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Title: Sneaky Assertions
Author: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Keywords: Filosofia del llenguatge
Semàntica (Filosofia)
Philosophy of language
Semantics (Philosophy)
Issue Date: 31-Dec-2018
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Abstract: Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Philosophical Perspectives, 2018, vol. 32, num. 1, p. 188-218
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ISSN: 1520-8583
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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