Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Abstract:||Imagination and Convention by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone is a sustained attack on a standard piece of contemporary philosophical lore, Grice's (1975) theory of conversational implicatures, and on indirect meanings in general. Although I agree with quite a lot of what they say, and with some important aspects of their theoretical stance, here I will respond to some of their criticism. I'll assume a characterization of implicatures as theory-neutral as possible, on which implicatures are a sort of indirectly conveyed meanings, illustrated by some traditional examples. Then I will discuss the claim that one can make an assertion indirectly, through a mechanism essentially like the one envisaged by Grice in his account of implicatures. This is something that not just L&S have argued against, but other writers as well, for more or less related reasons. Since it will be clear that assertions, the way I will characterize them, 'convey information in the usual sense' and provide 'information in the semantic sense of publicly accessible content that supports inquiry', I will be thereby arguing for a claim clearly at odds with some of those made by LΣ|
|Note:||Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20161012|
|It is part of:||Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2016, vol. 10, num. 1, p. 13-49|
|Appears in Collections:||Publicacions de projectes de recerca finançats per la UE|
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.