Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Reference without Cognition
Author: Martí, Genoveva
Keywords: Filosofia del llenguatge
Noms propis
Philosophy of language
Proper names
Issue Date: Apr-2015
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract: This chapter criticizes the view, recently defended by David Kaplan and others, that uses of proper names semantically refer to their bearers in virtue of speakers’ having the referents in mind. It is argued that grounding semantic reference in cognition is contrary to the tenets that Kaplan himself contributed to establish in the revolution against descriptivism and internalism in semantics. It is argued also that the having in mind of an object is neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to refer to its bearer. The criticisms lead to a reflection on the institution of naming and to a positive proposal: an externalist view, on which referring with uses of names requires that speakers join systematic, not necessarily social, linguistic practices.
Note: Versió preprint del capítol de llibre publicat a: https://10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.003.0005
It is part of: Capítol del llibre: Andrea Bianchi. 2015. On Reference. Oxford Scholarship Online. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.001.0001. ISBN: 9780198714088
Appears in Collections:Llibres / Capítols de llibre (Filosofia)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
292496.pdf201.64 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.