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Title: Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
Author: Calleja, Pere
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Lògica matemàtica
Economia matemàtica
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Mathematical logic
Mathematical economics
Issue Date: Jan-2017
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, num. 1, p. 197-220
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ISSN: 0176-1714
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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