de Mar				1	1	3	2	1	2	2	
		Santa Coloma de Farners							1	3	2	2	

Province	County	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Lleida	Alt Urgell	La Seu d'Urgell					1	1	2	2	1	
	Alta Ribagorça	El Pont de Suert					1	1	1	1	1	
	Garrigues	Les Borges Blanques			3	3	3	3	2	2	2	
	Noguera	Balaguer			2	2	2	1	2	1	1	
	Pallars Jussà	Tremp	3	3	4	4	5	3	2	1	2	
	Pallars Sobirà	Sort							1	1	1	
	Pla d'Urgell	Mollerussa	5	4	3	1	2	2	1	2	1	
	Segarra	Cervera			1	1	5	2	3	5	2	
	Segrià	Lleida				1	1	2	3	1	1	
	Solsonès	Solsona	3	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	2	
	Urgell	Tàrraga	3	3	3	1	2	2	3	3	2	
	Tarragona	Alt Camp	Valls	4	2	2		3	2	2	2	1
		Baix Camp	Cambrils	4	4	5	3	2	3	3	3	3
		Mont-roig del Camp			1	1	4	3	3	4	5	
		Reus				1	1	2	3	3	2	
Baix Ebre		Deltebre			3	1	3	2	1	2	2	
		Tortosa	3	4	2	1	3	2	4	2	1	
Baix Penedès		Calafell			1	1	1	2	2	3	2	
		Cunit			5	2	3	1	1	2	3	
		El Vendrell			1	1	2	2	2	1	4	
Conca de Barberà		Montblanc			2		1	2	2	3	1	
Montsià		Alcanar				4		5	2	1	2	
		Amposta			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
		Sant Carles de la Ràpita							1	2	2	
Priorat		Falset	3	3	4		1	1	1	2	3	
Ribera d'Ebre		Móra d'Ebre					1	1	2	2	2	
Tarragonès		Salou					2	3	3	3	3	
		Tarragona					1	1	2	2	1	
		Torredembarra			1	5	2	1	1	2	3	
		Vila-Seca			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Terra Alta		Gandesa			1			4	3	3	2	

ANNEX IV. IND lists participating in government

Province	Municipality	Acronym	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Barcelona	Abrera	EMA	*								
		ORT	*								
	Arenys de Mar	AMD			*						
		BM									*
		OTH	*	*							
		UA			*						
	Argentona	AA				*					
		EA						*			
		OTH	*	*							
		TA								*	
	Berga	ABI			*						
		OTH	*			*					
	Caldes de Montbui	CC-UCD	*								
	Calella	OTH	*								
	Canet de Mar	C2000			*						
		CI	*								
		GIC2000				*					
		PIC						*			
		UJI			*						
		UMdC								*	*
		Castellar del Vallès	UE	*							
		Castellbisbal	ALTpCB					*	*	*	
	OTH		*			*					
	TxC-FIC									*	
	Castelldefels	AVVIC							*		*
		PCC	*			*					
	Corbera de Llobregat	CUC						*			
		GIU						*	*		*
		OTH		*	*	*	*				
		URBACOR								*	
	Cornellà de Llobregat	OTH	*								
	Cubelles	EC			*	*					
		EC-FIC							*		
		ICb							*		
		OTH	*	*			*				
		UC-R									*
	Esparreguera	AIESPA									*
		GD'E									*
	Esplugues de Llobregat	IE	*								
	La Garriga	EiLG								*	
		UIG	*								

La Llagosta	CPLL							*
	EUNITARIA						*	
La Roca del Vallès	GIR				*			
	GIUR			*				
	OTH	*						
	UISA			*				
Les Franqueses del Vallès	CIPP	*						
	THA	*						
	UPLF							*
Malgrat de Mar	OTH	*						
Manlleu	OTH	*	*					
Manresa	UCD	*						
Montcada i Reixac	PCC		*					
Olesa de Montserrat	POM	*						
	UPO			*				
Palau-Solità i Plegamans	UP				*			
	VdPSiP							*
Pallejà	JA						*	*
	PDF					*	*	*
Parets del Vallès	AEP	*						
Piera	ADP				*			
	OTH	*	*					
	UPM	*	*					
Pineda de Mar	UPM	*	*					
Premià de Mar	CDS			*				
	OTH	*						
	NOP			*				
Ripollet	GIR	*						
	PPP	*						
Sant Andreu de la Barca	OTH	*						
	PEC				*			
Sant Andreu de Llavanes	GLL					*		
	OTH	*	*	*				
Sant Celoni	IB			*				
Sant Feliu de Llobregat	UCD	*						
Sant Joan Despí	PCC		*					
Sant Pere de Ribes	OTH	*	*	*				
	UM-9				*			
Sant Vicenç dels Horts	PIPV						*	
	UPM			*				
Santa Perpètua de Mogoda	PCCA							*
Sitges	OTH		*		*			
	NH					*		*
	SGI							*
	AIT				*			

Girona	Torelló	CC-UCD	*															
	Vallirana	OTH	*															
	Vilafranca del Penedès	CC-UCD	*															
			CIVB	*														
	Vilanova del Camí	VA																*
	Vilassar de Mar	OTH	*															
	Banyoles	PPCG					*											
	Blanes	GIB					*											
			PdB															*
	Calonge	AMICS											*					
			CCSA														*	
			COCADETE										*					
			SAI					*	*					*				
	Castelló d'Empúries	SI																*
			UDEM															*
			UiPM							*								
	Figueres	CC - UCD	*															
			FC					*										
			GID	*														
		GIF			*													
Girona	UCD	*																
La Bisbal d'Empordà	GIB					*												
Olot	CUEO		*															
		IO	*															
Palafrugell	AMC							*										
		CC - UCD	*															
Palamós	C de P															*		
		CC - UCD	*															
Roses	CDS			*														
		GIR-FIC														*		
Sant Feliu de Guíxols	TSF															*		
Torroella de Montgrí	CC - UCD	*																
		LEI										*	*					
		LEST															*	
		PAD	*															
		PAP		*														
		UPM			*		*											
Lleida	Cervera	AIPN					*											
		INSE														*		
		SiF													*	*		
	Les Borges Blanques	CIPM					*											
		IBB - FIC															*	
	Mollerussa	CC - UCD	*															
	Solsona	AEI	*															
		COMÚ														*		

Tàrrrega	AIPN					*			
	ITA		*						
	LCT		*						
	RCAT+SI							*	
	UCD	*							
	UIT		*						
	Tremp	GIET	*						
		GIT		*	*	*			
		RCAT							*
		UCD	*						
Tarragona	Alcanar	APAL				*			
		UILC-FIC				*			
	Calafell	ADMC					*	*	
		Cambrils	ACI			*			
	ACI- FIC						*		
	AEI		*						
	CC-UCD		*						
	Cunit	CIC	*		*				
		LA PLIC FIC							*
		AIC			*				
AR				*					
IC					*				
SDC				*					
UNIC					*				
Deltebre		ID			*				
		Falset	CC-UCD	*					
			EM	*					
	FIC					*			
Gandesa	OTH		*						
	IPF - FIC					*	*		
	AG - FIC					*	*		
	UG					*			
	Montblanc	APM				*			
		GPO						*	
IM - FIC							*		
IPM				*					
Mont-roig del Camp	ADMC						*		
	FIC						*		
	MI - FIC					*			
	MPI				*				
	VX+					*	*		
Salou	FUPS				*	*	*		
	UTPS						*		
Torredembarra	ADMC					*			
	GIT			*					

Tortosa

Valls

GIT - FIC						*	*	*
VUT						*		
IPE - FIC						*		
UPM	*							
UT				*				
CC-UCD	*							

ANNEX V. Party of the Mayor and Party of the First Deputy Mayor

Mayor's Party											First Deputy Mayor's Party										
Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011		Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
Abrera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		Abrera	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Alcanar											Alcanar										
Amposta											Amposta										
Arenys de Mar											Arenys de Mar										
Argentona											Argentona										
Badalona	Green										Badalona										
Badia del Vallès											Badia del Vallès										
Balaguer											Balaguer										
Banyoles	Yellow										Banyoles	Yellow									
Barberà del Vallès	Green										Barberà del Vallès	Green									
Barcelona	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		Barcelona	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Berga	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		Berga	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Blanes											Blanes										
Calafell											Calafell										
Caldes de Montbui											Caldes de Montbui										
Calella											Calella										
Calonge											Calonge										
Cambrils	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		Cambrils	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Canet de Mar	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		Canet de Mar	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Canovelles											Canovelles										
Cardedeu											Cardedeu										
Castellar del Vallès											Castellar del Vallès										
Castellbisbal	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		Castellbisbal	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Castelldefels											Castelldefels										
Castelló d'Empúries											Castelló d'Empúries										
Castell-Platja d'Aro											Castell-Platja d'Aro										
Cerdanyola del Vallès	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red		Cerdanyola del Vallès	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
Cervera											Cervera										
Corbera de Llobregat											Corbera de Llobregat										
Cornellà de Llobregat	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green		Cornellà de Llobregat	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Cubelles	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow		Cubelles	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Cunit											Cunit										
Deltebre											Deltebre										
El Masnou											El Masnou										
El Pont de Suert											El Pont de Suert										
El Prat de Llobregat	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green		El Prat de Llobregat	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
El Vendrell											El Vendrell										
Esparguera											Esparguera										
Esplugues de Llobregat											Esplugues de Llobregat										
Falset											Falset										
Figueres											Figueres										
Gandesa											Gandesa										
Gavà											Gavà										
Girona											Girona										
Granollers											Granollers										
Igualada											Igualada										
La Bisbal d'Empordà											La Bisbal d'Empordà										
La Garriga											La Garriga										
La Llagosta	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green		La Llagosta	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
La Roca del Vallès	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		La Roca del Vallès	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
La Seu d'Urgell											La Seu d'Urgell										
Les Borges Blanques											Les Borges Blanques										
Les Franqueses del Vallès	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		Les Franqueses del Vallès	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
L'Escola											L'Escola										
L'Hospitalet de Llobregat											L'Hospitalet de Llobregat										
Lleida											Lleida										
Lliscà d'Amunt											Lliscà d'Amunt										
Lloret de Mar											Lloret de Mar										
Malgrat de Mar											Malgrat de Mar										
Manlleu	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue		Manlleu	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Manresa											Manresa										
Martorell											Martorell										
Mataró											Mataró										
Molins de Rei	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green		Molins de Rei	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

Mayor's Party											First Deputy Mayor's Party										
Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	Municipality	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011		
Mollerussa										Mollerussa											
Mollet del Vallès										Mollet del Vallès											
Montblanc										Montblanc											
Montcada i Reixac										Montcada i Reixac											
Montgat										Montgat											
Montornès del Vallès										Montornès del Vallès											
Mont-roig del Camp										Mont-roig del Camp											
Móra d'Ebre										Móra d'Ebre											
Olesa de Montserrat										Olesa de Montserrat											
Olot										Olot											
Palafrugell										Palafrugell											
Palamós										Palamós											
Palau-Solità i Plegamans										Palau-Solità i Plegamans											
Pallejà										Pallejà											
Parets del Vallès										Parets del Vallès											
Piera										Piera											
Pineda de Mar										Pineda de Mar											
Premià de Mar										Premià de Mar											
Puigcerdà										Puigcerdà											
Reus										Reus											
Ripoll										Ripoll											
Ripollet										Ripollet											
Roses										Roses											
Rubí										Rubí											
Sabadell										Sabadell											
Salou										Salou											
Salt										Salt											
Sant Andreu de la Barca										Sant Andreu de la Barca											
Sant Andreu de Llavaneres										Sant Andreu de Llavaneres											
Sant Boi de Llobregat										Sant Boi de Llobregat											
Sant Carles de la Ràpita										Sant Carles de la Ràpita											
Sant Celoni										Sant Celoni											
Sant Cugat del Vallès										Sant Cugat del Vallès											
Sant Feliu de Guíxols										Sant Feliu de Guíxols											
Sant Feliu de Llobregat										Sant Feliu de Llobregat											
Sant Joan de Vilatorrada										Sant Joan de Vilatorrada											
Sant Joan Despí										Sant Joan Despí											
Sant Just Desvern										Sant Just Desvern											
Sant Pere de Ribes										Sant Pere de Ribes											
Sant Quirze del Vallès										Sant Quirze del Vallès											
Sant Sadurní d'Anoia										Sant Sadurní d'Anoia											
Sant Vicenç dels Horts										Sant Vicenç dels Horts											
Santa Coloma de Farners										Santa Coloma de Farners											
Santa Coloma de Gramenet										Santa Coloma de Gramenet											
Santa Perpètua de Mogoda										Santa Perpètua de Mogoda											
Sitges										Sitges											
Solsona										Solsona											
Sort										Sort											
Tarragona										Tarragona											
Tàrraga										Tàrraga											
Terrassa										Terrassa											
Tordera										Tordera											
Torelló										Torelló											
Torredembarra										Torredembarra											
Torroella de Montgrí										Torroella de Montgrí											
Tortosa										Tortosa											
Tremp										Tremp											
Vallirana										Vallirana											
Valls										Valls											
Vic										Vic											
Viladecans										Viladecans											
Vilafranca del Penedès										Vilafranca del Penedès											
Vilanova del Camí										Vilanova del Camí											
Vilanova i la Geltrú										Vilanova i la Geltrú											
Vila-Seca										Vila-Seca											
Vilassar de Mar										Vilassar de Mar											
Sant Adrià del Besòs										Sant Adrià del Besòs											

ANNEX VI. Enquiry sent for classifying the importance of the portfolios

Translation:

Importance of the portfolios valuation, 2012

Thanks for your attention.

First of all, please indicate the County to which your Municipality belongs

Then your gender

In the next question you can select which portfolio is the "most important" according to you

Valoració IMPORTÀNCIA regidories 2012

Moltes gràcies per la seva atenció.

En primer lloc li agrairé que indiqui la Comarca que corresponent al seu Ajuntament .

A continuació el sexe

A la següent pregunta pot seleccionar aquella regidoria que considera "la més important" en un Ajuntament

A continuació la que considera segona "més important", des del seu punt de vista

I així successivament fins la cinquena

Al final, prémer el botó SUBMIT

Comarca

Seleccionar una comarca (apareixen per ordre alfabètic) ▾

Gènere

Femení

Masculí

Regidoria més important

Seleccionar una opció ▾

Segona Regidoria més important

Seleccionar una opció ▾

Tercera Regidoria més important

Seleccionar una opció ▾

Quarta Regidoria més important

Seleccionar una opció ▾

Cinquena Regidoria més important

Seleccionar una opció ▾

Envia

No envieu mai contrasenyes a través de Formularis de Google.

Amb la tecnologia de [Google Docs](#)

[Informe dels abusos](#) - [Condicions del Servei](#) - [Termes addicionals](#)

This image shows the portfolio options that they could select, which were sorted in alphabetic order

Títol de la pregunta	Regidoria més important	
Text d'ajuda		
Tipus de pregunta	Escolliu d'una llista ▾	
1.	Seleccionar una opció	x
2.	Comerç	x
3.	Comunicació	x
4.	Cultura	x
5.	Economia i Hisenda	x
6.	Ensenyament	x
7.	Esports	x
8.	Festes	x
9.	Governació	x
10.	Habitatge	x
11.	Igualtat	x
12.	Joventut	x
13.	Medi Ambient	x
14.	Mobilitat	x
15.	Noves Tecnologies / Societat del Coneixement	x
16.	Obres i Serveis	x
17.	Participació Ciutadana	x
18.	Patrimoni	x
19.	Promoció de la dona	x
20.	Promoció Econòmica	x
21.	Règim Intern	x
22.	Seguretat Ciutadana	x
23.	Serveis Socials	x
24.	Territori	x
25.	Urbanisme	x