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Title: An implementation of the Vickrey outcome with gross-substitutes
Author: Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Keywords: Assignació de recursos
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Resource allocation
Asset allocation
Rate of retorn
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco16/353]
Abstract: We consider a market with only one seller and many buyers. The seller owns several indivisible objects on sale. Each buyer can receive many objects and has a gross-substitutes valuation for every package of objects. The gross-substitutes condition guarantees the non-emptiness of the core of the market (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002). Moreover, the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market leads to a core payoff in which each buyer gets his maximum core payoff. The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism. Simultaneously, each buyer requests a package by announcing how much he would pay for it. After all buyers' requests, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices. If a buyer gets a package of objects, it must be his request or an allocation at least as good as his request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome of the market.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/353
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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