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Title: Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption
Author: Colombo, Luca
Galmarini, Umberto
Keywords: Hàbit de fumar
Impostos especials
Tobbacco hàbit
Excise tax
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Series/Report no: [WP E-IEB15/02]
Abstract: We examine policies directed at regulating tobacco consumption through three types of instruments: (i) an excise tax hindering consumption by increasing the price of cigarettes, (ii) prevention programs helping consumers to make choices that are more time consistent when trading-off the current pleasure from smoking and its future health harms, and (iii) smoking bans directly restricting consumption. First, on normative grounds, we focus on the optimal design of public policies maximizing the economy’s surplus. Second, in a positive perspective, we investigate how the lobbying activities of the tobacco industry, of smokers, and of anti-tobacco organizations may distort government intervention.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IEB Working Paper 2015/02
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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