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Title: Visual experience: rich but impenetrable
Author: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Keywords: Filosofia de l'art
Philosophy of the art
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: According to so-called 'thin' views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called 'rich' views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Synthese, 2018, vol. 195, num. 8, p. 3389-3406
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ISSN: 0039-7857
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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