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Title: A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
Author: Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Rafels, Carles
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Keywords: Economia matemàtica
Assignació d'actius
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Asset allocation
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: Mar-2020
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Abstract: We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism: simultaneously, each buyer requests to the seller a package by announcing how much he would pay for it; once buyers have played, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices, as long as this assignment makes no buyer worse off than with his initial request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a:
It is part of: Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, vol. 87, num. March, p. 6-14
Related resource:
ISSN: 0304-4068
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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