Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/114772
Title: | How Much Vertical Integration? Contractual Choice and Public-Private Partnerships in the United States |
Author: | Albalate, Daniel, 1980- Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963- Geddes, R. Richard |
Keywords: | Privatització Contractació externa Integració vertical Estats Units d'Amèrica Privatization Contracting out Vertical integration United States |
Issue Date: | Aug-2017 |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Abstract: | Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of different tasks. We study the factors that explain bundling in single contracts. We focus on the choice between integrating operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus vertically integrating both operational and construction tasks. We analyze a new data set that includes 553 PPPs that were concluded in the United States. We find evidence that some financial variables play a role in bundling decisions. In addition, market size and the type of economic sectors involved, are also important drivers of contract choice and bundling decisions. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9540-1 |
It is part of: | Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 51, num. 1, p. 25-42 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/114772 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9540-1 |
ISSN: | 0889-938X |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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663719.pdf | 512.51 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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