Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/110579
Title: Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users
Author: Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Bel-Piñana, Paula
Rosell i Segura, Jordi
Keywords: Associacions
Concessions administratives
Infraestructures (Transport)
Política energètica
Associations
Concessions
Transportation buildings
Energy policy
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Economia i territori. Càtedra Pasqual Maragall
Abstract: Drawing on evidence from three case studies, we show how the State’s Financial Liability has worked in assigning risk in large PPP contracts in Spain. Project failure and the concessionaires’ bankruptcy have resulted in the government having to assume heavy financial obligations, which have ultimately been absorbed by taxpayers and users. In contrast, Spain’s leading construction companies, which were also major investors in the concessionaires, have been able to minimize their risk. Myopic PPPs have been entered into based on the transference of liabilities to taxpayers and users, and the, consequent, minimization of risks for the main private investors.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/catedramaragall/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Definitiu-WP022016.pdf
It is part of: Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori – Documents de treball, WP 02/2016
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/110579
Appears in Collections:Documents de Treball (Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori)

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