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Title: The political economy of infrastructure construction: The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads” (1880-1914)
Author: Curto Grau, Marta
Herranz Loncán, Alfonso
Solé Ollé, Albert
Keywords: Infraestructures (Transport)
Creixement econòmic
Sociologia electoral
Transportation buildings
Economic growth
Voting research
Issue Date: 2010
Publisher: Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Series/Report no: [WP E-IEB10/22]
Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road investment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration (1874-1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with higher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political parties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper combines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-barrel; clientelism and machine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of Spain’s provinces suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from minority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road investment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more resources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been ministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting resources to their constituencies.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: IEB Working Paper 2010/22
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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