Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300
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dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Carpintero, Manuel-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T14:11:43Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-24T22:01:39Z-
dc.date.issued2017-01-24-
dc.identifier.issn0020-174X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300-
dc.description.abstractInspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.-
dc.format.extent27 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherOslo University Press-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003-
dc.relation.ispartofInquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, vol. 60, num. 3-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003-
dc.rights(c) Oslo University Press, 2017-
dc.subject.classificationSubjectivitat-
dc.subject.classificationPensament-
dc.subject.otherSubjectivity-
dc.subject.otherThinking-
dc.titleThe philosophical significance of the De Se-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec667119-
dc.date.updated2017-01-31T14:11:43Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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