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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Galletta, Sergio | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-20T17:40:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-20T17:40:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/112646 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 50 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2016/01 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB16/01] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Galletta et al., 2016 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Màfia | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Corrupció | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Itàlia | cat |
dc.subject.other | Mafia | eng |
dc.subject.other | Corruption | eng |
dc.subject.other | Italy | eng |
dc.title | Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB16-01_Galletta.pdf | 2.31 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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