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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263| Title: | Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees |
| Author: | Cerrone, Claudia Manna, Ester |
| Keywords: | Motivació del personal Incentius laborals Selecció de personal Employee motivation Incentives in industry Employee selection |
| Issue Date: | 2018 |
| Publisher: | Walter de Gruyter |
| Abstract: | Heterogeneity in intrinsic motivation affects the optimal contract offered to employees in teams. Under individual incentives, the effort exerted by both motivated and selfish employees is distorted. This distortion is mitigated if employees receive a wage based on team performance. As a result, the principal prefers to use team incentives, while motivated employees are better off with individual incentives. |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190 |
| It is part of: | The BE Journal Of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, num. 1, p. 1-8 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/121263 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190 |
| ISSN: | 1935-1682 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 679723.pdf | 268.23 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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