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Title: | Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution |
Author: | Flamand, Sabine |
Keywords: | Pareto, Vilfredo, 1848-1923
Fiscal policy Distribució (Teoria econòmica) Política fiscal Descentralització administrativa Distribution (Economic theory) Fiscal policy Decentralization in government |
Issue Date: | 2010 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB10/37] |
Abstract: | We study the decentralization of redistributive taxation in a political economy model assuming regional heterogeneity regarding both group identity and average income. If a centralized system permits a beneficial pooling of national resources, it might also decrease the degree of solidarity in the society. With no group loyalty, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization even when regions are not identical. Furthermore, increased heterogeneity need not increase the relative efficiency of decentralization. If regions are equally rich, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization whenever group loyalty is not perfect. Finally, centralization is always more efficient than decentralization even when allowing for interregional transfers. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2010/37 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116854 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-37_Flamand.pdf | 431.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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