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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/104723
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Tejada, Oriol | - |
dc.contributor.author | Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-15T09:00:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-31T23:01:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-12 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1434-4742 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/104723 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders' bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games. | - |
dc.format.extent | 39 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Review of Economic Design, 2016, vol. 20, num. 4, p. 289-327 | - |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1 | - |
dc.rights | (c) Springer Verlag, 2016 | - |
dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Mercat de treball | - |
dc.subject.classification | Cooperatives | - |
dc.subject.classification | Fallides bancàries | - |
dc.subject.classification | Fallida | - |
dc.subject.other | Labor market | - |
dc.subject.other | Cooperative societies | - |
dc.subject.other | Bank failures | - |
dc.subject.other | Bankruptcy | - |
dc.title | Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | - |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 665585 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2016-12-15T09:00:10Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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665585.pdf | 795.14 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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