Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Information in the Parking Market
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Gragera Lladó, Albert
Keywords: Aparcaments
Control de preus
Planificació del transport
Parking garages
Price control
Transportation planning
Issue Date: Jul-2018
Publisher: University of Bath
Abstract: The main focus of the literature on the economics of parking has been on the cruising-for-parking externality and garage market power. However, all studies to date assume the existence of perfect information. Yet, imperfect information may well arise as drivers: (1) may not be aware of all the options available in their choice set; and (2) lack the information required to evaluate them, thus exacerbating the aforementioned distortions. We provide compelling evidence for the existence of information frictions in this market by examining the case of Barcelona, and we test whether users' lack of knowledge translates into undesirable market outcomes.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2018, vol. 52, num. 3, p. 322-342
ISSN: 0022-5258
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
681074.pdf2.84 MBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.