Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040
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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata-
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-22T06:56:32Z-
dc.date.available2016-09-22T06:56:32Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.issn1136-8365-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040-
dc.description.abstractSolymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)-
dc.format.extent9 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa-
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco16/350]-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/-
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs-
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos-
dc.subject.classificationÀlgebres de Von Neumann-
dc.subject.classificationProblema de Neumann-
dc.subject.otherGame theory-
dc.subject.otherResource allocation-
dc.subject.otherVon Neumann algebras-
dc.subject.otherNeumann problema-
dc.titleAn alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper-
dc.date.updated2016-09-22T06:56:37Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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