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Title: Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs
Author: Atay, Ata
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Assignació de recursos
Equilibri (Economia)
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Resource allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Abstract: We consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c) the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of all its pairs that belong to connected sectors. We provide a sufficient condition on the weights to guarantee balancedness of the related multi-sided assignment game. Moreover, when the graph on the sectors is cycle-free, we prove the game is strongly balanced and the core is fully described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with the edges of this graph. As a consequence, the complexity of the computation of an optimal matching is reduced and existence of optimal core allocations for each sector of the market is guaranteed.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Annals of Operations Research, 2019, vol. 279, num. 1-2, p. 271-290
ISSN: 0254-5330
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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