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Title: A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
Author: Atay, Ata
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Assignació de recursos
Competència econòmica
Presa de decisions (Estadística)
Matemàtica financera
Resource allocation
Statistical decision
Business mathematics
Issue Date: Mar-2019
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Abstract: We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, num. March, p. 10-14
Related resource:
ISSN: 0165-4896
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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