Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120341
Title: Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: Evidence from the US
Author: Esteller Moré, Alejandro
Solé Ollé, Albert
Keywords: Impostos
Relacions fiscals intergovernamentals
Impost sobre la renda de les persones físiques
Estats Units d'Amèrica
Taxation
Intergovernmental fiscal relations
Personal income tax
United States of America
Issue Date: 2000
Publisher: Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
Series/Report no: [WP E-IEB00/01]
Abstract: Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a result, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. A way to check the empirical relevance of this hypothesis is to test for the existence of interdependencies in the tax setting behaviour of various layers of government. Following this approach, this paper estimates the reaction of U.S. state personal income and general sales taxes to federal tax rates, taking into account the special features of the U.S. tax system. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions
It is part of: IEB Working Paper 2000/01
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120341
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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