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Title: Empirical Evidence on Cooperation Between Sub-Central Tax Administrations
Author: Durán Cabré, José María
Esteller Moré, Alejandro
Salvadori, Luca
Keywords: Política fiscal
Reforma fiscal
Assessors fiscals
Fiscal policy
Tax reform
Tax consultants
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: University of Exeter
Abstract: The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralised context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralised tax administration as, in the medium to long run, the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
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It is part of: Journal of Tax Administration, 2016, vol. 2, num. 2, p. 24-46
ISSN: 2059-190X
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

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