Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Piolatto, Amedeo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Trotin, Gwenola | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-03-28T06:30:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-01T23:01:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-02 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1097-3923 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT | - |
dc.format.extent | 13 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 29-41 | - |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12143 | - |
dc.rights | (c) Wiley, 2016 | - |
dc.source | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Frau fiscal | - |
dc.subject.classification | Frau de llei | - |
dc.subject.classification | Impostos sobre la renda | - |
dc.subject.classification | Perspectiva | - |
dc.subject.classification | Control de gestió | - |
dc.subject.other | Tax evasion | - |
dc.subject.other | Evasion of the law | - |
dc.subject.other | Income tax | - |
dc.subject.other | Perspective | - |
dc.subject.other | Management audit | - |
dc.title | Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | - |
dc.identifier.idgrec | 652901 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2017-03-28T06:30:35Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
652901.pdf | 348.61 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.