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dc.contributor.authorDurán Cabré, José María-
dc.contributor.authorEsteller Moré, Alejandro-
dc.contributor.authorSalvadori, Luca-
dc.description.abstractTax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper, we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters.-
dc.format.extent27 p.-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a:
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Tax and Public Finance, 2015, vol. 22, num. 5, p. 834-860-
dc.rights(c) Springer Verlag, 2015-
dc.subject.classificationPolítica fiscal-
dc.subject.classificationReforma fiscal-
dc.subject.otherFiscal policy-
dc.subject.otherTax reform-
dc.titleEmpirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

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