Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/147399
Title: Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law
Author: Marques, Teresa
Keywords: Filosofia del dret
Contextualisme (Filosofia)
Philosophy of law
Contextualism (Philosophy)
Issue Date: Feb-2019
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract: Dworkin’s famous argument from legal disagreements poses a problem for legal positivism by undermining the idea that the law can be (just) the result of the practice and attitudes of norm-applying officials. In recent work, the chapter author argued that a hybrid contextualist theory paired with a dispositional theory of value—a hybrid dispositionalism, for short—offers the resources to respond to similar disagreement- based arguments in other evaluative and normative domains. This chapter claims that the theory the author advocates can extend to legal statements and disputes, and shares some important features with Toh’s (2011) idea that legal statements express shared acceptance of norms. The chapter proposes that a contextualist semantics for legal statements paired with the pragmatic communication of implicatures that express shared acceptances of norms, achieves the same goal that Toh aims at.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190640408.003.0012
It is part of: Capítol 12 del llibre: David Plunkett, Scott J. Shapiro, and Kevin Toh. Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press. February 2019. ISBN: 9780190640408. http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190640408.001.0001
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/147399
Appears in Collections:Llibres / Capítols de llibre (Filosofia)
Publicacions de projectes de recerca finançats per la UE

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