Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/118700
Title: Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle
Author: Piolatto, Amedeo
Rablen, Matthew D.
Keywords: Frau fiscal
Ingressos fiscals
Poder adquisitiu
Auditoria fiscal
Tax evasion
Internal revenue
Purchasing power
Tax auditing
Issue Date: Apr-2017
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: The standard expected utility (EUT) model of tax evasion predicts that evasion is decreasing in the marginal tax rate (the Yitzhaki puzzle). Recent literature shows cases in which incorporating prospect theory (PT) does and does not overturn the Puzzle. In a general environment that nests both PT and EUT preferences, we provide a detailed study of how the elements of PT affect the Puzzle. PT does not always reverse the Puzzle, hence we give and interpret conditions for when it does and does not. When allowing for stigma and/or variable audit probability, PT reverses the Puzzle in the same way and with the same limitations as does EUT, if equally augmented.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9581-9
It is part of: Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 82, num. 4, p. 543-565
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/118700
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9581-9
ISSN: 0040-5833
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

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