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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863| Title: | Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany |
| Author: | Egger, Peter Koethenbuerger, Marco Smart, Michael |
| Keywords: | Eleccions Administració local Federalisme Dret fiscal Elections Local government Federalism Tax law |
| Issue Date: | 2010 |
| Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
| Abstract: | The impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives. |
| Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
| It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2010/44 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863 |
| Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
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| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEB10-44_Egger+Kotthenbuerger.pdf | 501.56 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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