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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Esteller Moré, Alejandro | - |
dc.contributor.author | Galmarini, Umberto | - |
dc.contributor.author | Rizzo, Leonzio | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-09-14T11:58:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-09-14T11:58:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/115376 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal equalization. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 37 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2015/21 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB15/21] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2015 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Política fiscal | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Impostos | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Distribució (Teoria de la probabilitat) | - |
dc.subject.other | Fiscal policy | eng |
dc.subject.other | Taxation | eng |
dc.subject.other | Distribution (Probability theory) | - |
dc.title | Fiscal equalization under political pressures | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB15-21_EstellerMore.pdf | 1.25 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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