Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116652
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dc.contributor.authorEsteller Moré, Alejandro-
dc.contributor.authorGalmarini, Umberto-
dc.contributor.authorRizzo, Leonzio-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-16T15:27:43Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-16T15:27:43Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/116652-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the tax assignment problem in a federation with two layers of government sharing an elastic tax base, in which Leviathan policy makers levy an excise tax in an imperfectly competitive market and producers lobby for tax rate cuts. If the lobby of producers is very influential on policy makers, we find that taxation by both layers of government might be optimal, provided that the market of the taxed good is highly concentrated; otherwise, it is optimal to assign the power to tax only to one level of government. Taxation by both layers of government is not optimal either when the influence of the lobby is weak, whatever the degree of market power. We also examine a richer set of tax setting outcomes, by considering the possibility that state policy makers have heterogeneous tax policy objectives.ca
dc.format.extent28 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions-
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2010/08-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IEB10/08]cat
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2010-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/-
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers-
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursoscat
dc.subject.classificationPolítica fiscalcat
dc.subject.classificationExternalitats (Economia)-
dc.subject.otherResource allocationeng
dc.subject.otherFiscal policyeng
dc.subject.otherExternalities (Economics)-
dc.titleShould tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?ca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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