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Title: Politics or mobility? Evidence from US excise taxation
Author: Esteller Moré, Alejandro
Rizzo, Leonzio
Keywords: Impostos
Política fiscal
Relacions fiscals intergovernamentals
Fiscal policy
Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher: Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Series/Report no: [WP E-IEB10/03]
Abstract: We test for the state interdependence of gasoline and cigarette taxation in the US (1975-2006). We estimate a tax reaction function, and find that state interdependence is due solely to yardstick competition, since any interaction disappears completely in the case of states with lame duck governors. This result holds for both taxes: the short-run reaction of those states whose governor is eligible to stand for reelection is 0.13 and 0.21 for gasoline and cigarette taxation, respectively. In the long run, the cigarette tax rates levied in a jurisdiction match those of its neighbors perfectly, while the long-run reaction in the case of gasoline is much lower at 0.72.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IEB Working Paper 2010/03
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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