Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/161648
Title: | Opacity, know-how states, and their content |
Author: | Toribio Mateas, Josefa |
Keywords: | Teoria del coneixement Filosofia de la ment Theory of knowledge Philosophy of mind |
Issue Date: | 2-Jun-2015 |
Publisher: | Universidade de Lisboa |
Abstract: | The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.disputatio.letras.ulisboa.pt/archive/ |
It is part of: | Disputatio, 2015, vol. 7, num. 40, p. 61-83 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/161648 |
ISSN: | 0873-626X |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
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