Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116985
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dc.contributor.authorPiolatto, Amedeo-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-24T07:21:24Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-24T07:21:24Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/116985-
dc.description.abstractThis study compares the representativeness of voters in the proportional electoral system with the situation under plurality rule. Representativeness is commonly measured by comparing parties’ received votes with their shares of seats in the Parliament; this implies that proportional rule should always better represent voters. A coalition within the Parliament, however, rules the country without interference and supports the government; when a coalition is formed, the pivotal role of small parties and the proposal right of the formateur can significantly impact the distribution of power. Focusing on the coalition formation stage, I demonstrate that the proportional rule is more representative only under very specific conditions. If these conditions are not met, introducing some distortions in the distribution of seats among parties can actually improve representativeness.ca
dc.format.extent32 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions-
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2009/27-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IEB09/27]cat
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Piolatto et al., 2009-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/-
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers-
dc.subject.classificationEleccionscat
dc.subject.classificationRepresentació proporcionalcat
dc.subject.classificationSociologia electoral-
dc.subject.otherElectionseng
dc.subject.otherProportional representationeng
dc.subject.otherVoting research-
dc.titlePlurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?ca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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