Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/107669
Title: Public and private production in a mixed delivery system: regulation, competition and costs
Author: Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Rosell, Jordi, 1955-
Keywords: Serveis públics
Investigació amb mètodes mixtos
Control de gestió
Administració local
Public utilities
Mixed methods research
Management audit
Local government
Issue Date: Aug-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Abstract: Academics and policy makers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public-private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. We find that private firms have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Furthermore, tenders tend to decrease delivery costs
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21906
It is part of: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2016, vol. 35, num. 3, p. 533-558
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21906
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/107669
ISSN: 0276-8739
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

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