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Title: Opacity, know-how states, and their content
Author: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Keywords: Teoria del coneixement
Filosofia de la ment
Theory of knowledge
Philosophy of mind
Issue Date: 2-Jun-2015
Publisher: Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: Disputatio, 2015, vol. 7, num. 40, p. 61-83
ISSN: 0873-626X
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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