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Title: Parties getting impatient: Time out of office and portfolio allocation in coalition governments
Author: Falcó Gimeno, Albert
Keywords: Governs de coalició
Gestió de cartera
Coalition governments
Portfolio management
Issue Date: 29-Feb-2012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: This article argues that long periods out of office make parties impatient and more willing to make concessions over portfolio allocation in exchange for participation in a coalition cabinet. Two hypotheses are analysed: on the one hand, being in opposition for a long time should put parties at a disadvantage when bargaining over office payoffs. On the other, this effect should not apply to the formateur party, since formation offers are based on the receivers' impatience. The empirical results largely support these expectations. Additional evidence of the causality of the main effect is obtained through the use of matching techniques based on the propensity score.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: British Journal of Political Science, 2012, vol. 42, num. 2, p. 393-411
Related resource:
ISSN: 0007-1234
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Ciència Política, Dret Constitucional i Filosofia del Dret)

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