Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102536
Title: Social welfare analysis of investment public-private partnership approaches for tansportation projects
Author: Rouhani, Omid M.
Geddes, R. Richard
Gao, H. Oliver
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Keywords: Benestar social
Associacions
Infraestructures (Transport)
Tarifes
Public welfare
Associations
Transportation buildings
Rates
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Abstract: This paper has two objectives: (1) to introduce a new approach to gaining widespread support for comprehensive road pricing; and (2) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe a new approach to garnering support for system-wide road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public-private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to its citizen-owners. Next, we present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. Policy makers typically evaluate public-private partnership (P3) projects using Value for Money (VfM) analysis. However, a P3 project's impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is lacking. Using Fresno City's transportation system as our case study, we show that system-optimal tolling scenarios favor average users, but that government¿and consequently taxpayers¿would pay for costly tolling systems. In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure's citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto-improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed private and public tolling scheme offers such an improvement. A mixed scheme results in the highest social welfare among all scenarios unless the weight placed on motorists' (i.e., transportation users') welfare is very low or the weight placed on residents' welfare is very high relative to the weight of other stakeholders.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.11.003
It is part of: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2016, vol. 88, p. 86-103
Related resource: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.11.003
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102536
ISSN: 0965-8564
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

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