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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537
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dc.contributor.authorMartínez de Albéniz, F. Javier-
dc.contributor.authorRafels, Carles-
dc.contributor.authorYbern, Neus-
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-31T11:22:55Z-
dc.date.available2023-03-31T05:10:23Z-
dc.date.issued2020-03-
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/154537-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.-
dc.format.extent10 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherElsevier-
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.001-
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, num. March, p. 144-153-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.001-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2020-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es-
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de conjunts-
dc.subject.classificationLògica matemàtica-
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions-
dc.subject.otherGame theory-
dc.subject.otherSet theory-
dc.subject.otherMathematical logic-
dc.subject.otherDecision making-
dc.titleAssortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec695302-
dc.date.updated2020-03-31T11:22:55Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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