Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names
Author: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Keywords: Filosofia del llenguatge
Filosofia analítica
Referència (Filosofia)
Noms propis
Philosophy of language
Analysis (Philosophy)
Reference (Philosophy)
Proper names
Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873
Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925
Kripke, Saul A., 1940-
Issue Date: 24-Aug-2018
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract: This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation¿which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take names to express¿depends on acts of naming with a semantic significance. Acts of naming create particular words specifically designed for referential use, which they perform whether or not the language has other words articulated with the same sound or orthography. Like other forms of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view affords responses to Kripke's semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism. The view is prima facie more complex than predicativism; but the additional complexity is independently attested in natural languages and well-motivated. Finally, the Mill-Frege proposal deals well with Kripke's modal argument, and accounts for modal intuitions about names, both issues that pose serious trouble to predicativism.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Mind, 2018, vol. 127 , num. 508, p. 1107-1168
Related resource:
ISSN: 0026-4423
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
673166.pdf547.29 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.