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Title: Politics, risk, and white elephants in infrastructure PPPs
Author: Albalate, Daniel, 1980-
Bel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
Gragera Lladó, Albert
Keywords: Risc (Economia)
Variables (Matemàtica)
Tàctiques polítiques
Variables (Mathematics)
Practical politics
Issue Date: Jun-2019
Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Abstract: Theoretical research on cooperation between public and private partners in infrastructure projects suggests that they can be a tool for preventing white elephants. However, various case studies suggest that actual outcomes are largely dependent on the effective transfer of operational risk to the private partner. This paper explores policy and planning dysfunction, and the idea that private entities that participate in public-private partnerships (PPPs) with no substantial risk transfer, and under heavily subsidized schemes, may engage in lobbying and exert pressure to develop white elephant projects.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Utilities Policy, 2019, vol. 58, num. June, p. 158-165
Related resource:
ISSN: 0957-1787
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

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