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dc.contributor.authorEsteller Moré, Alejandro-
dc.contributor.authorGalmarini, Umberto-
dc.contributor.authorRizzo, Leonzio-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal
dc.format.extent37 p.-
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a:
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2015/21-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IEB15/21]-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2015-
dc.subject.classificationPolítica fiscalcat
dc.subject.classificationDistribució (Teoria de la probabilitat)-
dc.subject.otherFiscal policyeng
dc.subject.otherDistribution (Probability theory)-
dc.titleFiscal equalization under political pressuresca
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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