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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/149141
Title: | Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge |
Author: | Palmira, Michele |
Keywords: | Teoria (Filosofia) Teoria del coneixement Theory (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge |
Issue Date: | 20-Sep-2018 |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Abstract: | Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only. |
Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019 |
It is part of: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018, vol. 118, num. 3, p. 377-385 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/149141 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019 |
ISSN: | 0066-7374 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
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