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Title: Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge
Author: Palmira, Michele
Keywords: Teoria (Filosofia)
Teoria del coneixement
Theory (Philosophy)
Theory of knowledge
Issue Date: 20-Sep-2018
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract: Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018, vol. 118, num. 3, p. 377-385
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ISSN: 0066-7374
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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