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Title: An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
Author: Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Teoria de conjunts
Lògica matemàtica
Presa de decisions
Game theory
Set theory
Mathematical logic
Decision making
Issue Date: Feb-2015
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, num. 1, p. 1-15
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ISSN: 0020-7276
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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